creative commons
COMMONS DEED

th po-Wrongd-Ground **2.0** Han Min

Under the conditions of the Lens-Sfor cr

- wa , cann, transfdispl, perfor We can send it .

Same as It should be :

th po. Original to It should be done

Wrongd Done wa Lee I can't .

Ground . Done wa , Mould Or Cannot Process .

- Done , wa l ca sir , Enemies Be Conditions It should be clearly indicated .
- th site Permitted cott These It won't be .

th Ern We By incense It doesn't .

thi Lee m (Legal Code) Hai easily What is In the

Disclaimer

dCollection

Ph.D. Thesis in Diplomacy

The Formation of the Republic of Korea as a Fragile Country (1945-50)

Nation-State Building of the Republic of Korea(1945-50): Formation of the Vulnerable State

August 2012

Graduate School of
Seoul National
University

Department
of
Diplomacy

The Formation Process of the Republic of Korea as a Vulnerable Country
(1945-50)

Advisor Professor Choi Jung Woon

Submitted this thesis as a doctoral dissertation in diplomacy

August 2012

Seoul National
University, Graduate

School of Foreign

Relations, Taeksun

Lee

Approved Lee's doctoral dissertation

July 2012

top won			
chief Ha	Park	Sang Sup	(phosphorus)
Young Sun	Kim	Yong office	(phosphorus)
(phosphorus)	Shin	Wook Hee	(phosphorus)
deputy chief	Choi	Jung luck	(phosphorus)
Distal Distal won			

Korean Abstract

The Formation of the Republic of Korea as a Fragile Country (1945-50)

This study aims to provide an alternative explanation for the reality of the 1945-50 U.S. military regime and the formation of the Korean state during the First Republic through the theory of the fragile state, a new theory that replaces orthodoxy and revisionism. The theory of the fragile state identifies the process of state construction as the result of the interaction between resources, and defines it as the formation of a new country in the Third World = human, material, economic, and ideological resources + international political relations + domestic politics through the union of a mediator who mediates the interrelationship between various resources and international political resources.

Shortly after experiencing 36 years of Japanese imperialist domination, Korea during the U.S. military regime lacked sufficient support from the U.S. and lacked all resources, creating a vulnerable state with primitive vulnerability. Meanwhile, in September 1946, a de facto civil war began by leftist forces. The U.S. increased its support around July 1947, but it was difficult to overcome its vulnerability. The reality of a vulnerable state was repeated even after the establishment of the Republic of Korea. In the process of the sudden decision to build the Republic of Korea amid continued fragility, the centrist forces opposed the nation-building process, thus failing to fully absorb the nationalist righteousness from the birth of the nation. On the other hand, as in the case of the Jeju 4.3 incident, this has become a pretext for leftist forces to accuse the Republic of Korea of building an anti-nationalist state that relies on the United States, which is trying to colonize Korea after Japan, and thus the reality of the vulnerable country continues to become entangled.

Therefore, the Republic of Korea has made efforts to overcome the limitations of a vulnerable state, including nationalistic vulnerability, from an early stage. First, it tried to gain legitimacy of the Provisional Government through the Constitution and the formation of the first Cabinet, and attempted to liquidate the pro-Japanese faction through the Anti-National Special Committee. However, the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents led to a national security crisis. As national security emerged as the top priority for the survival of the state, all means were taken to save the country, transcending laws and ethics, and the National Security Law was enacted and the Anti-People Special Committee was disbanded. At the same time, while the government continued to allow Japanese bureaucrats to remain in the government, right-wing youth organizations were involved in policing and national defense, and the state mobilized the resources it lacked from the private sector through its ideological resource of illicitism. In addition, officers from the Japanese army were deployed in earnest to defend the borders and subdue the partisans. However, this provided an excuse for leftist forces to reinforce their propaganda that the Republic of Korea was in the process of building an anti-nationalist state. As a result, the state, which judged itself to be unable to absorb nationalism, became conscious of its vulnerability and tended to exercise excessive state power in order to deliberately conceal its lack of capabilities, which led to the state being seen by the people as tyrannical and oppressive, thus undermining political legitimacy and ideological resources such as nationalism.
All of them.

Nonetheless, the First Republic, led by the mediator-like consul Rhee Seung-man, promoted land reform and compulsory education in elementary schools. Through this, it was possible to cultivate a new capitalist class to replace the traditional landlord class, centered on the refugee from the North, to compensate for the lack of material and economic resources and to increase the people's sense of belonging to the state. In addition, the centrists who observed this participated in the nation-building process in earnest through the election of the 2nd National Assembly, thus restoring political legitimacy and the ideological resources of nationalism. Shortly before the outbreak of

the Korean War, the country was emerging from the stage of collapse, with the rebellion almost suppressed and the fiscal balance achieved.

However, even after the Korean War, when everything was destroyed and the twin tasks of economic development and national security had to be achieved, the state did not fully absorb nationalism and proceeded with nation-building. And in the process, the vicious cycle of replenishing the most urgent resources and then having to be supplemented by another resource is repeated, and the country is still stuck in the reality of a vulnerable state. The fact that these processes continued to take a slightly different form in each period was the dynamic nature of the fragile state.

Key Words : Vulnerable State, Resources, Modern State, Nationalism, State Organization

craneNo.: 2005-30940

<Table of Contents>

I. 서 론 ---- 1
1. 문제의 제기 ---- 1
2. 기존연구 ---- 3
3. 취약국가론 ---- 34
4.연구의 구성과 사료 ---- 50
가. 연구의 구성 ---- 50
나. 연구사료 ---- 52

II. ----------

Nation-building by the U.S. military 59

1. Police 94
2. Armed Forces 107
3. Finance and Tax Organization 117

III. The ---------- 126
beginning of ---------- 130
the civil war ---------- 137
(1946-48) ---------- 142
1. Labor ---------- 161
disputes ---------- 165
and strikes
2. Left-wing uprisings of September and October 1946
3. Left-wing and right-wing youth organizations
4. Constituent Assembly elections and incense
5. Jeju 4.3 Incident

IV. Building the Republic of Korea (1) 171
1. Police 192
2. Army 199
3. Finance and Tax Organization 217
V. 대한민국의 국가건설 (2) 228
1. 제헌헌법 234
2. 반민족특별위원회 246
3. 여수, 순천사건 255
4. 국가보안법과 일민주의 266
5. 토지개혁 273
6. 초등학교 국가의무교육 288
7. 중도파의 국가건설참여 293
8. 국가성의 획득과 기획처 300
VI. Conclusion 305
References 334

<Table of Contents>

Table II-1) Changes in the size of the U.S. tactical military and military administration personnel from 1945-47 63 Table II-2) Number of schools, teachers, and students during the U.S. military regime 74 Table II-3) Education and experience of high-ranking Korean officials during the U.S. military period 77-81 Table II-4) U.S. Military Administration Personnel Status 83 Table II-5) Scale of U.S. Military Period's Aid to Korea 84 Table II-6) U.S. Military Period's Police Expenses 95 106 ~ 107
Table II-7) Increase in U.S. Military Police Force (1948-50)
Table II-8) U.S. Military Period's Defense Expenditures 108
Table II-9) The size of the army during the U.S. military administration 108 Table II-10) Graduation Status of Military English Schools 112 Table II-11) Increase in the number of South Korean National Defense Guard personnel by date in 1948 114 117 ~ 118
Table II-12) U.S. Military Revenue Structure (1946-1948)
Table II-13) Proportion of Aid Imports in Total Imports and Exports 119 Table II-14) Occupation Costs of the U.S. Military Government 123 Table II-15) Cost of National Construction 124～125

Table III-1) Comparison of the step-by-step classification of Sun Woo Jong-won, Kim Joo-gon, Yoo Jae-heung, and John Merrill 127

Table III-2) Comparison of Free Market U.S. Prices and Government Purchases in 1945-49 131-132 Table III-3) Labor Disputes in the U.S. Military Periods 134 Table III-4) Number of Sub-Requirements by Type of U.S. Military Periods 135-136 Table III-5) Statistics of Strikes Relating to the National Council of Korean Trade Unions 136-137 Table III-6) Trends in Major Left Youth Organizations from 1945-50 144-147 Table III-7) Trends in Major Right-Wing Youth Organizations from 1945-50 148-154

Table III-8) Amount of damage during the election period 162～164

Table IV-1) List of First Cabinets of the First Republic Table IV-2) Police Expenditures at the Beginning of the First Republic Table IV-3) Communist Guerrilla and Partisan Activities Before the Korean War Table IV-4) Defense Expenditures of the First Republic Table IV-5) Comparison of the salaries of military officers in the Republic of Korea and North Korea Table IV-6) Troop buildup in South Korea and North Korea Table IV-7) Comparison of the size and armament of the North and South in September 1949 206-207 Table IV-8) General account revenues for 1948-49 218-219 Table IV-9) U.S. Military Aid Recipients 222 Table IV-10) 1950 176～179 192 195～196 200 201 204

ECA (Economic Cooperation Agency) Budget for Economic Assistance to Korea 224-225

Table V-1) Main Contents of ---------- 235
the Constitution of the U.S. ---------- 240
Military Regime Table V-2) ---------- 256～257
Distribution of seats in the ---------- 278～279
Constituent Assembly (1948- ---------- 280～281
50) Table V-3) Development ---------- 281
of the Yeosu and Suncheon Incidents Table V-4)
Survey of large landowners with more than 500
seats Harvest Table V-5) Changes in Landlords
and Tenant Lands Table V-6) 1945-49 Changes
in Farmhouse Lakes by Viscount and Tenant

Table VI-1) Seven Stages of Formation of a Vulnerable State
---------- 307
Table VI-2) Human, Physical, Economic, Ideological, and International Political Resources from August 1945 to July 1950
---------- 307～315
Table VI-3) U.S. Military Administration: Early Years of the First Republic and the Rand Institute Standard Model Comparison of State Construction Funds and Manpower Inputs between Countries 316-318
Table VI-4) State-Building in Non-Western States in the Post-Modern Period 321

I. Introduction

1. Raising the issue

The theme of this study is the formation of the state apparatus from 1945-50.

It is the process of establishing a modern state in the Republic of Korea. The process of the establishment of the Republic of Korea has been covered many times since it is a very important research topic that has become the prototype for almost all fields such as politics, economy, society, and culture that we currently have. In order to explain this, the Korean national theory studies, which have been centered on orthodoxy and revisionism, have raised various issues related to the establishment of the Korean state in their own way using new theories introduced from Western academia.

Nonetheless, both orthodox and revisionist discussions fail to adequately explain the reality of Korea in the 1945-50 period, and each has its own limitations and problems, and the reality of the recurring confrontation between the two parties is repeated. Therefore, this study aims to review the validity of the existing discussions on the process of national family formation in Korea, focusing on the orthodox and revisionist discussions, and to propose a third new theory to replace these theories.

This study will avoid adding another study that examines the process of Korean state formation in a theoretical way, focusing on the explanation of Western theory, as many previous studies have done. Rather, the purpose of this study is to accurately recognize the actual process of nation-building in Korea and to create a new theory that can provide a clear and specific explanation of the reality of Korea, which could not be clearly explained by existing theories. Through this, we

aim to encompass as much as possible the problematic consciousness of the research on various topics that have been developed in a complex way with different terminology and explanations, and to present a completely new level of theory that can be understood by many people.

As will be discussed in detail in the existing research section, the countries that have been developed so far

Internal and external discussions show that:

First, the discussions on the Korean state-forming process have revolved around orthodoxy and revisionism. Revisionism, which emerged in earnest in the 1980s, challenged orthodoxy, which had been in absolute authority since the Korean War. However, since the 1990s, fundamental questions and criticisms have been raised about the relevance of the revisionist theory of the state, even from within, and it has reached a point where it is inevitable to propose an alternative. In addition, the orthodox theory of the state has not been able to provide a clear explanation of the various issues raised by revisionism and has not secured its position as a dominant discourse as before, so it has not re-emerged as a definite alternative to revisionism.

Second, therefore, this study is a new alternative to orthodoxy and revisionism.

I would like to propose a theoretical alternative. And to this end, Neo-Beverian examines the actual construction process of the modern state, focusing on the core state institutions.

I would like to use the Neo-Weberian perspective as a theoretical basis.

However, as mentioned above, the research on Korean national theory so far has been

It was limited to a theoretical review that introduced new theories of the old and failed to proceed with an in-depth analysis that fits the reality of Korea. Therefore, this study also aims to create a completely new

theory that meets the reality of Korea by taking only theoretical implications rather than making the mistake of adding theoretically examined studies using the recent neo-Beverian study as the main theoretical framework.

Third, to this end, this study examines the process of building a modern state using various resources.

After examining the results of the interactions, we will examine how these resources have influenced the Korean nation-building process through key state institutions.

Fourth, by providing a completely different dimension of explanation from the existing theories through the new theory, we will present a more detailed and clear conclusion that can encompass all the universalities and particularities found in the process of Korean nation-building, as well as the character, essence, and capabilities of the Korean state, which the existing theories have sought to ilucidate.

Lastly, the analysis of the study assumes a period of 1945-50. Until now, existing studies have mainly covered the period from just before the inauguration of the First Republic in August 1948 to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. However, if we cover only the period up to 15 August 1948, just before the inauguration of the First Republic, the period of 1948-50 is omitted. In addition, since the period after the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 would include too large an element of war and would lead to an excessive expansion of the scope and subject of the study, we decided to set 1945-50 as the period of the study.

All of them.

2. Existing Research

The domestic theory of the state is a debate between orthodoxy and revisionism over the nature of the state.

It emerged from the very beginning of the full-fledged discussion of the theory of the state. In other words, in the international political environment of the Cold War, a debate developed between orthodoxy, which recognized the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea, which established the first modern nation-state after liberation, and revisionism, which emphasized the class and oppressive character of the Republic of Korea, from the standpoint of the Marxist theory of the state, which defined the state as an executive committee serving the interests of the bourgeoisie[1]. Lee Wan-beom has nationalist views, especially right-wing and conservative, He points out that if studies written from an anti-communist standpoint are orthodox, then studies that tend to organize and edit history from a left-wing and innovative standpoint are revisionist.[2] In this study, we will discuss numerous Korean national theories that have developed both domestically and internationally.

At the risk of mere generalizations, I would like to summarize the debate between orthodoxy and revisionism. First of all, orthodoxy is based on the division of the Korean Peninsula and the Korean War from the standpoint of political and diplomatic history.

It emphasizes the responsibility of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of North Korea for the conflict. They actively defend that national

---

[1])Karl Marx, Capital Volume III : A Critique of Political Economy (London: Penguin Books, 1981).

[2])이완범,"해방 전후사 연구 10 년의 현황과 자료,", 한승조 외 공저,『해방 전후사의 쟁점과 평가 1』,(서울: 형성출판사, 1990), pp. 57.

security was the most important of the many tasks of nation-building since the Soviet Union and internal communists had hindered nation-building since the beginning of the U.S. military occupation and the Republic of Korea, and that the Republic of Korea, which succeeded in establishing the first modern state of the Korean nation in the midst of such adversity, retains the character and legitimacy of a people's state. In this context, we support the position of Modernization Theory, which emphasizes the positive role that foreign powers such as the United States have played in Korea's development through the capitalist economic order, the introduction of a new political and administrative system, and economic aid. In addition, it emphasizes the autonomous power that the state secures over society through a centralized system, etc., and denies that the state is dominated by a specific force.

Representative studies that have examined the history of Korean state-formation in the 1945-50 period by adopting the orthodox perspective are the description of concrete facts and events in the context of political and diplomatic history.

Cho Soon-seung[3] and Seo Dae-sook[4], Robert Scalapino and Lee Jeong-sik[5], and Gregory Henderson, [6]Grant Meade[7], Kim Un-tae[8][9], and Han Bae-ho[10], who examined this from the perspective of political administration, institutions, and national security.

From the standpoint of political development, Kim Un-tae argues that the era of the US military administration is a major part of modern Korean politics The basic structure of administration, the direction of governance, and all the archetypes of the economy, society, and culture are formed Identify it as a holy time. Furthermore, he assumes that the Korean state has traditionally exercised centralized control over society, and expands his research area to the Goryeo period, demonstrating the contribution of political institutions and bureaucracies introduced from abroad to the dimensionality of historical continuity.

Han Bae-ho points out that the First Republic in the period from the U.S. military administration to the period before the Korean War was in a state of chaos dominated by political, economic, and social turmoil and extreme insecurity created by direct and indirect threats from a communist North Korea, and he applies Harold Laswell's theory of the

---

[3])Cho Soon Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 : an Evaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley : Univ. of California Press, 1967).

[4])Suh, Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1967).

[5])Robert A Scalapino & Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1986).

[6])Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Harvard University Press; 1978).

[7])Grant E, Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York : King's Crown, 1951).

[8])김운태, 『미군정의 한국통치』, (서울: 박영사, 1992); 김운태, 『고려정치 제도와 관료제』,(서울: 박영사,

[9]).

[10])한배호. "서론: 제 1 공화국의 정치체제,", 한배호 (편) 『한국현대정치론 I: 제 1 공화국의 국가형성, 정치과정, 정책』,(서울: 오름, 2000).

Garrison State[11]. He describes the First Republic after the Korean War as a kind of "military state" in which national security emerged as the top priority of the state and the military was superior in all aspects, and pointed out that in such an environment, the help of the United States was inevitable and had a positive effect on the survival of the nation.

In addition to this, the situation from the time of liberation to the Korean War was largely staged in the first stage. (1945-1946), the second stage (1946-1947) (the period in which legitimate political struggle and illegal violent struggle coexisted), and the third stage (1948-1950)[12] (the period of violent struggle) had a great influence on the work of Sasaki Harudaka and John Meril, who argued that a de facto civil war broke out during the founding of the Republic of Korea, which led to a great national security crisis until just before the Korean War[1314]. By the way, Orthodox studies have stalled for the following reasons, paving the way for the emergence of revisionism. First, Jeon Sang-sang points out that orthodoxy in Korea can often be found in state textbooks and government propaganda materials before the 1980s, and by placing all the blame for the division and the cause of the Korean War on the Communists, he criticizes the atmosphere before the 1980s, when there was no room for criticism of the legitimacy of the founding of the country and the role of the United States, as a gross dereliction of duty by the Korean academic community.[15He] also points out that the fundamental

---

[11])Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State,", The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jan., 1941), pp. 455-468

[12])김점곤, 『한국전쟁과 노동당전략』 (서울: 박영사, 1973).

[13])사사끼 하루다까, 강창구 편역. 『한국전비사』 (서울: 병학사, 1977).

[14])John R. Meril, Korea-The Peninsular Origins of the War, (New York: University of Delaware Press, 1989).

[15])전상인, "고개 숙인'수정주의,", 유영익 편, 『수정주의와 한국현대사』,(서울: 연세대학교 출판부, 1998), pp. 263-264.

limitations of orthodox studies that led to the focus on one-size-fits-all technology hiding behind the Cold War ideological shield with an anti-communist, security, and ideological-centered perspective served as the foundation for the growth of revisionism.[16Korean] orthodoxy, which remained in a state of theoretical stagnation and focused on historical narratives centered on facts and events, has been in the U.S. National Archives since 1977.

The disclosure of secret documents from the National Archives, more than 25 years old, highlighting the U.S. responsibility for the Cold War, has led to a crisis. However, existing orthodox studies have faced criticism for failing to respond quickly to revisionist studies based on a wide range of newly released documents, and for failing to conduct research based on objective data.

Revisionism refers to the New Left movement to critically reinterpret historical facts based on Marxism or Neo-Marxism, which argues that the Soviet Union stuck to a bloc ruled by socialists in Eastern Europe because the U.S. government threatened the Soviet socialist economic system with its capitalist need to expand markets and investment opportunities.[17)] Korean revisionist writings that accepted this position also focused on the faults of the United States and South Korean right-wing forces rather than the Soviet Union and North Korea, and negatively evaluated the founding of the Republic of Korea.

In other words, they emphasized the oppressive nature and class nature of the state based on ideological premonitions based on Marxism, arguing that

[16])전상인, "고개 숙인수정주의: 한국현대사 연구의 새로운 출발,", 전상인, 『고개 숙인 수정주의: 한국현대사 의 역사사회학』,(서울: 전통과 현대, 2001), pp. 415-416.

[17])William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland : World Pub. Co, 1959).

the Korean state was thoroughly subordinate to the interests of Japan, the United States, and the ruling class, and existed to serve them.

In addition, the study of revisionism in Korea became public through the theory of the fascist state, which emerged through Bruce Cummings and the debate on social constructs, and came to suppress the orthodoxy that had been the dominant discourse until the previous period. First, in the mid to late 1970s, the theory of national economy emerged, which raised a fundamental critique of the character of the Park Chung-hee regime, which pursued the values of Western-style modernization, national security, and economic development. From the end of 1979 to the early and mid-1980s, the Pusan and Masan uprisings and the May 18 Gwangju Democracy Movement raised the urgent need to accurately define the essence of the state and to clarify the political system and industrialization pursued by the military regime. Accordingly, neo-Marxist theories of the state, which were actively developed abroad at the time, were introduced in order to study the state in earnest, and as a result of these efforts, the Portrait of the History of the Post-Liberation Period, which began to be published,[18] and the fascist theory of the state, which was born out of the debate on social constructs in 1986, combined with Cummings' writings, led to the emergence of revisionist discourse in Korean society in earnest.

---

[18])이는 송건호, 강만길, 박현채, 최장집 등이 중심이 되어 1979 년부터 출판되기 시작했고 그 목록은 다음과 같다. 송건호 외,『해방 전후사의 인식 1: 미군정과 민족분단, 친일. 반민족 세력의 실상과 해방직후의 경 제구조』,(서울: 한길사, 1979). 강만길 외,『해방 전후사의 인식 2』,(서울: 한길사, 1985), 박현채 외, 『해방 전후사의 인식 3: 정치·사회운동의 혁명적 전개와 사상적 노선』,(서울: 한길사, 1987), 최장집 외, 『해방 전후사의 인식 4: 민중항쟁. 무장투쟁. 문화예술운동. 한국전쟁의 해명』,(서울: 한길사, 1989), 김 남식 외,『해방 전후사의 인식 5: 북한의 혁명전통.인민정권의 수립과 반제 반봉건 민주주의 혁명과정
』,(서울: 한길사, 1989), 박명림 외, 『해방 전후사의 인식 6: 쟁점과 과제 』,(서울: 한길사, 1989),

Of course, the theory of invasion of the North and the theory of responsibility of the South existed through the testimonies and writings of long-term partisan prisoners who had previously been engaged in the leftist movement, and the seeds of revisionism were sprouting in combination with the works published abroad.[19] However, Kim Dong-chun points out that in South Korea, where far-right anti-communism has ruled, revisionist views have taken hold in the public arena, making it virtually impossible to refute orthodoxy.[19] First, Cummings applied Marx's hierarchy of the state to international relations, establishing the hierarchy between states as central, peripheral, and semi-periphery, based on the economy.

Wallerstein's World System Theory[20] was used to explain the relationship between Korea, the United States, and Japan.[21] Next, Barrington Moore's study of the political potential of the peasants in the course of the revolution of the 20th century (22) can be applied to Korea, and the basis and conditions for the social revolution in South Korea at the time of liberation

---

Frank Fleming) published The Cold War and Its Origins (1917-1960) and turned it into a scholarly study. This led to the theory of inducing the invasion of South Korea through the research of David Conde, who claimed that South Korea provoked the Korean War, and Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, who argued that North Korea's invasion of the South was induced by MacArthur in collusion with Rhee Seung-man based on a revisionist interpretation of U.S. foreign policy in general. Later, Robert R. Simmons, It was Bruce Cummings and Jon Halliday who compiled the revisionist studies of Korea that led to John Merill and others. For a detailed discussion, see Isidor. F Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly

[19])커밍스 이전의 수정주의 담론들은 다음과 같이 전개되어졌다. 일찍이 미국의 언론인 스톤(Isidore F. Stone)이 1952 년에 발간한『한국전쟁비사: The Hidden History of the Korean War』를 통해 한국전 쟁이 맥아더, 이승만, 장개석, 덜레스 간의 음모에 의해 빚어진 전쟁이라고 주장하면서 소련이 한국전쟁 을 사주했다는 정통주의 해석에 의문을 제기한 것을 시작으로, 1961 년에는 역사학자 플레밍(Denna

Review Press 1952) ; Written by I.F. Stoun; Translated by Paek Apocrypha, The Korean War (Seoul: Shinhaksa, 1988); Denna Frank Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960 (New York : Doubleday, 1961); D·コンデ著; 岡倉古志郎 監譯 現代朝鮮史(An Untold History of Modern Korea) (東京: 太平出版社, 1972). ; Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power (New York: Harper& Row. 1972); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, "The Liberation of America and Korea," Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, Revisiting Contemporary Korean History (Seoul: Stone Pillow, 1982); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko. "U.S. Global Strategy and the Korean War," in Kim Joo-hwan, ed. U.S. Global Strategy and the Korean War, (Seoul: Cheongsa, 1989); Gabriel Kolko, "International Political Dynamics and Postwar Processing," by Bruce Cummings et al. 『Division

Postwar Contemporary History, (Seoul: Ilwol Seogak, 1983) ; Robert Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peiking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press,

1975); Robert R. Symonds. "Regional Integration: Korea and Japan in U.S. Policy toward Asia," in Frank Baldwin, ed., Contemporary Korean History: 1945-1975 (Seoul: Four Seasons, 1984); Written by J.R. Merrill; Translated by Shin Sung Hwan. "Invasion or Liberation War?" (Seoul: Science and Thought; 1988).

[19] Kim Dong-chun, War and Society, (Seoul: Stone Pillow, 2000).

20) Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) ; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World Economy: The State, the Movements, the Civilizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

21) Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War volume I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); Bruce Cummings, translated by Kim Jung-won. The Origins of the Korean War, (Seoul: Ilwol Seogak, 2001), pp.35.

[20]In[21] order to deny Gregory Handerson's explanation that the highly centralized Korean state was also powerful in relation to society, James Palais' explanation of the late Joseon Dynasty state was dominated by the privileged sarim (士林[2223] to argue that the Korean state was traditionally a class state dominated by privileged local classes.[25]

---

[20])Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[21])Cumings, 2001, pp.47-48.

[22])James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1975).

[23])Cumings, 2001, pp.38-40.

Finally, Cummings introduced Hamza Alavi's theory of the "over-developed state" from Nicos Poulantzas, who developed[24] Marx's explanation that exceptional forms of the state can emerge in a chaotic state like the Charles Louis Napoléon Bonaparte regime[2526,] and applied it to Pakistan and Bangladesh.[28] According to Poulantzas, late colonial society is a servant of the central capitalist system

The pursuit of industrialization led to a change in the class structure and the rise of fascism. In other words, as the capitalist class, which had been divided into the sell-out bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, united to meet the challenges of the industrial working class, two forms of exceptional state emerged: fascism and military rule. And, since these states are sustained by the union between the bourgeoisie and the ruling class, such as the military and the bureaucracy, they have a class character.

[24])Karl Marx, “The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and Capital,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955).

[25])Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship : the Third International and the Problem of Fascism (London : Verso, 1979).

[26])Cumings, 2001, pp.365.

This is the first time that a new[27]

Hamza Alavi applied it to Pakistan and Bangladesh and proposed the theory of the mega-growth state. In his study of state formation in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Alavi points out that the domination of the country was achieved by solidarity between the indigenous bourgeoisie and the military, the bureaucracy, and the Metropolitan Bourgeois of the central capitalist state. He also argues that the state apparatus in these countries is overgrown relative to the sphere of society because these countries have inherited the powerful state apparatus of the colonial period, such as the military and administrative apparatus, which aimed to subjugate the indigenous classes after independence.[29] Revisionist studies have introduced these explanations to explain the process of Korean state-formation. First of all, unlike in the West, in colonial Korea, even before civil society was formed, overgrown state institutions with a modern bureaucracy and police force were formed and dominated society. [28] These state organs were dismantled immediately after liberation in 1945 when the newly formed People's Committees controlled about half of Korea's counties and assumed the role of government.[29] However, the U.S. military government, which had set its basic policy to stop leftist forces and foster a pro-American regime in South Korea, [30 revived the] repressive state apparatus that had been

---

[27])Hamza Alavi "The State on Post-Colonial Societies: Parkistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, Vol. 74, (Jul.-Aug 1972).

[28])Cumings, 2001, pp.41.

[29])Cumings, 2001, pp. 350.

[30])이는 알라비의 주장을 수용한 존 사울(John Saul)이 추가한 '이데올로기의 기능'을 냉전의 전개에 따른 반
공이념으로 대체한 것이다. John S, Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania,,", John S, Saul The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press,

overgrown during the colonial era in order to rule based on anti-communist ideology. Accordingly, the state apparatus such as the military and administrative apparatus was re-strengthened by the US military administration and became an over-growth state, suppressing the popular part and helping the ruling class to accumulate capital.[(33)] And, finally, under the auspices of the U.S. military government,

313233Right-wing forces such as Rhee Seung-man and the Democratic Party of Korea (MDP) came to dominate the country. [34] However, since the beginning of revisionist discourse arose from questioning the orthodox interpretation of the causes of the Korean War, the early revisionist writings did not directly address the process of state formation in Korea. Since Cummings' research also began with the identification of the causes of the Korean War, he only emphasized the class and oppressive nature of the Korean state and did not deal with the process of state formation in detail. Therefore, Cummings' explanation is connected to the Korean social construct controversy, which was developing by introducing the explanation of neo-Marxist political economy in order to identify the nature, role, and class[3536] nature of the state. I was able to equip it.

1979). 최 장집, 이성형, "한국사회의 정치 이데올로기,", 한국산업 사회 연구회 편, 『한국사회의 지배이데올로 기』,(서울: 녹두, 1991).

[31])최장집,"과대성장국가의 형성과 정치균열의 전개," 최장집, 『한국현대정치의 구조와 변화』, (서울: 까치,

[32]). pp.81-113.

[33])Cumings, 2001. pp. 364.

[34])손호철, 『한국정치의 새 구상』(서울: 풀빛, 1991).

[35])이는 1985 년 하반기 '산업사회 연구회'가 서울대의 안병직 교수를 초청하여 벌인 사회구성체 논쟁을 시작 으로 박현채와 이대근이 계간 『창작과 비평』을 통해 공개적인 사회구성체 논쟁을 벌임으로써 공론화되 었다. 이에 대한 자세한 논의는 정성기, "80 년대 한국사회구성체논쟁, 또 하나의 성찰적 재론,", 『역사비 평』 통권 71 호 (여름),(서울: 한국역사연구회, 2005), pp.34-66. 를 참조할 것.

[36])박현채, 조희연, 『한국사회구성체 논쟁 I: 80 년대 사회변동과 사회구성체 논쟁의 전개』(서울: 죽산, 1989).

Lee Byung-cheon points out that even before the debate on the Korean social structure began in 1985[37], the Park Chung-hee government, which had achieved a high level of economic growth and development centered on the ideology of national security and economic development, was criticized by the national economic theories of Park Hyun-chae and Byun Byun-yun, who defined it as colonial-subordinate capitalism. The theory of the national economy is based on the fact that the Park Chung-hee government, which accepted the status of a subordinate partner in the triangular alliance of Korea, the United States, and Japan, which was formed around the Korea-Japan Agreement in 1965, achieved a high level of economic development through export-oriented policies that relied on foreign capital and preferential support for chaebols. It was argued that it has a fundamental limitation of reproducing an uneven structure between regions and industries, exploiting and alienating the people. In addition, their discussion had a great impact on Park Hyun-chae, who is also the lead author of 『Recognizing the History of Before and After Liberation 3』, and participated in the debate on the Korean social construct.[39] The [38]debate on the Korean social construct, which began as a confrontation between Ahn Byung-jik's colonial anti-feudalism (colonial anti-capitalism)[39] and Park Hyun-chae's neo-colonial state monopoly capitalism[40], later developed into the theory of the fascist state, as

[37])노재봉은 60 년대 이후 국가가 '경제발전'과 '국가안보'의 두 가지를 이데올로기 자원으로 활용하고자 했다 고 지적한 바 있었다. 노재봉, "제 3 부 제 3 장 한국 경제개발에 따르는 정치적 cost,", 노재봉, 『사상과 실 천』, (서울: 녹두, 1985).

[38])안병직, "식민지 반 봉건 사회론의 쟁점,", 『산업사회연구』 제 1 집(1985).

[39])박현채, "제 3 부 경제구조와 사회발전론, 제 4 장 현대 한국사회의 성격과 발전단계에 관한 연구(1),"in 박현 채, 『한국경제구조론』, (서울: 일월서각, 1986).

[40])식민지 반 자본주의론은 한국 경제의 자본주의화를 인정하면서도 여전히 제국주의에 대한 매판성과 전 근 대성을 가진 반 자본주의에 불과하다고 지적한다. 신 식민지 대리통치체제론은 한국이 형식적으로만 독립 국의 모습을 지니고 있을 뿐 미국과의 일방적인 군사조약 등을 통해 미국의 지배를 받는 새로운 식민지 이며 한국의 군부가 미국을 대신해서 한국을 통치하고 있을 뿐이라고 주장하면서 미국의 군사작전권 보 유를 결정적인 증거로 언급한다. 마지막으로 매판군사 파시즘은

it developed into the theory of the fascist state, which developed into the theory of the colonial state, the theory of neo-colonialist proxy rule, the theory of sell-out military fascism, and the theory of neo-colonial state monopoly capitalism[41]. In other words, by combining the revisionist debate with the debate on social constructs, it encompasses the period of military rule that emerged after the First Republic, and includes the metropolitan bourgeois in the central United States and the indigenous landowning class in Korea, Bureaucracy and military forces unite to establish fascist rule

[39] Lee Byung-chun, "Korean Capitalism in the Age of Transition: A Test of the '61 and '87 Regimes,'" Historical Criticism Vol. 71
(Seoul: Korean Historical Research Association, 2005), pp.67-90.

It [42]was generalized as the fascist theory of the state.[44] According to them, the Korean state has been around since the period of Japanese militaristic rule.

한국의 군사정권이 미국의 대리정권이지 만 스스로의 계급적인 기반을 지니고 있다고 지적한다. 즉, 매판 자본과 예속정권은 모두 미국에 의해 창 출되었지만 계급의 이익을 옹호하는 계급 지배도구로서의 성격을 지니고 있으며 동시에 미국의 신 식민 주의적인 통치기구로써의 성격을 지닌다는 것이다.

[41])신 식민지 파시즘은 1960-70 년대 라틴 아메리카 지역에서 출현한 군부 독재체제를 설명하기 위해 유럽 과 라틴 아메리카의 정치경제학자들이 만든 이론을 적용한 것이었다. 이에 따르면 라틴 아메리카 국가들 이 유럽과 미국의 중심 자본주의 국가들의 경제발전과 대외전략에 중요한 농업자원과 천연자원들을 식민 지 시기부터 수출하고 있었기 때문에 독립 이후에도 이를 계속 획득하기 위한 중심 자본주의 국가들과 라틴 아메리카 내부의 지배계급과 군부사이의 결탁이 이루어짐으로써 신 식민지 파시즘이 출현하게 되었
다. 자세한 논의는 이성형, “신 식민지파시즘론의 이론구조,,”『현실과 과학』2 집과 조형제, “한국 국가에 대한 신식민지파시즘론의 적용,” 한국산업연구회 편,『경제와 사회』4(겨울호), (서울: 한울, 1989).을 참 조할 것.

[42])복잡하게 전개되어 온 파시즘 국가론들 중 신 식민지 파시즘이 지배 패러다임이 되었으므로 본 연구에서 는 신 식민지 파시즘을 주된 분석대상으로 설정하였다. 국내 소장학자들에 의해 전개된 파시즘 국가론의 흐름은 다음을 참조할 것. 한국정치연구회, “제 1 장 한국국가성격에 관한 이론적 고찰,”, 한국정치연구회 지음, 『한국정치론』(서울: 백산서당, 1989), pp. 19-57.

It was politically and economically subordinated to Japan, and from the period of the US military rule, it was subordinated to the United States, the new central power, and defended the interests of the United States, Rhee Seung-man, the Democratic Party of Korea, and other pro-American ruling forces. In addition, the character of the government of the First Republic was defined as fascism, and after the First Republic, the military and bureaucrats succeeded it, Lee Seung-man → Park Chung-hee →the genealogy of the fascist regime that led to the Chun Doo-hwan regime[43] was created. And, accordingly, Cummings' follow-up study, which focused only on the historical continuity with the period of Japanese colonial rule, focused only on the relationship with the ideology of fascism, but did not directly define the Rhee regime as a fascist regime[44] also finally led to the fascist rule to the Japanese colonial period. By extension, it has been established as a study that embraces the fascist state theory that has been applied throughout modern and modern Korean history.[45] The criticism of these revisionist studies began with the work of Bruce Cummings, who was praised for overcoming the early revisionist writings that were limited to developing conspiracy theories based on fragmentary facts in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, when the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union collapsed. In other words,

---

[43])김규항.『나는 왜 불온한가: B급 좌파 김규항, 진보의 거처를 묻다』,(서울: 돌베개, 2005) 이에 반해 진 보성향의 고명섭은 이승만, 박정희, 전두환 정권을 파시즘 체제로 보기는 어렵다고 지적한다. 고명섭.『지 식의 발견: 한국 지식인들의 문제적 담론읽기』, (서울: 그린비, 2005).

[44])커밍스는 1.독일 군사연수 경험이 있었던 이범석과 나치즘 , 2. 이청천과 장개석의 비밀 첩보조직 남의사 와의 관계, 3. 초대 문교부 장관인 독일 유학파 안호상의 소년단체 결성주장과 나치 유겐트와의 상관성, 4. 이승만과 스페인의 프랑코, 포르투갈의 살라자르 중국의 장개석과 같은 권위주의정권 지도자들과의 비 교 등만을 단순기술하고 있을 뿐 한국 역사 전체를 파시즘과 연관시켜 해석하지는 않았다. Bruce Cumins, The Origins of Korean War volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1946-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[45])Bruce Cumins, Korea's Place in the Sun : a Modern History (New York: Norton 1997).

since the mid-1990s, the release of classified documents from the Soviet Union and China began in earnest, and this time, on the contrary, the responsibility of the Soviet Union in the Cold War was highlighted.

All of them.

On June 24, 1993, the Russian government handed over to the ROK some of the documents obtained by Dmitrii Volkogonov, and in June 1994 the Russian government handed over to the ROK Government a total of 216 documents and 548 pages that had been stored in the Archives of the Presidential Palace of the Russian Federation and the Foreign Policy Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. In the midst of this crisis, Kim Kuk-hu obtained some related documents that were disclosed to the public in Russia between 1991 and 1993 and the testimonies of related survivors and serialized them in the JoongAng Ilbo[46]. The Seoul Shimbun also reported that it had taken over 950 and 3,000 pages of undisclosed secret documents related to the Korean War. From May 15 to August 11, 1995, Evgueni Bajanov and Natalia Bajanova's A total of 30 studies were introduced[4748].

Domestic research is also based on newly released Soviet documents as follows.

The responsibility of the Soviet Union was emphasized. First, Pak Myung-rim's The Outbreak and Origin of the Korean War 1-2 examined major domestic and foreign documents related to the background of the Korean War and revealed that the Korean War was not a war of national liberation but a war of aggression that Stalin and Mao Zedong finally

---

[46])박길용, 김국후 공저.『김일성 외교비사』,(서울: 중앙일보사, 1994). 김국후,『소련의 평양군정』(서울: 한 울, 2008).

[47])예프게니 바자노프, 나딸리아 바자노바, 김광린 역.『소련의 자료로 본 한국전쟁의 전말』,(서울: 열림,

[48]).

agreed upon on Kim Il-sung and Pak Hun-yong's plan to unify North and South Korea by military means.[49] In addition, Kim Yong-ho claimed that Stalin of the Soviet Union, who was on the defensive in Europe due to the aggressive containment policy of the United States, approved and supported North Korea's invasion of the South as part of a rollback policy to achieve his strategic goals. According to this, the Soviet Union decided that it had seized a decisive victory in the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in Asia with the success of the Communist Revolution in China in October 1949, and [50] took advantage of the internal situation on the Korean peninsula, such as the presence of North Korean leaders advocating the theory of armed reunification and the ongoing border dispute between North and South Korea, to switch to an active offensive against the United States.51)

On the other hand, the following studies refute Cummings' argument that the revolution in South Korea, where the foundations and conditions for the social revolution were fully mature at the time of liberation, was thwarted by U.S. intervention. By criticizing the October 1946 People's Uprising as spontaneous as Cummings assumed, Chung refuted Cummings' argument that emphasized the voluntary capacity of local indigenous forces and the actions of farmers linked to them.[51] Shin Ki-wook also pointed out that the various popular movements promoted by the South Korean People's Committees after liberation were a continuation of the traditions of the reformist peasant protests of the

[49])박명림, 『한국전쟁의 발발과 기원 1-2: The Korean war : the Outbreak and Its Origins』(서울: 나 남출판, 1996).

[50])김영호, "한국전쟁 원인의 국제정치적 해석-스탈린의 롤백 이론,", 유영익 편, 『수정주의와 한국 현대사』, (서울: 연세대학교 출판부 1998). pp. 223-258.

[51])정해구, 『10 월 인민항쟁연구』, (서울: 열음사, 1988).

1920s and 30s, not the revolutionary tradition of the Red Peasants' Guilds of the 1930s, as Cummings claims.[52]Based on an analysis of the 1946 U.S. military government's public opinion surveys, Jeon Sang-sang argued that the Korean peasants' desire for land reform after liberation was relatively conservative compared to the desire for social change of other classes, so it cannot be said that the peasants voluntarily sympathized with the radical social revolution.[53Overseas] studies have also begun to refute revisionist arguments about the causes of the Korean War and who is responsible. First, from the standpoint of political and diplomatic history, studies have been conducted that rediscover the responsibility of the Soviet Union, which is relatively larger than the United States, and representative researchers include James Matray and William Stueck, who used a wide range of U.S. documents centered on U.S. foreign policy[5455]. In particular, Mattrey's research was conducted by the United States, which witnessed the communization of mainland China in 1949, by withdrawing the USFK from Korea, which was relatively less important in the world strategy, while pursuing a policy of containment to increase economic aid support. It claimed that it was attempting to maintain the balance of power in Northeast Asia through the input of Sudan.

Whereas their studies confronted revisionist discourse, mainly using American documents, the following researchers used Soviet and

---

[52])Shin Gi Wook, Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea (Seattle : University of Washington Press, 1996).

[53])전상인,『고개 숙인 수정주의: 한국현대사의 역사사회학』, (서울: 전통과 현대, 2001).

[54])James Irving Matray. The Reluctant Crusade : American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

[55])Wiliam Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University

Chinese documents to refute Cummings' claims. Jon Halliday,[57] a leading revisionist who had written a book with Cummings on the development of the Korean War and argued that germ warfare was most likely carried out by the U.S. military during the Korean War, used Soviet and Chinese diplomatic documents to reverse Cummings' and his earlier claims, arguing that there was no evidence that the U.S. military had perpetrated a war of three equals, and that it was in fact propaganda and conspiracy by the Communist bloc.[58]Russian Andrei Lankov examined Soviet Politburo documents and concluded that North Korean leaders and their Soviet patrons did not sacrifice any of the political influence and control they had already established in North Korea for the sake of unifying the Korean Peninsula.[59]Woodrow Wilsonsen, USA

Kathryn Weathersby of the Cold War International History Project has translated and introduced more than 124 documents related to the Korean War from March 5, 1949 to November 14, 1962 in the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation, which have been open to access since January 1994.[60] Based on these trends, from the late 1990s to the mid to late 2000s, the following studies were carried out both domestically and internationally, and the following studies were carried out to discuss the revisionist discourse.

Press: 1995). ; William Whitney Stueck. Rethinking the Korean war : a New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton, NJ ; Oxford : Princeton University Press, 2002).

57) Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea : the Unknown War (New York : Pantheon Books, 1988).

58) Jon Halliday and Jung Chang. Mao : the Unknown Story (New York : Knopf, 2005).

59) Andrei Lankov, “Soviet Politburo Decisions and the Emergence of the North Korean State, 1946-1948,”, Korea Observer Vol.36. No.3 (Institute of Korean Studies; 2005), pp.385-404.

60) Kathryn Weathersby, Kyu-Hyung Kang. "The Influence of the North Korea-China-Soviet Triangle on the Course of the June 25 War and Postwar Relations with North Korea," Journal of Spiritual Culture, Vol. 33, No. 3, (Bundang: Academy of Korean Studies, 2010).

was refuted. First of all, domestic studies include "Sujeongism and Contemporary Korean History", which began to criticize revisionism in earnest[56], "Recognition of Pre- and Post-Liberation History", which raised fundamental questions and criticisms about the validity of the "Perception of Pre- and Post-Liberation History" series, which was one of the origins of the formation of revisionist state theory, and "[57]The Recognition of the Founding of the Republic of Korea", and "[58]Comparison of the Government-Establishment Process of North and South Korea, 1945-1948", which sought a comparative study of the process of state-building in North and South Korea. Overseas researchers include Allan Millett, who emphasized the contribution of the United States in the process of Korean state-forming and the positive role of right-wing forces such as the Korean Democratic Party[59], Gregg Brazinsky.[60]He argued that Korea's military power, which received the resources needed to build a nation from the United States, made great strides under the influence of the modern national heritage formed during the period of Japanese rule, a fellow Asian nation.

However, as mentioned above, Cummings' research, which began to investigate the causes of the Korean War, only emphasized the class and oppressive nature of the state, but did not deal with the actual process of nation-building. The debate between orthodoxy and revisionism, which revolved around Cummings' work, was also centered on the realms of political and diplomatic history, with little criticism of the revisionist theory of the state, as the research conducted with the aim of fundamentally refuting Cummings' arguments by identifying the

---

[56])유영익 편, 『수정주의와 한국현대사』,(서울: 연세대학교 출판부:1998),

62)박지향 등저, 『해방 전후사의 재인식 1-2』,(서울: 책세상, 2006).

[57])이인호, 김영호, 강규형 등저, 『대한민국 건국의 재인식』,(서울: 기파랑, 2009).

[58])이철순 편, 『남북한 정부수립 과정 비교 1945-1948』,(서울: 인간사랑, 2010).

[59])Allan R. Millett. The War for Korea, 1950-1951 : They Came From the North (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

[60])Gregg Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea : Koreans, Americans, and The Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill, NC : University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

causes and responsibilities of the Korean War rather than the process of nation-building.

For example, in the case of overseas studies, there were very few studies that directly examined the process of nation-building within Korea, with the exception of Millet and Brzezinski, and they mainly took a U.S.-centric perspective and discussed the responsibility of the Soviet Union in the context of international politics. Studies in the domestic academic community, which focus on the processes and efforts of subjective formation within Korea, have also often pointed out the errors in the facts found in Cummings' work because a series of writings have attempted to systematically review and refute the revisionist theories of the state. However, the application of the discourses of Park Sang-seop and Park Kwang-ju raises fundamental doubts about the validity of the revisionist theory of the state, and the rebuttal can be deepened as follows.

First, the works of neo-Marxists Perry Anderson and Barrington Moore, which provide a theoretical starting point for Cummings' revisionism,[61] emphasize that international politics plays a greater role in the process of state-forming in the new Third World countries than internal factors such as the occurrence of revolutions due to class conflicts, which Cummings emphasizes.

First, Perry Anderson [62]points out the importance of international politics in the process of forming a new state, citing Friedrich Engels' argument that the development of Prussia is not only due to economic necessity but also to international

[61])Cumings, 2001, pp. 30, 각주 2).

[62])Karl Marx and Frederick Engels; Selected Correspondence, 1846-1895 (New York: International Publishers, 1942), pp. 417.

political relations linked to it[63.6465] In addition, Barrington Moore's work, which is the basic starting point for Cummings' thesis that the atmosphere of revolution was already established on the Korean peninsula at the time of liberation, also argues that the economic and political dependence of small states on large and powerful states means that the political determinants of these small states lie outside their territory rather than inside their own territory.71)

Second, during the Japanese colonial rule, no indigenous class in the colonial society could exert enough influence to control the colonial state because the economic structure that could build the material foundation of capitalism was deliberately distorted to achieve the Japanese objectives of exploitation and expropriation, and no hegemonic ruling class was formed.

For example, a capitalist society must have an economic mechanism of production relations and management methods peculiar to capitalism, the existence of a civil society centered on the bourgeoisie with hegemony, and a social and political mechanism of securing legitimacy through their consent.[66] However, in the case of Korea, even if the economic mechanism could exist in an undeveloped state, there was no bourgeoisie that could hold hegemony in the Gramscian sense and be in charge of social and political[67 mechanisms)] and the citizens' association. Thus, the question arises as to whether the explanation of

---

[63])Louis Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in Louis Althusser, For Marx, (New York : Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 111-112.

[64])Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State ,(London: Verso 1974), pp. 236-237.

[65])Barrington Moore, 1966, pp. 13.

[66])박상섭, 『자본주의 국가론: 현대 마르크스주의 정치이론의 전개』, (서울: 한울, 1985).

[67])Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

Marxist political economy is appropriate for Korea, which did not have the integrity of a capitalist society.

Third, this situation is in the midst of political and economic turmoil after liberation.

First, the poor were[68] too vulnerable to participate in politics, as Samuel Huntington points out[69].The bourgeoisie with hegemony as the ruling class, defined by the neo-Marxist Ralph Miliband [70]as "a class that owns and controls the means of production and is able to use the state as an instrument of social domination on the basis of the economic power vested in it") also did not exist and was not organized to serve the interests of the ruling class. Fourth, the failure of the capitalist system to develop in this way has led to the formation of civil society.

As a result, it was not possible to gain political legitimacy based on the consent of civil society and seek ideological domination, but was forced to pursue domination by autocratic power through state institutions such as the police, the military, and the bureaucracy.

Fifth, however, unlike the colonial state apparatus, which was able to receive abundant material and autocratic power bases supplied from Japan, these state institutions were not able to have sufficient power resources because they did not receive proper support from the founding process due to the weakness of the political, economic, and social foundations of the state. Sixth, these state institutions also had to carry out the tasks of nation-building in a more diverse and broad way, unlike the colonial state institutions, which were able to concentrate on the limited objectives of expropriating and policing

[68])커밍스는 이를 언급하면서도 판단을 유보하고 지주계층의 권력이 경찰의 보호를 통해 하나의 억압적 구조 를 형성할 수 있다는 점 만을 강조한다. Cumings, 2001. pp. 364.

[69])Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Heaven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 52.

[70])Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York : Basic Books, 1969).

colonial society. Thus, a greater number of personnel were needed, but it was not enough to employ all the vice-ministers.

However, experienced Buil officials participated in the atmosphere immediately after liberation.

I was reluctant. Eventually, there were cases where the chief police officer promoted and appointed the police officer who had tortured him during the Japanese colonial era.[77] For these reasons, the state apparatus immediately after liberation could only imitate the institutional management and organizational appearance of the colonial state apparatus, and could not operate and carry out its duties efficiently.

Seventh, since the construction of the Korean state apparatus after liberation was carried out without any resources to support it, it cannot be regarded as being overgrown by the same military and bureaucratic elites and reigning as the dominant power over the indigenous people simply because it had the appearance and human resources similar to that of the Japanese imperialist era.78)

Meanwhile, in the 1990s, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed.

---

[77] In the case of Jang Taek-sang, he personally promoted Lee Gu-beom and Ga Chang-hyun, who had tortured him when he was imprisoned in 1938 for the Cheonghoe case, to the rank of chief general. Kyunghyang Sinmun, April 15, 1977, "The Secret Story of One Generation (110) Military Administration Police [41] Appointment of Torture Police"

[78] This is summarized using new words and sentences in line with the thesis of this study. Kwangju Park,

"Chapter 1 Theory of Dependency," Kwang-ju Park, "The Theory of the Korean Authoritarian State: The Magisterial Neo-Resident State under the Guided Capitalist System", (Seoul: Human Love, 1992), pp. 31-58. ; Park Kwang-ju, "Chapter 2 Theory of the Over-Growth State", Park Kwang-ju, 1992, pp. 63-73. ; Park Kwang-ju, "Chapter 8 The Character of the Korean State and the Prospects of Democracy", Park Kwang-ju, 1992, pp.346.

In South Korea, democratization has led to rapid changes in the political environment, both domestically and internationally. In addition, the political economists of Europe and Latin America, on whom the theory of the fascist state depended, could not explain it properly, so they did not write any more, and the structure of domestic influx was cut off. Therefore, while some still consider the Roh Tae-woo government to be a fascist state,[71] there are studies that seek alternatives to the theory of the fascist state by defining the characteristics of the state that previous governments possessed, such as Yoo Pal Mu and Choi Jangjip[72], as bureaucratic authoritarian or military authoritarian states, rather than fascist states. It has appeared. Thus, the following refutation is possible against the theory of the fascist state, whose fundamental question was raised even within itself the validity of the theory.

First, the sell-out military fascism, which stretched the history of fascism to the First Republic, was criticized as fascism without a material foundation. In other words, in order to define a country's political system as fascism, monopoly capitalism based on material and class foundations must first be premised. Critics also pointed out that if these pre-production cases were not preceded by such a pre-production system, even an open terrorist dictatorship such as the Fifth Republic of a country, which neo-colonial fascism defined as a fascist system[73], could not be called fascism. If, If this is acknowledged, then the equation of fascism as an open terrorist dictatorship is established, and since all places where there is a terrorist dictatorship can be defined as fascism, the problem arises that even the period of Japanese imperialism must be defined as a fascist system.

---

[71])유팔무, “시민사회의 성장과 시민운동,”, 유팔무, 김호기, 『시민사회와 시민운동』,(서울: 한울, 1995).

[72])최장집, “한국정치균열의 구조와 전개,”, 최장집, 『한국 민주주의론』,(서울: 한길사, 1993).

[73])이성형, 1988. pp. 210

Of course, the sell-out military fascism defined Korean fascism not as fascism based on internal material foundations, but as exogenous fascism created by imperialism, and explained that fascism began during the First Republic. However, unlike Latin America, which was the main explanation of neo-colonial fascism, Korea was devastated by Japanese exploitation and did not possess strategically important mineral resources, and it was scarce in almost all[7475 of them, so it started out in a state where it was importing food from the United States]. It was not a country that had any significant economic[76 implications]. In other words, in the case of the United States, which, unlike Japan, did not have much strategic or economic importance to a country, there was no need to establish a fascist regime in Korea.

Second, if the Japanese period is considered fascism, then all imperialism, including Japanese imperialism, should be defined as fascism anew. In fact, revisionist theories of the state, which embraced the neo-colonial explanation of fascism, included the period up to the Japanese occupation as a period of fascist rule.

However, the sell-out military fascists refer to the period of Japanese imperialism as fascism.

Authoritative studies of foreign political thought that have not defined it as a system and have long meticulously examined the scope and

---

[74])Albert Wedemeyer, Report to the President Submitted by Lt. Gen, A. C. Wedemeyer: Korea, September 1947, (Washington, D.C: USGPO, 1951), 미국 국방성(US Department of Defense), 알버 트 웨드마이어(Albert Wedemeyer), 민정합동위원회(Joint Civil Affairs Committee: JCAC); 신복룡, 김 원덕 옮김.『한국분단보고서 하: American Military Government in Korea』, (서울: 풀빛. 1992). pp.

[75] -296.

[76])Joint Civil Affairs Committee:, Report of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea, (Feb, 1947), Record Group 165: ABC 014 Japan, 미국 국방성(US Department of Defense), 알버트 웨드마이어(Albert Wedemeyer), 민정합동위원회(Joint Civil Affairs Committee: JCAC); 신복룡, 김원덕 옮김. 1992. pp. 322.

definition of fascism[77] make a strict distinction between Japanese imperialism and fascism. Cho Hyo-je of the Korean academic community also points out that since mass dictatorships and military dictatorships are not fascism, it is difficult to define authoritarian regimes such as Stalin and Park Chung-hee that have elements of mass dictatorship as fascist regimes in the historical sense. In addition, the everyday discussion of fascism, or fascism within us, which is not used in precise technical terms, but is easily expressed as a kind of analogy, rather than preventing fascism. It can desensitize us to toxicity so that we don't recognize it when real fascism emerges[78].85)

As fundamental questions arose about the validity of revisionist national theory, the revisionist debate on the state remained stagnant from the mid-1990s onwards, unable to resolve numerous issues.[79] As an alternative, studies have emerged in the late 1980s and late 1990s that attempt to examine the changes in the policy and political process of the Korean state in the process of industrialization by adopting the perspectives of the neo-Weberians who inherited Weber's position. Representative studies include Jang Dal-joong, which showed the process of the state becoming stronger centered on the autonomy of the state through the state apparatus during the industrialization process[80], and Park Ki-duk, who showed the process of change in the capability

---

[77])Kevin Passmore, Fascism : a Very Short Introduction (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York : Knopf, 2004), ; 네오 클 레우스, 마크 지음, 정준영 옮김.『파시즘』, (서울: 이후, 2002).

[78])조효제, "머리글,", Robert O Paxton, 2004. ; 손명희, 최희영 옮김.『파시즘 : 열정과 광기의 정치혁명』,(서울: 교양인, 2005). pp. 14-15.

[79])최장집,"한국 국가론의 비평적 개관,", 최장집,『한국 민주주의이론』(서울: 한길사, 1993).

[80])장달중, "국가와 자본주의 발달,", 김성국(외), 『한국자본주의의 정치 경제학적 연구』 (분당: 정신문화연 구원, 1988).

and autonomy of the Korean state after liberation through the presentation of concrete[81] figures.

On the other hand, attempts to propose a theory of the state that reconciled and integrated neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist theories continued into the mid-1990s and early 2000s. For example, Kim Il-young emphasized the relative autonomy of the state by applying Bonapartism, which Marx pointed out as an exceptional state, to establish Rhee Seung-man's rule after the mid-term of the First Republic, and Jin Deok-kyu integrated Michael Mann's IEMP model with the theory of the world system, and Kim Seok-joon also explained the period of the US military rule and the beginning of the First Republic by grafting the theory of the world system to the Byung-uk theory of military rule, which was the explanation of orthodoxy at the time.[82] By the way, even before these, domestic academia already considered the concept of state autonomy

Accommodating Eclecticism National Theorist Bureaucratic Bureaucratic

Authoritarianism)[90]and Corporatism'[91] and from the early to mid-1980s, neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist theories abroad have been faithful to their respective theoretical positions, but they have shown a compromise and integration in terms of the relative autonomy of the state, which they agree with.[92] Of course, the neo-Marxist theories of the state, which succeeded the Marxist position, focused on demonstrating that state

[81])박기덕, “한국 국가의 성격과 능력 : 통계지표에 의거한 민주화 전후의 비교연구,”, 박기덕 편,『한국 민주 주의 10 년 : 변화와 지속』,(분당: 세종연구소, 1998).

[82])자세한 설명은 김일영, “부산정치파동의 정치사적 의미,”,『한국과 국제정치』17('93.6),(서울: 경남대학교 극동문제연구소, 1993), pp.31-66. 진덕규,『한국현대정치사 서설』(서울: 지식 산업사. 2000), ; 진덕규, 『한국정치의 역사적 기원』(서울: 지식 산업사, 2000), ; 김석준,『미군정 시대의 국가와 행정』(서울: 이화여대 출판부, 1996). 을 참조할 것.

intervention was not for the benefit of the people as a whole, but for the protection of the capitalist class. However, since the appearance of the strong state found in the new countries of the Third World could not be explained by existing Marxist theories alone, the aforementioned Poulantzas recognized the autonomy of the state.

Nora Hamilton, Bamat Thomas,93 and Sen Anupan,94 among others' actively recognized the relative autonomy of the state.

---

[90] Guillermo A O'Donell advocated a theory of the world system based on Marxism and neo-Marxism, and a theory of 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' that acknowledged the solidarity between the ruling classes but noted that the state could direct development by owning the means of production directly or exercising strong control over capital and finance.
Guillermo A. O'Donnell. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973). In Korea, Han Sang-jin, Kang Min, and Kim Young-myung conducted a study that accepted it. For a detailed discussion, see the following studies. Han Sang-jin, "Prospects for Democracy under Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," ed., Korean Sociological Association, Where Is Korean Society Going?, (Seoul: Institute for Contemporary Society, 1983). Min Kang, "The Korean Generation of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," Journal of the Korean Political Science Association, Vol. 17, (Seoul: Korean Political Science Association, 1983). ; Kim Young-myung, Military Rule and Political Economy in the Third World, (Seoul: Hanul,
1983).

[91] According to this, the developing countries of the Third World that have begun to industrialize have an authoritarian form of governance in order for the state to control social forces. However, the state, with its own interests and independent entities, exercises a strong leadership in the policy-making process, forcibly and hierarchically organizes and encompasses various social groups to build consensus. For representative domestic studies, see Jangjip Choi, "Corporatist Control of Trade Unions," Byun Byung-yoon et al., The Era of Division and Korean Society (Seoul: Magpie, 1985).

92) Peter Evans and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[93] Beimat argues that in Latin America, unlike in Western countries, the society is much more complex and there is no ruling class, so that the autonomy of the state is increased, so that the state itself functions as a hegemonic force, rather than as a mouthpiece of the ruling

class. Thomas Bamtat, “Relative State Autonomy and Capitalism: Brazil and Peru,”, Insurgent Sociologist, Vol.7, 1977. pp. 74-84.

[94] Sen, like Alabi, argues that Poulantzas is an exceptional state in which the state enjoys a high degree of autonomy beyond class interests.

It was.

However, around the 2000s, the meaning of the state and the reality of state analysis faded from previous periods as the means of controlling capital gradually lost and became powerless due to the emergence of transnational capital that crossed borders through globalization. In the intervening years, of course, the following notable studies have been conducted.

First, Suh's research, which sought to apply the process and theory of state formation in Western countries through war to the case of Korea, examined the process of Korean state formation with a focus on key state institutions such as the police, the military, and the finance and tax organizations, and pointed out the importance and necessity of research topics such as nationalist ideologies and right-wing youth groups in future research.[95] Park Chan-pyo's work adopts the position of early revisionism as it is, and the Soviet Union and

This study describes in more detail than previous studies that the United States, conscious of the Cold War confrontation, destroyed the possibility of building an alternative state proposed by the Founding Preparatory Committee immediately after liberation, colluded with the right-wing forces in Korea, restored the state apparatus of the Japanese imperialist period, and exercised repressive power to proceed in four stages of anti-communist state construction. At the same time, however, he rejected the fascist theory of the state and accepted the position of post-revisionism, which defined the Korean state as an authoritarian state, and viewed the oppressive nature of the state and class domination emphasized by early revisionist studies in a relatively relaxed way. In

other words, by examining the process of the enactment of the Constitution, the enactment of a special law on punishment of pro-Japanese factions, and the formation of the National Assembly in the early period, the role and weight of the centrist faction were highlighted, and the authoritarian state that focused on national security and economic development was forced to move to the stage of democratization.

The Bonapartist type, which was recognized as a form, is explained by applying it to the example of India. According to him, the traditional social foundation, which can be described as an 'Asian mode of production', acts as an obstacle to the bourgeoisie's acquisition of hegemony, thus delaying the independent development of the bourgeoisie, so that the state transcends social classes and becomes an independent entity.

It is said that it exists as Anupam Sen, The State, Industralization and Class Formations in India: A Neo-Marxist Perspective on Colonialism, Underdevelopment and Development, (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).

95) Xi Xi. 2008. 『The Formation of the Korean State System』, Seoul: Academic Information.

Nonetheless, as Korean academia has become desperate to digest the vast range of research topics and challenges, discussions on the revisionist theory of the state have remained unresolved. Thus, the revisionist discourses, which were inevitable to be completely revised, remained firmly entrenched and constantly reproduce the facts and perceptions based on their discourses. In particular, some researchers have continued to expand the discussion of the fascist state at the risk of reaching the unreasonable conclusion that the period from the Japanese colonial period to the present is a period of ahistorical and static fascism that has not experienced qualitative changes. Charles

Armstrong Armstrong)[83] and Shin Ki-wook[8485)] argued that fascism, which originated from the Japanese imperialist period, was mobilized for the nation-building of North and South Korea from the time of Rhee Seung-man and Kim Il-sung, and led the nation-building. In addition, in the Korean academic field, studies continued to be carried out in the field of history and literature that still embraced the theory of the fascist state.[98] On the other hand, foreign studies on the state have focused on the state-building process of new countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, where the international community was deeply involved due to serious conflicts.[86] For example, a state with a strong despotic power but weak infrastructural power is called a weak state, and countries that fail to build a state due to a lack of the will and ability of the state are called a failed state or a collapsed state, respectively.[100] In recent years, there have been overseas studies that describe in more detail the causes and classification criteria of the failures and crises of these broken or collapsed states,[101] and domestic studies have also

---

[83])Charles Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2003).

[84])Shin Gi Wook, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics and Legacy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

[85])그 대표적인 목록은 다음과 같다. 고영자,『일본의 파시즘과 대한민국임시정부기』, (서울: 탱자, 2008); 권명아,『역사적 파시즘 : 제국의 판타지와 젠더 정치』, (서울: 책세상, 2005) ; 김명인,『조연현, 비극 적 세계관과 파시즘 사이』, (서울: 소명, 2004) ; 김사량 외저; 이상경 편,『일제 말기 파시즘에 맞선 혼 의 기록』, (서울: 역락, 2009) ; 김상봉,『도덕교육의 파시즘 : 노예도덕을 넘어서』, (서울: 길, 2005) ; 방기중 편.『일제 파시즘 기 한국사회 자료집』, (서울: 선인, 2005) ; 방기중 편.『일제 파시즘 지배정 책과 민중생활』, (서울: 혜안, 2005). ; 방기중.『일제하 지식인의 파시즘체제 인식과 대응』, (서울: 혜 안, 2005), ; 이현식,『일제 파시즘체제하의 한국 근대문학비평 : 1930 년대 후반 한국 근대문학 비평 이 론 연구』, (서울: 소명출판, 2006). ; 임지현 외.『우리 안의 파시즘』, (서울: 삼인, 2000).

[86])Robert I Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

emerged as a major research topic with the Korean National Power Bulletin.

Assistance (ODA) and international cooperation.[102] And, if we look at these recent overseas studies, we will see Weber and Ne

---

100) Robert I Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press; 2004).

[101] A report by the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security (Crise) at the University of Oxford summarizes reports by the UK's Department of International Development (DFID), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank, citing the three factors of a country in crisis: (1) Authority, (2) Service Entitlements, and (3) Lack of Legitimacy. (1) Failure of Authority: 1. Organized political violence, such as civil war, 2. When the authority of the state is not exerted in a significant part of the region, 3. When there is regular political or collective violence that causes death or destruction, 4. The state's coordination or judicial system is incapable of dealing with high-level crime; (2) Failure of Service Entitlements: 1. When the state fails to provide health services; 2. When the state fails to provide basic education; 3. Failure to provide water and sanitation, 4. Failing to provide basic transportation and energy infrastructure, 5. Reduction in income poverty, (3) Failure of legitimacy: 1. Lack of democracy (e.g., in the absence of free and fair regular elections), 2. The strong role of the government in the military division, 3. the acquisition of power by coercion, 3. repression of the opposition, 4. control of the press, 5. the exclusion of a significant number of the people from power, 6. It refers to the absence of civil and political freedoms, such as arbitrary arrest and the absence of freedom of speech. On the other hand, it points out the difference between countries that are in bankruptcy and those that are at risk: In other words, when the authority of the state fails, the state is plunged into a state of violence and war, and a broken state is one in which this state has continued until recently, and a state in crisis in which it has occurred in the last two years or the last four years. On the other hand, violence and war are also classified according to the following criteria: violence with an average of 125,000 victims over a period of 3.38 years, and war with an average of 474,000 victims over an average of 8.53 years. Frances Stewart and Graham. Brown, Fragile States, Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security, University of Oxford, Crise Working Paper, N0.51, (January), (London: Oxford: 2009).

[102] Lee Jo-won, "A Study on the Vulnerable State Model and Development Cooperation on North Korea," Journal of the Society for North Korean Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, (Society for North Korean Studies,

2008), pp. 289-321. ; Choi Jin-geun and Lee Eun-jin, "Promotion of Development Cooperation between Vulnerable Countries and the Saemaul Movement," 『Saemaul Movement and Ji

It can be seen that the criteria that the Beverians emphasized on bureaucracy, infrastructure power, and the establishment of domestic and international policing and defense through the monopoly of violence are important in the concrete process of building a state.

The previous discussions so far are summarized as follows. Based on the U.S. documents that were publicly available to the public about the orthodox theory of the state, which held a dominant position until the 1980s, a new revisionist theory of the state emerged that held the right-wing forces in the United States and South Korea responsible for the division. Beginning in the 1990s, the Soviet Union and Chinese documents were made public, and the responsibility of the Soviet Union and North Korea was again raised, and criticism of the revisionist theory of the state arose from within the DPRK. In such a situation, eclectic state theory and neo-Beverian's view have emerged as new alternatives to the third state theory, and in particular, neo-Beverian's position has been actively raised by recent overseas studies that have observed the actual process of nation-building in Africa and elsewhere.

However, in the meantime, Korean national studies have appeared anew in each period.

By focusing on explaining the case of Korea by quickly introducing foreign studies on national theory, it has failed to develop a theory that can properly explain the reality of Korea by comparing, reviewing, and deepening the explanations of the existing theories. Therefore, this study only takes the neo-Beverian theory of state formation as the starting point, and tries not to repeat the trial and error of the existing studies that produce a theoretical review by applying the recent neo-Beverian studies to the case of Korea as the main theoretical framework.

Rather, by approaching a dimension that is completely different from the existing research, we want to propose a new theory that could not be solved by the problematic consciousness of the existing research. Through a new theory of the fragile state, not the old orthodoxy or revisionism,

---

Journal of Reverse Social Development, Vol. 6, (Pyeongtaek: Saemaul Research Institute, Kyungmun University, 2010), pp.123-142. ; Kwon Hyuk-joo, "Understanding Vulnerable Countries: Focusing on the Discussions between INCAF and International Cooperation Organizations," International Development Cooperation (No. 3, 2010), (Seoul: Korea International Cooperation Agency, 2010) pp.46-65. ; Kwon Hyuk-joo, Bae Jae-hyun, Noh Woo-young, Won Gra-mi, Lee Yoo-joo, "Development Cooperation in Vulnerable Countries Caused by Conflict and Conflict: Focusing on Vulnerable State Models and the Search for Policy Alternatives," Journal of Public Administration Vol. 48, No. 4 (December 2010), (Seoul: Korea Institute of Public Administration, Seoul National University, 2010) pp.171-199.

The arguments of this study, which attempts to explain the nation-building process of the Republic of Korea, are as follows.

C. During the U.S. military occupation and the early years of the First Republic, Korea was in the midst of an international political environment of the development of the Cold War and a domestic political environment that lacked the human, material, and economic resources necessary to create a core state apparatus essential to building a modern nation. In addition, the new Republic of Korea, which had already experienced threats of overthrow from home and abroad even before its birth, had no choice but to go through the process of building a unique form of a vulnerable state without fully absorbing nationalism in order to avoid the collapse of the state and quickly build a modern state.

First of all, if we look at the impact of international politics, the Soviet Union, which had actively supported North Korea's state-building and South Korea's leftists in order to establish a communist regime on the entire Korean peninsula immediately after liberation, was already developing a

de facto Cold War. Since September 20, 1945, when the Soviet Union sent about 200,000 troops into North Korea, it has dispatched about 30,000 Koreans living in the Soviet Union. In addition, with the establishment of the North Korean People's Security Force under their leadership, the Soviet Union did not have to waste its strength, unlike the U.S. military.[87] The Communist-dominated North Korean People's Security Service held a series of elections to institutionalize local People's Committees beginning in October 1945. When these local People's Committees took shape to their satisfaction, the Soviets gave them the right to govern, giving them the form of local self-government. Thus, after August 1945, a de facto Cold War had already developed on the Korean Peninsula.

The U.S. military administration and Rhee Seung-man were aware of this. First, when John Reed Hodge, the commander of the U.S. Armed Forces, received information that the Soviet Union was organizing and training South Korean troops in North Korea, he feared that Soviet expansion would lead to domination of the entire Korean peninsula and suggested to the U.S. government the establishment of a South Korean military to prevent this and ensure the safe withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. However, when this proposal was thwarted, the establishment of the Military English School on December 5, 1945, and the establishment of the South Korean National Defense Guard on January 14, 1946, and the full-fledged reinstatement of Japanese subordinate police officers, mainly cadre-level personnel, began in early 1946. Rhee Seung-man, who became the chairman of the Democratic House of Representatives

[87])Paul McGrath, U..S.. Army in the Korean Conflicts, Record Group 407(Manuscript), Record Group 332, Box 45. (Office of the Chief of Military History: OCMH, Department of Defense, 1953).; 신복룡, 김원덕 옮김.『한국분단보고서 하: American Military Government in Korea』, (서울: 풀빛. , 1992, pp.58. 각주 99).

established on February 14, 1946, also argued that South Korea should have a provisional government or a North Korean committee in his speech on June 3, 1946, when the first US-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved on May 8, 1946.

However, the U.S. administration, which was reducing its armaments and troop in the midst of the transition from a wartime mobilization system to a peace regime, failed to invest sufficient human, material, and economic resources on the Korean peninsula, which is of relatively low strategic importance, by prioritizing the withdrawal of the USFK through negotiations with the Soviet Union. The U.S. government continued to insist on a swift withdrawal of troops from Korea, where it did not have much strategic interest, through negotiations with the Soviet Union. The reason for this was that after World War II, U.S. policy rapidly shifted to a peace-based system, which necessitated massive reductions in military forces and budgets, but it still had to fulfill commitments made around the world, so the focus was on finding a way to withdraw from Korea, which was relatively less strategic and important, without losing face.

On August 31, 1945, the U.S. government resolved to evacuate 5.5 million Army and 260,000 Navy personnel deployed overseas by July 1, 1946. Accordingly, President Truman, in his State of the Union Address on January 8, 1946, announced that the wartime mobilization system would be completely lifted by the end of 1946.

On June 30, 1947, the wartime mobilization of all conscripts was lifted.[88] Accordingly, the U.S. military administration, which was suffering from

[88])James F. Schnabel, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff : The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945~1947 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1996), pp.101~104.

a general lack of resources,[89] mobilized and withdrew the USFK, while concentrating on temporary management rather than systematically supporting Korea's nation-building.[106] On the other hand, Korea, which had been thoroughly exploited during the colonial period in order to wage Japan's war of aggression, lacked human, material, and economic resources because it did not have the political and social mechanisms essential for building a modern state immediately after liberation, unlike in the case of the West, where a modern state was built due to the spontaneous development of capitalism and the growth of civil society.[107] In the midst of this general shortage of resources, the U.S.

At the end of January 1946, the military government made the decision to mobilize all the bureaucrats in Japan, and thus managed to establish a formal framework for administration. To make matters worse, in March 1946, one of the three divisions of the USFK began to return home for the demobilization scheduled for June 1947. Accordingly, excessive centralization for the withdrawal of the US forces was promoted, and from the summer of 1946 onwards, great confusion broke out in the administrative power of the provinces.[108]In particular, the lack of sufficient recruitment of Korean police and Korean defense guards to replace them, resulting in vacancies of about 10,000 people, became prominent.

---

[89])도널드 맥도널드(Donald Stone MacDonald)는 미군정 기간 동안의 자원부족의 문제를 지적하고 있다. 즉, 그에 따르면 미국이 소련과 한반도 통치에 대한 합의에 도달할 때 까지 적극적인 프로그램을 수행하 려 하지 않아 미국이 자원을 배치할 때 한국의 우선순위가 낮았으므로 한국의 국가형성 기 동안 미국은 자원부족과 정책 및 계획 부족으로 인해 효과적으로 활동할 수 가 없었다고 지적하고 있다. 도널드 스턴 맥도널드(Donald Stone MacDonald)지음. 한국역사연구회 1950 년 반 옮김.『한미관계 20 년사 (1945-1965 년) 해방에서 자립까지: U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance』,(서울:

On the other hand, due to the overall lack of resources, administrative and judicial expenses in the state budget

Because of the small amount of money spent on the police,[109] the Korean officials and the police were not allowed to

---

Hanul. 2001). pp 28, pp. 233.

106)FRUS 1948, September 7, 1948, "Memorandum on U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Salzman's Proposal for Economic Assistance to Korea," pp. 1292~1298

[107] Park Sang-seop, "Chapter 9 Conclusion: An Evaluation of Neo-Marxist State Theory," Park Sang-seop, The Capitalist State Theory: The Development of Modern Marxist Political Theory, (Seoul: Hanul, 1985), pp. 227.

108) Grant E, Meade, American Military Government of Korea (New-York : King's Crown, 1951), pp.

80-81.

[109] Since the state was in charge of production and consumption, the highest proportion of the total budget was spent on government services, and the proportion of police expenditures and defense expenditures was as follows, respectively, and accounted for about the third or fourth place in the total budget.

The salary was also small. Since the U.S. military administration could not afford to pay sufficient salaries to Korean officials,[110] civil servants, like ordinary people, were in great difficulty, especially in 1946 and 47, when the economy was in trouble. As a result, corruption became rampant, and the dissatisfaction of the economically and politically troubled people with the US military administration reached a fever pitch. The Communist Party, backed by the Soviet Union and North Korea,[111] did not miss this, and in September and October 1946 there were nationwide strikes and demonstrations.

Therefore, right-wing youth organizations have been working to make up for the country's lack of physical strength.

They voluntarily took part in the nation-building process, which began in earnest with the United States increasing aid in the wake of the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee in July 1947, and by supporting the elections

to the Constituent Assembly in May 1948. On the other hand, the establishment of the government in less than a year allowed the vice-Japanese bureaucracy to continue to exist and did not adequately reflect the nationalist demand for the establishment of a unified nation-state in the process of state-building.

The government of the Republic of Korea, which was inaugurated on August 15, 1948, established a constitution that opposed the ideology of the Provisional Government and formed the first Cabinet with high-nationalist legitimacy in the anti-Japanese struggle, while promoting the punishment of anti-national actors and embarking on the construction of a nation capable of absorbing nationalism. However, on October 20, 1948, the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents threatened the very survival of the new nation, and the United States, fearing a decline in prestige, completely withdrew the USFK on June 30, 1949, even though it increased economic aid and the size of its military advisory group. By September 1949, a communist regime had been established in China, and North Korea had secured military superiority over the Republic of Korea by acquiring three divisions of the People's Army with extensive field experience from China.

It was. Police expenditure:10.8% (1945) →1,1% (1946) →10.8% (1947) →8.3% (1948) Defense expenditure:0.001% (1945)→
6.2% (1946) →10.4% (1947)→13.2% (1948)

[110] By early January 1947, U.S. Department of War officials had determined that the shortage of manpower and materiel for the USFK was so acute that it was impossible to continue occupying South Korea in this state. FRUS 1947, VI, 27 January 1947 「Vincent to Marshall」, pp.601-603.

[111] National History Compilation Committee, translated by Jeon Hyun-so, 『Shtykov Diary』, (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee, 2004), September 9, 1946, pp. 6. and "September 28, 1946," pp. 20.

It constantly infiltrated the armed forces and strengthened its support for partisan forces inside the ROK.

As the existence of the state was endangered by constant threats from within and without, the state, which was short of almost all resources, took almost all measures to survive, such as the enactment of the National Security Law and the abolition of the Special Anti-People Committee. In addition, despite accusations of anti-nationalist state-building, the government has been forced to tolerate the participation of officials and right-wing youth organizations in the fields of state administration, public safety and security. However, unsure of the future viability of the state, they overreacted to the political agitation of the leftist forces, who propagandized that the South Korean state was building an anti-nationalist state with the support of the United States, and relied heavily on tyrannical power.

However, vulnerable states have not been able to stop them, so informal organizations have not been able to formalize their legal status. Ignoring administrative procedures and using violence, the massacre of the Yang people like the Jeju 4.3 incident took place. accordingly. The political legitimacy of the state has been undermined by the recognition of the state as an oppressor of society. In addition, the deterioration of these ideological resources has again eroded the foundations of material and economic resources, resulting in a vicious cycle of vulnerability of state power.

Nonetheless, the state has implemented land reform and compulsory primary school education.

It absorbed nationalist elements in the process of state-building and produced the bourgeoisie, which is the basis of the country's material and economic resources, thus equipping the social mechanism.

C. In addition, the sense of belonging to the state of the people who benefited from the distribution of land and free education by the state also increased. Accordingly, around the election of the 2nd National Assembly in 1950, the centrist forces, which had refused to participate in the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948, began to participate in the nation-building process in earnest, thus establishing a political mechanism called political legitimacy. By the time the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the country had achieved a balanced budget and was gradually emerging from the worst stage of national collapse.

3. Fragile Countries

The Republic of Korea was constrained by the international political situation of the development of the Cold War and began as a vulnerable country because it lacked the human, material, and economic resources necessary to create a core state organization to build a modern state. In other words, in Western countries where capitalism developed spontaneously, the bourgeoisie and civil society grew together with the appropriate political and social structures, and led the modern nation-building and government, but in the case of the Republic of Korea, there was no social mechanism based on such a political and social structure and the existence of a ruling class that could have hegemony. Thus, a weak state is a type of state that has little to do with a particular class structure or economic condition because it emerges in a primitive situation in which the social and economic conditions for building a modern state are very inadequate and exhausted, and there is no leading ruling class.

In addition, as we will see, the Republic of Korea, which started as a vulnerable country, failed to properly absorb nationalism at the stage of nation-building and repeatedly lacked different resources in each

period, so the vulnerable state was maintained. In other words, the state inherently made efforts to somehow solve the most urgent problem of resource shortage in each period, so that the state could be maintained without collapsing, but the overall state of the national resources was vulnerable as the problem of other resources anew emerged. It was around May-June 1950 that the slightest possibility of solving this problem of resource vulnerability was discovered, but it was then that the Korean War broke out.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, the process of nation-building is the result of the interaction between resources.

The theory of the fragile state is based on Marx's view of the state as a coercive body of administration and law that controls a certain territory and population under the independence of sovereignty.

Weber)[90] as a theoretical starting point. Therefore, in order to help us understand the theory of the fragile state, which is a completely new theory of the state, I would like to briefly introduce the theory of the state in Neo-Bevery, which provided the theoretical implications, and then describe how the conditions of the early resources of the U.S. Army-First Republic came to be at work in the formation of the vulnerable state.

Neo-Weberians defined the concept and capabilities of the modern state based on Weber's theory of the state, which emphasizes human, material, and economic resources such as the bureaucracy and tax system, which are the basis for the formation of state institutions, and developed discussions on the autonomy of the state through the state apparatus based on the consent of civil society. The process of the formation of the modern state, which they present in different terms and descriptive ways, can be summarized as the interaction between resources, international relations, and the consuls who lead domestic

[90])Max Weber, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds), Economy and Society : an Outline of

politics as follows. The formation of a new Third World state = human, material, economic, and ideological resources + international political relations + the combination of a mediator who mediates the interrelations between various resources and international political resources in domestic politics. In other words, in order to understand the process of the formation of the modern state in the Third World, it is necessary to understand the process of the formation of the institutions of the state and the ideology that constitutes the unified identity of the state,[113] the intervention of elements of international politics,[114] and the mediator who coordinates domestic politics.

(moderator praetorian)[115].

Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1978).

113) Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the history of European State-Making,” in Charles Tilly(eds), The

Formation of National States in Western Europe (N.J: Princeton : Princeton University. Press, 1978),

114) Written by Jeanne Franco Potzi; Translated by Sangseop Park. The Development of the Modern State (Seoul: Minumsa, 1995), pp.105.

[115] Eric Nordinger applies Samuel Huntington's concept of the consul system to explain that in the process of modern state-building in the new countries of the Third World, an authoritarian system of governance emerges in three stages: moderator, guardian, and ruler. In other words, 1. It is the least authoritarian and has the form of a civilian-led government, but it is a "mediator" who exercises the "veto power" and distributes power to citizens through economic compensation, political order, and stable government guarantees on the basis of the Constitution, and induces a balance of power between rival groups→2. It is a coalition government between the military and civilians, which has a moderately authoritarian character, and the military is the "guardian" of the civilian population, openly trying to replace the civilian population→3. The military-led regime directly controls the authoritarian stage of government, the authoritarian stage of the "rulers." Eric Nordinger, Soldiers in Politics : Military Coups and Governments, Englewood Cliffs, (N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1977).

You have to take a look at it.

On the other hand, the identity integrated with the institutions of the modern state can be further classified into human and material resources,

economic resources, and ideological resources. Here, human resources refer to bureaucrats, which are the basis of oppressive and substructural institutions of power that monopolize legitimate violence and implement administration such as tax collection to realize rational governance. Next, material resources and economic resources refer to the military control exerted by the state through the bureaucracy, the security of administration, the tyrannical power, and the finances such as revenue secured through the collection of taxes.[116)]The state secures material and economic resources and pays them to the bureaucrats, who are human resources, to gain their loyalty and thus maintain rational rule.[117] In addition, ideological resources refer to the unified identity among the members that enables the rational rule of the modern state, and this is also the source of political legitimacy. The modern state secures political legitimacy by negotiating with the bourgeoisie and civil society to pay for the mobilization of resources and to obtain their consent, thereby sustaining the mobilization of material and economic resources.[118] At the same time, the interaction of these resources with the resources of international relations, the international political element, is the formation of the modern state. Of course, in the case of modern Western countries, international political factors such as the Edo War intervened, and the state negotiated with the bourgeoisie and civil society to wage external wars, and their roles and rights were enhanced, thus promoting the formation of modern states, but in the case of new countries in the Third World, where various human, material, economic, and ideological resources are lacking compared to Western modern countries, international political factors play a greater role than in the West.[119] Lastly, human and material resources, economic and ideological resources are weak, and international affairs

pp.21-27.

116)Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter Evans and Theda Skocpol,1985. pp. 5, pp. 16.

117) Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 11-21.

118) Charles. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, Mass., USA : B. Blackwell, 1992), pp.12-225.

119)Moore, 1966. pp. 13.

In the case of a new Third World country where the influence of the elements is great, a moderator-like praetorian emerges who coordinates these elements in domestic politics. This is the first of the three levels of consulship, which is the least authoritarian and has a form of civilian government, with veto power and the Constitution to guarantee economic rewards, political order, and a stable government, while distributing power and preserving the balance of power among rival groups. The consul system develops into a power-based rule that unfolds in three stages→ moderator→, guardian, and ruler, and it will continue until a bourgeois class with political legitimacy and hegemony is formed and political and social mechanisms are established. In this study, we will consider Rhee Seung-man, the first president of the First Republic, as a mediator consul. If so, how did these resources affect the formation of a vulnerable state in Korea?

First, the influence of international politics has been one of the factors in the formation of vulnerable states.

C. Because the United States, which had not given up the possibility of withdrawal through negotiations with the Soviet Union until the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee was completely dissolved in July 1947, belatedly tried to establish a free and democratic state[91, the] Republic of

[91])하영선은 미국의 한반도에서의 사실상의 봉쇄정책이 1947 년 이후부터 적극적으로 수행된 것으로 보고 있다. 하영선, “냉전과 한국,”, 하영선 편, 『한국전쟁의 새로운 접근: 전통주의와 수정주의를 넘어서』(서 울: 나남, 1999), pp. 21-26.

Korea did not have enough time and leisure for nation-building. By contrast, the Communists in South Korea were engaged in a de facto civil war immediately after liberation. These are the serious political, economic, and economic effects left by Japan's colonial rule. Trying to use the chaotic situation caused by the social crisis as an opportunity for a communist revolution, with the support of the Soviet Union and North Korea, from the time of the US military occupation to the inauguration of the Republic of Korea, they constantly staged armed uprisings such as the Daegu Riot, the Yeosu and Suncheon Rebellions, and the Jeju 4.3 Incident. The U.S. also acknowledged the possibility of a communist invasion and increased its support.

In accordance with the United Nations resolution, the withdrawal of U.S. troops began on September 15, 1948, a month before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Korea. To make matters worse, the friction that occurred between the U.S. government and the South Korean government during the process of handing over the government caused a major setback in the administration.[9293] The establishment of a government in such a short period of time in such a tense situation made it difficult for a normal state to integrate its citizens into the institutions of the state. However, in order to quickly build a nation, the Republic of Korea had to accept the process of forming a unique and modified form of state-building called a fragile state.

Second, among resources, the problem of the human resources department, which Weber pointed out as the two core functions of the

[92])FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 8 월 18 일「Jacobs to Marshall」. pp.1282-1283. 와 FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 8 월 24 일「Jacobs to Marshall」. pp.1287. 참조.

[93])Albert Wedemeyer, Report to the President Submitted by Lt. Gen, A. C. Wedemeyer: Korea, September 1947, (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1951).; 신복룡. 1992. pp. 290.

modern state, the state's legitimate monopoly of violence and bureaucratic administration, was the most serious.

In the process of building a modern state, the most important thing was to create the army and police, which are repressive state apparatus to secure social order and prevent aggression from outside, and the bureaucratic organization, which is a substructural power apparatus that performs basic administrative tasks such as tax collection to finance the state. In fact, the state apparatus during the Japanese colonial period was able to receive a sufficient supply of trained personnel who could effectively carry out the limited objectives of expropriating the colonial society and maintaining public order based on the material and coercive power resources supplied by the Japanese homeland.

C. Japan even provided manpower for the managerial and professional sectors as well as the technician class.[122] By contrast, immediately after liberation, Korea lacked enough training to work for the state apparatus. First of all, the U.S. military administration, which had a small number of troops, had only U.S. military officers who were inexperienced in local affairs and administrative affairs, and there were few competent military personnel or officers.[94]There was too little time and preparation for the trained American agents to take over the administrative work of the government. Accordingly, the U.S. military administration was distributing guidelines for specific actions and administrative tasks for U.S. soldiers who had no prior knowledge of Korea and administrative experience.

At the same time, the problem of quantitative shortage of military personnel was also serious. As of November 31, 1945, there were a total

[94])FRUS 1945 VI, 1945 년 9 월 15 일「Polit Adviser in Korea to Secretary of State」 pp. 1052.

of 1,061 administrative personnel in the local military administrations[95, and] a month later, at the end of December 1945, there were still 935 fewer than the number officially authorized by the Ministry of the Army. Accordingly, even on January 4, 1946, when the U.S. Military Administration in Korea was established and the final stage of the establishment of the military administration began, the problem of shortage of military personnel was still at a serious level.[96)]

This absolute shortage of American human resources meant that the majority of personnel had to be recruited from untrained Koreans who had no connection with the state apparatus of the Japanese colonial era, but there was also a lack of time and the Americans to train Koreans who would be used as human resources to replace the Japanese.[97] In the end, in order to solve this problem, it was necessary to mobilize as many Koreans as possible with administrative experience who had worked for Japan in order to fill the administrative gap.

However, because Japan had monopolized political, social, and economic positions for a long time, there was an acute shortage of skilled Korean human resources for national management and construction.[9899] In other words, the majority of the competent administrative officials and technical personnel were the evacuated Japanese.[100]During Japanese colonial rule, Koreans were only able to play supporting roles in lower-

---

[95])Lenoard C. Hoag; 신복룡, 김원덕 옮김.『한국분단보고서 상: American Military Government in Korea』, (서울: 풀빛. 1992). pp. 387.

[96])Hoag. 1992. pp. 159-160.

[97])미군정 장관 아놀드는 5 년으로 설정된 신탁통치 기간을 해명하면서 기술자 1 명을 양성하는데도 4 년의 시간이 요구된다고 진술한 바 있었다.

[98])리차드 D. 로빈슨 지음. 정미옥 옮김.『미국의 배반: 미군정과 남조선』,(서울: 과학과 사상, 1988). pp.

[99] .

[100])Wedemeyer. 1992. pp. 290.

level positions, and the proportion of Koreans who could hold senior management positions was dwindling, so the number of Korean officials who could master modern administrative skills was extremely limited.[101]At that time, Japan applied the traditional hierarchical status society that had been passed down for thousands of years to Korea, and most of the government positions were held by Japanese, so the door open to Koreans was very narrow, and the only way to become a high school officer was to pass the high school examination or go to the Japanese military academy to become a high school officer, but even this was very difficult.
It was unlikely.[102)]

Therefore, in order to control and manage South Korean society, which was under temporary occupation until it withdrew through negotiations with the Soviet Union, the U.S. military government had no choice but to mobilize all the Korean officials in Japan and gather up the crumbs of the Japanese bureaucracy to form a framework for the state apparatus even if it was crude. However, as mentioned above, the USFK was also reduced in the middle of 1946 in accordance with the order of demobilization from the United States, and the number of Korean personnel who could replace it did not reach this level. In particular, this has been hit the police and the Korean National Defense Guard, which are in charge of public security, resulting in the reduction of about 10,000 employees.

As a result, in such an environment, the state apparatus, which had enjoyed a dominant position since the Japanese colonial era, could

[101])1927 년 당시 한국인 관리의 비율은 35.9%였으나 이 중 전문적인 기술을 요하는 고위직인 한국인 고등 관의 비율은 1.4%에 불과했다. 박동서,『한국 관료제도의 역사적 전개』,(서울 :한국연구도서관, 1961). pp. 70-72.
[102])김정렬. 『항공의 경종: 김정렬 회고록』,(서울: 대희, 2010). pp. 60.

not be maintained and strengthened, and even basic administrative practices could not be carried out properly. The Communists, who took advantage of this opportunity, launched nationwide demonstrations and strikes in September and October 1946 with the support of the Soviet Union, causing great turmoil. By the end of 1946, when the state of social control had not been established[103, the] question of building a new state had been put on the back burner[104,] right-wing youth organizations were involved in the work of building the state, mainly in the fields of public security and national defense, so that the elections to the Constituent Assembly could be held on May 10, 1948. Was.

Third, the material and economic resources of the state were also caused by the turmoil that appeared immediately after liberation.

The state of the economy lacked self-sufficiency because it started at a capitalist zero point. In other words, the state of the country's material and economic resources had to be reorganized from[105106 scratch, and it] was not possible to provide sufficient tax revenues and tax sources. Thus, in the absence of bourgeois hegemony capable of leading the capitalist state-building, the desolate state, with few resources[107, assumed] all responsibility for production and consumption and became dependent on aid from the United States.

However, the U.S. military administration was unable to develop the economy in the long term, restore productive forces, or nurture the bourgeoisie, as it was able to inject only a limited amount of money, so

---

[103])로빈슨. 1988. pp. 20-28. pp. 87.

[104])그레고리 핸더슨 지음. 박행웅. 이종삼 옮김.『소용돌이의 한국정치: KOREA The Politics Of The Vortex』,(서울: 한울아카데미, 2000). pp. 521, pp.248-250.

[105])박상섭,「한국정치와 자유민주주의」, 한국정치학회(편),『현대 한국정치와 국가』, (서울: 법문사, [106]), pp. 421.

[107])Wedemeyer, 1992, pp. 286, pp.296.

it could not solve the problem of economic difficulties caused by the lack of material and economic resources. As a result, government officials also committed irregularities, focusing on rations and aid from the US military, which increased the people's dissatisfaction and distrust of the state. This reality continued into the Republic of Korea, which diminished the political legitimacy of the state.

Korea, which had just emerged from Japanese colonial rule, was experiencing an economic and financial disconnection from the yen bloc such as Manchuria, from which it had imported about 95 percent of its goods before the war, accelerating the collapse of its domestic economy. In addition, the productivity of factories that had been built mainly to produce war materials was shrinking by 20 percent, and the number of unemployed was increasing. However, due to the poor tax administration of the U.S. military government, tax collection was sluggish, resulting in skyrocketing prices and huge budget deficits.[108]The problem of lack of material and economic resources could be solved to some extent through U.S. aid. In fact, the amount of military and economic aid that the First Republic obtained from the United States far exceeded the amount of taxes it collected from its citizens. However, the United States also had limited financial resources to help.[109] The U.S. defense budget, which totaled $90 billion in August 1945, had been nearly halved to $48.5 billion in 1946. In addition, from 1947 onwards, the U.S. Congress was pressuring the administration to reduce military spending, and the reduction of the defense budget was accelerating.

---

[108])Joint Civil Affairs Committee Report of US Delegation on US-USSR Joint Commission(20, August, 1947), Record Group 332, Box 66Joint Civil Affairs Committee, 신복룡 옮김, 1992. pp.314-315.

[109])Wedemeyer, 1992, pp. 299.

Thus, from September 1945 to about September 1946, after liberation for about one year,

Even under the chaotic and chaotic economic situation of the United States, the US military government responded eloquently to economic measures directly related to the problems of people's livelihood due to lack of budget and resources, and did not pursue a long-term economic construction plan, but only focused on passive management and maintenance.

Of the $434 million in aid received during the U.S. military administration, Foodstuffs accounted for 39% of the total, or $177 million, while dry livestock and railroad materials accounted for only 1.7% and 3%, respectively, of $8 million and $13 million, indicating that aid at the time was focused on providing urgent relief or temporarily repairing facilities. In addition, the US military administration did not actively promote the restoration of productive forces and the private divestment of the industrial enterprises, which at that time accounted for 90 percent of the country's assets[110, so that] a capitalist class capable of hegemonizing the national economy could not be formed.

On the other hand, the budget for the state to carry out its policies is already under the control of the US military government.

It[111] was not possible to pay the civil servants even a minimum salary to make a living. As a result, many civil servants, who were suffering from a lack of economic and material resources, resorted to the false authoritarian remnants of the Japanese colonial period, such as bribes and bribes, and smuggled U.S. aid, resulting in corruption becoming an endemic malady. In particular, since their corruption was directly related

[110])재무부, 1958. pp. 120-121.

[111])Wedemeyer, 1992. pp. 284.

to the lives of the people who were struggling with economic difficulties at the time, the communists who received the support of the Soviet Union took advantage of this and became one of the main reasons for the spread of the nationwide strikes and demonstrations in September and October 1946. It came to work as one. Accordingly, the U.S. administration also increased the scale of economic aid to Korea from the end of December 1946, before the conclusion of the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission in July 1947, and by 1947-48, the level of production had gradually recovered, mainly among small and medium-sized enterprises. However,[112][113] it was difficult to solve the problem of corruption caused by the lack of fundamental material and economic resources in a short period of time, as the productivity of the large-scale factories under the control of the government was still in a state of stagnation. This continued even after the establishment of the Republic of Korea, and the people, who were experiencing severe economic and political difficulties, lost trust in the government, leading to a decline in the political legitimacy of the country.

Fourth, because of this lack of all power resources, the only power resources that could be relied upon for the construction of the state were ideological resources. However, in July 1947, when the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved and the government was established just over a year later, the Republic of Korea was unable to fully absorb nationalist elements from its birth due to the clash between the position of nationalism to build a modern state and the nationalist position that the construction of a unified nation-state should be prioritized.

---

[112])김기원.『미군정기의 경제구조: 귀속기업체의 처리와 노동자 자주관리운동을 중심으로』,(서울: 푸른산,

[113]).

Thus, the Republic of Korea, which was established on August 15, 1948, was a member of the independence struggle.

Like other new Third World countries that embarked on the process of building a modern state centered on ideological resources based on political legitimacy[114, the Yanyuan] sought to proceed with the construction of a modern state that absorbed nationalism as much as possible in order to maximize the ideological power resources of nationalism. In addition, these efforts were manifested in the formation of the initial Cabinet, which sought to appoint people with high political legitimacy and nationalist causes, the drafting of the Constitution to reflect the ideology of the Provisional Government, and the promotion of the activities of the Anti-National Special Committee, which attempted to liquidate the pro-Japanese faction.

Externally, however, there was a threat from North Korea, and internally, a significant number of people who supported communism continued to hinder the establishment of a liberal democratic state. On October 20, 1948, the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, which caused a serious national security crisis, threatened the survival of the country.

As a result, there was a sense of crisis that the state would collapse at any moment, and many people who participated in nation-building tried to save the First Republic, whose existence was uncertain until now, transcending the legal and ethical dimensions. In the midst of the situational limitations in which almost all power resources were lacking, the urgent need to prepare a way for the new Republic of Korea to live in a sympathetic way was formed. The National Assembly also passed a resolution on October 30, 1948, recognizing the necessity of stationing U.S. forces until the defense posture of the Republic of Korea

[114])박광주, “제 2 장 과대성장국가론,”, 박광주, 1992, pp. 68 각주 17), pp.76.

was refined, instead of scrapping the emergency motion for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces on October 30, 1948.

The U.S. Government, which had only 7,500 U.S. troops stationed in Korea until January 15, 1949, also supported the position of the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Mucho, who had requested a postponement of the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in a telegram dated January 27, 1949, reporting on North Korea's overwhelming military strength and the appearance of Soviet Navy submarines on Cheju Island[115]. Accordingly, the Army Ministry and MacArthur's insistence on the withdrawal of troops from Korea, which had no strategic value and had little chance of viability as an independent country[116], were put on hold in 1949 The withdrawal of the USFK was postponed until 30 June. In addition, the size of the USFK Advisory Delegation, which was established on August 26, 1948 with 100 members, was increased to 500 in preparation for the withdrawal of the US forces, and the scale of economic aid to Korea was also greatly increased.

Nonetheless, the U.S. government did not allow U.S. forces in Korea until June 30, 1949.

The withdrawal of Choe Jong began on May 28, 1949, in accordance with a report by the National Security Council (NSC) of March 22, which recommended that the United States withdraw its troops for six months in case of an emergency, and issue an official explanation that the withdrawal of U.S. troops would not weaken U.S. support for the ROK

[115])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 1 월 27 일「무쵸 주한 미 특별 대표부 특사, 한국의 정치·경제·사회 등 각 분야에 대해 美국무부에 상황보고 」. pp. 947-952.

[116])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 1 월 27 일「로얄 미 육군 장관, 애치슨 미 국무장관에게 5 월 10 일까지 주한미군 최종부대의 철군 완료를 제의」. pp. 945-946.

Army[117]. Accordingly, on April 14, 1949, Rhee sent a special letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Mu Cho, protesting the U.S. action against the unilateral decision to withdraw U.S. troops.[118] On 11 June, Mucho reported to the U.S. government that North Korea, supported by the Soviet Union and China, had established six regular divisions[119, but it] was not possible to reverse the decision to withdraw troops. Finally, on August 30, more than three months after the withdrawal of the U.S. forces was completed, the Soviet Union successfully tested the atomic bomb that the U.S. had monopolized, and on October 1, the Chinese Communist Army drove the Kuomintang forces back to Taiwan and established a communist regime. In South Korea, a large number of North Korean partisans and internal partisans were waging an armed struggle, threatening the existence of the Korean state. In this way, when the withdrawal of the USFK was completed and a national security crisis arose both inside and outside, the National Security Law was enacted on December 1, 1948, and the activities of the Special Committee on Anti-People were finally discontinued on August 13, 1949, with the logic that the country in crisis should make merit and pay for its past sins, and the use of police and other officials in Japan was allowed. In addition, on December 19, 1948, the right-wing youth groups, which were united into the Korean Youth League, led by these young people from the North who were determined to take revenge on the Communists, engaged in public security and

---

[117])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 3 월 22 일「미국 국가안전보장회의가 트루만 美대통령에게 제출한 NSC 8/2 '한국 에 관한 미국의 입장' 보고서」. pp. 969-978.

[118])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 4 월 14 일「이승만 대통령이 주한 미군 철수와 관련하여 무쵸 주한 미 특별대표부 특사에게 보내는 편지초안」. pp. 990-991.

[119])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 6 월 11 일「유엔한국위원단과 주한미군 철수협의에 대한 무쵸 주한미대사의 보고 전문 」. pp. 1040-1041. ; FRUS 1949, 1949 년 6 월 11 일「최근 한국의 군사동향에 대해 무쵸 주한미 대사가 국무장관에게 보내는 전문」. pp. 1041-1043.

defense affairs and helped the country, which was lacking almost all resources.

However, due to the urgency of the situation, the state was forced to use them as part of the state apparatus without sufficient consent from the people, which had the side effect of strengthening the rule of tyrannical power.

At that time, not a few of those who participated in the nation-building had a paranoid mentality that was hostile to a considerable number of the people. In other words, when the leftist forces constantly criticized the ROK government for committing anti-national acts by recycling the state apparatus and bureaucracy of the Japanese imperialist era with the help of the United States, they overreacted to this and had a tendency to hastily exercise autocratic power over the hostile forces without careful consideration. and, As they often ignored the formal legal procedures established by the state and resorted to violence, informal power took precedence over the official power of the state, resulting in far greater casualties and innocent victims than the official tally of the state. In fact, Lee Han-rim, who was the military commander at the time, pointed out that there were many cases where the police were emotional about the people's dissatisfaction and resentment, and that the Yeosu and Suncheon rebellions were a typical example of the military and some leftists taking advantage of the people's resentment against the police. [120] This undermined the political legitimacy of the Republic of Korea and reduced the political support of its constituents, while resulting in a repetitive vicious cycle of weak ideological resources. In other words, the state family, which was vulnerable to almost all the resources of power, was not able to fully

[120])이한림. 『이한림 회상록: 세기의 격랑』,(서울: 팔복원, 1994). pp. 87-88.

absorb the nation and nationalism, but rather opposed the nation and relied on the resources of tyrannical power, thus being perceived as an entity that oppressed society. This undermined the legitimacy of the public authority exercised by the state, and this decline in ideological resources in turn eroded the base of material and economic resources.

In this way, the Republic of Korea at that time was modern under the given circumstances.

It did its best to create a nation-state, but it had inherent limitations due to the lack of various power resources. And this has revealed aspects of the construction of the country that are still going on to this day. For example, from the very beginning of the nation's construction, dependence on the United States for a large part of its major material and economic resources has made it dependent on the superpowers. The concept of diplomacy is also based on the stable acquisition of aid from the United States for the construction and operation of the state for a period of time. It was focused only on compensating for the weakness of economic resources, and it was not possible to carry out normal diplomatic activities. In addition, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States handed over many of the powers necessary to conduct an independent war, such as the right to control wartime operations, and allowed foreign troops to be stationed in independent countries. As a result, the ROK failed to acquire the status and character of an independent warring agent, and the Korean people inevitably developed feelings of hostility and opposition to the United States, and [121] could not overcome the weakness of the nationalist ideological resources.

Nonetheless, the state, through a number of intrinsic efforts, has been able to

[121])Joint Civil Affairs Committee,1992. pp.325.

As the construction progressed, it gradually improved its vulnerability and increased its autonomy. First, in order to supplement the insufficient material and economic resources of the state and to solve the tasks of national security, a unique form of Japanese democracy emerged as an ideological resource in the transitional period, combining the ideology of the Provisional Government, Sammyunism, and national security.

In a letter to Truman on August 20, 1949, Rhee said, "If If South Korea does not receive U.S. aid and is invaded by force from North Korea, the cost will be paid by South Koreans, not Americans. The U.S. side says it has enough ammunition to fight for two months, but inside the South Korean army they say it's only two days' worth[122] of ammunition." In fact, even though Truman's promise of continued equipment and military aid to the ROK Army on September 28, 1949, was passed by the U.S. Congress and formally enacted into law,[149] this assistance to Korea had not yet been adequately implemented, and the fragility of resources had not been ameliorated. On March 15, 1950, the U.S. Congress approved a budget of $10,970,000 for military aid to Korea, but by June 25, 1950, only about $1,000 of the $52,000 in communications equipment and $298,000 in accessories that the U.S. had shipped to Korea had arrived. Accordingly, while the people's movement for nation-building was carried out at the government level on the basis of one-democracy principles, the Korean Youth League and the Student Protection Corps used it as a resource to solve the problems of national security, and mobilized it to supplement the human, material and economic resources that the state lacked by fostering paramilitary organizations[150] and conducting campaigns for the dedication of

[122])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 8 월 20 일「이승만 대통령이 트루만 미국 대통령에게 군사원조를 요청한 서한」. pp. 1075-1076.

airplanes.151 At the same time, the consul Rhee Seung-man issued a constitution that supported his political legitimacy.

---

[149] Kyunghyang Sinmun, October 2, 1949, "Foreign Military Assistance Bill Signed by U.S. President Truman Takes Effect."

[150] An adviser to the USFK Military Advisory Group compared the Korean army at that time to the American Independence Army of 200 years ago. In other words, he pointed out that marksmanship training was the most urgent task for the ROK Army, which had insufficient weapons, and that the ROK Army could hardly be called an army except for a strong sense of national pride. The ROK military, which lacked marksmanship training, was showing a serious level of ammunition waste despite the lack of support from the United States, as revealed in a memorandum sent by the USFK military advisers to Defense Minister Shin Shin-mo. This is the book of Seoul Shimbun, 1979, pp. 120. and National History Compilation Committee, ed., Documents of the U.S. Military Advisers in Korea, (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee, 1999),

『Record Group 338, KMAG Box8 : Brig. General W.L. Roberts(Personal Correspondence)』,17, August, 1949,「Memorandum to Minister of National Defense」. Reference.

On the other hand, at that time, the ROK Army lacked human resources to the extent that it urgently appointed 60-year-old Kim Seok-won, who had avoided participating due to his experience in the Japanese army, as a brigadier general and appointed him as a division commander in the Ongjin area, which was the front line. However, Kim Seok-won, who was considered a war hero in Asia, was also evaluated by Brigadier General W. L. Roberts, head of the U.S. military advisory group, as inferior to a junior officer in the U.S. military in terms of military tactics and unit management. For this, see the National History Compilation Committee,

1999, Record Group 338, KMAG, Box 8, Brig General W. L. Roberts (Personal Correspondence, Memorandum) 1, August 1949, "Tactical Disposition of the 1st Division, Korean Army," ed. Record Group 59, Records of State Department, 25, March, 1950, Activities of Brig Gen. Kim Suk Won: Enclosure 1. Reference.

[151] At that time, North Korea also carried out a large-scale donation campaign for the purchase of airplanes, tanks, and ships, and on November 4, 1949, Pyongyang merchants donated 17 airplanes and 550,000 won. At the end of December, the total amount raised reached 281 million won, but they were not satisfied with this, so they issued "patriotic bonds" and forced farmers to donate grain, collecting a total of 48,400 kilns. Academy of Social Sciences of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Institute of History. Joseon History Vol. 24 (Pyongyang: Encyclopedia of Science Publishing House, 1981). pp. 284-285.

Against the backdrop of ideological resources such as the Constitution, land reform and compulsory education in elementary schools were promoted, and it was able to play the role of an appropriate mediator to reconcile the rivalry between social forces. In doing so, he sought to assimilate nationalist voices, which had been neglected in the face of national security issues, into the nation-building process. Rhee Seung-man, who had already used the title of the consul governor since the days of the Han Provincial Government, and in 1919 issued an administrative decree in the name of the consul governor of the provisional government of Shanghai[123] and issued public bonds[124, exercised veto-power over the Democratic Party of Korea on the basis of the Constitution and sought to establish a balance of power (status-quo) among the groups, and took reform measures. It was done. Through this, the bourgeoisie, which is the basis of the material and economic resources for the formation of the capitalist state, began to be produced[125), and the peasants, who constituted the majority of the people, benefited from land reform and compulsory elementary school education, and gradually became compliant with the Korean system, thus improving

[123])『신한민보』,1919 년 8 월 19 일「집정관 총재 이승만 각하의 공고문」.

[124])"이승만, 집정관 총재 행정령으로 공채표를 발행,"1919 년 9 월 4 일, 이현희,『대한민국 임시정부사』,(서 울: 집문당, 1982), pp. 486.

[125])이승만은 1948 년 3 월 28 일 미 육군 차관 윌리엄 드레이퍼(William H.Draper)와의 대화를 통해 한국이 증가하는 인구를 돌보기 위해 산업화 추진이 반드시 필요하다고 역설하였다. 삼일 후 남조선과도입법정부 공보부 는 드레이퍼의 말을 인용하여 미국 국무부가 한국인의 필수품과 대외 수출품을 대량 생산하는데 필요한 원료와 기계 부속품 수입에 관한 계획안을 준비하고 있으며 곧 미국 의회의 승인을 거쳐 실행될 것이라고 밝혔다고 발표하였다. 국사편찬위원회 편, 1999,『Record Group 335, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army』10, April 1948,「Conference between Under Secretary Draper and Mr. Syngman Rhee, on 28 March 1948」과 "서울신문" 3 월 31 일「공보부, 과도정부의 예산균형 등에 관한 미육군차관의 담화 발표」. 참조.

the vulnerability of material resources, the economy, and these ideological resources.

In addition, politicians who refused to participate in the founding of the country in 1948 also began to participate in the nation-building process through the election of the 2nd National Assembly on May 30, 1950, further compensating for the weakness of ideological resources. Thus, on June 25, 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Republic of Korea, which had replenished the minimum material and economic resources necessary for its survival as a nation and had been recognized for its political legitimacy, had achieved a fiscal surplus and was emerging from the stage of national collapse.

4. Structure and Feed of the Study

A. Structure of the Study

Chapter 1 is a study of Korean national theory, which has been divided into orthodoxy and revisionism.

He said that his research will focus on the theory of fragile states, a new theory that fits the reality of Korea. First, the formation of a new Third World state = human, material, economic, and ideological resources + international political relations + domestic politics is summarized as a combination of a mediator-like consul who coordinates the mutual relations between all the above-mentioned resources, and then the background and process of the formation of a vulnerable state in Korea during the US military regime and the early First Republic are summarized and a theoretical framework is presented. Lastly, the existing research, which has been carried out extensively through the structure, method, and historical materials of the research, has been organized in a clear manner according to the research topic and the type

of feed, focusing on the primary sources so that subsequent researchers can use them.

Chapter 2 examines that the US military administration, which was focused on achieving the goal of an early withdrawal through negotiations with the Soviet Union despite the constraints of the international political environment of the development of the Cold War, was forced to start from the limits of a vulnerable state from the beginning due to the lack of human, material and economic resources necessary to form a core state apparatus. The interaction of these various resources and their results were examined through the formation of the core state apparatus: the police, the military, the finance and the tax districts.

Chapter 3, The Beginning of the Civil War, examines how the Communist forces, supported by the Soviet Union and North Korea, mobilized from September 1946 and tried to overthrow the state under the cover of the chaos caused by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the home country and the outbreak of corruption in the face of a shortage of almost all resources, and the right-wing youth organizations that emerged to help the state became directly involved in the process of building the state around July 1947 in order to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly in May 1948, and the vice-Japanese bureaucrats continued to exist in the state apparatus.

Chapters 4 and 5 of the Republic of Korea's Nation-Building (1)-(2) are still The author describes a situation in which the centrists led by Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, who were concerned about the formation of a divided state due to the sudden decision to build a nation in the midst of a shortage situation, did not participate in the nation-building, and the accusations of the Soviet Union and North Korea building an anti-nationalist state by the United States, which succeeded Japan, were

circulated mainly in the Jeju 4.3 incident in 1948, which led to the failure to fully absorb nationalism from the birth of the state, leading to the development of a vulnerable state in the Republic of Korea. Accordingly, in order to absorb the elements of nationalism in the process of nation-building, the Republic of Korea, which had been forming a nation by maximizing its ideological resources through the enactment of the Constitution and the formation of the first Cabinet with a high degree of nationalism, described a situation in which the survival of the Republic of Korea as a nation was threatened by the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents that occurred in October 1948. Furthermore, in order to save the country, desperate efforts have been made beyond the legal and ethical dimensions, such as the enactment of the National Security Law, the abolition of the Special Committee on Anti-National Activities, and the insertion of members of the Korean Youth Corps into the field of national defense and security. On the other hand, it was examined that in this process, the Provisional Government's ideology of Sammyunism, national security, and the transitional ideological power resource of Ilminism, which included both aspects of the people's movement for nation-building, emerged, and efforts were made to mobilize the insufficient human, material, and economic resources of the state through informal state organizations. However, in the process of reviving the new state, officials and youth members, who were deeply aware of the weakness of the state, overreacted to the leftist propaganda that they were building an anti-nationalist state in order to conceal it, and exercised autocratic power over the people, thus reducing their ideological resources.

Nonetheless, Rhee Seung-man, the mediator of the First Republic, increased his physical, human and economic resources by carrying out social reforms such as land reform and compulsory state education in

elementary schools in order to regain nationalism and gain political legitimacy as a political mechanism in the face of a shortage of resources. In addition, the people's support for and sense of belonging to the state increased, and the autonomy of the state was expanded by equipping the capitalist class, which is the social mechanism of the modern state. In addition, the centrists who observed this changed their initial stance of refusing to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly and participated in the nation-building in earnest through the election of the 2nd National Assembly, showing that the minimum requirements for a state were gradually being fulfilled by achieving a balanced budget amid increasing political legitimacy.

Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing all of the above discussions, stating that all resources are absolute

In the process of forming a fragile state, which was carried out in seven stages in a state of scarcity, the state building was carried out without sufficient absorption of nationalism, and the vicious cycle of continuous efforts to make up for the lack of resources at each stage was repeated. In addition, it was written that these limitations that arose from the formation of a vulnerable state in the early days have still affected the present day, and that the current state has not completely escaped from the vulnerable state and that the nation-building is still in progress.

B. Research Feed

This study first reviews domestic and foreign historical documents, documents, and evidences used in previous studies, and adopts a historical methodology that seeks to identify the characteristics of the Korean nation-building process through complementary documentary research.

Focusing on the frequency of use of the main primary data in Korea to be adopted for this study

In summary, it is as follows.

First, the following is a list of historical sources that contain comprehensive data.

1. National History Compilation Committee (http://www.history.go.kr/), "History of Korea" and "Modern and Contemporary Korean Newspaper Materials" and "Records of the 1st and 2nd National Conferences" 2. National History Compilation Committee, 『Memoirs of Korean History: Korean Economic Policy Document 1: 1948.8-1949.12』, (Gwacheon: Sunin, 2010). 3. National History Compilation Committee, 『Memoirs of Korean History 2: Korean Economic Policy Data 2: 1950.1-1950.6』, (Gwacheon: Sunin, 2010). 4. National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, ed., 『Records of the South Korean Transitional Legislative Assembly』, (Seoul: Sunin Cultural History. 1999). 5. Jung Yong-wook, ed., Sourcebook of Political and Social History in the Immediate Aftermath of Liberation, Vol. 7-10 (Seoul: Attic, 1994). 6. Seoul Shimbun, 『30 Years of USFK
(1945-1978)," (Seoul: Haenglim Publishing House, 1979),

The following materials have been used for specific purposes. Economic Indicators: 1. Research Department of the Bank of Korea, Annals of the Korean Economy, (Bank of Korea, 1948), 2. Research Department, Bank of Korea, Economic Yearbook, (Bank of Korea, 1948), 3. Research Department, Bank of Korea, 『Economic Statistics of Korea』, (Bank of Korea, 1949), 4. Economic Yearbook, ed., Research Department, Bank of Korea, 1955), 5. Korea Development Bank Research Department, ed., A Decade of the Korean Economy, 1945-1955, (Bank of Korea Research Department, 1955). 6. Korea Federation of Financial

Unions, 『Korea Agricultural Annual』, (Korea Federation of Financial Unions, 1955).

Economic History: 1. Ministry of Finance, 『Retrospective of Finance and Finance: Achievements of the Tenth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic of Korea』, (Seoul: Ministry of Finance, 1958), 2. The Federation of Korean Industries, ed., 30 Years of Korean Economic Policy, (Seoul: History of Social Thought, 1975), 3. Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Korea, Ninety Years of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, (Seoul: Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1976), 4. Research Department, Korea Development Bank, 『A Decade History of the Korean Industrial Industry』, (Korea Development Bank, 1955).

Police: 1. Public Security Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, ed., Ten Years of Police (Public Security Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, 1958), 2. Public Security Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. History of the Korean Police (Seoul: Kwangmyung Printing Corporation, 1972). 3. Public Security Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, 『History of the Korean Police 2』, (Seoul: Public Security Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, 1973), Public Information Office: 1. Public Information Office, Bulletin No. 39, (Editorial Division, Publication Bureau, Ministry of Public Information, 1949), 2. Office of Public Information, Bulletin No. 52, (Editorial Division, Publication Bureau, 1950) Elections: 1. Central Election Commission, 『History of the Election of the Republic of Korea, Vol. 1』, (Central Election Commission, 1973), Education: 1. Ministry of Education,

『Outline of Education and Educational Administration』 (Chosun Kyohak Book Co., Ltd., 1946), as well as autobiographies and memoirs of those who lived in that era as oral materials

It will be utilized, and it is also organized by field as follows.

Politicians: 1. Written by Kim Koo and Compiled by Do Jin-soon, 『Baek Beom Eorok: The First Step of Peaceful Reunification, Baek Beom's Last Words and Writings』 (Seoul: Dol Pillow, 2007). 2. Written by Kim Koo and translated by Jin Soon Do. 『Baek Beom Diary for Easy Reading』, (Seoul: Dolpillow, 2011). Officials of the Right-Wing Organization: 1. Kim Doohan, 『The Blood-Stained Eve of the National Founding: Memoirs of Kim Doohan』, (Seoul: Yeonwoo Publishing House, 1963), 2. Kim Doohan, 『Kim Doohan's Autobiography (2)』, (Seoul: Met Law Seoul Holdings, 2002). 3. Sun Woo Ki-sung, 『The Life of an Activist』, (Seoul: Bae Young Sa, 1987), 4. Yoo Se-yeol and Kim Tae-ho; Okgye Yujinsan Teacher Memorial Project Edition,
Yoo Jin-san: Life, Thought, and Politics, (Seoul: President, 1984). 5. Lee Cheol-seung, 『National Hakryun』, (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbo, 1976).

Soldiers: 1. Kong Kuk-jin, An Old Soldier's Lament (Seoul: Wonmin, 2001), 2. Kim Jung-ryul, 『Alarm of Aviation: Memoirs of Kim Jung Jung』, (Seoul: Daehee, 2010), 3. Baek Sun-yup, Without My Country, I Am Without My Country, (Seoul: Monthly Army, 2010), 4. Lee Eung-jun, 『Ninety Years of Retrospective: The Autobiography of Lee Eung-jun』, (Seoul: Sanwoon Memorial Foundation, 1982), 5. Hanlim Lee, Memoirs of Hanlim Lee: The Turbulence of the Century, (Seoul: Pal Restoration Press, 1994), 6. Yoo Jae-heung, 『Turbulent Years: Memoirs of Yoo Jae-heung』, (Seoul: Eulyu Cultural History, 1994), 7. Ichi up. Stephen M. Talph Ball
That. General Lightning, (Seoul: Wonmin, 2001). 8. Chae Myung-shin, "Memoirs of Chae Myung-shin," (February 7, 2007), (Defense Daily Electronic Newspaper: 2007). 9. Jim Hausman, translated by Il-Hwa Chung, The U.S. Armed Forces That Moved the President of South Korea (Seoul: Hankookwon, 1995). 10. Kang Sung-jae, General Lee Jong-chan, (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo, 1987). Police, Prosecutors: 1. Jang Taek-sang,

『The Founding of the Republic of Korea and I: The Autobiography of Changrang Jang Taek-sang』, (Seoul: Changrang Jang Taek-sang Memory Foundation, 1992). 2. Cho Byung-ok, My Memoirs, (Seoul: Minsa, 1959). 3. Sunwoo Jongwon. 『Ideological Examination』, (Seoul: Keimyungsa, 1992).

Bureaucracy and General: 1. Ha-Young Choi, "Commissioner for Political Affairs Summons Korean Chief,"

Ang, August 1968, (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbo, 1968), 2. Lee Young-geun, "Yeo Woon-hyung's Frustration in 'Geon-jun'; Memoirs of the late Lee Young-geun, Chairman of the Unification Ilbo (above)," Monthly Chosun, September 1990, (Seoul: Chosun Ilbo) 3. Korea Institute of Spiritual Culture, ed., Institute of Korean Ethnic Culture, 『Oral Materials 1-3』, (Seoul: Sunin Book Publishing, 2001).

Next, I will compare the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union and examine the primary documents of the United States and the Soviet Union in as equal weight as possible in order to reconstruct the history as objectively as possible.

First, the overall position of the U.S. government is 1. FRUS(Foreign Relations of

the United States)1948-1950155) and DNSA(Declassified National Security [126]Archive) 2. NSC Report (National Security Council:U.S. National Security Council), 3. CIA Reprt(Central Intelligence Agency:U.S. Central Government). On the other hand, in order to examine the positions of the U.S. Department of State and local policymakers in South Korea, who led the Korean peninsula policy, 1. 『Record Group

[126])본 연구는 연구의 정확성을 위해 1948 년 8 월 17 일부터의 FRUS 의 번역은 국사편찬위원회의 번역본을 채 용했다. 이는 "국사편찬위원회(http://www.history.go.kr)"를 참조할 것.

59, General Records of the Department of State, 895 ((Internal Affairs of Korea) Series (National History Compilation Committee, National History Compilation Committee, U.S. Aid to Korea Documents 1-2, (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee, 2006)[127] and

2.『Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State" (U.S. Department of State's Overseas Diplomatic Documents) (National History Compilation Committee, National History Compilation Committee, U.S. Aid to Korea Documents 1-2』, (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee,

2006).[128]

In order to examine the position of the U.S. military and the USFK, which were stationed in Korea at the time, the following materials will be used. Official Reports from the U.S. Military Administration and the U.S. Forces Korea

The guns are as follows: 1. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), South Korean Interim Government Activities (hereinafter referred to as

By Summation Abbreviation) of Non-Military Activities. No.1-6. (1945.8-1946.3) Lee Gil-sang, 『Summation of U. S. Military Government Activities in Korea (SKIG Activities): Report on the Activities of the U.S. Military Government』, Vol. 1-6, (Seoul: Wonju

---

127)Record Group 59 문서 군에 대한 자료해제는 정병준, "미 국립문서 기록 관리청 소장 RG 59(국무부 일반문서) 내 한국 관련문서,", 국사편찬위원회 편, 『해외 사료총서 2: 미국 소재 한국사 자료 조사 보고 제 1 권』(과천: 국사편찬위원회, 2002),를 참조할 것.

128)본 연구가 인용하는 그레고리 헨더슨(Gregory Henderson)과 도날드 맥도날드(Donal McDonald)의 저 작에 등장하는 수많은 정보와 비공개문서(unclassified documents)의 상당수가 바로 이 Record Group 84 중 Entry 2845-2849 에 속하는 것들이다. Record Group 84 문서군에 대한 자료해제는 정병준, "미 국립문서 기록 관리청 소장 RG 84(국무부 재외 공관문서) 내 한국 관련문서,", 국사편찬위원회 편, 『해외 사료총서 2: 미국 소재 한국사 자료 조사 보고 제 1 권』(과천: 국사편찬위원회, 2002),를 참조할 것.

Cultural History, 1990), 2. Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific(CINCAPAC), Summation of U. S.
Military Government Activities in Korea. No.7-15(1946.3-1947.7). Lee Gil-sang, 『Summation of U.S. Military Government Activities in Korea (SKIG Activities)』, Vol. 1-6, (Seoul: Wonju Cultural History,
1990). 3. Commander in Chief, Far East(CINCFE), Summation of U.
S. Military Government Activities in Korea. No.16-22(1946.3-1947.7). Lee Gil-sang, 『Summation of U. S. Military Government Activities in Korea (SKIG Activities)』, vols. 1-6, (Seoul: Wonju Cultural History, 1990), 4. USAMGIK (History of the United States Army Military Government in Korea), South Korean Interim Government Activities. No.23-34(1947.8-1948.8). Lee Gil-sang, 『Summation of U.S. Military Government Activities in Korea (SKIG Activities)』, Vol. 1-6, (Seoul: Wonju Cultural History,
1990), 5. HUSAFIK (History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea 1-4), (Seoul: Dolpillow, 1988). 6. HQ, USAFIK G-2 periodic report Vol. 1-7 (USFK Information Journal: hereinafter abbreviated as P/R), (September 9, 1945-June 17, 1949), (Chuncheon: Center for Asian Culture, Hallym University, 1988-1989). 7.
HQ, USAFIK G-2 weekly summary Vol. 1-5 (USFK Weekly Information Summary: hereinafter abbreviated as W/S), (September 9, 1945-November 26, 1948), (Chuncheon: Center for Asian Cultural Studies, Hallym University, 1990). 8. National History Compilation Committee, ed., Documents of the U.S. Military Advisers in Korea, (Gwacheon: National Historical Committee, 1999).

The following is a document containing reports and documents prepared by U.S. military officials.

Enemies. 1. George M. McCune Postwar and Politics of

Korea(Journal of Politics, Vol. IX ,1947), 2. George M. McCune, Korea Today, (Cambrige: Harvard University. Press, 1950), 3. Grant, E Meade, American Military Government of Korea (New-York : King's Crown, 1951), ; Grant Meade, translated by Ahn Jong-chul, History of U.S. Forces Korea, (Seoul: Community, 1993). 4. Lenoard C. Hoag; Shin Bok-ryong, translated by Kim Won-duk. The Report on the Division of Korea: American Military Government in Korea, (Seoul: Pulvit. 1992).[158] 5. Paul McGrath, U.S. Department of Defense, Albert Wedemeyer; Shin Bok-ryong, translated by Kim Won-duk. Under the Korean Division Report: American Military Government in Korea』, (Seoul: Pulvit. 1992).[159]

In addition, in order to examine the position of the Soviet side, the Soviet Foreign Ministry:

Reference will be made to the primary secret documents of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Defense. 1. Park Jong-hyo, ed., 『Korean Policy Data of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation I』, (Seoul: Sunin, 2010) 2. National History Compilation Committee, "Soviet Military Administration Documents of the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Report on the Situation in South Korea", National History Compilation Committee (http://www.history.go.kr/), 3. National History Compilation Committee, translated by Jeon Hyun-so, 『Shtykov Diary』, (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee, 2007).

Finally, I would like to review the works that were commonly adopted by orthodox and revisionist studies as secondary sources, and the list is as follows. 1. Written by Gregory Henderson. Park Haeng-woong. Translated by Lee Jong-sam. Korean Politics in the Whirlwind:

KOREA The Politics Of The Vortex, (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2000). 2. Written by Donald Stone MacDonald. Korean Historical Research Association

Moved in 1950. 20 Years of U.S.-ROK Relations (1945-1965) From Liberation to Self-Reliance:

U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance』,(Seoul: Hanul

158) This book is a translation of a report commissioned by Dr. Hogg, a professor at Middlebury College, for the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH, Department of Defense).

159) Each of these books is a translation of the following declassified secret documents: 1. Paul McGrath, U.. S.. Army in the Korean Conflicts, Record Group 407(Manuscript), Record Group 332, Box 45. (Office of the Chief of Military History: OCMH, Department of Defense, 1953). 2. U.S. Department of Defense, The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945. (U.S Department of Defense, 1955). 3. Trusteeship, Record Group 332, Boxes 29&65, Report of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea, Record Group 165: ABC 014 Japan. 4. Report of US Delegation on US-USSR Joint Commission(20, August, 1947), Record

Group 332, Box 66. 5. Albert Wedemeyer, Report to the President Submitted by Lt. Gen, A. C.

Wedemeyer: Korea, September 1947, (USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1951). 6. Report of the Special

Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea, (Feb, 1947), Record Group 165: ABC 014 Japan.

Academy, 2001). 3. Written by Richard D. Robinson. Translated by Jung Mi-ok. The U.S. Betrayal: The U.S. Military Administration and South Korea (Seoul: Science and Thought, 1988). 4. Robert Tarbel Oliver, 1954 Syngman Rhee : The Man Behind the Myth, (New York :

Mead ; London : R. Hale), ; Written by Robert Oliver; Translated by Hwang Jung-il. Lee Seung-man: A Mythical Figure, (Seoul: Konkuk University Press, 2002).

II. Nation-building by the U.S. military

As already mentioned above, the U.S. military government is necessary to form a core national apparatus.

In the face of a shortage of human resources, material and economic resources, and the constraints of the international political environment of the development of the Cold War, the Korean government had to accept the nationalist aspirations of the Korean people and proceed with nation-building, so it had no choice but to start from the limits of a vulnerable country. For example, since Korea was only the seventh most important country in its global strategy to the U.S. government, they focused on building a unified modern nation-state on the Korean Peninsula through negotiations with the Soviet Union and withdrawing as quickly as possible, and the period from August 1945 to September 1946 was extremely chaotic when the U.S. did not provide sufficient resources. Nonetheless, as will be explained later, the United States could not resist international opinion that it should help the newly independent nations formed after World War II to establish nation-states.

Therefore, the U.S. military administration in the field, despite the lack of resources, has developed the will and will of the Koreans.

Reflecting nationalist ideology as much as possible, he strongly expressed his will to help build a nation-state after the US military administration. For example, they pushed for reform in the education sector, eliminated as many unemployed bureaucrats as possible from high-ranking positions, and increased the number of Korean-American officials with experience in the independence movement. Politically, pointing out that a de facto Cold War was unfolding on the Korean peninsula through the actions of the Soviet Union, which was rapidly building a state in the North Korean region, the DPRK accepted the

insistence of Rhee Seung-man and the rightists to form a government in South Korea to respond to the North Korean region, and tried to reflect the nationalist demands of the Korean people as much as possible through measures such as reinstating the Buil police from the beginning of 1946 and establishing the South Korean National Defense Guard, and deliberately appointing centrist nationalists as elected members of the South Korean Legislative Assembly at the time of the establishment of the South Korean Transitional Legislative Assembly. In other words, the U.S. military government, which could not go against the public opinion of the international community, tried to respect nationalist sentiments in order to mobilize resources domestically and to gain political legitimacy. Therefore, from the beginning, the US military regime had to start with a process of constant debate, conflict, and compromise between the US government and the nationalists.

However, the withdrawal of one of the three divisions of the USFK in accordance with the order of demobilization from the home country created a vacuum in all administrations, and in particular, the newly recruited Korean human resources could not adequately fill the reduction in personnel in the field of security and security, resulting in a shortage of about 10,000 Korean personnel, and in September and October 1946, leftist forces staged nationwide strikes and demonstrations. Accordingly, the U.S. government began to actively express its intention to build a nation in 1947 and increased the scale of economic aid to South Korea, and the U.S. military government also outlawed the Communist Party and began to increase the size of the Korean National Defense Police and the police.

From July 1947 to 1948, when the Second U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission was dissolved,

In August of this year, for a period of about a year, with the help of increased support from the United States, Korea began a full-fledged nation-building process in order to lay the foundation for Korea to survive as a liberal democracy without becoming communist. For about three years, from August 1945 to August 1948, when the U.S. military administration entered Korea, the terms of the resources were as follows. All of them.

First, in the case of human resources, there was an absolute shortage of American personnel who exercised policy-making authority and Korean personnel who assisted them, both in terms of number and quality.

First, the U.S. administration hastily decided to divide the Korean Peninsula and thus a long-term occupation

The [129]U.S. military did not have a policy and landed on the Korean peninsula without sufficient preparations. [130] Of the 120 members of the military administration team that arrived in Korea through the port of Incheon on September 11, 1945 with the second team of the 7th Division, only 30 officers had only some military experience, and the military personnel who arrived from October 20 were mainly trained people who had aimed at landing in the Philippines or Japan. The subsequent military government units that continued to land until January 1946 also had only military personnel who could only take care of temporary management of welfare and relief, so there was an absolute shortage of personnel who could be in charge of actual administration in both the central and local areas.

In particular, those who have received administrative training or have business experience among military personnel,

---

[129])FRUS 1945, VI, pp.657-660, 1039.

[130])당시 한반도에 상륙한 미군은 체제 상 제 24 군단과 미군정으로 나뉘어져 있었고, 제 24 군단은 제 6, 7, 40 보병사단과 지원부대로 구성되어 있었다.

In addition, there was a shortage of professional manpower, such as engineers in the mining industry that required special skills, among the government jobs that were taken over by the U.S. military government.[131]As a result, a U.S. military sergeant who worked as a railroad dispatcher in the U.S. suddenly became the manager of a cement factory, a chemical factory, a coal mine, etc., or[132] a situation in which the commanders of the U.S. military field forces, who were only counting the dates of their discharge, became governors or ministers of local provinces[133].

On the contrary, immediately after liberation, the communists in the Korean Peninsula region were friendly to them.

The Soviet Union, which occupied North Korea with the clear goal of establishing a state of statehood[134135,] immediately after August 15, 1945, dispatched Koreans with Soviet nationality to key administrative and judicial positions, as well as important positions in the military, police, and educational circles.[136137] In addition, it did not send back key Japanese flag fighters, but kept them in their original positions, and made great efforts to rebuild the North Korean industry, such as hiring Japanese war criminals.[138] Thus, in the case of North Korea, the problem of lack of human resources was relatively less serious than in South Korea. In addition, in order to help Kim Il-sung, who was facing many

---

[131])HUSAFIK 『주한 미군사』 3, 1988.,pp. 155.

[132])핸더슨. 2000. pp. 220-222.

[133])핸더슨. 2000. pp. 334.

[134])1946 년 3 월 서울에서 개최된 미소 공동위원회 개최 당시 소련 측 수석대표의 발언을 인용한 맥도널드.

[135] . pp. 69.

[136])박종효 편역,「1950 년 2 월 23 일 북조선 외무성에서 조선 주재 소련 대사관에 보낸 외교문서」,2010. pp.

[137] -453.

[138])로빈슨. 1988. pp. 232.

difficulties due to his lack of administrative experience, he sat down with Soviet economic experts to explain how to draw up the plan for the development of the national economy in 1947 and gave specific instructions on the points to be considered when drawing up the plan, and discussed specific measures to deal with the shortage of funds in the areas of daily necessities and finance.[139] The inability of the U.S. military government to secure personnel to manage the administration of the state continued until 1946, so the formal establishment of the U.S. military government in charge of civilian administration did not take shape until the beginning of 1946, and the administration of the U.S. military government was not established until the end of 1946.[140][141]Since the situation in the provinces was worse than in the center[142], it was inevitable that the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Republic and the People's Republic, which were in charge of the actual administration, would coexist with the US government. At that time, the occupation of the provinces by the U.S. military government was 1. Provisional dispatch of inspection teams to observe the situation→2. Occupation by tactical units→3. It consisted of three stages of occupation through the observation of military administration personnel with administrative powers, and by December 1945, the 6th Division (South Jeolla Province, North Jeolla Province, and Jeju Island) and the 7th Division (Seoul, Gyeonggi Province, Gangwon Province, South Chungcheong Province and North Chungcheong Province), and the occupation by the 40th Division (South and North Gyeongsang Provinces) was mainly only a

[139])국사편찬위원회, 전현수 역, 2004,「1946 년 1 월 3 일-1 월 4 일」, pp. 69-70.
[140])이혜숙.『미군정기 지배구조와 한국사회: 해방이후 국가-시민사회 관계의 역사적 구조화』,(서울: 선인,
[141]). pp. 605.
[142])Hoag, 1992, pp. 158-160.

tactical occupation in the second stage. In this way, due to the lack of numbers and quality of military personnel with administrative powers, the last three stages were delayed, and only the first and second stages were completed, resulting in a transitional state.

Nonetheless, the U.S. military mobilized overseas at home The work was underway, and the USFK soldiers were also hoping for a speedy repatriation. In fact, the USFK, which had been stationed in Korea with the promise of a speedy withdrawal, was delayed in implementing the troop reduction plan at home and the US government failed to clarify the size of the USFK to be stationed during the remainder of the occupation, so when the US Secretary of the Army, Robert Peterson, visited Seoul, he sent a representative to Seoul to formally protest.[143] Accordingly, the U.S. military government began a full-scale demobilization operation in May 1946, starting with the withdrawal of the 40th Division, which had occupied the Gyeongsang-do area, to its home country on March 15, 1946.[144] By the end of October 1946, the total size of the tactical army and the military administration had been reduced to less than half of what it had been by October 1945, and the number of military personnel who were responsible for the operation of the military administration as heads of departments in the central and local administrations had also been reduced by about 23 percent. As a result, by October 1946, there were about 40,000 vacancies compared to the beginning of the U.S. military administration.

jealousy	Tactical Forces	Military Personnel	sum

[143])FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 년 1 월 13 일「Memorandum on press conference questions」.
[144])맥도널드. 2001. pp. 112.

Oct. 45			77,643 people
January '46	54,331 people	4,212 people	58,743 people
May '46	52,119 people	4,808 people	56,927 people
October 46	34,197 people	3,721 people	37,918 people
July 47	41,340 people	3,231 people	44,571 people

Table II-1) Changes in the size of the U.S. tactical military and military personnel in 1945-47 (173)

Their vacancies were particularly acute in the field of tactical forces, which are responsible for national defense and public security, making it difficult for the state to monopolize violence. However, the number of police, Korean defense guard, and South Korean military personnel who had to fill these vacancies in the U.S. military was far below this. The number of police officers at that time was 22,620 and 26,386 in June 1946 and January 1947, respectively, while the number of the Korean Guard and Coast Guard was 6,464 in November 1946, about 30,000 people, less than 10,000 for the 40,000 vacancies.[174] In the case of Korean human resources mobilized due to the sudden increase in personnel, more than half of them were in their 20s or older, who were increasingly young and inexperienced in the provinces and low-level bureaucracies. For example, according to a study that categorized the U.S. military government officials, Seoul city officials, and local government employees by age distribution group, the middle

173) George M. McCune, Korea Today, (Cambrige: Harvard University. Press, 1950), pp.74 and Park Chan-pyo, 2007. pp. 214.

174) CINCAPAC SKIG Activities No. 10, No. 14 ; Lee Gil-sang, Report on the Activities of the U.S. Military Administration, Vol. 2, 1990. CINCFE SKIG Activities No. 18, No. 19; Lee Gil-sang, Report on the Activities of the U.S. Military Administration, Vol. 3, 1990. CINCFE SKIG Activities No. 22; Lee Gil-sang, Report on the Activities of the U.S. Military Administration, Vol. 4, 1990.

In the case of Korean government officials, 46.5 percent were in their 20s, while 10.1 percent were in their 20s or younger.[145] The South Korean Communist Party staged a massive Soviet-funded strike in late September and October, and[146] the U.S. military government had no choice but to accept their cooperation when right-wing youth groups spontaneously stepped forward to support the Soviet Union-backed leftists' violent acts.

Haji blamed the riots on the Soviets and the left to seize power. By focusing on the international political context, the cause was 1. Rapid urbanization and industrialization, 2. Wartime mobilization and economic collapse of 1937-45, 3. Population is the same, 4. As Henderson, who refers to the lack of leadership in the first year after liberation, points out in points 2 and 4[147], the fundamental problem of human resource shortage was linked to the international political context.

Second, the problem of lack of material and economic resources was also serious, which in turn led to the lack of state administrative capacity due to the lack of human resources, which led to the lack of state finances due to the lack of tax collection.

---

[145])조기안, 『미군정기의 정치행정체제 : 구조분석 : 조직·법령·자원을 중심으로』, (서울: 아람, 2003). pp. 76-79, 177-179. ; 원구환, 「미군정기 한국 관료제의 소극적 대표성」, 『행정논총』 제 41 권, 제 4 호(2003 년 12 월호), (서울: 서울대학교 한국행정연구소, 2003), pp. 51-74.

[146])국사편찬위원회, 전현수 역, 2004, 「1946 년 9 월 28 일」, pp. 20.

[147])핸더슨. 2000, pp. 232.

On January 30, 1947, Edwin Martin, Director of the Economic Division of the U.S. Department of State, pointed out that although Japan had done a lot for industrial development after the occupation of the Korean Empire, it was for the sake of Japan's interests, so when the United States entered Korea, the Korean people were starving, so the first project of the United States in Korea was to provide relief supplies to the starving people.[148] V. A Arnold, the commander of the U.S. military administration, also expressed the weakness of Korea's material and economic resources at that time, stating in a conversation with Pak Hun-yong at the U.S. Military Administration on November 13, 1945 that Korea needed a production base, but that production was in a state of paralysis due to strikes in various parts of South Korea.179)

In fact, [149]on January 5-6, 1944, Tanaka, the vice-governor of the Governor-General of Korea, said in an exclusive press conference with the Kyungsung Ilbo that the entire administrative power of Korea was concentrating on strengthening the productive forces to strengthen the war potential,[150] and the diplomatic documents of the Soviet Union, which were evaluating Japanese rule at the time, also showed that the size of the land owned by Japan increased more than sevenfold due to Japan's colonial policy of taking farmland from Korean peasants through the injection of Japanese capital and Japanese immigration, and the peasant and rural economy, which accounted for 80% of the total Korean

[148])박종효 편역, 2010,「미국 국무성 한, 일 과장의 방송내용」,pp. 233-234.
[149])박종효 편역, 2010,「남조선 미 24 군사령관 하지와 박헌영 회견: 1945 년 11 월 13 일 남조선 미군청장 아 놀그와 박헌영이 12 일 2 시부터 3 시 30 분까지 미 군정청에서의 대화」, pp. 175.
[150])박종효 편역, 2010,「1944 년 1 월 5-6 일(경성일보)」, pp. 233-234.

population and 70% of the economy[151,] collapsed. It was pointed out that inflation was already being detected.[152)]

Due to the fragility of these material and economic resources, the country's revenue estimates at that time were mostly dependent on government and property revenues, and tax revenues were extremely negligible.

C. In fact, the proportion of regular tax revenues from the US military was extremely small, about 20 percent, of the fiscal revenue of the state, so the problem of material and economic resources due to the lack of revenue arose in all provinces.[153]Because of this fundamental deprivation of material and economic resources, an abnormal structure emerged in which the country's finances became dependent on U.S. aid. However, the U.S. military administration focused on a passive status quo policy that focused on temporary management rather than the development of the national economy.[154155)]

On the other hand, due to the lack of human resources with administrative power, combined with material and economic weakness, even after the inauguration of the South Korean Transitional Legislative Government, the collection of taxes was only 50%-65% of the average monthly tax revenue originally expected. [156157)] The U.S. military government found that the problem was aggravated by the delay in tax

---

151)박종효 편역, 2010,「일본의 조선 식민지정책(1): 8)농민」,pp. 153.

152)박종효 편역, 2010,「일본의 조선 식민지정책(2): 3)재정」, pp. 157.

153)CINCFE, SKIG Activities No. 18. ; 이길상,『미군정 활동 보고서』3 권, 1990. pp. 40.

154)이는 HUSAFIK 제 6 권, “Republic of Korea Economic Summation, No. 36, 1948.9-10,”,1988. pp.9 와 같은 자료를 이용한 조기안. 2003. pp. 194 중 <표 6-4> 귀속재산의 추정가치를 참조.

155)FRUS 1948, 1948 년 9 월 7 일「미국 국무부 점령지역 차관보 살쯔만의 대한경제원조 정책안에 대한 비 망록」, pp. 1292~1298.

156)USAMGIK, SKIG Activities No. 27. pp. 135.

157)FRUS 1947, VI, 1947 년 12 월 13 일「Langdon to Lovett」. pp.877-878.

collection due to the complex tax collection system, which prevented efficient tax collection. Therefore, in order to improve the technology of effective taxation, the tax collection system that made the most of the tax system of the Japanese colonial period was overhauled six times. However, this problem of lack of economic resources was not resolved until December 31, 1947, at the end of the U.S. military administration, so William Langdon, who was a political adviser to Hodge, was involved in South Korean politics at the time. He pointed to the economic situation as "politically excited, violent, and economically barely alive."[187] North Korea, on the other hand, was increasing its material and economic resources under the active intervention of the Soviet Union. First, on March 5, 1946, land reform was carried out, distributing more than 1 million hectares of land free of charge to poor peasant tenants, increasing the area under cultivation and increasing yields. On June 27, 1946, the Spot Tax Law, which had previously paid 50-70% of the rent including tenant fees and taxes, was improved through the enactment of the Spot Tax Law, which provided that 25% of the harvest was collected in kind.[158] In August 1946, industry, transportation, telecommunications, and banking were established.[159] In addition, because these measures strengthened the weak material and economic foundation, the situation was much better than in South Korea. For example, North Korea continued to supply essential energy to South Korean industries after liberation, but the U.S. military was unable to pay the electricity bills requested by the Soviet military command in North Korea several times due to economic and material vulnerabilities. In the end, on June 17, 1947, the U.S. military agreed to pay the fees used from 1945 to May 31, 1947

[158])박종효 편역, 2010,「미, 소 공동위원회 소련대표단의 보고서(5 월 21 일-10 월 21 일)」, pp.385.
[159])박종효 편역, 2010,「1947 년 1 월 21 일 연해주 군관구 사령부에서 외무성에 보낸 남, 북 조선의 정세 보 고서: 북조선 정세」,pp. 237.

in goods within six months. On December 17, 1947, only 6% of each item, They only paid 12 percent and 22 percent.190)

Third, the U.S. military government is facing an absolute shortage of human, material, and economic resources.

In order to achieve the goal of the speedy withdrawal of US forces, the ROK had no choice but to acknowledge the nationalist sentiments of the Korean people to a certain extent and increase its ideological power resources.

At that time, the US military administration lacked material and economic resources, and since the bourgeoisie was absent as the social mechanism of the capitalist state, it had no choice but to secure political legitimacy through negotiations with the Koreans, which eventually became a political mechanism. Of course, from the beginning, the U.S. military government did not have nationalist legitimacy for the Koreans, but if it did not accept the minimum nationalist demands, it would not be able to mobilize its ideological power resources, which were almost the only resources of power that the ROK possessed at the time.

Accordingly, the U.S. military government deliberately appointed human resources with nationalist causes such as the anti-Japanese struggle to high-ranking management positions as much as possible, and in order to fill the administrative vacuum caused by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from March 1946, the U.S. military administration increased the number and authority of Korean officials, and used terms related to the ideology of the provisional government, Sammyunism, and promoted educational reform, which was one of the nationalist demands that the U.S. military government could accept. And, through this, by instilling in the consciousness of Koreans a sense that Koreans are beginning to participate directly in military affairs,[191] it enhances a sense of belonging to the state and invites voluntary participation in nation-

building. It sought to overcome the fragility of material and economic resources.

First, recognizing the nationalist sentiments of the Korean people, the U.S. military government tried to appoint Koreans with experience in the anti-Japanese struggle to high-ranking positions in the core organization of the U.S. military government to participate in nation-building. Next, the U.S. military government deliberately adopted the ideology of the Provisional Government

---

[190] Pak Jong-hyo, 2010, "The Actual Situation of Electricity Transferred from North Korea to South Korea, Prepared by Advisor Lupov, Far East 1 Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, January 2, 1948," pp. 267. 191)FRUS 1945, VI, pp.1069.

The related terms "equality" and "Hongik people" were deliberately used in the process of reforming education policies in order to gain the favor of the Korean people. Finally, as will be explained later, the US military government sought to harness its ideological power resources by officially sponsoring centrist youth organizations such as the Korean National Youth League, which was founded mainly by former members of the Provisional Government and had legitimacy instead of far-right anti-communist youth organizations. In the first place, Hodge, Langdon and other U.S. military officials, who disarmed 120,000 Japanese troops on September 9, 1945, and established a military government, had suspended Japanese colonial officials for the time being. However, when the Koreans strongly opposed this, and on September 11, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee of the State Department, the Ministry of the Army, and the Ministry of the Navy ordered the immediate resignation of the Japanese colonial officials, and a week later, on September 18, 109 U.S. military officers, who were not fully prepared, were appointed as directors and were hastily put in. Soon after, on

October 13, the Initial Basic Decree of Korea, approved by the Three-Provincial Coordination Committee, was delivered to the U.S. military government, which stipulated that in order to gradually eradicate all remnants of Japanese imperialism from the lives of Koreans, all Japanese laws, orders, and regulations should be abolished, and all Japanese, pro-Japanese, and non-Japanese collaborators who remained in public institutions should be reorganized politically and administratively.
192)

Eventually, Hodge, Langdon, and other U.S. military officials, who were forced to accept some of the nationalist sentiments of the Koreans, soon came to believe that the U.S. military withdrawal was possible only if the Koreans who were opposed to the trusteeship approved the provisional government of Kim Koo and Rhee Seung-man, to whom they had given legitimacy, and formed a government and transferred power.[193] Accordingly, on October 15, 1945, the military administration police and tactical units under the command of the 6th Division of the U.S. Forces Korea clashed with the People's Committee of Namwon and the Armed Forces Reserve Corps in Namwon, and it was necessary to recruit police personnel to be responsible for public security.

---

192)FRUS 1945, VI, pp.1074-1075.

193)FRUS 1945, VI, 18 November 1945, "Langdon to Byrnes". pp.1129-1133; FRUS 1945, VI, 25 November 1945, "Hodge to MacArthur." pp.1133-1134; FRUS 1945, VI, 26 November 1945, "Langdon to Byrnes." pp.1134-1136.

When it became possible, it was decided to give priority to the appointment of people from the Provisional Government.

However, when there were setbacks in the process, the US military government appointed Cho Byung-ok and Jang Taek-sang, who had experience in the anti-Japanese movement, as commissioners of the

National Police and the Metropolitan Police Agency. In addition, in November 1945, the U.S. military government established the Korean Employee Inspection Committee to examine the pro-Japanese or transfer activities of incumbent officials and civil servants and to exclude them from public service, and in December 1945, the U.S. military administration appointed Korean officials as directors jointly with American military officials to expand the recruitment of Koreans and their participation in nation-building.

All of them.

However, due to the lack of human resources, mid- and lower-level officials had no choice but to appoint a large number of bureaucrats with experience in the Japanese government, especially in areas such as the police, finance, and taxation organizations, which required specialized skills. As a result, public support for the U.S. military government declined and nationalist ideological resources eroded. This is in contrast to the case of North Korea, where the Soviet Union was able to supply a large number of human resources and was able to arrest and imprison 185 former military police officers and police officers during the Japanese colonial era.[160] In addition, in the case of North Korea, the Central Party School, a training school for Party cadres, was established on June 1, 1946, and a total of 707 Party cadres were trained by 1948, thereby disseminating communism and supplementing the problem of human and ideological resources.[161] In this way, North Korea, with the full support of the Soviet Union, which was active in nation-building much earlier than the United States, had a relatively less serious problem

[160])박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 4 월 21 일 북조선 김책이 조선 주재 소련 대리대사 이그니찌예프에게 보낸 외교문서」, pp. 447.

[161])박종효 편역, 2010,「소련이 1945 년 8 월 15 일 이후 북조선에 파견하여 조선에서 근무하는 소련국적 고 려인에게 북조선 정부가 훈장수여 동의를 소련정부에 요청한 고려인 명단」, pp. 495.

of vulnerability of human, material, economic, and ideological resources than South Korea.

Next, the U.S. military government used the "Hong" to express the founding ideology of the Provisional Government.

The term "pterodactyl" was used consciously. This began when Ahn Jae-hong, who was well versed in Sammyunism, proposed the "Plan for Cultivating the Citizens of a Democratic Country Based on the Founding Ideals of Hongik People" at the Education Deliberation Session of the U.S. Military Administration.

All of them.[162]As a result, whenever the education reform policy was implemented during the period of the military administration, the expression that it was based on the educational philosophy of Hongik-man was frequently used. For example, when the Academic Affairs Bureau of the county government changed the name of a school, it stated that it had established a new academic system in order to place an emphasis on science education under the educational philosophy of Hongik-man[163, or that it had "submitted a decision on a new education to enhance the founding ideology of Hongik-man[164]", "democratization of school education to implement the true democratic education of Korea by Hongik-man"),[165 and "elementary education that will move forward vigorously under the slogan of Hongik-man's education"[166]).

Nonetheless, between the end of December 1945 and the beginning of January 1946, Koreans angered by the new policy of tak rule staged a massive strike under the direction of the Provisional

---

[162])『동아일보』,1945 년 12 월 20 일「교육 심의 본회의, 교육이념 심의」.
[163])『동아일보』,1946 년 2 월 24 일「국정청 학무국, 학교 칭호변경」.
[164])『서울신문』,1946 년 3 월 5 일「교육 심의회 총회, 신교육을 위한 최종 결정안 학무국에 이관」.
[165])『동아일보』,1946 년 4 월 17 일「문교부, 학교교육의 민주화를 위해 교육심의회에 자문구함」.
[166])『동아일보』,1946 년 6 월 8 일「경기도 학무과, 초등교육 상황 보고회 개최」.

Government[167], and Korean officials who were employed in the police and other state organizations also participated in large numbers. Thus, while formally warning Koreans that violent protests and political unrest would guarantee the implementation of trusteeship, the U.S. military government unofficially persuaded Kim Koo and Rhee that trusteeship was not an indispensable part of the Moscow Agreement. Furthermore, Hodge's public statement that independence would be granted immediately after the establishment of the Provisional Government ended the four-day chaos when Kim ordered the return of Koreans serving in the U.S. military administration.[168] Accordingly, the U.S. military administration began on January 14, 1946.

In the process of its establishment, consideration was given to people from the Provisional Government to the highest positions from the negotiation stage. Accordingly, even when recruiting people from the Japanese military to make up for the lack of human resources, human relations with those from the Provisional Government were considered as the top priority. Kim Koo, who led the de facto coup, was also appointed prime minister of the South Korean Democratic Party, which was established as an advisory body to the U.S. military government about a month later, on 14 February.[169] Chung Byung-joon claimed that Kim Koo had lost the favor of the top leaders of the US military government, including Haji, as a result of the coup attempt[170], but if this argument were accepted, it would have been impossible if the US government had not respected the political legitimacy of Kim Koo and

[167])FRUS 1945, VI, 1945 년 12 월 30 일「Hodge to MacArthur. pp.1154.
[168])Matray, 1989, pp. 90-93.
[169])로빈슨. 1988. pp. 115.
[170])정병준,『우남 이승만 연구』, (서울: 역사비평사, 2005). pp. 511.

the Provisional Government's experience in the struggle for independence.

With the support of the U.S. military government, Lee Seung-man and Kim Koo are in fact

If we look at Article 27 of the Democratic House of Representatives' policy, which was evaluated as a demonstration of the mobilization of right-wing forces, we can find traces of the Provisional Government's embrace of the Three Mysteries pursued by the Provisional Government in order to overcome the reality of the human, material, and economic vulnerability that Korea was facing at the time with ideological resources. In fact, in a leaflet distributed in the name of the Provisional Government shortly after his return, Kim Gu declared, "The official government established in the country will be organized according to the new charter based on the principles of an independent state, a democratic government, and an equal society."[171)]

1) to build an equal society of independent nations based on the principle of full political, economic and educational equality of all peoples, and 6) to rebuild our economy and industry within the recent limits and to implement a planned economy in order to produce important daily necessities. 7) Major heavy industry, mines, livelihoods, utilities, banks, ironworks, telecommunications, water supply, fisheries, electricity and transportation, etc., shall be state-owned, 8) State supervision of all commercial and industrial enterprises shall be established to ensure the fair welfare of consumers, sellers and producers; 9) All confiscated land shall be redistributed according to the peasants' ability to cultivate; 10) Land of large landowners shall be redistributed according to the same principle, 17) Compulsory education shall be instituted at the expense of the State; 19) Established a system of horse-and-mortar and social

171)『전단』,1945 년 9 월 3 일「김구, 임정의 당면정책과 국내외 동포에게 고하는 성명 발표」.

insurance for all workers and sharecroppers, 20) Enacted a minimum wage law, and 23) established a six-hour workday for all women and children under 16 years of age, and an eight-hour workday for men and women.[172)]

On the other hand, equality in education was something that the Provisional Government, based on Sammyunism, emphasized that the construction of education was the most urgent thing at present, and the U.S. military government[173] [also] consciously repeated the term "equality of education" in an effort to accommodate the aspirations of the Korean people, who were eager for educational opportunities that they could not have due to the racially discriminatory policies of the Japanese Colonial Period.[174][175] In fact, the Korea Independence Party, which was on the verge of returning to Korea, stated that the party's platform was "In particular, throughout the entire process of the founding of the country and the government, the consistent goal of the party is to build a new democratic country based on equality in politics, economy, and education, and at the same time to realize the equality of the national and women's nations of the tribal people, and to further move toward the course of the world family." He said.209)

Accordingly, the policies of the various political parties and social organizations that were competing for the Provisional Government also strongly advocated the establishment of compulsory elementary school

---

[172])『조선일보』,1946 년 3 월 19 일「민주의원, 임시정책 대강 발표」.

[173]) 당시 미군정의 교육부장이었던 유억겸과 피텐져(A. Pittenger)중령은 1946 년 7 월 13 일 “현하 조선에서 가장 긴급한 것이 교육의 건설이다.”라고 밝히고 있었다.『대동신문』,1946 년 7 월 14 일.;서울대학교 40 년 사 편찬위원회,『서울대학교 40 년사 1946-1986』,(서울대출판부, 1986), pp. 13.에서 재인용.

[174]) 김용일,「미군정의 교육정책과 서울교육」,『향토 서울』제 71 호 (2008 년 2 월호), (서울특별시사편찬위 원회, 2008), pp. 136-137.

[175])『전단』,1945 년 8 월 28 일「재 중경한독당 제 5 차 임시대표대회, 선언 당강 당책 발표」,

education in order to improve the elementary school enrolment rate, which stood at 47% at the time of August 15, 1945. In addition, many of them emphasized unemployment education in order to nurture human resources necessary for economic reconstruction at the time, and they also went one step further and insisted on equal access to secondary and higher education, which was not possible under the economic conditions of the time. For example: Immediately after liberation, the majority of Koreans hoped for the realization of equal educational opportunities due to the discriminatory education policies implemented during the Japanese colonial period.

Eventually, the members of the so-called Educational Revolution Group, led by Kim Sung-so, in 1945

On August 17, 1947, they met to convey the aspirations of the Korean people to the U.S. military government, and as a large number of educators participated in the administration as advisers or high-ranking officials of the U.S. military government, the U.S. military administration quickly accepted them. In particular, the Koreans' arguments began to be strongly reflected during the period from June 13, 1947 to August 15, 1948, when the United States began to begin full-fledged nation-building following the breakup of the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee.[176] Accordingly, Oh Chun-seok, who became the Minister of Education under the U.S. military administration as a member of the educational revolutionary group,[177] was also openly advocating the purpose of equality in education.[178] In addition, the Ministry of Education of the U.S.

[176])자세한 배경은 김용일, 2008.을 참조할 것.

[177])정태수,「'현대 한국 군정교육의 역사적 평가'에 대한 토론」,『한국교육사학』13, (서울: 한국교육학회 교육사연구회, 1991), pp. 214.

[178])『경향신문』,1947 년 12 월 14 일「신임 문교부장, 문교시책에 대해 소신피력」.; 『서울신문』,1948 년 3 월 12 일「문교부장 오천석, 문교사업 실태와 사업계획 발표」.

Military Government said, "Education that only special family children could learn

We must eliminate inequality and promote genuinely democratic equalization of education," and called for the implementation of a compulsory education system as soon[179] as possible, and the Committee on High School Education under the Ministry of Education decided and announced a proposal for temporary measures for higher education with the goal of equalizing education[180], and prepared a plan to reform the secondary school entrance examination system with a focus on equal opportunities for applicants[181], and decided to open a co-educational normal school to[182] equalize education.

On the other hand, the U.S. military government has increased the number of teachers and students, as well as the number of school facilities that can hold classes.

This was because reflecting the nationalist aspirations of the Korean people was the best way to secure support for the U.S. military government, and at the same time, it was imperative to increase human resources, which would serve as the foundation for the future economic and material foundations, in the current situation of the time, when all resources were scarce. Accordingly, immediately after liberation, the number of schools, teachers, and students in elementary schools increased as shown in Table II-2 below. In particular, the fourfold increase in the number of Korean teachers and the increase in the

[179])『동아일보』,1946 년 4 월 25 일「문교부 초등교육국장, 각 분과위원회에서 시험제도 연구 중임을 언 명」.

[180])『동아일보』,1946 년 4 월 26 일「문교부, 고등교육제도에 대한 임시조치요항 발표」.

[181])『서울신문』,1946 년 4 월 30 일「문교부의 중등학교 입학 시험제도 개혁안」.

[182])『동아일보』,1946 년 5 월 25 일「문교부, 남녀공학 사범학교 개설결정」.

number of students to more than 2 million in the period from August '45 to the end of '46 reflected the nationalist desire for education.

jealousy	Number of Schools	Number of Teachers	Number of students	Per Teacher Number of students
August 45	3,037 devices	5,352 people	1,305,331 people	
End of 45	2,937 devices	23,474 people	1,637,723 people	69.8 people
End of '46	3,201 devices	28,975 people	2,199,607 people	75.9 people
End of '47	3,429 devices	34,235 people	2,231,788 people	65.2 people
End of '48	3,536 devices	37,056 people	2,354,977 people	63.6 people

Table II-2) Number of Schools, Teachers, and Students in the U.S. Military Period217)

However, despite this outward rapid growth, there were many side effects because the U.S. military administration was obsessed with quantitative expansion at the expense of qualitative aspects such as teacher qualifications and educational conditions. In other words, the U.S. military administration was obsessed with maximizing the acceptance of students in order to provide an opportunity for everyone to receive an education, and neglected the qualitative aspects such as the reduction in the number of students per teacher and the improvement of the treatment of teachers, as well as the substantial equality of opportunities in education through the improvement of educational conditions. In addition, In the case of secondary schools, where the number of schools had decreased and the number of teachers had plummeted to one-third since

the liberation of Korea due to economic and material difficulties, there was little practical support for the establishment of private schools by Koreans with voluntary enthusiasm.(218) In the case of higher education such as universities, the plan for the establishment of a national university was also stalled due to problems such as the shortage of staff and conflicts between the left and the right. Accordingly, at a meeting held in Seoul in May 1947 by the heads of academic affairs in each province, the expansion of secondary education, the imposition of an education tax on a per-county basis, and the standard of living of teachers

---

217) The number of teachers and students in August '45 is calculated excluding the number of teachers and students per person. Statistics Korea, 『Economic and Social Picture of the Post-Liberation Period from Statistics』, p. 74, (Statistics Korea, 1993); Bureau of Education History of Bureau of Education: From 11 September 1945 to 28 Feburary 1946; Reprinted in Kim Yong-il, 『A Study on Education Policy under the US Military Administration: A Political Approach to Education』, (Seoul: Korea University Institute of Ethnic Studies, 1999), p. 194.

[218] Ministry of Education, 『Outline of Education Administration』, (Cho Missionary Books Co., Ltd., 1946), p. 437. ; HUSAFIK, Vol. IV, pp. 45~48; Kim, Yong-Il, 1999, pp. 200. Requoted from.

They began to demand concrete economic support measures, such as the implementation of financial restructuring to provide guarantees.[219] In the end, the tasks of guaranteeing compulsory primary education by state support, imposing an education tax to secure finances, improving the quality of education by increasing the salaries of teachers, and nurturing human resources necessary for nation-building by securing professors in secondary and tertiary education, which have become scarce due to the exodus of one-man teaching staff, will be postponed to the First Republic.

On the other hand, since the US military administration was officially established in January 1946, 60 reorganizations of the national

administrative apparatus were carried out in 1946 alone, accounting for about 59% of the total number of reorganizations during the entire period of the US military administration. In other words, the U.S. military administration, which had to accept the nationalist demands of the Koreans and proceed with the withdrawal of the USFK despite the shortage of various resources, had to undergo frequent reorganization through name changes, new organizations, changes, and abolitions, as well as upgrades and transfers of functions. For example, between 1945 and 1946, shortly after the acquisition of the Rotor Organization of the Governor-General of Japan, it was organized almost once a week. It had to be reorganized.[220] In fact, the U.S. military administration made two separate visits to Korea in March 1946 and July 1947.

By appointing a large number of people and appointing them as heads of departments, he gradually took steps to transfer administrative authority to the Koreans. First, on March 29, 1946, when the withdrawal of the USFK began to progress, the departments were expanded, and the Korean directors were promoted to the positions of department heads and directors. This signifies, albeit a formality, of a change in the status of Korean officials. The American director was replaced by the head of the department, and the existing Korean acting director was promoted to the position of department head, and the two-head system was implemented, in which there were two department heads in each department.

In addition, the U.S. State Department told Hodge in July 1946 that liberals and moderates

a policy that directs the establishment of a broad left-right coalition united front.

---

219)USAMGIK, "Department of Education, Summary for the Week Ending 24 May 1947, 25 May

1947", Lee Gil-sang, 『Report on the Activities of the U.S. Armed Forces』, Vol. 4, 1990. ; Jung Tae-so, 『U.S. Army Flag Collection of Korean Education History image
1945~1948』, (Seoul: Hong Jiwon, 1992), pp. 380.
[220] Cho Ki-an, 『Political and Administrative System of the US Military Period: Structural Analysis: Focusing on Organization, Laws, and Resources』 (Seoul: Aram, 2003). pp. 76-79, pp. 255-261. "Appendix 1: Details of the Periodic Reorganization of the U.S. Armed Forces."

After delivering the order, Hoji pushed ahead with a plan to establish a South Korean transitional legislative assembly centered on Kim Kyu-sik and Yeo Un-hyung.[183] Accordingly, on 24 August, a legislative council was established with the South Korean Division, and on 31 August, just before the nationwide strike began, instructions were passed for the transfer of administrative authority to the Koreans, and Koreans were appointed to the positions of heads of all ministries, and the former directors of the U.S. military were appointed as advisers to serve as deputy directors[184)] On 11 September, Lt. Gen. Haji announced that he would transfer all administrative authority to the Korean directors.

On the other hand, the U.S. military government began centralizing power from August 31, 1946.

By subordinating administrative organizations to central ministries, he sought to prevent administrative inefficiencies caused by the decline in the American workforce. On September 13, 1946, the Civil Service Training Center was established to train existing and new Korean officials and to increase the number of Korean civil servants. In fact, by October 15, 1946, the proportion of Korean employees had risen from 7,684, or about 56 percent[185, to about] 40,000, or more than 90 percent of

[183])FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 년 7 월 16 일 pp.715-716.
[184])전현수 역, 『쉬띄꼬프 일기(1946-1948)』, 「여운형-로마넨꼬 회담록(1946 년 9 월 27 일」, (국사편찬위원 회, 2004), pp. 181.
[185])정일형, 「해방 이후의 인사행정 실체」, 『법정』 제 1 권 제 1 호(1946 년 9 월), pp. 13.

the total, by July 1947.[186] On October 23, when nationwide protests such as the Daegu riots came to an end,

Military Government Decree No. 114 abolished the provincial police departments and placed the local police under the direct control of the central government, a measure that was made because the US military government was unable to effectively deal with leftist forces in South Korea due to a lack of resources. In fact, the U.S. military administration cited the following reasons for this centralization: uniform education and maintaining equity in law enforcement, nationwide sharing of information on criminal and revolutionary activities, and maintaining equity in emergency and law enforcement.[187Next,] on February 10, 1947, the U.S. military government was appointed by the South Korean Transitional Legislative Government.

Ahn Jae-hong, a centrist figure, was appointed to the post of minister of government to oversee the affairs of the military government, and on 17 May, the name was officially changed from the US Military Administration to the Transitional Legislative Government of South Korea. Accordingly, on 15 February, all the heads of ministries and provinces under the Minister of Civil Affairs Ahn Jae-hong were replaced by Koreans, and in order to accommodate this, a reorganization was carried out, accounting for 20% of the reshuffle during the entire US military administration.[188] On the other hand, he was appointed as the head of the central ministry and the provincial minister of the South Korean Transitional Law Government at the time.

---

[186])George M. McCune 1947 Postwar and Politics of Korea. Journal of Politics. Vol. IX. Summation no.1 (Journal of Politics ,1947). pp. 614.

[187])USAMGIK, SKIG Activities, No. 27, 1947. 12, pp. 167.

[188])조기안, 2003. pp. 76-79, 255-261.(부록 1: 미군정기 조직개편 세부내역).

Looking at the careers of high-ranking Korean officials, they often excluded subordinate officials during the Japanese imperialist period as much as possible and appointed intellectuals such as lawyers, scholars, educators, businessmen, religious figures, and doctors who had been involved in the anti-Japanese movement, and preferred Korean democrats who had studied in the United States or had doctoral degrees in the United States. In other words, instead of bureaucrats who had experience in Japanese military service, they sought an alternative among intellectuals who could acquire administrative practice through short-term education and experience, but because of the exclusion of the Founding Preparatory Committee,[189] they were able to communicate with them in English. Intellectuals who had studied in the United States were employed. In addition, 9 people were from the North, which had the largest Christian influence (5 in South Pyongan Province, 2 in North Pyongan Province, and 1 in South Hamgyong Province.

Myung), and among them, Pyongan Province accounted for the absolute majority, and it became a human base to support the growth of the Northwestern Youth Association, a right-wing youth organization that will be discussed later.

Position	Statement	Education	Career/Region
Civil Affairs Officer	Ahn Jaehong	Bachelor of Economics, Waseda University, Japan	Anti-Japanese Movement, Vice Chairman of the National Founding Committee Par)/Match

[189])최하영, 1968. ; 이영근, 1990.

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court	Yongmu Kim	Chuo University Law Department, Japan	Anti-Japanese Lawyer (Democratic Party of Korea) / Jeonnam

Chief of Police	Byung Ok Cho	Doctor of Philosophy, Columbia University, USA	Professor of Anti-Japanese Movement and Yeonhee (Democratic Party of Korea) / Chungnam
Head of the Judiciary	Byungro Kim	Meiji University, Japan 學)	He served as a judge and later became an anti-Japanese lawyer and a professor of Kyungseong Law (after defecting from the Democratic Party of Korea→ he worked as a centrist in promoting left-right cooperation) / Seoul
Minister of Education	Billions of people	Japan University of Tokyo(東京大) 學) Faculty of Law	Served as a patent attorney and professor at Yonhee College. Christian leader imprisoned for his involvement in the Heung-up Gang Movement (Korea Democratic Party)/Gyeonggi

Head of the Ministry of Finance	Yunho Byung	Japan East Light Commercial School (東京高等商業學校)	President, Korea Heung Bank/Seoul
Head of the Postal Service	Gilwonbong	Gyeongseong umbilical cord	After passing the high school exam, he became the head of the Insurance Contract Division of the Postal Service Bureau and the director of the Busan Regional Postal Service 228)/Pyongnam
Director of Health and Later Life	Theory of Use	Severance Medical College / Kyungsung Imperial University M.D.	Suyang Alumni Association Imprisoned for the incident (Former member of the National Founding Preparatory Committee →Democratic Party of Korea after withdrawal)/Pyongnam

Head of Civil Engineering Department	Choi Kyung-yeol	Department of Civil Engineering,	Governor-General of Korea, Interior Affairs Bureau,

		Imperial University of Japan	Civil Engineering Division/Pyongnam
Director of Public Affairs	Cheolwon Lee	Ph.D. in Journalism, Columbia University, USA	President of World News Agency 229) / Chungnam
Chief of the General Staff	Flow Heat	Imperial Japanese Military Academy 15th	Chief of Staff of the Liberation Army/North Pyongbuk
Head of the Department of Agriculture	Hoon Koo Lee	Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin, USA	Professor, Jinneung University, Nanjing, and Professor of Soongsil College, Chosun Ilbo, Chief Editor and Vice President of Chosun Ilbo (Independent and Affiliated with Moderate Political Parties such as the Workers' and Peasants' Party after leaving the

			Democratic Party of Korea → Party)/ Chungnam
Head of the Ministry of Labor	Captain Lee	B.A. in Sociology, Yale University / M.A. in Social Education, Columbia University	Worked as a major figure in the organization of the Christian Fellowship and the Heungsan Division, and was imprisoned for 3 years for the incident of the Foster Fellowship / North Pyongbuk
Director of Food Administration	Ji Yong Eun	Northwestern University, USA	Served as principal of Pyongyang Kwangseong Gobo / Pyongnam
Chief of the General Staff	Heterologies	Rarice University, Chicago, USA	President of Chosun Book Association (Democratic Party of Korea) / Gyeongbuk

Director of Personnel Administration	Jung Il-hyung	Doctor of Philosophy, University of New York, USA	(Democratic Party of Korea)/Seoul
Inflation Pavilion	Taewook Choi	Waseda University, Japan	Anti-Japanese Movement 230) (Korea Democratic Party)/Unknown

Head of the Trustee	Lim Byung-hyuk	Mount Union Economics, USA	Yonhee Professor/Unknown
Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Moon Wook	Study in the USA (Theology)	Professor, Methodist Theological Seminary (Democratic Party of Korea) / Unknown
Gyeonggi-do Governor	Gujaok	Doe	Korean Christian Youth Association 231) (Democratic Party of Korea)/Kyung energy
Gangwon-do Governor	Gunwon Park	Faculty of Medicine, Kyungsung Imperial University	Chairman of the Gangneung County Self-Government Committee/Hamnam

Governor of North Chungcheong Province	Hayoung Yoon	B.A. in Theology, Princeton University, U.S.	Pastor/Chungbuk
Governor of South Chungcheong Province	Jongman Park	Kyungsung Imperial University/Boston University, USA	Served as Governor-General of Korea (Democratic Party of Korea)/Chungnam
Gyeongsangbuk-do Governor	Choi Hee-song	College of Engineering, Massachusetts State University, USA	Anti-Japanese Movement 232) (Korea Democratic Party)/North Pyongyang
Gyeongsangnam-do Governor	Cheol-so Kim	Keio University, Japan	2.8 Imprisoned for Declaration of Independence, Served as a Facilitator of the South Korean Transition Act (Democratic Party of Korea)/ Gyeongnam
Jeollabuk-do Governor	Jung Ilsa	Washington Army Medical School, USA	Severance Medical Professor and X-ray Chief/Gyeonggi

Governor of Jeollanam-do	Minho Seo	Graduated from Columbia University, USA	Anti-Japanese Movement (South Korea Democratic Party) / Jeonnam
Jeju Island Branch	Yoo Hae Hae	Chuo University Law Department, Japan	Served as the head of the anti-Japanese movement and the agricultural department of the Korean Independence Party (Han
			National Independence Party)/Jeonbuk

Table II-3) Education and Career of Senior Korean Officials in the U.S. Armed Forces233)

This was also the case for mid- and high-level officials, especially for central officials.

In this case, this phenomenon was even more pronounced. In other words, according to the statistics of the central civil servants, the Seoul Metropolitan Government, and local government officials, 71.7 percent of the total number were former Japanese government officials, while only 53.8 percent of the central government employees were employed.(234) In addition, Kim so-ja's study, which examined 30 high-ranking officials and 67 lower-middle-ranking officials based on age, educational background, and experience in public office during the Japanese colonial period, found that bureaucrats were classified as high-ranking bureaucrats (department heads, department heads, and cha of each ministry).

General), middle bureaucrats (3-6 levels), and low-level bureaucrats (7-14 and 15 levels), the proportion of people with bureaucratic experience during the Japanese colonial period was 19% for senior bureaucrats, 68% for middle bureaucrats, and low-level bureaucrats

The proportion was 47 percent, which is relatively small, especially those who came from the Japanese bureaucracy at the top of the bureaucracy.[235)]

Nonetheless, from September 20, 1945, immediately after liberation, the military administration

---

[228] Lee Ki-yeol, 『Travelogue of Information and Communication History』, (Seoul: Book Story, 2006), pp. 101.

(229) In the case of Yi Cheol-won, apart from his educational background, his pre-liberation activities are not well known. However, in the U.S. military government document, Lee Cheol-won is a big

He goes by the name Clarence Ryee. USAMGIK, "United States Army Militay Governmnet in Korea, Department of Public Information, 1948," Lee Gil-sang, Report on U.S. Military Political Activities, Vol. 6, 1990. pp. 18.

[230] Dong-A Ilbo, January 17, 1984, "Choi Tae-wook Ong, a man of independent merit."

[231] Dong-A Ilbo, February 10, 1946, "Koo appointed governor of Gyeonggi Province in recent days."

[232] Dong-A Ilbo, October 5, 1958, "Rep. Choi Hee-song, who lived in exile for 30 years."

[233] "Appointment Decree No. 118 (March 29, 1947)," (National Archives); Committee for the Publication of the History of the Republic of Korea, 『The Beginning of the Tripartite Factors of the Republic of Korea』, (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee, 1987); Song Nam-heon, 『Three Years of Liberation 2: 1945-48』, (Magpie, 1985), pp. 334-456.

[234] Won Koo-hwan, "Passive Representation of the Korean Bureaucracy in the U.S. Military Period," Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 41, No. 4 (December 2003), (Institute of Korean Public Administration, Seoul National University, 2003), pp. 51-74.

(235) On the other hand, according to this, 11 percent of the ministers and deans had the experience of bureaucrats during the Japanese colonial period, compared to 38 percent of those at the deputy director level. In addition, the proportion of the Korean People's Party and Christians among high-ranking officials reached 44.8 percent and 38 percent, respectively, while the proportion of those from the North and those from the education sector were also high, at 39 percent and 41 percent. Kim Su-ja, "The U.S. Military

Government's Management of the Military Periodic Organization and the Policy of Appointment of Officials," Hometown Seoul No. 71 (February 2008), (Seoul Special City History Committee, 2008), pp.
28.

To the extent that Major General A. V. Arnold admitted that it was difficult to find Koreans to replace Japanese in key government positions [190], the problem of experienced bureaucrats and human resources was so serious that it was inevitable to appoint former Japanese officials to lower-level bureaucrats and in the case of provinces. In particular, in the case of rural areas, 76.5 percent of the respondents were former Japanese officials[191, and] this was due to the withdrawal of the USFK, which began in earnest in April 1946.

As the number of U.S. military personnel decreased due to the withdrawal of the USFK, in the early days of the occupation

On April 27, 1946, the U.S. military government, which had been striving for decentralization by breaking away from the totalitarian bureaucratic tradition of the Governor-General of Korea, abolished the local administrative offices, which played a buffer coordination role between the central departments and the lower local departments, ostensibly on the grounds that they would disperse the functions of the military government, and on August 31, 1946, General Haji instructed the Minister of Military Administration to hand over the actual administrative authority of all other departments of the military government to the Koreans, with the temporary exception of the agencies that handle the supply of property and civilian goods, such as material control, computer management, and civil affairs and protection administration. It was strategized as a regional office.[192] In the end, in this state, the provinces,

[190])박종효 편역,「1945 년 9 월 20 일: 뉴욕 발 따스」, 2010. pp. 180.
[191])원구환, 2003.
[192])Meade, 1951, pp. 80-81.

which were severely understaffed, were unable to secure human resources to replace experienced Japanese officials, so the ratio was much higher than in the center.

Lastly, if we look at the international political context, until the conclusion of the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission in July 1947, the US Government's position was most focused on early withdrawal through compromise with the Soviet Union, so the US government, which was relatively aware of the situation in the field, was unable to embark on active nation-building. And, as a result, Rhee Seung-man, who had made it clear early on that he could not participate in such a joint venture for fear that the future of Korea would follow in the footsteps of Poland, which had formed a coalition government with the Communists, and would threaten peace with the United States and the world' The political forces of South Korea also did not give up the possibility of establishing a unification government until the very end, and the actual state-building of the U.S. military was carried out in the first year from July 1947 to August 1948.

In fact, between October 1946 and November 1947, the number of U.S. military personnel increased by about three times in one year, and the number of Korean personnel increased by more than three times. Also, as will be explained later, police and military manpower also increased dramatically during this period. This increase in the number of people also led to the strengthening of administrative power, resulting in the food collection rate increasing from 12% of the target at the beginning of 1946 to 98% by the end of 1947.

jealousy	American Workforce	Korean Workforce	sum
October 1946	3,721 (7.1%)	48,949 people	52,670 (100%)

November 1947	2,626 (1.7%)	150,441 people	153,067 (100%)

Table II-4) U.S. Military Personnel Status 240)

The scale of U.S. aid to Korea also soared in 1947-48 when nation-building was in full swing.The scale of aid to Korea in 1947 had already increased by about 4.5 times compared to 1946, but the amount of aid to Korea in 1948 increased more than 8 times compared to 1947.

---

[239] As early as the Yalta Conference, Rhee began to be wary of the Soviet Union, accusing it of trying to dominate Korea as the Soviet Union openly expressed its expansionist ambitions in Eastern Europe, and tried to compare Korea's future with Poland's.
was. For this, see FRUS 1945, VI, May 15, 1945, Rhee to Stettinus, pp. 1028. and Oliver, 2002. pp. 212-216 and pp. See 224-225.

240) Cho, 2003. pp. 149.

year	In dollar terms	Based on KRW
1945	4,934 thousand dollars	₩74,010 ₩n.
1946	45,371 thousand dollars	₩680,565 ₩19
1947	204,120 thousand Dollars	KRW 10,206,000
1948	179,592 thousand dollars	KRW 80,816,400
sum	434,017 thousand dollars	KRW 91,776,975,000

Table II-5) Scale of U.S. Military Aid to Korea[193)]

From 1945 to 1947, the U.S. goal in Korea was to maintain U.S. position at the 38th parallel and then withdraw from Korea as quickly and dignified as possible, as MacDonald pointed out, based on a memorandum between Walton Butterworth, Deputy State Secretary, and J. K. Penfield, Acting Director of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. During Korea's state-building period, the U.S. was unable to operate effectively due to a lack of resources and a lack of policies and plans, and the U.S. was unwilling to carry out an active program until it reached an agreement with the Soviet Union on the unification of the Korean Peninsula. This was due to the low priority of South Korea when it was deployed.[194)] Basically, the U.S. State Department states that the long-term U.S. occupation of Korea is the Soviet Union.

Fearing that it would arouse unnecessary suspicion from the United States, they believed that the trusteeship plan was the only way to reduce the possibility of Soviet domination of the Korean peninsula and to enable the withdrawal of U.S. troops.[195] In fact, because the U.S. government, which emphasized negotiated withdrawal at the time, did not want to provoke the Soviet Union, major U.S. news outlets did not report on the massacre in North Korea.[196] This was clearly a departure from the South Korean media, which reported on the anti-tak demonstrations and bloodshed in North Korea by more than 100,000 people, which drew outrage from the Soviet Union for being provocative and anti-Soviet.[245] It was the conclusion of the U.S. government in late

[193])조기안, 2003. pp. 193 표 6-3).
[194])맥도널드. 2001. pp 28, pp. 233.
[195])FRUS 1945, VI, 1945 년 11 월 29 일「Byrnes to Langdon」. pp.1137-1138.
[196])국사편찬위원회, 전현수 역, 2004,「1947 년 7 월 31 일」, pp. 123.

1945 and early 1946 that if Stalin still insisted on exclusive control of the Korean peninsula, it could abandon the trusteeship plan and allow Korea to become independent.[246] In fact, Martin, the U.S. State Department's Economic Section Chief, went so far as to say in a broadcast in early 1946 that U.S. forces were in the process of withdrawing from Korea.247)

On the other hand, the perception of the US military officials who were stationed in the region after the establishment of the US military administration was very different from that of the US State Department officials, and in the end, the situation proceeded as they had been judged. Thus, compared to the Soviet Union, which was rapidly establishing a unilateral government in North Korea than the United States, the U.S. policy toward North Korea, which tried to adhere to traditional liberal principles, was much less organized, and there was no smooth communication between the U.S. government and the U.S. government. Nevertheless, in the end, the US State Department and the US military administration both wanted the US military withdrawal as soon as possible.

However, since many of the actions of the US military officials, who were basically stopped by the US State Department, showed conservative and anti-communist tendencies and were friendly to the right, it is not unreasonable to find Cold War thinking even before the Korean War, as revisionism points out if we focus on them. As mentioned above, Hodge and many other officials of the U.S. military administration had insisted from the beginning of the occupation that they should give up the trusteeship and hand over power to the provisional government of Kim Koo and Rhee Seung-man, and withdraw U.S. troops, and the Soviet Union, which had no intention of weakening its control over North

Korea, refused to accept the U.S. offer of negotiations, prompting conservatives in South Korea to be encouraged by the U.S.

---

[245] Jeon Hyun-so, 2004, July 9, 1947, pp. 82.

246)FRUS 1945, VI, 11 and 14 December 1945, "Langdon to Byrnes". pp.1142-1144.

[247] Park Jong-hyo, ed., "Special Interview with U.S. State Department Officials on the Reasons for U.S. Military Presence in Korea, Heard in Khabarovsk, January 30, 1947," 2010. pp. 233.

They believed that if they did not act quickly, the left and the Communists would dominate the new government.[197] In particular, the U.S. military, which was personally deeply concerned about Soviet expansion,

Commander Hodge felt that the situation south of the 38th parallel was steadily deteriorating, leading him to hope for far-reaching social and economic reforms in the country.[198] Hodge, insisting that the people of South Korea should take positive measures to counter the growing influence of the Soviet Union as they lose confidence in the United States, and warned that if the United States pursued its current policy of delay, the Soviet Union would ultimately dominate the entire Hanban Province.

Therefore, he argued that in order to stop Soviet expansion and not commit any more military force to the Korean peninsula, the United States should abandon the trusteeship and immediately grant independence to Korea, form a provisional government and a government led by Rhee Seung-man, and establish the Korean Defense Guard as the mother of the ROK Defense Forces so that the demoralized USFK could be quickly withdrawn. To this end, he offered to leave Korea, taking full responsibility for his failure to make an agreement with the Soviet Union as a scapegoat.[250] In order to pursue his plans, Hodge asked the U.S. government to postpone the opening of the US-Soviet Joint Committee,[251] and persuaded Kim Koo and Rhee Seung-man to

[197])FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 년 1 월 7 일「Benninghoff to Byrnes」. pp.608.

[198])FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 년 2 월 23 일「Eisenhower to MacArthur」. pp.638-639.

년

년

년

establish the "Democratic Committee of the South Korean People" in February 1946.

In response to Hodge's proposal, the Minister of the Army, Petterson, was also encouraged by the fact that there would be no further military commitments or troop buildups, and he actively supported it.

All of them.[252)William] Averell Harriman, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, who visited Hajj in February 1946, also told President Harry Shippe Truman that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of the precarious position of the Hajj to promote the ideology and hegemony of the Soviet Union.

250)FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 February 2 "MacArthur to JCS". pp.628-630.
251)FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 January 22, Hodge to War, pp. 613.
252)FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 Patterson to Bynes, November 1, pp. 1111.

It is said that it is trying to expand to the whole of North Asia.[199] In fact, the Soviet Union had made it clear from the beginning of 1946 that it had no intention of withdrawing from Korea. First, starting with the election of Kim Il-sung as chairman of the Provisional People's Committee in February 1946, land reform was carried out in March on the principle of free confiscation and free distribution, and in June the nationalization of large-scale industrial facilities, telecommunications, and banks was consolidating the foundations for building a socialist state.

[199])FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 년 2 월 12 일「MacArthur to JCS」, pp.632-633.
년
년

However, the U.S. State Department still refused to give up the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet Union, fearing that all of Hodge's proposals would only make negotiations with the Soviet Union difficult, so it blocked almost all of Hodge's proposals, including the Provisional Government, right-wing support led by Rhee Seung-man, and the creation of a national defense force. In fact, Secretary of State Burns

James Francis Byrnes told Secretary of the Army Peterson that since the United States had promised the Soviet Union to implement the Moskova Agreement, Hodge's mission was only to cooperate with the Soviet Union, and that Hodge should not discuss the pros and cons of trusteeship over Korea.[200] As a result, the top priority of the U.S. military administration was limited to the maintenance of law and order, and even this was not a new rule, and according to a poll conducted in mid-February 1946, only 52 percent of Koreans thought that the administration of the U.S. military government was better than that of the Japanese imperialists.[201]On the other hand, since about mid-1946, in accordance with the policy of the U.S. State Department,

It pushed ahead with plans to establish a South Korean transitional legislative assembly centered on Kim Kyu-sik and Yeo Un-hyung, and publicly reaffirmed that the United States would abide by the Moscow agreement.[202] Yeo Un-hyung was also willing to cooperate with the United States to become the head of the administration and to carry out a left-

[200])FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 년 4 월 1 일「Byrnes to Patterson」. pp.655-656.
[201])로빈슨. 1988. pp. 85.
[202])FRUS 1946, VIII, 19467 월 16 일 pp.715-716.
년
년
년

right joint movement in order to become the head of the administration, 203even though the Soviet Union was preventing the participation of the leftists in South Korea because they feared that the South Korean Transition Committee, which the US military government was trying to establish, would hasten the establishment of a central government.[258] Accordingly, from July 1946, the centrist faction formed a left-right joint committee led by Kim Kyu-sik, a member of the Democratic Party of the Right Party, and Yeo Un-hyung, a member of the Democratic Party of the Left Party.

However, the First U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee held on March 20, 1946 Joint Statement No. 7 was issued on May 1, but due to disagreements, it was postponed indefinitely until the second meeting of the US-Soviet Joint Commission on May 21, 1947. In the end, the fate of Korea was also placed on the same level as the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and in fact, the postponement of the US-Soviet Joint Committee on May 8, 1946 was considered to be the first step toward the Korean War.[259] Edwin Foley, who also observed the situation in North Korea and pointed out that the Soviet Union's willingness to continue occupying North Korea until the Communists formed a government made Korea "an arena of ideological confrontation on which the success of the United States' Asian policy depended."

(Edwin Pauley)[260] and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Hildring[261] were directing a complete reassessment of U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula.

Thereafter, the U.S. military administration and the Haji continued to work to maintain order and reach an agreement with the Soviet Union.

---

203)전현수 역, 2004,「19469 월 26 일」, pp. 17.

년

년

Exercising budget and authority limited to the limited areas of combating disease and social unrest, the U.S. State Department was faithful to the demands of the U.S. Congress, which mandated that riots be suppressed and hunger was addressed, while preparing for the worst-case scenario. In other words, on August 31, 1946, the Koreans were given the daily duties of the military administration to reduce the cost of stationing the garrison and began preparations for a full-fledged withdrawal, while on June 15, the "South Korean National Defense Guard" was established to prevent any eventuality. Rhee Seung-man also sensed the complicated position of the US military government, and after the first US-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved in May 1946, the South Korean government became a full-fledged

---

[258] "Soviet Military Administration Documents of the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Report on the Situation in South Korea", 1946~1947 VI.. Documents of the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 172, List 614632, Folder 33 5. "Information on the Situation in South Korea from Romanenko to Comrade Shtykov," January 28, 1947.

259)FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 Langdon to Byrnes, April 30, pp. 663.

260)FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 Pauley to Hilldring, June 22, pp. 706-708.

261)FRUS 1946, VIII, 1946 June 16. pp.692-698.

년
년
년

He began to emphasize the need for lips. At the same time, the centrist forces in South Korea, which had won the support of the US military government, were also pushing for a left-right cooperation, and Kim Koo and the forces of the Provisional Government were also unwilling to give up their dream of building a unified nation-state centered on them, asserting the legitimacy of the Provisional Government.

However, as the U.S. military administration preoccupied an agreement with the Soviet Union, some of the USFK withdrew

In the meantime, the social and economic situation in South Korea was deteriorating rapidly, and the Communist Party of South Korea took advantage of this by launching a massive Soviet-funded strike in late September and October.[204] Accordingly, Hodge wrote in an October 1946 report that North Korea was expected to invade the South under the auspices of the Soviet Union within six months, but since the capabilities of the USFK could not prevent it, it was necessary to send additional U.S. troops and strengthen right-wing youth organizations in South Korea.[205]At the same time, the US will have no choice but to reconsider its plans as the US State Department won the election of the "South Korean Transitional Legislative Assembly" held for the early withdrawal of US troops, contrary to the US State Department's policy of supporting the centrists. Rhee, who effectively took control of the "South Korean Transitional Legislative Assembly," visited Haji and criticized Haji's support for the centrists, but Hodge was adamant that he would not allow the rightists to intimidate the U.S. military commander or illegally seize power.[206]

---

[204])전현수 역, 2004,「19469 월 28 일」. pp. 20.

[205])FRUS 1946, VIII, 194610 월 28 일「MacArthur to Eisenhower」, pp.750-751.

[206])FRUS 1946, VIII, 19468 월 26 일「Bunce to Byrnes」, pp.731-733.

년

년

년

At the time, Hodge had no choice but to confront Rhee because 19 of the 45 members of the committee he could appoint were filled by members of the Left and Right Joint Committee and left-wing parties in order to carry out the U.S. government's order to support the centrists. However, when the State Department refused, the Truman administration began to openly accuse the administration of pursuing a policy of appeasement, supporting trusteeship, and dividing Korea. Meanwhile, as early as 1947, President Truman and other officials in the U.S. administration were realizing that further indecision would lead to disaster. By January 1947, U.S. Army officials had also determined that the shortage of manpower and materiel for the USFK was so severe that it was impossible to continue occupying South Korea under this condition. Thus, Secretary of the Army Petterson argued that the U.S. forces should be withdrawn unless the State Department asked Congress for additional $50 million in funding, and John Vincent, director of the State Department's Far East Bureau, supported Peterson's proposal, believing that if the U.S. maintained a hard-line stance, the Soviets would inevitably retreat.[207] In the end, the only options the United States had against South Korea were to reopen the US-Soviet Joint Commission or to form a government that would include both North and South Korea within two months. However, since the resumption of the US-Soviet Joint Commission seemed impossible, the realistic alternative was to pursue the establishment of a single South Korean government.[208] Of course, in this case, too, the U.S. military administration was suffering from a lack of resources and the non-cooperation of the people, so if the U.S. did not provide $600 million in

[207])FRUS 1947, VI, 1947 년 1 월 27 일「Vincent to Marshall」, pp.601-603.
[208])Matray, 1989, pp. 133.
년

economic aid over three years, it would have to withdraw from Korea and seriously damage the U.S. global position.[209)]

On February 25, 1947, George Catlett Marshall, the new Secretary of State, announced that he would order a review of South Korean policy, and on March 1, Hodge, who had been repatriated to Washington, announced at a press conference that the Soviet Union was organizing 500,000 North Korean troops in violation of the Moscow Agreement[210] in preparation for an invasion of the South. Thus, President Truman's "Truman Doctrine," which he presented to Congress in March 1947, described the Soviet threat to U.S. security as direct, imminent, and global. However, the Republican victory in the 1946 midterm elections resulted in $6 billion

The Truman administration, which had been slashed in its budget, hoped that it could deter Soviet expansion by spending relatively little money and military power on Korea, which was judged to be less important than Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, the Soviet Union also believed that the breakup of the US-Soviet Joint Committee would lead to the suppression of the left wing of the US military government and additional economic aid to South Korea, which would strengthen the position of the United States.[211] Accordingly, an agreement was reached between US Secretary of State George Marshall and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Molotov, who visited Moscow, on the resumption of the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission.

---

[209])FRUS 1947, VI, 1947 2 월 25 일「Memorandum of the Special Inter-Department Committee」, pp.609-618.

[210])Oliver, 2002. pp.252.

[211])전현수 역, 2004,「1947 년 8 월 2 일」. pp. 128.

1947, VI, 1947 년

When the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to resume the Second U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, Truman Dogg

Rhee, who had cheered Trinh's announcement, feared that the resumption of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union would put the brakes on the establishment of a unilateral government in South Korea, even though it was certain that the Soviet Union would not agree to the establishment of a unified and independent government on the Korean peninsula.[212] Kim Koo and the forces of the Provisional Government also strongly opposed this and organized a series of demonstrations and strikes against the trusteeship and negotiations with the Soryon. On the other hand, the centrists in South Korea felt that they had a chance to establish a unified government, so they pushed for land reform and enacted legislation to punish pro-Japanese factions.

However, through the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission, which resumed on May 21, 1947, even US State Department officials came to the conclusion that a compromise with the Soviet Union was absolutely impossible and that the establishment of a single South Korean government was inevitable.[213] If the United States insisted on the participation of right-wing parties, it would be impossible to compromise with the Soviet Union, which refused to do so, and if the United States decided to compromise with the Soviet Union and eliminate the right-wing forces, it would be possible to establish a unity government, but it was obvious that a regime with left-wing forces would emerge. In the end, it became clear that the formation of a joint left-right unification

---

[212])Oliver, 2002. pp. 254.

[213])FRUS 7 월 14 일「Marshall to Jacobs」, pp.701-703.
년

government according to the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was absolutely impossible, and the centrist faction also dispersed in the wake of the assassination of Yeo Un-hyung and the declaration of renunciation by Kim Kyu-sik.

1947, VI, 1947 년

In the summer of 1947, as the Communist victory in mainland China became assured, some officials in the Truman administration began to reconsider the strategic value of Korea and its plans for an early withdrawal. They suggested that further negotiations with the Soviet Union were pointless and that the Soviet Union would ultimately accept Korea as a buffer zone in Northeast Asia if the United States provided economic aid to South Korea and established a force commanded by U.S. military officers to develop Korea as a bulwark of righteous freedom in Asia, rather than guaranteeing a complete Soviet victory by prematurely withdrawing USFK.

However, in the midst of all this, the United States explored the possibility of a final round of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In order to achieve the goal of a speedy and dignified withdrawal of the U.S. forces, it was decided to refer the Korean peninsula issue to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1947.

C. Since the Soviet Union announced its permanent withdrawal from the US-Soviet Joint Commission on October 23, 1947, and a week later proposed to the International Union the formal withdrawal of US and Soviet troops from Korea, the US State Department could never give up hope that negotiations with the Soviet Union might be possible.[214][215] On the other hand, at this time, the U.S. military administration thought that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea had to be preceded by some conditions. Hodge predicted that if the U.S. government adopts and supports a five-year economic reconstruction plan drafted by the military administration in September, and if economic and political

[214])FRUS 1947, VI, 1947 년 10 월 29 일「Austin to Marshall」, pp.849.

[215])Matray, 1989, pp. 166.
1947, VI, 1947 년

stability is achieved under the supervision of the U.S. Embassy, the ideological and diplomatic blockade that the U.S. initially envisioned would be possible, and even reunification of the Korean peninsula would be possible under a government acceptable to the U.S.[273] Accordingly, Hodge was asking the U.S. government to approve the plan for the establishment of a unilateral government in South Korea without further delay.[216] However, the U.S. State Department still believed that it could get out of Korea through negotiations with the Soviet Union. In a report to the Cabinet of Ministers on 9 November, U.S. Secretary of State Marshall argued that South Korean politics were dominated by political immaturity and violence, that South Korean troops could not resist Soviet expansion, and that since South Korea was not of decisive strategic importance to the United States, the primary task of the United States was to escape without serious damage to its prestige.[275] However, on 14 November, when the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution on the establishment of a unilateral government in South Korea, the U.S. Secretary of State, Marshall, also instructed Hodge to prepare for elections and to contact the United Nations Provisional Commission to set a specific date for the vote.276)

On the other hand, on December 3, 1947, an incumbent police officer who claimed to be a supporter of Kim Koo

He assassinated Jang Duck-so, a key right-wing figure who was advocating for a general election under the supervision of the United Nations. This led to a break with the Democratic Party of Korea, and Kim Koo disagreed with Rhee Seung-man and joined Kim Kyu-sik, arguing that holding elections in the areas occupied by the US military

---

[216])FRUS 1947, VI, 1947 년 11 월 3 일「Hodge to JCS」, pp.852-853.

would not bring about the reunification of Korea but would promote a permanent division. Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik believed that since the United Nations elections to establish a unilateral government in South Korea would fix the division of the 38th parallel, all plans for the elections should be postponed until the Soviets cooperated. Accordingly, they rejected Hodge's suggestion that they issue a joint declaration with Rhee Seung-man on February 12, 1948, in support of the United Nations election plan, and on February 21, Kim Koo held a press conference to officially announce his opposition to the elections.

Afterwards, Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik attended a joint meeting of inter-Korean representatives held by Kim Il-sung from 19 to 26 April to establish a unified coalition government. However, when Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik returned in late April, they became convinced that the People's Government was a conspiracy to seize control of the Korean Peninsula by the Soviet Union and declared that they could not support the Communists' plan. Nonetheless, they still officially opposed South Korea-only elections, appealing to their followers not to participate in the elections. As a result, in the May 1948 elections to the Constituent Assembly, domestic political forces, including the centrists, refused to participate in the elections.

---

275)FRUS 1947, I, "Policy Planning Staff Report," 6 November 1947, pp. 770-777.
276)FRUS Marshall to Jacobs, November 17, pp. 860-861.

And in the midst of this complex international political environment, August 15

The schedule for the establishment of the Japanese government was also abrupt. Thus, in order to take over power from the United States, form a new state apparatus, and implement policy, there was a much greater need for the already scarce human resources. However, due to

the refusal of Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik to participate in the government, some available human resources were prevented from participating. In addition, the failure to fully accommodate nationalist demands from the birth of the state has undermined nationalist legitimacy and reduced its ideological power. As a result, the vulnerability of the country, which lacked all power resources, was further constrained, resulting in the Republic of Korea starting as a vulnerable country from the start, following the US military administration.

1. Police

As mentioned above, in July 1947, the Second U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved.

The U.S. military government, which had been obsessed with the speedy withdrawal through negotiations with the Soviet Union, tried to maintain security at a minimum. On the other hand, in the process of increasing expenditures in order for the state to be responsible for both production and consumption, the proportion of administrative and administrative expenses was the highest, and the proportion of police expenditures in the state budget was relatively low. This is also demonstrated by the following table II-6), which charts the amount and scale of police expenditures incurred by the U.S. military. In 1946, when nationwide strikes and demonstrations took place in September and October, police expenses had to be increased due to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea that began in March. Nonetheless, the amount and proportion of the total national budget decreased compared to 1945, and in 1947 and

1947, VI, 1947 년

1948, when the South Korean government became a reality due to the dissolution of the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee, the amount of money increased, but the proportion of the total national budget was actually decreasing compared to 1945.

year[217]		1945	1946	1947	1948
General Finance		1,868,4 million	13,365,2 million	KRW 19,235.0 million	KRW 15,263,2 million
the police rain	amount	202.5 million won	KRW 147.0Mn	KRW 2,016.5 million	KRW 1,269,100,000
	ratio	10.8%	1.1%	10.5%	8.3%

Table II-6) Police Expenses of the U.S. Armed Forces 277)

However, Cummings argued that South Korea had a police bureau that acted as a pawn of a small landlord class,[218] and Suh also pointed out that the U.S. military government used the police as much as possible to further strengthen centralization.[219]This claim is not unfounded. In fact, unlike other state agencies, in the case of the police, which required special policing skills, the subordinate forces were excluded from the upper bureaucracy and were largely assigned to the lower bureaucracy. In contrast to other state agencies, which were largely assigned to the lower bureaucracy, the subordinate forces were appointed to the top cadres, and most of the subordinate police positions were occupied by human resources who had no police experience during the Japanese colonial period. In fact, among the 1,173 police officers above the rank of inspector and below occupying the upper echelons of the police force, 82 percent had experience in the Japanese police, and all 10 police chiefs in Seoul appointed by the U.S. military government in early

[217])최광,「미군정하의 재정제도와 재정정책」,『재정학연구 3』, (한국재정학회, 1989),pp. 119-160.
[218])Cumings, 2005. pp. 284-289.
[219])서중석,『지배자의 국가, 민중의 나라-한국 근현대사 100 년의 재조명』,(서울: 돌베개, 2011).

October 1945 had served as Japanese police officers or bureaucrats. More than half of the police chiefs in Gyeonggi Province were former Japanese police officers. Accordingly, Won Se-hoon, a member of the Legislative Assembly and chairman of the Internal Affairs and Police Committee, criticized that even in May 1947, the positions of the eight ward mayors and police chiefs in Seoul were usually occupied by Japanese-era officials. [220] In this way, because the U.S. military government restored the police force at the executive level, mainly Korean police officers from the Japanese colonial era, the police became the object of hatred and resentment among the Korean people.

Then, how did the cadre-level police officers who had experience in the Japanese Empire survive in spite of the pro-Japanese liquidation theory, and did they really have a strong enough influence to contribute to the establishment of a military police state in the United States, as the revisionists claimed?

First, in the political situation in the early days of liberation, the pro-Japanese liquidation theory was the left[221)] or the Provisional Government. It was being raised not only by the forces [222]but also by almost all political groups, [including] Rhee Seung-man[223] and the Democratic Party of Korea[224.] As a result, the Japanese subordinate police had no choice but to act cautiously, just like their counterparts in the political, social, cultural,

---

[220])『서울신문』,1947 년 5 월 11 일「입법의원, 민족반역자 처단범위 보선법처리 격론」.

[221])『매일신보』,1945 년 10 월 14 일「인공 중앙인민위원회, 아놀드의 발표에 대한 성명 발표」, ;『자유신 문』,1945 년 10 월 31 일「박헌영, 민족통전결성에 관한 조공의 견해 피력」.

[222])『서울신문』,1945 년 12 월 8 일「신익희, 국기 친일파 국내분열 등에 관해 기자회견」, ;『자유신 문』,1945 년 12 월 8 일「임정 신익희, 38 선 문제 소신 피력」.

[223])『매일신보』,1945 년 11 월 6 일「이승만, 독촉 결의서에 대한 조공과의 차이점 등에 관해 기자회견」.

[224])『전단』,1945 년 11 월 1 일「한민당, '조선지식계급에게 訴함'이란 담화 발표」.

and economic[225] circles, and since most of them avoided going to work and fled in droves, the U.S. military government hastened the appointment of new Korean police officers who had no experience in the service.

Second, during the period of restoring the police force, the US military government tried to appoint former Chinese military personnel who had served in the Liberation Army to the top positions of the police force, such as the first chief of the Gyeonggi Provincial Police Agency and the Jeolla Police Commissioner. In the early stages of the establishment of the National Police Force, the U.S. military government tried to appoint people with military experience similar to those of the military in many respects, especially those from the Liberation Army who had nationalist causes, instead of appointing police officers to the highest police positions that could be appointed by Koreans.

All of them.

Prior to appointing Cho Byung-ok as the head of the police department, the U.S. military administration appointed Kim, a former member of the Chinese military.

In consideration of the appointment of Njo to the post of Director of Police, he was appointed as an advisor to the Chief of Police, Colonel Reamer Argo. In early October 1945, when leftist forces such as the People's Committee of the People's Committee disturbed security in Namwon, the U.S. military government, which became desperate, appointed Kim Eung-jo as the chief of the Jeolla Police and dispatched him to Namwon.[226] In addition, Cho Kai-ok, who was recommended by

[225])당시 한 단체의 민족반역자 규정 발표에 따르면 8.15 이전에 경부급 이상의 경관과 고등경찰에 종사하는 형사급 이상으로 여전히 그 자리에 있는 자를 무조건 민족 반역자로 규정하고 있었다. 『중앙신 문』,1945 년 12 월 10 일「대한독립협회, 민족 반역자 규정 발표」.

[226])국방부 전사편찬위원회, 『국방사 1: (1945.8.15-1950.6.25)』, (서울: 국방부, 1981), pp. 264.

Lee Seung-man from North China County, was appointed as the first Gyeonggi Provincial Police Commissioner.

However, Cho Gae-ok, who turned out to be a sloppy general with exaggerated rank and experience, was forced to resign after 10 days due to his lack of competence and unreasonable coercive attitude[227, and] Kim Eung-jo, who lacked even basic military knowledge, resigned to launch a campaign against trusteeship.[228] Those who lacked fundamental abilities later joined the army and were recruited by former officers of the Japanese army, which they used to serve in the police. Accordingly, on October 20, 1945, the U.S. military government recruited Cho Byung-ok as the head of the Korean National Police and formally appointed him as the Commissioner of Police on January 4, 1946, and on January 16, 1946, Jang Taek-sang became the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police

He was appointed as[229Third], as mentioned above, the Japanese officials were hastily dismissed from about September 18.

The U.S. military government selected applicants who were not illiterate in the police field and had no physical abnormalities who had passed a simple recruitment test, and conducted short-term training at the police officers' training center for three days to one week, and then hurriedly assigned them to each police station. From October 15, the name of the police officers' training center was changed to the Korean Police Academy, and a four-week training was provided to those who passed

---

[227])『경향신문』,1977 년 3 월 18 일「비화 한 세대 (91) 군정경찰〔22〕조개옥 천하」,『경향신문』,1977년3월21일「비화 한 세대(92) 군정경찰〔23〕조개옥의 퇴진」,『경향신문』,1977 년 3 월 22 일「비화 한 세대 (93) 군정경찰〔24〕조개옥의 이력」,『경향신문』,1977 년 3 월 23 일「비화 한 세대 (94) 군정경찰 〔25〕 이승만과 조개옥」.

[228])「제 4 부 백남권」, 한국정신문화연구원 한민족문화연구소 편, 2001. pp. 181.

[229])HUSAFIK,『주한 미군사』제 3 권, 1988. pp. 280.

the exam.[230] As a result, starting with the 430 students of the second class of the Korean Police Academy, who graduated after a month's police training by the U.S. military[231] administration, new police personnel selected and trained by the U.S. military administration were gradually appointed to take the place of Japanese and Korean police officers.

In this context, if we look at the actions of the early US military police, we can often find cases of active behavior in eliminating pro-Japanese police and police reform, contrary to the preconceived notions created by revisionism. In fact, according to a tally compiled by the U.S. military administration in June 1947, more than 80 percent of all police officers at the time did not serve in the police force before liberation. In other words, 83 percent of the police officers in the Police Department, 83 percent in the Metropolitan Police Agency, 77 to 88 percent in the Metropolitan Police Agency, and 80 percent in the Railway Province Police Agency had no police experience in Japan.[232][233] On the other hand, Cho Byung-ok, head of the police department, said in an interview with reporters at the military government office on October 26, 1945 that he would gradually purge police officers who had obliterated the will of the Korean people, violated human rights, or abused their rights beyond their positions.[234] [235]Measures were also taken to renew the atmosphere of the Japanese imperialist era, such as the carrying of clubs instead of the

---

[230])서울신문사, 1979, pp. 50-70.

[231])『동아일보』,1945 년 12 월 23 일「조선경찰학교 제 2 기생 졸업식 거행 예정」.

[232])CINCFE, SKIG Activities No. 21, June 1947, 이길상,『미군정활동보고서』제 3 권, pp.31-32. ; 서주 석, 2008, pp. 219 각주 21). 서주석은 USAMGIK 로 표기하였으나 USAMGIK 는 SKIG Activities NO.

[233] 부터 시작하고 있으므로 이는 Commander in Chief, Far East(CINCFE)의 오기임.

[234])『자유신문』,1945 년 10 월 27 일「경무과장 조병옥, 경찰행정 일신하여 불량경관 숙청언명」.

[235])『동아일보』,1946 년 2 월 13 일「경기도 경찰 부, 악질 친일경찰 구속」.

swords, which were the symbols of the Japanese police inspectors,[236] and the dress and name of the police officers.[237][238] In addition, a stop-and-check system was established within the Metropolitan Police Agency to detect police officers' abuse of authority.297)

Fourth, however, about 85 percent of the new police officers hastily recruited by the U.S. military administration had no experience in policing, making their work inefficient. Accordingly, from December 19, 1945, the U.S. military government raised the recruitment requirements for police officers to those with a junior high school diploma or higher.[239)] However, because the US government, which had hoped for the early withdrawal of US troops through negotiations with the Soviet Union, was reluctant to monopolize the power and maintain public security, which is the basic task of a modern state, terrorism by various left-wing and right-wing groups was rampant, and the issue of public safety reached a serious level.

---

[236])『매일신보』,1945 년 11 월 8 일「경찰관 패검 대신 곤봉 휴대」.

[237])『동아일보』,1946 년 1 월 10 일「경찰의 복장과 직명 바꿈」.

[238])『서울신문』,1946 년 11 월 7 일「수도경찰청, 경찰관 직권남용 적발 목적의 불심검문제도 창설」.

[239])HUSAFIK,『주한 미군사』제 3 권, 1988. pp. 289-291.

As a result, it has become difficult for new human resources without experience and expertise to handle this.

In fact, in 1946, about 15,000 Korean police officers were recruited, filling the positions of about 14,000 Japanese police officers who had disappeared due to dismissal or repatriation. At the time of Japan's surrender, the Korean police force numbered about 23,000 throughout the Korean peninsula, of which about 9,000, or 40 percent, were Korean junior police officers. The Soviet military administration document dated March 20, 1946 lists the number of Korean police at that time as 20,000. [240] According to records that 80% of the Korean junior police officers who were on duty at the time of Japan's surrender were rehired by the U.S. military [241][242], about 13,000 new police officers, accounting for more than 60% of the total police force, were recruited.

Henderson points out that from the late summer of 1945 onwards, crime increased at frightening rates. The daily influx of 4,000 defectors and the rapidly increasing number of returnees were stealing and adding to the violence, and the Incheon Police Department reported that there were so many thieves that people could hardly leave their homes. The Chosun Ilbo, in an open article to General Hodge on August 31, 1946, reported that Koreans were suffering more than during the Japanese colonial period. Therefore, At that time, the general public expected safety, discipline, and protection from the police above all else.[301] In addition, the left and right forces of the 1945-48 U.S. military occupation were able to determine their political agenda.

---

[240])『러시아 연방 국방성 중앙 문서보관소 소련군정문서, 남조선 정세 보고서』, 1946~1947 Ⅱ.러시아연 방국방성 중앙문서보관소 문서군 172, 목록 614631, 문서철 17 1. 「구두 정보 보고」.

[241])FRUS, 1947, VI, pp.802.

[242])핸더슨. 2000, 223.
pp.

The extent and frequency of private violence exercised to achieve the enemy was very serious. According to the Ministry of Police's tally at the time, from August 1945 to April 1947, the police arrested 311 terrorist incidents, excluding large-scale incidents, resulting in 29 deaths, 721 serious injuries, and 149 building destructions. At the same time, the maintenance of public safety was also emerging as a major problem. For example, from April 1945 to April 1946, there were 120,000 general crime arrests, 502,000 theft cases, and 13,815 decree violations.

All of them.[243][244] At that time, Seoul was turning into a dark street with robbery rampant in every alley, and the media was demanding that those who disturb public order be severely punished and that the security forces be strengthened to relieve the fear of the general public and improve the administration that is not well-known.303)

Fifth, when the security forces were organized and the People's Committee was established in North Korea in the midst of this development, the US military government forcibly reinstated experienced police officers in Japan and tried to establish public authority by actively opposing the left and right forces that resisted the authority of the US military government. At the same time, Buil police officers from North Korea to South Korea were also recruited, and from 1946 onwards, a large number of Buil police officers entered the ranks of police officers. In other words, after the Soviet Army organized the Securitate Force, which is equivalent to the National Police in North

---

[243])『서울신문』,1947 년 6 월 14 일「경무부,1946 년 4 월-1947 년 3 월까지의 남조선 범죄 검거 수 발표」.

[244])『조선일보』,1946 년 1 월 15 일「군정당국, 미곡 및 치안대책 밝힘」.

pp.

Korea, and the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea, which was the de facto government, was established on February 8, 1946, the U.S. military government also began to recruit Buil police officers in earnest from the beginning of 1946 in order to equip the police force.

First, the U.S. military administration was temporary from about November 17, 1945.

By allowing the return of Buil officials, mainly senior police officers[245, and by] intimidating and persuading Korean police officers who refused to report to work for several months with arrest orders, they were finally able to take over the police force by the end of 1945.[246According] to Mark Mozwer's research, the early Soviet troops stationed in the former East Germany and Eastern Europe, like the U.S. military, recycled much of their existing police forces. In other words, Communist partisans steeped in Communist ideology joined the new police organization, but since they could not rely on newcomers with no experience from the outset, many of the existing officers with specialized skills were retained.

All of them.[306)]Accordingly, the police themselves at the end of January 1946 decided to work with the left-wing side of the Students' Union.

The suppression of clashes between right-wing youths who supported the anti-tak movement gave him confidence that order and security

[245])『중앙신문』,1945 년 11 월 17 일「군정장관실 미군정의 현재와 장래에 대한 제반문제에 관해 발표」.

[246])이혜숙, 2008, 605.
pp.

were gradually being restored[247], and [248249]Archer L. Lerch, the Minister of Military Administration, also praised the 18,000 Korean police officers, who had grown to 18,000 and developed into world-class police officers against the left and right forces. 250)

Sixth, the U.S. military government, whose main goal was still to negotiate with the Soviet Union to withdraw as soon as possible, was lukewarm in actively arresting and suppressing the Communists in an attempt to operate the police in a politically neutral manner. Thus, the police, which had strong right-leaning tendencies, did not have to be loyal to the right, as a number of police chiefs in Seoul had already joined the right-wing plan of the transition of power planned by the right-wing wing of the provisional government led by Kim Koo and Shin Ik-hui in early 1946. Even left-leaning police chiefs were emerging, and one of the top officers of the right-leaning U.S. military police was quite nervous.

From around February 1946, when the guidelines for supporting the centrists were established, the U.S. military government tried to remove the party color of the existing police force as much as possible.[251)] Chang Taek-sang testifies that Haji, the military commander, prevented the arrest of Pak Hun-yong on the grounds that it would cause international trouble in accordance with the State Department's policy at the time, which sought coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that he maintained his stance of not

---

[247])Mazower, Mark. Dark continent: Europe's twentieth century, London : Penguin. 1999. 김준형 옮
김. 『암흑의 대륙 : 20 세기 유럽 현대사』, (서울: 후마니타스, 2009), pp.354-356.

[248])장택상, 『대한민국 건국과 나 : 창랑 장택상 자서전』, (서울: 창랑 장택상 기념 사업회, 1992). pp.
[249] -72.

[250])『조선일보』,1946 년 2 월 26 일「군정장관 러취, 조선경찰을 절대 신임 한다는 성명을 발표」.

[251])『서울신문』,1946 년 2 월 6 일「군정장관 러취, 경찰의 정당색 배격 등에 관해 언명」.
pp.

discriminating against the left and right in consideration of the relationship with the Soviet Union until the first US-Soviet Joint Commission was held in May 1946.[252]The Soviet military government document dated March 29, 1946 also states that Metropolitan Police Commissioner Chang Taek-sang gave instructions at a meeting of police chiefs on March 23 that "the political situation is developing against us and we must maintain a neutral position until further instructions."

[252])장택상, 1992. 73.
pp.

It is reported. It also states that left-wing supporters emerged within the police, and in early March 1946, Cho Byung-ok, who had returned from an inspection visit to South Chungcheong Province and North Chungcheong Province, dismissed police chiefs who had supported the leftist representatives.[253][254] Accordingly, all current police officers, including those who have experience in Japanese service.

The fluctuations were wild, and the number of new police applicants was also very low. For example, according to Soviet military documents, many police officers were submitting their resignations, but the U.S. military administration refused to grant their wishes and threatened officers with warnings of three months in prison for those who petitioned for dismissal. In addition, when an advertisement was put out to recruit 200 police officers in Daegu, only 170 people applied, showing a low hope for police jobs.[255] Seventh, under these circumstances, as described above, from about April 1946

The withdrawal of U.S. troops has led to a significant reduction in human resources in the field of public security. As a result, there was a need to increase the number of external international police and Korean police personnel, as well as to improve their equipment. Nonetheless, due to the lack of economic and material resources, the U.S. military government, which spent only 11.8 percent of its total budget on judicial police expenses, was unable to fill this gap sufficiently. However, in May

---

[253])『러시아연방 국방성 중앙문서보관소 소련군정문서, 남조선 정세 보고서』,1946~1947 Ⅰ. 1946 년 3 월

[254] 일. 러시아연방국방성 중앙문서보관소 문서군 172, 목록 614631, 문서철 12 6. 「구두 정보 보고 № C-7」.

[255])『러시아연방 국방성 중앙문서보관소 소련군정문서: 남조선 정세 보고서』, 1946~1947 Ⅳ.러시아연방 국방성 중앙문서보관소 문서군 172, 목록 614631, 문서철 10 1. 「로마넨꼬가 쉬띄꼬브 동지에게 보낸 남조선 정세에 대한 정보자료 (바) 경찰의 행동에 대하여」.

1946, the Communist Party of Korea and the leftist forces launched the First U.S. After the breakup of the Soviet Joint Committee, the Soviet Union, which was deeply intervening in the affairs of South Korea, launched a general strike and the Daegu Uprising in September and October 1946 and turned to violent tactics.[256] As a result, the U.S. military government, which had limited human, material and economic resources, could not be systematically replaced by forces that opposed the tyranny of the state, and thus tolerated the cooperation of right-wing youth organizations. First of all, due to the return of U.S. tactical forces and U.S. military personnel during this period, the defense and The number of people in charge of public security was rapidly decreasing, but the number of newly recruited South Korean police officers and the Korean National Defense Guard was about 10,000 short. Under these circumstances, of course, the Daegu police could not suppress the uprising by force, so the U.S. military government mobilized U.S. tanks to disperse the crowd occupying the Daegu police station and declared martial law. Finally, the outbreak, which spread throughout the country, was 20 days after the outbreak, and on October 20, 63 police officers were deployed in the North Gyeongsang area. It developed into a large-scale outbreak in which 73 civilians were killed. In addition, the U.S. military government, which was mobilizing U.S. tactical forces and police from other regions, tolerated the cooperation of the lesser right-wing youth groups.[257] In other words, right-wing youth organizations such as the Korean Democratic Youth League and the Northwestern Youth League are under the control of the U.S. military.

---

[256])전현수 역, 2004,「1946 년 9 월 28 일」,「1946 년 10 월 21 일」. pp. 20. pp. 27.
[257])정해구,『10 월 인민항쟁연구』, (서울: 열음사, 1988), pp. 152-154.

They were used as informants for intelligence agencies, or as members of the military and police organizations by accompanying the police in suppressing strikes and arresting leftists. In addition, some members of the Northwestern Youth League and the Korean National Youth League were formally appointed as railway police officers during the general strike in September and the Daegu uprising in October, when the leftist forces fought against them with all-out war.[258]

Eighth, in spite of this situation, the US government was also supporting the moderates because the US State Department was still clinging to the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

In fact, according to Chang's testimony, Haji was asking the police to sponsor Kim Kyu-sik and the centrist instead of Rhee Seung-man in accordance with the US State Department's policy.[259] However, the left and right forces at that time only emotionally called for the cause of liquidating the pro-Japanese faction, and failed to present the exact categories of the pro-Japanese faction that should be liquidated, the standard of punishment, and the time of punishment, which led to disagreements between each other. In many cases, the logic of liquidation of the pro-Japanese faction was used as a political tool to appeal to the nationalist sentiments of the masses.

For example, Yeo Un-hyung, who used the term "some reactionaries" instead of "pro-Japanese" and proposed that all but the pro-Japanese faction who held prominent positions or engaged in prominent pro-Japanese activities[260 should be included] also changed his stance and claimed that he absolutely opposed the establishment of the Legislative Assembly

[258])김두한, 『김두한 자서전(2)』, (서울: 메트로 서울 홀딩스, 2002), pp. 34-36.
[259])장택상, 1992. pp. 75-79.
[260])서중석, 2011, pp. 154.

because he demanded several preconditions for participation in the Legislative Assembly, such as the purge of national traitors and a fundamental overhaul of the police system, in order to somewhat improve the current suffocating state of south Korea[261], but it was not accepted. [262] The left-leaning National Front also showed logical incoherence and contradictory positions, denouncing the Legislative Council's proposal to punish pro-Japanese traitors within a day as too harsh and would backfire.[263] The reason why their position changed in a day was that Yi Seung-yop, a member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of the South, criticized the draft law on the transitional administrative organization of south Korea as anti-democratic and created the basic conditions for the formation of a dictatorship of the privileged class.[264]

On the other hand, Eom Hang-seop of the Korea Independence Party criticized the leftist forces after the liberation of Korea as they insisted on the national traitor regulation more than necessary, so he thought that there should be a pro-Japanese national traitor regulation, but now is not the time for it, and that it is an ideology that forgets the actual state of the nation. In other words, since the regulations proposed in the South Korean Transitional Legislative Assembly could be overturned because they were not based on the actual state of the nation, the Korean Independence Party hoped that the content would be examined

---

261)『조선일보』,1946 년 11 월 24 일「여운형, 입법의원에 대한 반대의사 표명」.

262)『경향신문』,1947 년 3 월 6 일「민전, 선거권 박탈할 친일파 민족반역자의 범위 확정」.

263)『경향신문』,1947 년 3 월 7 일「민전의장단, 입법의원의 친일파반역자 처단 안이 가혹하다고 비난」.

264)『서울신문』,1947 년 3 월 7 일「남로당중앙위원 이승엽,남조선과도행정조직법초안은 반민주적」.

and defined more qualitatively rather than in form.[265][266] Kim Gu was also criticized for differing his stance according to political interests without any specific standards or consistency of the pro-Japanese faction, and according to Paek's explanation of this, Paek Beom also acknowledged the limitations of the liberation regime and accepted the proposal to form a government centered on himself and the Korea Independence Party without a clear solution.

I was urged to do it.[323] Ninth, as criticism of the police continued to emerge as part of the leftist political offensive, the U.S. military government decided to dispatch 12 American police officers as police inspectors and assign them to each police station to supervise and direct the Korean police chiefs on the grounds that it would focus on the U.S. police administration in a way that would make the rights of individuals fair and respectful.[267] 1. Establishment of the Central Police Commission, 2. decentralization of the police, 3. Transfer of various licensing powers for the overall social and economic activities of ordinary civilians to the general administrative organization, 4. This includes the introduction of a warrant system. In the case of 1 and 2, it was proposed by Ahn Jae-hong, Minister of Civil Affairs, as a measure to ensure the political neutrality of the police, and in the case of 1, in particular, it was originally proposed by Ahn Jae-hong, Minister of Civil Affairs, in response to the opposition of the lawmakers of the Transitional Legislative Assembly against the police's suppression of the left-right

[265])『동아일보』,1947 년 3 월 12 일「한국 독립당, 모스크바 4 상회의와 친일파·민족반역자규정에 대해 담 화」.

[266])김구 지음, 도진순 엮고 보탬,『백범어록: 평화통일의 첫 걸음, 백범의 마지막 말과 글』, (서울: 돌베개, 2007), pp. 229-231.「혁명운동 재출발의 신 결심- 신민일보 사장과의 대담」.

[267])『경향신문』,1946 년 11 월 25 일「미국인 경찰관 12 명, 경찰 감독관으로 각 경찰서로 배치」.

coalition. In the case of Case 3, the police have been using it as a publicity stunt to suppress political opponents as well as leftists.

Tenth, however, in July 1947, when the Second Joint Committee of the United States and the United States of America broke up and the establishment of a single South Korean government became a reality, leftist forces led nationwide strikes and demonstrations, effectively entering a state of civil war. As a result, police reform measures have been delayed and have not yielded much results, leading to a quantitative expansion of the police force and an increase in the cost of policing. In such a situation, the U.S. military government

With the inauguration of the government of the Republic of Korea in August 1948, all duties were transferred and withdrawn. As a result of the planned plan, more and more security personnel were needed, so the punishment and dismissal of Buil police officers with expertise in policing were postponed until after the inauguration of the Republic of Korea government.

In other words, the police reform measures taken by the US military government at that time did not achieve much results due to unprecedented political, social, and economic turmoil, the influx of refugees, the insufficient preparation of the US military administration, the confusion caused by the collapse of Japanese rule, and the continuation of police[268][269] traditions.[270] In fact, on July 27, 1947, the police controlled a nationwide demonstration in which a total of 1.7 million people participated, claiming the successful resumption of the US-Soviet Joint Committee. And, during this period, the capacity to control the whole country by dividing it into three regions

---

[268])USAMGIK, SKIG Activities, No. 27, 1947. 12, 이길상,『미군정 활동 보고서』5 권, 1990, pp.
[269] -169.

[270])핸더슨. 2000, pp. 227.

I came to have this.[271)]

Table II-7) follows to finally chart the increase in police force over time. From this, it can be seen that the size of the police doubled by August 1948, when the establishment of a unilateral government was assured, compared to November 1945, when the United States was obsessed with the possibility of negotiations with the Soviet Union. In particular, in the one year from July 1947 to August 1948, more than 7,000 police officers, 1/4 of the existing police force, were recruited, and in 1948, 5,000 police officers, 1/6 of the total police quota, were added in just 8 months.

jealousy	Police Scale
15 Nov 1945	15,000 people
31 Jul 1946	22,620 people
28 Feb 1947	26,386 people
July 31, 1947	28,552 people
January 30, 1948	30,000 people
30 Apr 1948	34,330 people
25 Jun 1948	34,900 people
20 Aug 1948	35,000 people

Table II-7) Increase in U.S. Army Regular Police Force (1948-50)328)

However, as mentioned above, there was a lack of national budget that could be allocated to national security and national defense, and external funds had to be injected to make up for it, but the U.S. military government did not inject sufficient operating funds until the Second U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission was dissolved in July 1947. Thus, because of the lack of funds formally devoted to the judicial police, the police

271)전현수 역, 2004,「1947 년 8 월 1 일」, pp. 125.

were forced to make so-called voluntary contributions to compensate for the shortfall in salaries, and as Henderson pointed out, extortion of money from the police became a daily occurrence, and the public's disgust with the U.S. military administration was only amplified. Had.[329)]

2. Military

328) HUSAFIK, U.S. MILITARY IN KOREA, VOL. 3, 1988. pp. 439. and each Summation, Lee Gil-sang, "Report on the Activities of the U.S. Army," vols. 1-6, 1990, and the G-2 Report is HQ, HUSAFIK G-2 P/R Vols. 1-7, 1988-1989. References.;Commentary on Summation and G-2 Report, 2008, pp. 215 <Diagram V-3>.

329) Henderson, 2000. pp. 229.

year		1945	1946	1947	1948
General Finance		1,868,4 million	13,365,2 million	KRW 19,235.0 million	KRW 15,263,2 million
Defense Expenditures	amount	0.1 million won	KRW 826.5 million	KRW 1,991.0 million	2,016,8 million
	ratio	0.01%	6.2%	10.4%	13.2%

Table II-8) National Defense Expenditures of the U.S. Armed Forces (330)

As mentioned above, prior to the conclusion of the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission in July 1947, the US government's policy was focused on the withdrawal of troops through early negotiations with the Soviet Union, and since the state was spending the largest amount of money in the government sector to take responsibility for both production and consumption, the amount of defense expenditures and the proportion of the budget in 1945-46 were also very low, as can be seen from Table II-8 above. In addition, as can be seen from Table II-9 below, in 1946, when the Daegu Riot occurred, the size of the armed forces was also the smallest, and the country's defense capability was weak. Although the amount and proportion of defense expenditures increased significantly from 1947 onwards, they remained relatively small as a share of the national budget.

year	U.S. Forces Korea	South Korean National Guard	sum
1945	77,643 people		77,643 people
1946	37,918 people	64,64 people	44,382 people
1947	44,390 people	14,595 people	58,985 people
1948	22,740 people	52,752 people	75,492 people

Table II-9) The size of the army during the U.S. military administration331)

[330] Choi, 1989, pp. 119-160.

331) The G-2 Summary for Determining the Number of South Korean Defence Guards is HQ, USAFIK G-2 weekly summary 1-5

Sasaki points out that due to the difficulties that the Korean economy was facing at the time, it was not possible to provide sufficient

salaries for the fledgling members of the National Defense Guard. In addition, due to the flood damage caused by the 1946 flood and the shortage of fertilizers and agricultural equipment, there was a huge crop failure that occurred early, and even the basic feeding conditions were very poor, such as 2 or 3 loaves of bread or rice cakes being provided as substitutes instead of food, and even the basic feeding conditions were very poor, which was difficult for the young people in the prime to endure. And, As a result, a case of embezzlement of two vehicles and the illegal disposal of nearly 20,000 socks occurred in a supply company in Yeongdeungpo, which became the starting point for leftist officers to develop into a movement to oust right-wing officers through a campaign against corrupt and corrupt officers.[332] In fact, Gong Kuk-jin, who had joined the Korean National Defense Guard at the time, also recalled that since the salaries of the members of the National Defense Guard were barely enough to cover a few days' living expenses, the field rations provided by the U.S. military government were sold at the Namdaemun market to help with their living expenses.333)

On the other hand, Cummings, who had a profound influence on the revisionists, claimed that Haji founded the National Defense Guard in December 1945, before the establishment of the South Korean army, and that all the officers of the main members of the National Defense Guard, which began with six divisions at the time of its establishment, were filled by men who had served in the Japanese army, highlighting Kim Seok-won, who was notorious among those who had served in the Japanese army,[334] thus creating the myth of modern history that the command of the National Defense Guard and Coast Guard launched by the U.S. military administration was composed of pro-Japanese veterans.

However, Kang Man-gil points out that "even if the situation in the liberated area forced the establishment of a single independent

government in South Korea by right-wing forces, the upper echelons of the government should have been composed of Lim Jeong-in who had returned from China and former members of the Liberation Army."[335] If,

---

Vol., 1990. and G-2 Summary, 2008, pp. 167 <Diagram IV-4>. The number of USFK is Park Chan-pyo, 2007, pp. Table <4 of 214> Trends in the size of U.S. tactical forces and military personnel, pp. Table 6 of < 216> Citation of the Korean National Guard and the Trend of the Enhancement of the Eyeglass Trophy of the Sea respectively.

[332] Sasaki, 1977. pp. 113-114, 144.

333) Principality. An Old Soldier's Lamentation, (Seoul: Wonmin, 2001), pp. 42.

334)Cumings, 2001. pp. 299, 347.

If so, can it [272]be said that the case of the US National Defense Guard and the Coast Guard, whose top commanders were composed of former members of the Liberation Army and the Lim Chung Factor who had returned from China, met the minimum requirements of legitimacy claimed by Kang Man-gil?

As will be explained later, Kim Seok-won and other experienced Japanese military personnel came to the fore at a time when the national security crisis reached its peak due to the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents in October 1948, and they had previously avoided participating in the reality of the nationalist cause. Thus, during the period of the US military administration and the beginning of the ROK government, former members of the Liberation Army formed the top leadership of the military, despite being outnumbered in absolute numbers.

Although the U.S. military government did not recognize the Provisional Government, it had plans to establish a Provisional Government and a government centered on Rhee Seung-man and withdraw troops until February 1946 when it was ordered to support the moderates, and

---

[272])강만길, 2011, pp. 255-256.

almost all state apparatus except the police were appointed to the top of the apparatus with extensive experience in the anti-Japanese struggle. Accordingly, the highest command of the U.S. military was also appointed by people from the Liberation Army, and below that was occupied by people from the Japanese Army.

On January 14, 1946, the U.S. military government, which established the Korean National Defense Guard, ordered the dissolution of all military groups and appointed Yu Dong-ryeol, Song[273] Ho-seong, and Son Won-il, son of Son Jung-jung, chairman of the Provisional Government, as the symbolic head of the National Guard,[274] the Commander-in-Chief of the Commander-in-Chief, and the Coast Guard, despite the fact that the majority of the Liberation Army were delayed from returning home. The expansion and reorganization of the organization of the Korean National Defense Guard was carried out in June 1946: Establishment of the General Headquarters of the Korean Guard and the General Headquarters of the Korean Coast Guard →2.September 1946: Appointment of Yu Dong-ryul as the head of the Korean Commander-in-Chief→3.April 1947: Establishment of the post of Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Unification →4.June 1948: The establishment of the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Korean Coast Guard[275].(338) At that time, the U.S. military administration and the Korean Liberation Army were coordinated into the military to provide regular national defense.

---

[273])『조선일보』,1946 년 6 월 12 일「군정청 통위부 설치하고 초대 조선인 부장에 유동렬 임명」.

[274]) 해군의 모체에 해당하는 해안 경비대는 1946 년 1 월 29 일의 해안경비대 설치계획 발표로 인해 시작되었 으며 임무는 주로 국가 법령과 규칙에 의거하여 수역을 경비하여 불법항행과 밀수출입을 취체 할 임무와 권리를 가지는 것이었다. 『경향신문』, 1947 년 2 월 1 일「경무 부장 조병옥, 통위부장 유동열, 경찰과 경 비대의 임무한계 발표」.

[275])국방부 전사편찬위원회, 1981, pp. 264.

It was reported that the army was going to be organized[276),] and the Democratic Party of Korea, which had been calling for the formation of a provisional government, was also insisting on the rapid strengthening of the Liberation Army in order to secure national defense and security. [277] Accordingly, in the early days of the US military administration, there was a widespread justification that the Korean Army should be organized with the Liberation Army as its mother, so former Japanese military personnel such as Lee Eung-jun, Won Yong-deok, and Kim Seok-won, who had been negotiated by the US military administration, also declined the invitation of the US military on the grounds of diligence and actively recommended the former members of the Liberation Army. [278 The] U.S. military government ordered the dissolution of private military organizations immediately after the invasion of Pearl Harbor, and despite the fact that it was in conflict with the Provisional Government, which attempted to seize power by issuing the first and second issues of the "National National" on December 30, 1945, it continued to maintain the Liberation Army rather than an officially sanctioned organization, and this was the "Korean Liberation Youth Association", a right-wing youth organization led by Oh Kwang-hwan, which will be described later. Later, as in the case of the "Korean National Youth League," youth organizations organized around the leaders of the Liberation Army of the Provisional Government, such as Yi Beom-seok, were officially sponsored by the U.S. military government, and they were later appointed as cadres of the ROK Armed Forces in large numbers and played an important role in the

[276])『동아일보』,1945 년 12 월 4 일「정규 국방군 편성예정」.
[277])『동아일보』,1945 년 12 월 7 일「한민당, 임정지지 국민운동 전개 결의」.
[278])국방부 전사편찬위원회, 1981. pp. 306-307.

establishment of the Korean Armed Forces. In fact, The members of the Daedong Youth League and the Korean National Youth League, organized by Yi Beom-seok, Chief of Staff of the Liberation Army, who returned to Korea on June 3, 1946 with about 500 Liberation Army[279] soldiers, and Yi Cheong-chun, the commander of the Liberation Army, who [280]returned to Korea with about 5,000 Liberation Army soldiers around May 21, 1946, were selected as military cadres in the early days of the First Republic as the orthodoxy of the Liberation Army became public opinion and there were large-scale vacancies among military cadres due to leftist searches within the military.

On the other hand, from the time of the establishment of the Military English School, the U.S. military administration has been involved in the Liberation Army, the Japanese Army in Manchuria.

In an attempt to balance the difference between military backgrounds, Cho Gae-ok from the Liberation Army, Lee Eung-jun (344), who was involved in the establishment of the Provisional Government as the son-in-law of independence activist Yi Kap from the Japanese Army, and Won Yong-deok from the Manchurian Army. By April 30, 1946, 110 commissioned officers had graduated from the Military English School, and 87 were from the Japanese Army, accounting for 80 percent.345)

category	Japanese Yuksa	Japanese Crane Corps	Japanese Volunteer Soldiers	Manchuria military	Liberation military	sum

279)『조선일보』,1946 년 6 월 5 일「광복군참모장 이범석 귀국」.

280)『조선일보』,1946 년 5 월 18 일「이청천 이하 오천 여 명의 광복군이 개인자격으로 귀국 예정」.

personnel	13 pass.	68 people	6 pass.	21 pass.	2 people	110 people
Hundred minutes rate	11.8 %	61.8 %	5.5 %	19.1 %	1.8 %	100 %

Table II-10) Graduation Status of Military English Schools346)

On the other hand, the establishment and build-up of the Korean National Defense Guard by the U.S. military administration was greatly influenced by international political factors such as negotiations and conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Already on January 11, 1946, the first North Korean army under the direct leadership of the Soviets

(344) Yi Eung-jun's father-in-law, Yi Kap, had left his daughter in the care of Yu Dong-yeol, a former classmate of the Korean Military Academy and the Japanese Military Academy, when he defected to China. The reason for this was that Li Gab had married his sister to Yu Dong-yeol, and the only in-laws he could rely on was Yoo Dong-yeol. Thus, after the death of his father-in-law, Lee Gap, his wife's uncle, Yoo Dong-yeol, was like a father-in-law to Lee Eung-jun. Transcription Commission of the Ministry of Defense, 1981. pp. 264. 308. On the other hand, Lee Eung-joon's son-in-law was Lee Hyung-geun, who received the ROK Army's military number 1 and served as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Army. This shows that the legitimacy of the Provisional Government was valued, but the army in the early days, which lacked human resources, relied heavily on human relations.

[345] Han Yong-won, "A Comparison of the Military Establishment Process of North and South Korea," in Lee Cheol-soon, ed., A Comparison of the Processes of Government Establishment in North and South Korea: 1945-1948, (Seoul: Ingansarang, 2010), pp. 302.

346) This is Han Yongwon. 1984. pp. This is according to the study of the Commentary on Xu, which was prepared with reference to 74. Xi Xi. 2008. pp. 155.

The Railway Security Force was established, but it was assigned to the police force in view of its relationship with the U.S. military government. However, after the conclusion of the First US-Soviet Joint Committee, on August 15, 1946, the Security Officer Training Battalion was established to prepare for the training of cadre officers under the active involvement of the Soviet military government.[281][282] On May 17, 1947, the Soviet Union renamed the Security Officer Training Battalion into the North Korean People's Group Military Command, and gave all service members a rank insignia made in imitation of the rank insignia of the Soviet Army, and supplied Soviet-made weapons to each unit to embody the appearance of the regular army Meanwhile, in the case of the Navy and Air Force, the Surface Security Corps, which was established in October 1945, was reorganized into the Coast Guard Command in December, and the Sinuiju Air Corps, which was incorporated into the Pyongyang Gakuen Aviation Company in June 1946, was reorganized into the Chung Kyu Squadron on May 17, 1947. 348)

After the failure of the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission in July 1947, the Soviet Union, which had been insisting on the withdrawal of US and Soviet troops, announced the establishment of the Korean People's Army on February 8, 1948, before the establishment of the government. The North Korean military, which already existed at the time, had enough military potential to cause considerable concern in the United States.

The NSC 8 Report of April 2, 1948, reported that about 27,000 South Korean guards and coast guards were operated by 20,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, compared to 125,000 regular North Korean soldiers

[281])안드레이 란코프 저, 김광린 역, 『소련의 자료로 본 북한 현대정치사』, (서울: 오름, 1995), pp. 90.
[282])한용원, 2010, pp. 174-179.

trained by 45,000 Soviet soldiers.[283] Accordingly, the United States, which was still obsessed with the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet Union by transferring the Korean issue to the United Nations even after the conclusion of the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee in July 1947, also rapidly increased its Korean Guard forces in 1948 after the United Nations decided to establish a de facto sole government in Korea in November 1947. Table II-11) shows that the number of troops increased more than 3-4 times in just over 7 months, which is entirely based on the strategic purpose and necessity of the United States to build up a military force capable of surviving against North Korea in a short time while withdrawing US troops after the establishment of the ROK government. It was.

date	Guard	Coast Guard	sum
January 30, 1948	14,800 people	2,850 people	17,650 people
27 Feb 1948	22,023 people	2,850 people	24,873 people
26 Mar 1948	24,691 people	2,859 people	27,550 people
30 Apr 1948	24,189 people	2,859 people	27,048 people
28 May 1948	31,156 people	2,779 people	33,935 people
25 Jun 1948	38,165 people	2,858 people	41,023 people

[283])National Security Council Report 8, April, 2, 1949, ; DNSA(Declassified National Security Archive), pp.2.

30 Jul 1948	49,783 people	2,789 people	52,572 people
13 Aug 1948	49,995 people	2,627 people	52,622 people

Table II-11) Increase in the number of South Korean National Defense Guard forces by date of 1948 (350)

However, this rapid expansion in a short period of time had the side effect of the rise of Japanese military personnel, who were far superior in number compared to those from the Liberation Army, and the massive infiltration of leftist forces, which led to the First Republic. The U.S. military advisors preferred those from the Japanese Army and the Manchurian Army, who were equipped with modern warfare skills, because they had more than a college degree and English language skills, compared to those from the Liberation Army, who lacked modern tactical warfare. The admission criteria for the Military English School, which was opened for the first time by the U.S. military government, were limited to officers and noncommissioned officers from the Japanese, Manchurian, and Liberation Army who had graduated from junior high school or higher and had some knowledge of English. However, many of the officers of the Liberation Army, most of whom were from the Chinese army, did not speak any English, were old, and did not receive the rigorous training that they received in Japanese military training institutions.351

350)HQ, USAFIK G-2 weekly summary vols. 1-5, 1990. and G-2 Summary, 2008, pp. 167 See <Chart IV-4>.

Due to the lack of knowledge and experience as a military man[284], there was often an emphasis on patriotism alone.

For example, in the case of Song Ho-sung, who served as the commander-in-chief of the National Defense Guard, the Japanese military It has been pointed out as a typical case of people being excluded from the military's existence, but[285] contrary to these preconceived notions, there are many statements that question his qualifications, erudition, and military knowledge. According to the testimony of Chae Myung-shin, who served as the commander of the ROK forces in Vietnam, Song Ho-sung did not speak a word of English and had no etiquette due to his long life in the Liberation Army.[286] Yoo Jae-hung, who was a former Japanese soldier but had great respect for General Yoo Dong-ryeol and Kim Hong-il, also recalled that Song Ho-sung used his history of independence in China to show off his presence in private retaliation.[287] In addition, he received special treatment from officers from the U.S. and Japanese armies because of his experience in the Liberation Army, which caused a backlash from the officers in the majors.[288] This assessment was not unique to Koreans. Hausman, who had a profound influence on the creation of the Korean army and is considered the

---

[284])실제로 중, 일 전쟁을 경험했었던 장개석 마저도 대만으로 쫓겨간 이후 비밀리에 일본군 장성을 초빙하 여 그에게 중국식 이름을 부여하여 대만군을 훈련시켰을 정도로 국부군의 수준은 일본군에 비해 매우 뒤 떨어졌다. 즉, 장개석은 구 일본군의 중국 파견군 사령관이었던 토미타 나오스케 전 육군소장에게 부탁하 여 구 일본군 장교들로 구성된 군사 고문단 백단(白團)을 만들었다. 토미타 나오스케는 백홍량 이란 중 국식 가명을 사용하면서 약 80 여명으로 구성된 백단을 통해 대만군 장교들에게 일본식 전술 및 전략 교 육을 시켰다. 이들 1969 년 일본으로 돌아갈 때 까지 국부군에게 큰 영향을 미쳤고, 실제로 국부군이 중 화 인민공화국군과 대결하여 승리를 거둔 금문도 전투에도 매우 중요한 역할을 하였다고 전해진다.

[285])김동춘, 2000. pp. 165.

[286])『국방일보 전자신문』,2007 년 2 월 7 일「채명신 회고록」.

[287])유재흥. 1994.『격동의 세월: 유재흥 회고록』,(서울: 을유문화사). pp. 86-93.

[288])이치업. 스티븐 엠 딸프 공저,『번개장군』, (서울: 원민, 2001), pp. 90-92.

"father of the Korean army" by revisionists, also mentions Song Ho-sung's lack of qualities.[289]The reason why Song Ho-sung, who was lacking in so many ways, was able to stay in office for two years was because he was protected by Vice President Yu Dong-yeol, who was also from the Liberation Army.[290] As this situation was unfolding, Cummings also

[289])짐 하우스만 저, 정일화 역, 『한국 대통령을 움직인 미군대위』, (서울: 한국문원, 1995), pp. 140-141.

[290])대한민국 국방부 전사편찬위원회 편. 『한국전쟁사 1 권: 해방과 건군, 1945~1950』, (서울: 국방부 작전

He points out that the U.S. soldiers, who are in charge of the troop, found that the basic military training of the former members of the Liberation Army was insufficient, and that the former members of the Liberation Army who were selected for the first military English school did not get the highest rank in the National Guard.(358) On the other hand, in the process of forcibly increasing the number of troops in a short period of time, the U.S. military administration

Background checks were not carried out properly, so it was easy for the Communists to break in.

In addition, the US military administration equated the left and the right wing for the sake of political neutrality, but there was no way to prevent it from happening to the head of the Presidential Committee, Yu Dong-yeol, so the Korean National Defense Guard was one of the main bases of the Communist Party at the time.(359) This was the main reason for the frequent rebellions of leftist forces within the army in the early years of the First Republic, which led to large-scale purges.

At the same time, however, the U.S. military government encouraged right-wing youth members to join the army, which was compensating for the violence of the state. The number of right-wing youth members from the North was also increasing significantly. In fact, among those who entered the Security Academy, which was established on May 1, 1946 in place of the Military English School, and the Liberation Army School, which was established on January 17, 1946, the proportion of right-wing youth members from the North was particularly high. For example, in the case of the Guards Academy, which produced a total of 1,254 officers in six classes, two-thirds of the successful applicants among the 5th class, which had a highly competitive ratio of 15 to 1, were from the North. The majority of the 6th phase were also made up

,

of people from the North and South Korea. The proportion of them gradually increased, until the proportion of members of the Liberation Youth Association, the National Youth League, and the Daedong Youth League, which were nurtured by the leaders of the Liberation Army during the 7th to 10th regular military periods, and the members of the Taedonggang Comrades' Association and the Yalu River Comrades' Association, which were nurtured by the leaders of the Liberation Army, reached nearly 2,500.[360] The members of the Northwestern Youth also testified that they had consulted with the then head of the Presidential Security Department and others to apply in large numbers for the 5th Army Corps and 13 others for the 7th Army Corps for the purpose of eliminating the Communist fracties in the National Defense Security Corps.361)

Compilation Committee, 1967), pp. 270.

358)Cumings, 1981. pp. 233.

[359] Ministry of National Defense Transcription Compilation Committee, 1981. pp. 308.

360) Han Yong-won 2010, pp. pp. 186-189.

3. Finance and Tax Organizations

category		1946		1947		1948	
		amount	%	amount	%	amount	%
Appropriations	Administrative Expenses	2,106	17.8	1,976	10.2	5.746	16.4
	Judicial Police Fee	1,356	11.5	2,323	11.9	4,014	11.5
	Defense Expenditures	1,026	8.7	1,697	8.7	4,969	14.2

,

	Education	387	3.3	1,600	8.5	1,761	5.0
	Civil engineering fee			614	3.2	730	2.1
	Industrial Costs	1,957	16.6	2,260	11.6	2,524	7.2
	Pipe Expenses	3,991	33.8	7,498	38.6	13,828	39.5
	Social health expenses	415	3.5	867	4.5	898	2.6
	National Debt Ratio	562	4.8	550	2.8	533	1.5
	guitar					20	0.1
	system	11,800	100	19,445	100	35,119	100
Three-mouthed	tax	722	6.1	3,600	18.5	5,058	14.4
	Stamp Income	6	0.1	150	0.8	260	0.7
	Government/Property import	6,870	58.2	11,065	56.9	19,712	56.3
	Borrowings	3,787		4,010	20.6	9,459	27.6
	Bond		16.6				
	guitar	415	33.8	620	3.2	529	1.5

,

[361] Kyunghyang Sinmun, January 28, 1987, "Half a Century of the Youth Movement: (12) Northwestern Youth Association."

	system	11,800	100	19.445	100	35,119	100

Table II-12) Revenue Structure of the U.S. Army (1946-1948) (Unit: Million Won)362)

As mentioned above, in the case of the newly vulnerable countries of the Third World, the production of the country and It has been pointed out that the formation of the bourgeoisie responsible for the development of capitalism was delayed, so the state took the lead in producing and provided the necessary material resources for itself, and if we look at the revenue structure of the US military period in 1946-1948, we can find that this explanation can be applied as it is. In fact, in 1946-48, the largest proportion of the U.S. military government's appropriations and revenues was government expenditures, which accounted for an overwhelming proportion of other areas.

By comparison, judicial and defense expenditures, which emphasize the role of the overgrowth state and revisionism, are only the third largest expenditure behind administrative expenditures, and in some cases have lagged behind industrial expenditures. As can be seen from Table II-12 above, the 2nd US-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved in July 1947 and the establishment of a single South Korean government became a reality, and defense expenditures almost doubled. At the same time, however, due to the lack of material and economic resources of the state, the proportion of judicial and police expenditures did not increase significantly, and right-wing youth organizations

,

voluntarily participated in policing work because of the lack of interest and ability of the state.

In conclusion, despite the fact that the national economy was devastated by the exploitation of the Japanese imperialists and fell into a state of extreme inflation, when there were no manpower or classes to take charge of the country's production and consumption, the state directly took over the economy as the biggest producer of production and consumption. President Xi interpreted this as a burden imposed on the state at a time when tax revenues were extremely low, mainly through non-tax means, such as inflation through currency evaporation, government revenues, and aid. [363] In fact, this is the Republic of Korea

---

[362] Korea Development Bank Research Department, 『Ten Years History of the Korean Industrial Economy』, (Seoul: Korea Development Bank, 1955) pp. 359-360.
363) Xi 2008. pp. 260.

,

It is more appropriate to evaluate it as a phenomenon that occurs in the early stages of the construction of a vulnerable state.

This can be understood when we consider two factors: the international political factor of the US policy toward Korea at the time and the situation of Korea, a new country that built a modern nation amid a lack of various resources. As mentioned many times, after the fall of the Japanese Empire, the economy and industry collapsed completely, but without the bourgeoisie to take over, Korea's finances at the time were entirely dependent on foreign economic aid from the United States. The following table shows the proportion of U.S. foreign aid imports in 1945, which accounted for 100% of total imports and exports, with these figures 81.5% and 77% in 1946 →85.9% and 77.1% in 1947→1948
It was 84.4 percent and 76.3 percent, respectively.

	1945	1946	1947	1948
Aid Imports	$4,493,000	$49,496,000	$199,899,000	$175,592,000
Off	$4,493,000	60,721,000 USD	$232,615,000	208,003,000 dollars
Total Imports & Exports	$4,493,000	$64,262,000	$259,419,000	$230,263,000
Aid Imports/ Off	100%	81.5%	85.9%	84.4%
Aid Imports/ Total Imports	100%	77%	77.1%	76.3%

and Exports				

Table II-13) Proportion of aid imports in total imports and exports364)

U.S. economic aid to Korea during the 1945-48 U.S. military occupation was provided through the U.S. Department of the Army, totaling $409,394,000 from September 1945 to August 1948.

[364] Thirty Years of Finance and Finance History Compilation Committee, ed., Thirty Years of Finance and Finance, (Seoul: Thirty Years of Finance and Finance Compilation Committee, 1978), pp. 40.

Occupied Area) [291] and the U.S. Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC) in 1947 in the form of loans in the form of medical supplies and clothing, totaling $24,928,000.[292] The Administrative Relief Aid for Occupied Territories (GARIOA), which accounted for the largest proportion of them, was provided to the ROK in September 1945 for the purpose of stabilizing the people's livelihood by preventing starvation, disease, and social unrest in all areas occupied by the United States after World War II. However, as we have already seen, since the goal of the US military administration was focused on the rapid withdrawal of troops through negotiations with the Soviet Union, the focus was not on revitalizing the economy, but on stabilizing society by solving the problem of food deficiency and disease among the Koreans, which were the immediate priority of the Korean people, by providing emergency relief supplies such as food, clothing, and medical supplies. I had no choice but[293] to do it. As a result of the US policy toward Korea, which set

[291])한국은행 조사부, 『경제통계연보』 (서울: 한국은행, 1962), : 홍성유, 『한국경제와 미국원조』, (서울: 박 영사, 1962), pp. 92.

[292])산업은행, 『한국산업경제 10 년사』, (서울: 산업은행, 1955) , pp. 545-547.

[293])홍성유, 1962, pp. 19, pp. 48.

the early withdrawal of troops as the priority goal through negotiations with the Soviet Union, the problem was further aggravated by the fact that the US government's economic policy was also operated as a stopgap measure rather than focusing on long-term economic reconstruction and self-reliant economic development. In fact, the only economic and financial management policy that the US government received from the U.S. government was on October 17, 1945, but it was also vague and not specific at all.[294] The U.S. military government's economic policy and fiscal and tax policies can be described as the middle price of expenditures and fiscal deficits, and the prevalence of inflation. First, Korea's per capita tax burden, which accounted for only one-sixth of the per capita national income during the Japanese period, was barely inferior to that of Japan.[295] This is a glimpse of Japan's harsh expropriation of Koreans and the fact that the Japanese living in Korea monopolized the economy and production activities and were responsible for a large part of the tax revenue. However, with the defeat of the Japanese imperialists, these forces were completely eliminated and the Koreans who suffered economic damage from the defeat could not replace them, so the country's tax revenue was greatly reduced.

In fact, despite the fact that the U.S. military government, which had the Central Economic Commission, the head of the Ministry of Finance, and the deputy director under the minister of military affairs and the minister of civil affairs, and the Finance Bureau and the Deputy Directorate of Finance and the Finance Bureau, the Accounts Bureau, the National Treasury Bureau, the Monopoly Bureau, and the Accounting[296] Bureau under the Vice President, introduced the U.S.-style tax system and reorganized

[294])FRUS 1945, VI ,1945 년 10 월 17 일. pp. 1073-1091.
[295])김명윤, 『한국재정의 구조』, (서울: 고려대학교 출판부, 1971), pp. 29-33.
[296])김운태,1992, pp. 250.

the tax system several times, the tax revenue, which was 20% at the end of the Japanese Empire, remained at 6.1% (1946) and 14.4% (1948) during the period of the US military administration. Naturally, the state had no choice but to increase appropriations to compensate for this, which resulted in a massive budget deficit and widespread inflation. If you look at the table above, the appropriation for the three years of the U.S. military period was 11.8 billion won. It nearly tripled to 35.1 billion won. This increase in appropriations has led to a fiscal deficit, which has also exploded to 996.8 million won →7.848 billion won→16.235 billion won.

And this led to widespread inflation, and the inflation rate at the time was It continued to increase from 125.5% →228.3%→372%, creating a hyper-inflation situation of more than 330% per year.[297)]

However, with the dissolution of the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission in July 1947, US economic policy was forced to undergo a fundamental change. In fact, on July 24, 1947, shortly after the conclusion of the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee, instructions were sent to the U.S. military administration aimed at rebuilding and healthy the Korean economy so that South Korea could build a self-reliant economy against the Soviet-backed North Korean government.[298] In addition, the delegation of William Draper, who visited the ROK in September 1948, prepared a policy of economic aid to Korea on the premise of the possibility of establishing a single independent government in South Korea, and submitted a report pointing out that economic aid should be expanded for the political and economic stability of South Korea after the decision to hold a general election under the supervision of the United Nations in November 1947.

---

[297])서주석, 2008. pp. 255 각주 15 번).

[298])FRUS 1947, VI 1947 년 7 월 24 일, pp. 714-731.

However, the Soviet Union still submitted a proposal to the United Nations to establish a single South Korean government.

The U.S. State Department, which had not ruled out the possibility of a last-minute negotiation with the United States, refused to accept the economic aid plan proposed by the U.S. military government's economic experts with the aim of reviving the ROK in the long term.[299]This position did not change until 1949, when China became communist. Basically, the policy of the Truman Doctrine was to create conditions for the natural and dignified withdrawal of US troops from Korea, which is less strategically important than in Europe, by forming a viable government in South Korea against North Korea. In other words, it was the policy of the Truman Doctrine in Korea to avoid the use of enormous military power by the United States by providing minimal economic support to political and ideological effects.

The U.S. National Security Council (NSC) 8 (National Security Council) Report of April 2, 1948, sums up this policy. While acknowledging that the main goal of the Soviet Union's policy toward Korea was ultimately the Soviet Union's domination of the Korean peninsula, the report decided to withdraw U.S. troops in view of limited manpower and funds. At the same time, in order to prevent the economic collapse that might result from the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the United States decided to increase U.S. economic aid to support the South Korean government to the extent practicable. [300] However, as

[299])국회도서관 입법조사국, 『선진제국의 대 아시아 경제협력』,(서울: 국회도서관, 1964), pp. 433-471.

[300])National Security Council Report 8 3b, 2, April, 1948, DNSA(Declassified National Security Archive), ; FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 4 월 2 일, pp.1163-1169.

McDonald[301's] and the officials of the U.S. Army Department already admitted, the United States at that time was in great trouble by injecting insufficient human and material resources into Korea.[302303] In fact, if we compare the cost of occupation by the US military administration at that time with the study of the RAND Research Institute, which quantified the cost of the occupation of the US military at that time by combining cases of national house construction, it can be seen that the amount of money invested in the operation of Korea was a very small amount, so it was inevitable that the country would start as a vulnerable country from the time of the US military administration. The following is a table that calculates the cost of occupation during the three years of the U.S. military administration.

Fiscal	Medical Benefit	Troop Maintenance Expenses	GARIOA	OFLC	Amount
1946	89,000	85,500	27,800		202,300
1947	82,000	74,300	96,400	24,928	277,628
1948	84,300	67,500	92,700		244,500
Amount	255,300	227,300	216,900	24,928	724,428

[301])맥도널드는 미군정 기간 동안의 자원부족의 문제를 지적하고 있다. 즉, 그에 따르면 미국이 소련과 한반 도 통치에 대한 합의에 도달할 때 까지 적극적인 프로그램을 수행하려 하지 않아 미국이 자원을 배치할 때 한국의 우선순위가 낮았으므로 한국의 국가형성 기 동안 미국은 자원부족과 정책 및 계획 부족으로 인해 효과적으로 활동할 수 가 없었다고 지적하고 있다. 맥도널드. 2001. pp 28, pp. 233.

[302])이미 전술한 것처럼 1947 년 1 월 초에 미 육군성 관리들은 주한미군의 인력과 물자부족 문제가 너무나 심각하여 이 상태로는 남한을 계속 점령하는 것이 불가능하다고 판단하고 있었다. FRUS 1947, VI,

[303] 년 1 월 27 일「Vincent to Marshall」, pp.601-603.

Table II-14) Cost of Occupation by U.S. Forces377) (in thousands)

Based on this, the RAND Corporation's study suggests the cost of national construction and comparison as shown in Table II-15. In conclusion, considering the 60-year difference, the population four times larger, and the difference in exchange rates, the US military spent only about 1/25 of the cost. In addition, since these funds were not sufficiently invested, unofficial additional costs had to be brought in from outside, which means that there is a high possibility that illegal tax revenues can be generated by officials. In other words, the United States, which was burdened with the enormous amount of money invested in managing crises around the world, aimed at early withdrawal of troops from the Korean region, which is of relatively low strategic importance, and shifted the cost of management to Korean society, thus creating a social structure in which corruption is inevitable for survival.

---

377) Park Chan-pyo, 2007. pp. 314. This study is reprinted here in 1947 by the U.S. Committee on Foreign Liquidation.

The Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC) provided a total of $24,928,000 in paid aid in the form of loans.

[378] "Results of the First Census (as of May 1, 1949: Announced on June 16, 1949)," National History Compilation Committee, Annals of Korean Citizens

	Korea during the U.S. military occupation	RAND Institute Standard Model Bureau (Peace Enforcement Activities)
population	21 million (1949)378)	5,000,000
Per capita	$40 ($379)	$500

National Income			
the police troops380)	1945	15,000 people	60,000 (1,5000*4)
	1946	22,620 people	
	1947	28,552 people	
	1948	35,000 people	
the police Budget381)	1945	202.5 million won	$72 million ($18 million*4)
	1946	KRW 147.0 million	
	1947	KRW 2,016.5 million	
	1948	2.4 Billion Won	
army Troops382)	1945	77,643 people	20-400,000 (5-100,000*4)
	1946	44,382 people	
	1947	58,985 people	
	1948	75,492 people	
soup room B383) budget	1945	KRW 0.1 million	$200 million ($50 million*4)
	1946	KRW 826.5 million	

	1947	KRW 1,991.0 million	
	1948	8.1 Billion Won 384)	
The cost of national construction	Approx. $2.4 billion		Approx. $62.4 billion

Korean History Sourcebook: Korean Economic Policy Document 1 (1948.8-1949.12)』, 2010, pp. 333.

[379] National History Compilation Committee, Memoirs of Korean History 2 Korean Economic Policy Document 2 (1950.1-1950.6), 2010. pp. 3.

380) HUSAFIK, U.S. MILITARY IN KOREA, VOL. 3, 1988. pp. 439. and each Summation, in Lee Gil-sang, Report on the Activities of the U.S. Armed Forces, Vols. 1-6, 1990, and the G-2 Report, HQ, HUSAFIK G-2 P/R Vols. 1-7, 1988-1989. References.;Commentary on Summation and G-2 Report, 2008, pp. 215 <Diagram V-3>.

381) Choi, 1989. and the Research Department of the Bank of Industry, 1955. See the

[382] For the G-2 Summary to determine the number of South Korean National Defense Guards, see HQ, USAFIK G-2 weekly summary Vols. 1-5, 1990. and G-2 Summary, 2008, pp. 167 <Diagram IV-4>. The number of USFK is Park Chan-pyo, 2007, pp. Table <4 of 214> Trends in the size of U.S. tactical forces and military personnel, pp. Table 6 of < 216> Citation of the Korean National Guard and the Trend of the Enhancement of the Eyeglass Trophy of the Sea respectively.

[383] Public Security Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, 『History of the Korean Police 2』, 1973, pp. 295. and National History Compilation Committee, 『Memoirs of Korean History: 1948.8-1949.12』, 2010, pp. 691. References.

[384] Choi, Kwang, 1989, and Korea Development Bank, 1955. See.

Table II-15) Cost of National Construction385)

Thus, Henderson's assertion that "U.S. aid to Korea was inadequate and intermittent" up to the Korean War, quoting a June 30, 1957, letter from John Vincent, then director of the State Department's Far East Bureau, to the New York Times.(386) In fact, during the period of

the US military administration, there was a period of injustice by the civil servants over the collection and distribution of grain by the US military government, and the leftist forces, who had witnessed the people's resentment against it, presented it as one of the greatest causes of labor disputes and strikes, which will be described next, thus creating a vicious cycle that was bound to be repeated.

385) James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, (RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION: RAND Corporation, 2007).

386) Henderson, 2000. pp. 236.

III. The Beginning of the Civil War (1946-1948)

Sun Woo Jong-won, who was famous as an ideological prosecutor in the period around the Korean War immediately after liberation, argued that when the cost of living soared and the people's livelihood worsened amid social turmoil and disorder, the Communist Party used it as an excellent excuse and opportunity for a communist revolution.[304]Furthermore, he points out that the Communist Party's activities developed in four stages from the moment of liberation until the Korean War, and according to this, from September 1946 onwards, the first stage of the Communist Party's political struggle centered on strikes was developed. Merrill, who described himself as a neo-revisionist, also points to four stages of the struggle of the Communist Party, and according to his explanation, the second stage, the mass uprising, began to appear in the fall of 1946. In addition to these, Kim Jum-gon's explanation of the Communist Party's struggle is also the second stage, and September 1946, when the legitimate political struggle and the violent struggle were going hand in hand, was an important point in the gradual transformation of the legitimate political struggle into a violent struggle.

In other words, starting in September 1946, the work of communization was carried out legally.

The stage of political struggle ended and the stage of mass uprising centered on violent struggle was transformed, and the period of de facto civil war began. From 1947 onwards, some guerrilla units appeared and clashes began to break out along the borders along the 38th parallel, and a full-scale violent struggle centered on strikes and demonstrations began to prevent the establishment of a government. As a result, by the beginning of 1948, the situation was actually entering a non-regular war.

[304])선우종원.1986. pp.49.

Then, from October 1948, when the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents occurred, the ROK Army

While instigating a rebellion and forming guerrilla units, guerrilla units sent from North Korea infiltrated and intensified irregular warfare. As a result, the irregular war reached its climax in mid-1949, when the withdrawal of the USFK was completed and rumors of North Korea's aggression were being circulated to the masses, reaching the preceding stage of the start of regular warfare, and by 1950, when North Korea decided to reunify by force, it was entering the stage of a small-scale conventional war.

	Sunwoo Jongwon	Kim Joo-gon	Jaeheung Yoo	John Merrill
Phase 1	Political Struggle	1 9 4 5 years - 1946: Phase of legal political dispute	1945-1946: Legalization in the political field progresses	1945-1946 :Political stage
Phase 2	Political Struggle→ Violent Struggle	1 9 4 6 years - 1947: Juxtaposition of legal political disputes and illegal violent struggles	Summer 1947-1948: Uses the South Korean Workers' Party to disrupt the establishment of the government or overthrow the government.	Autumn 1946: Phase of the Mass Uprising

Phase 3	Guerrilla Formation	1 9 4 8 years -1950: Violent Struggle	Fall 1948 -1949: Inducing rebellion within the Korean army and dispatching guerrilla troops	19 Early 48 - early 1950 : Non-regular period
Phase 4	The preceding stage of the intensification of guerrilla warfare and the beginning of regular warfare		Summer 1950 : Unification by force	1950-1950 June :Small-scale conventional phase

Table III-1) Comparison of classification by step of Sun Woo Jong-won, Kim Joo-gon, Yoo Jae-heung, and John Merrill

Thus, from September 1946 onwards, as the de facto state of civil war due to the mass uprising was realized, right-wing youth organizations began to assist in the affairs of the security and security of the country, which was particularly weak due to lack of resources. Some of them became part of the army and police, which had been expanding in number since July 1947, when the establishment of the government began to take shape, and were included in the official organization of the state, and the rest of the youth members also participated in the nation-building in earnest by confronting the leftist groups that were waging a violent struggle to prevent the establishment of the government by blocking the first National Assembly elections in

May 1948. At the same time, however, the excessive intervention of those who were conscious of the weakness of the state and forcibly carried out violence in order not to show it provoked public rejection and anger, and the situation became evil.

A representative example was the Jeju 4.3 incident.

On the other hand, as the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission was dissolved in July 1947 and the hope of establishing a unified single nation-state on the Korean peninsula gradually disappeared, the division between the realist position of the establishment of a modern state in South Korea and the nationalism of the establishment of a unified nation-state in opposition to North Korea, which was in fact formed by the Soviet Union, became acute within the right-wing camp from July 1947.

Accordingly, around mid-1947, when the border dispute between the North and the South began slowly, the Soviet Union also began to stir up nationalist sentiments in earnest, claiming that the pro-Japanese police and officials, supported by the United States, were oppressing the people in an attempt to subordinate the Korean peninsula economically. At that time, the Soviet Union was aware of criticism of the United States by moderate forces that supported Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, and judged that the prestige of the United States was declining in South Korea. In fact, the Soviets tried to take advantage of the criticism of those who had not hesitated to accuse the United States of deceiving the Koreans, cooperating with the Soviet Union, and acting contrary to the will of the Korean people.

All of them.[305] Thus, the Soviets intensified their propaganda that appealed to the nationalist sentiments of the Koreans.

[305])박종효, 2010,「미국의 모순적인 한국 신탁안과 통일정책: 1947년 7월3일 (뉴욕 타임스-따스)」,pp.

It [306]was ordered to North Korea and leftist forces. In addition, this further provoked the conflict within the right-wing camp, which argued that a Western-style modern state should be built even in South Korea, which was intensifying at the time, and that a truly nationalist state could not be built unless a state including North Korea was built. For example, if a leaflet containing ambivalent content such as "If Rhee Seung-man is an agent of the United States, then Kim Il-sung is also an agent of the Soviet Union" was circulated and provoked Kim Il-sung's heart[307], the focus of criticism in both the North and the South gradually shifted to focusing on Rhee Seung-man.

Next, on the U.S. military administration and the Hajj, encourage the right-wingers to

and to point out that they are committing acts of terrorism. Through the media, they published information on the pro-Japanese factions to expose what they did during the administration and what they are doing now, and encouraged them to propagandize that the United States is planning to establish a single government in south Korea in order to make south Korea a colony under the guise of aid, and that the people's lives are much worse than they were during the Japanese regime because the U.S. has exhausted all its supplies and destroyed it, just as the Japanese had taken rice out of south Korea.[308] As a result, the criticism of the South Korean public has also focused on criticizing the living standards of the peasants that are lower than those of the Japanese colonial period and the fact that many people who worked for Japan during the Japanese colonial period are still working for the police, despite the demand for

[306] .

[307])전현수 역, 2004, 「1946 년 12 월 24 일」, pp. 61.

[308])전현수 역, 2004,「1947 년 8 월 29 일」, pp. 154.

the liquidation of the pro-Japanese elements.[309] In addition, these nationalist sentiments were in full swing in the wake of the Jeju 4.3 incident that occurred on April 3, 1948, and became widespread after the establishment of the Republic of Korea in August, and the new Republic of Korea was unable to fully accept the nationalist arguments on the formation of the state due to issues such as national security, which led to the destruction of ideological resources and the repetition of the vicious cycle of "weak states."

On October 28 and 29, 1947, the Soviet Union submitted a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly inviting the people's representatives of the North and the South to resolve the Korean peninsula issue, and at the same time, the Soviet Union and the United States and the Soviet Union resolved to withdraw at the same time in order to give the Korean people the opportunity to form their own government.[310] Thus, the Korean Committee of the United Nations, which had visited Korea on 8 March 1948, could not ignore this nationalist trend in Korea, although it was ultimately decided to hold elections in South Korea due to the Soviet Union's refusal to enter North Korea. [311]

In fact, on March 4, 1948, the U.S. military administration held elections in South Korea.

Fifteen South Korean members of the Central Election Commission were appointed, but just three days earlier, on March 1, more than 1,000 of Kim's supporters staged a demonstration against the election. Upon

---

[309])전현수 역, 2004,「1947 년 7 월 19 일」, pp. 102-105.

[310])박종효, 2010,「소련이 UN 총회에 상정한 조선 문제 결의안: 1947 년 10 월 28 일: 소련 대표단에 의해 UN 총회 제 1 위원회에 상정한 “남, 북조선 인민대표 초청결의안”(Dok-A/C 1/229」, 1947 년 10 월 29 일 소련 대표단에 의해 UN 제 1 위원회에 상정한 “남,북 조선에서 동시 미, 소군 철수 결의안”(Dok-A/C

[311] /232)」 pp. 264.

hearing this, the United Nations Committee on Korea also tried to avoid accusations that it was solidifying the division of the Korean peninsula by supporting the voices of the people in South Korea who called for the establishment of a single democratic government by holding general elections simultaneously in both the North and the South to the end as much as possible. As a result, immediately after the inauguration of the First Republic, the members of the minority faction in the National Assembly began to advocate the withdrawal of the US troops on nationalist grounds, and the country had to think for a while to reflect this nationalist demand even though the continued presence of the US military was necessary for the survival of the country.

1. Labor disputes and strikes

As mentioned above, in July 1947, the Second U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved.

Until now, the U.S. military administration has not taken an active role in nation-building, and the economic situation has become

The situation became difficult and the discontent of the workers and peasants grew. In fact, a report on the situation sent to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 21, 1947 from the headquarters of the Primorsky Military District of the Soviet Army pointed out that the US military administration had not been able to resolve any economic or political problems in south Korea for the past two years, making the people's lives under the US military administration more difficult than in the past.[393] In particular, the greatest grievances of the Korean people at the time were, as Robinson pointed out, the problem of food and agriculture. First, the surge in demand from overseas returnees and

refugees demanded more food production. For this purpose, chemical fertilizers and agricultural commodities produced in North Korea were needed, but they were not sufficiently supplied due to the breakdown of negotiations with the Soviet Union. In addition, the U.S. military government neglected the most fertile agricultural land, which accounted for 12.5% of Korea's agricultural land at the time, without proper management. In other words, The U.S. military government did not actively pursue highly productive agricultural land until July 1947, when the Second U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission was dissolved, and the food problem worsened.

In order to solve the food problem, the U.S. military government harvested from Korean farmers

Attempts were made to collect, but the price set by the U.S. military was too low, so the farmers tried to sell their harvest on the black market. As shown in Table II-2 below, the price offered by the US military government was in the 20-30% range, which is far less than half of the free market price.

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
Free Market Micah	10.78	65.67	111.92	176.52	191.08
Government Purchase price	1.32	23.84	26.31	49.33	106.88
Government Purchase A/Freedom	12	36	23	28	55

[393] Pak Jong-hyo, ed., 2010, "Report on the Situation in North and South Korea from the Primorye Military District Headquarters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 21, 1947: The Situation in South Korea," pp. 238.

Market Beauty					

Table III-2) 1945-49 Free Market U.S. Prices and Government Purchases Comparison[312)]

The U.S. military government used chemical fertilizers and grains imported from the U.S. as an inducement

When exchanges were offered to the peasants, but to no avail, the state mobilized the police and administrative apparatus to collect grain.[313] As a result, the grain collection increased from 5.3% and 48% of the target in 1945 and 1946 respectively to 82.9%.[314] However, as mentioned above, the U.S. administration was not fully established, so the grain collection carried out by the local committee, composed mainly of landowners and police officials, was met with strong opposition from the peasants, which became one of the biggest factors in the massive strike in September 1946 and the Daegu Incident on October 1, 1946. The fundamental problem was that as mentioned above, sufficient funds could not be injected into the operation of the country, but the United States, which had withdrawn the USFK from 1946 as planned, did not sufficiently replenish the corresponding Korean personnel. It had to rely heavily on the existing Korean agents.

By the way, as mentioned above, out of the state budget, administrative and judicial police expenses

312)농수산부 편, 『한국 농정사』, (서울: 농수산부, 1978).

313)로빈슨. 1988. pp. 242-244.

314)조선은행조사부, 『조선경제연보』, (서울: 조선은행, 1948), I-242, I-243, I-248.

Because of the small proportion allocated, the salaries paid to Korean officials and police officers were also small. Of course, they were given special rations to make up for some of their shortfalls[315], but they, like the general population, were in great difficulty, especially in 1946 and '47, when the economy was in trouble. In the case of the police, their livelihood depended on so-called "voluntary donations" rather than salaries, and in fact, as Henderson points out, extortion by the police became commonplace in 1946 and 1947. Ro Vinson also said that the salaries paid to Koreans employed by the U.S. military were not enough to cover even the minimum living expenses, so civil servants were able to maintain their basic livelihoods. It is pointed out that he was compelled to take ill-gotten gains.

According to the aforementioned Rand Institute study, police officers were recommended to be paid two to three times the per capita national income as a monthly salary, but in September 1945 the salaries paid to police officers in South Korea were only $3 instead of $80-120, which was two to three times the average national income at the time. By comparison, by January 1946, the monthly salary of a translator who worked for the Soviet military government was about 200 rubles, but[316] by March 1949 he was earning a salary of about $40 per month, [317] since according to Stalin's calculations, one dollar could be counted as five rubles. In addition, In the case of North Korean commissioned officer cadets who were being educated at the Soviet Higher Military Academy around February 1950, the second lieutenant judged it reasonable to receive about 1,300 rubles, which can

[315])『조선일보』,1944 년 3 월 30 일. ; 『동아일보』,1946 년 4 월 7 일.

[316])박종효, 2010,「1946 년 1 월 26 일 소련 외무성 극동 2 과장 게네날오프가 외무성 인사과에 보낸 문서」, pp. 191.

[317])박종효, 2010,「1949 년 3 월 5 일 스딸린과 김일성을 단장으로 한 조선정부 대표단과의 회담」,pp. 311.

also be converted into about 260 dollars.[318] In the end, these data clearly show how little money was needed to build a nation in South Korea compared to North Korea, as well as the difference in interest between the Soviet Union and the United States.

As a result, monopoly and corruption prevailed from the military government to the police and the last civil servants hired by the military government. In particular, one of the main sources of income for the police to commit fraud was rice and U.S. goods that they traded on the black market.[319]However, since these goods were the most urgently needed items for the people who were suffering from economic difficulties at the time, the antipathy towards the police[320] was bound to grow.[321] In particular, the withdrawal of the USFK, which can be in charge of administration and public security, has begun.

The growing reliance on a small number of Korean workers led to a surge in the number of labor disputes in 1946-47, when public disgust with the U.S. military administration reached its peak. The following table shows the situation of labor disputes during the US military administration, which reached its peak in 1946 and was mainly caused by wages and awards, but in 1947 opposition to dismissal was the main cause.

				Cause (Requirement)

[318])박종효, 2010,「1950 년 2 월 2 일 소련 외무성에서 소련 주재 북조선 대사관에 보낸 문서」, pp. 466.

[319])로빈슨. 1988. pp. 140-141.

[320])핸더슨, 2000. pp. 223.

[321])핸더슨, 2000. pp. 229.

	Number	laborer number	Participants enemy	Wage increase	Opposition to factory closures	Fired van v.	Reduced working hours	Overseer Rejection	Combination Winner	Holiday Wage Payment	Gita
1945 years	1	308	308								
1946 years	170	2,295	57,434	107	1	28	1	16	4	4	9
1947 years	134	53,402	35,210	16		35	1	4	1	2	75

Table III-3) Status of Regular Labor Disputes in the U.S. Armed Forces (404)

On the other hand, the peasants, who made up the largest proportion of the Korean population at the time, were also in great difficulty. According to Table III-4 below, which counts the number of disturbances by type of U.S. military period, the unrest in 1945, immediately after liberation, was focused on attacks on pro-Japanese factions, police stations, and government officials, but from 1946 onwards, it gradually turned into a problem of daily life, such as

opposition to grain collection and food demands. Therefore, as explained above, the mass withdrawal of US troops is sufficient for South Koreans.

---

[404] Bank of Korea Research Department, 1948, pp. 158.

The unrest was concentrated in the second half of 1946 and the first half of 1947, when the staffing was not filled and about 10,000 vacancies occurred, causing disruptions in the administration of the government.

		1945	1946			1947			1948			
		Subtotal	Upper Half Period	Second Half Period	Subtotal	Upper Half Period	Second Half Period	Subtotal	Upper Half Period	Second Half Period	Subtotal	Total
Agriculture	Grain Harvest Yard	2	2	8	10	9	37	46	4	7	11	69
	Food nine	5	5	14	10	24	1	1	2			31
	Land Reform Request					2	1	3				3
	landowner Tenant Disputes		1		1							1

	Subtotal	7	17	18	35	12	39	51	4	7	11	104
Police Raid case		34	4	172	176	25	8	33	13		13	256
Japanese Pro-Japanese attack		69							2		2	71
Government offices, buildings Reattack		11		7	7	3	1	4				22
Left right gastric insectivore	On the left wing By	12	3	25	28	14	5	19	1		1	60
	On the right wing By	1	2	1	3	17	2	19				23
	Left-Right Collision	3	3	6	9	2	4	6				18
Military Government, U.S. Army,		4	1	5	6	1		1				11
Rapid Attack												
Regional, Administrative Takeover Prayer		6		3	3							9

Chantak Demonstration	1					1	1				2
Other,Unknown	8	2	11	13	2	3	5				26
Amount	156	32	248	280	76	63	139	20	7	27	602

Table III-4)Number of Subrequirements for Type of U.S. Military Aircraft)[405]

The left has dug into this situation. In fact, according to the following statistics of strikes involving the left-wing National Council of Korean Labor (朝鮮勞動組合全國評議會), which was formed in December 1945, the number of strikes and the number of participants were most concentrated between September 1946 and March 1947, when there was a vacuum in the administration of state affairs due to the mass withdrawal of US military personnel. From July 1947, when the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved and the US military government began full-fledged construction of the country, the number of strikes and the number of strikers declined sharply, and in February 1948, when a full-fledged struggle broke out under the orders of North Korean and Communist forces, the number of strikes increased again, but the number of strikes was less than half of what it was from September 1946 to March 1947.

period	Number	Number of participants		harm	
			Bloody	Blood Sword	discharge
1945.8-1946.8	1,299	266,998		1,090	2,331

1946.9-1946.10 (General Strike)	472	173,404	25	4,780	7,767
1946.11-1947.2	67	24,434		361	1.553
1947.3 (General Strike)	550	162,050		1,646	3,883

[405] This study corrects the 1946 Agricultural Relations Subtotal (34→35) and the 1946 Government Office and Management Attack Subtotal (11→7) that were incorrectly entered by reviewing the following data. HQ, USAFIK G-2 periodic report, vols. 1-7 (USFK Information Journal). 1988-1989. HQ, USAFIK G-2 weekly summary Vol. 1-5 approx.), 1990.; Lee, Hye-sook, 2008. pp. 469.

1947.4-1947.7	258	28,908		616	750
1947.8-1948.1	231	26,648		632	1,090
February 7, 1948 (General Strike)	374	80,471	Doe	1,607	1,216
system	3,371	722,913	25	10,741	18,599

Table III-5) Statistics of strikes related to the National Council of Korean Trade Unions[322)]

2. The left-wing uprisings of September and October 1946

In May 1946, following the "Jung Judge Counterfeit Bill Incident," the U.S. military government outlawed the South Korean Workers' Party

[322])조선경제사, 『조선경제요람』,(서울: 조선경제사, 1947), pp. 174.

and ordered the arrest of those involved. In response, the Communist Party forces led by Pak Hun-yong and the National Council of Korean Trade Unions instigated the Soviet-funded workers to launch a nationwide general strike in September 1946, mainly by railroad and transport workers, in order to oppose the U.S. military administration. As can be seen from Table III-6), the number of attacks by the right-wing forces by the left was 12 and 28 in 1945 and 1946, respectively, far exceeding the number of attacks by the right-wingers, which were only 1 and 3. Thus, the Communists, who were the early dominants in the field of violent demonstrations, were also dominating the right in the possession of violence until 1946.

The strike, which began on September 23, 1948, signaled the strike of 7,000 railway workers in Busan. On September 24, 40,000 workers belonging to the South Korean Railway Workers' Union, which is a member of the National Council of Korean Trade Unions, went on strike against their employers, the U.S. Military Administration and Transportation Bureau, demanding an increase in rice rations, an increase in lunches, and an end to job cuts. The next day, September 25, rail transport was soon paralyzed as the railroad workers went on strike, and on the same day, the publishing union went on strike, and all newspapers were suspended. On September 27, the strike was followed by the post office and telephone offices, and on September 30, It extended to workers in other industries, such as electricity and printing[323), and] on October 2, there was a strike by tram drivers and conductors in the city. General Hodge denounced the September 28 strike as provoked by agitators.[324]

---

[323])이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 4 월 15 일「청년운동 반세기: (23)대한민청. 청총」.

[324])핸더슨 2000. pp. 229-230.

The Communist Party leadership that led the strike at the time was a cow stationed in North Korea.

I inquired about the strike policy from the Allied Army Headquarters. In response to Pak Hun-yong's inquiry on September 9[325], Shtykov paid 2 million yen for financial support and instructed them to go on strike until their demands were met, including wage increases, the release of arrested leftist activists, the publication of left-wing newspapers published by the US military government, and the revocation of the arrest order against the leaders of the Communist Party.[326] However, as has already been mentioned many times, the security forces of the U.S. military government, which was carrying out a large-scale plan to withdraw U.S. troops, were not enough to stop it. In fact, the situation did not get worse because the Soviet Army, which had in mind cooperation with the United States, recommended that the transfer of power to the People's Commissariat be virtually excluded from the requirements of a general strike. The Soviet military government limited the work of the general faction to a level that criticized the policies of the US government and supported negotiations with the US government, thus preventing the general strike from developing into a direct struggle for power to overthrow the US government.[327] On the other hand, as mentioned above, the US military government at the time controlled the price of rice and ordered the collection of grain in order to prevent the price of rice from skyrocketing due to inflation, and leftist forces spread false rumors that the United States was imitating the case of Japan, which had carried out economic exploitation by crashing the price of grain in Korea in the past, thereby inspiring resistance to the US military

[325])전현수 역, 2004,「1946 년 9 월 9 일」, pp. 6.
[326])전현수 역, 2004,「1946 년 9 월 28 일」, pp. 20.
[327])전현수 역, 2004,「1946 년 10 월 21 일」pp. 25-27.

government. Leftist forces used this as a pretext to expand their protests to the rest of the country. The protests in Daegu on October 1 will develop into violent demonstrations on a nationwide scale.

At that time, the Daegu area was known as the "second Moscow" due to the active activities of leftist forces. At that time, only 35 percent of the industries in Daegu and North Gyeongsang were operating, and the number of unemployed people, which was about 32 percent, was the second largest in the country.[328] The unemployment rate in Daegu was already as high as 16.6 percent on April 13, 1938, during the Japanese colonial era, but the rate doubled after the liberation.[329] In addition, the U.S. Military Administration in North Gyeongsang Province, which started collecting grain later than other regions,[330] was forcibly mobilizing police and administrative forces in the process of collecting the largest amount of grain in all of South Korea,[331] which led to an increase in the residents' resentment. However, as mentioned above, the police support rate in Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province was extremely low, and the security force was not sufficiently established. As a result, the dissatisfaction of the residents of Daegu, which had been expressed since the beginning of 1946, developed into an extreme demonstration of force by killing police officers and US military officials, and on October 2, the US military government declared martial law.

The protests spread not only to Daegu but also to the neighboring North Gyeongsang region, and in 1945

[328])조선은행조사부 1948, 중 I-203, 와 USAMGIK,「한국 인구조사」, pp.2. ; Cumings,. 2001. pp. 468. 에서 재인용.

[329])1938 년 4 월 13 일 당시 대구의 인구는 81,449 명이었는데 이들 중 주민의 1/6 에 해당하는 1,317 명이 실 업자였다. 박종효, 2010,「1938 년 4 월 13 일(조선일보)」, pp. 134.

[330])조선은행조사부,『조선경제통계요람』,(서울: 조선은행, 1949), pp. 35.

[331])정해구, 1988. pp. 86-99.

As the manpower of the U.S. Army, South Korean National Defense Guard, and the police, which had been reduced by about 10,000 from that time, could not be stopped, right-wing youth organizations led by the "General Federation of Youth Organizations of the Korean Independence Choksung" and the "Youth League of the Korean Independence Choksung National Association," which were formed on December 21, 1945 and May 13, 1946, voluntarily helped to suppress the Daegu incident. Already, more than 2,000 members of right-wing youth groups such as the Northwestern Youth League, the Korea Independence Labor Federation, the Korea Independence People's Association Youth League, and the Korea Independence Youth League, led by the Democratic Youth League, actively intervened in the railroad and transport workers' strikes that began in September and defended the return to work of about 3,000 workers belonging to the right-wing Korean Labor Independence Choksung Labor Federation.[332]) In addition, the Korean Independence Youth League, which was formed on September 21, 1946, was formed and from September 29 to October 2, 800 members of the Korean Independence Youth League mobilized all its members to devote themselves to suppressing the September general strike, while on October 12, the Seoul People's Commissariat, the National Front for Democracy, and the Korean Democratic Youth League attacked and seized the Imundang building at the Anguk-dong roundabout in Jongno-gu, which had been occupied and used without permission after the defeat of the Japanese imperialists. They later completed the approval process for the use of the building by the U.S. military administration, and allowed it to be used by themselves and the National Student

[332])이경남, 『경향신문』, 1987 년 4 월 15 일「청년운동반세기: (23)대한민청. 청총」.

Federation of Anti-Tak Tak, and took over the Hyundai Ilbo, which was the organ of the leftist side but had been suspended on September 3. In response to the propaganda of[333)]

As right-wing youth organizations began to intervene, their activities After mid-1947, when it began to take off in earnest, the right-wing "General Confederation of Korean Independent Workers," which had been organized in March 1946, surpassed the left-wing "National Council of Korean Trade Unions" in size and number of members. In September 1947, the Korean Federation of Independent Workers, which had 39,786 members in 221 unions, far outpaced the National Council of Trade Unions of Korea, which had 2,465 members in 13 unions.[334] The Korean Federation of Independent Workers, which grew rapidly, actively supported Rhee Seung-man and participated in the nation-building project in the general election on May 10, 1948, with a number of cadres, including its leader, Jeon Jeon-han.

On the other hand, the communist sabotage began in September and October 1946.

Small is constantly repeated. First, many leftists went on strike to prevent the establishment of the Korean government, the general strikes of March 1947 and February 1948. In addition, some leftists fled to the mountains to escape arrest and carried out partisan activities that formed a prelude to the Korean War conflict, which led to the Yeosun and Suncheon rebellions in 1948 and guerrilla activities that continued until the spring of 1950.

First, the partisan activities of the leftist forces began in October 1946, and the existence of the partisan units can be confirmed by the

333)이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 7 월 8 일「청년운동반세기: (35)대한독립청년단」.
334)조선은행조사부 1948, III-156.

report of the Korean Communist Party, which inquired about the future actions of the Communist Party to the Soviet military government at the time. Pak Hun-yong, who was in the North, also complained about the shortage of food and ammunition for these partisan units and asked them to give instructions on the future course of the struggle.[335] Later, some of these partisan units crossed over to the North and asked the Soviets to arrange jobs for them, but Shtukov ordered them to be disarmed, investigated, held for a short time, and then sent back to South Korea or interned.[336] In this way, Shtukov wanted to prevent the possibility of North Korea being turned into a base behind the armed struggle,[337][338] because he wanted to avoid friction with the US military administration as much as possible until North Korea had fully established its state.

On the other hand, after the general strike of February 7, 1948 and the Jeju April 3 incident, some of these fugitive leftist forces were converted into armed guerrilla groups called "Yasan Dae" in the areas of Gokseong and Gurye counties in South Jeolla Province, and some of the Yasan Battalions were absorbed into the guerrilla forces that they had converted from regular military units after the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents in 1948. Accordingly, from 1948 onwards, five guerrilla districts were formed, the names of which are as follows: 1. Honam guerrilla district (Naju County, Yeonggyeong County, Hampyeong County, and Jangheung County Plains Area in South Jeolla Province), 2. Jirisan Guerrilla District (a mountainous area in Jeollanam, Gyeongsangnam, and North Jeolla that connects Baekunsan Mountain in the south and

[335])전현수 역, 2004,「1946 년 10 월 21 일」, pp. 27.

[336])전현수 역, 2004,「1947 년 1 월 4 일」, pp. 71.

[337])전현수,『해제: 한국현대사와 소련의 역할(1945-48)-쉬띄꼬프 일기를 중심으로』, 전현수 역, 2004. pp.

[338] .

Deokyusan Mountain in the north centered on Jirisan), 3. Taebaeksan Guerrilla District (a mountainous area in southern Gangwon and northern Gyeongsangbuk centered on Taebaeksan and Sobaeksan Gukmangbong Peak, reaching Andong-gun and Cheongsong-gun in the south), 4. Yeongnam guerrilla zone (around Daegu, including Gyeongju, Yeongcheon, Yeongil, and Cheongdo, and around Yangsan, Ulsan, and Dongnae, Gyeongsangnam), 5. Jeju Island Guerrilla District (the area around Hallasan Mountain on Jeju Island formed in the aftermath of the Jeju April 3 incident).

The Congress for the Formation of the Fatherland United Democratic Front, which was launched in Pyongyang in June 1948, introduced a message from the guerrilla forces in Jirisan and emphasized cooperation with the guerrillas as one of the key tasks for the formation of the Fatherland United Democratic Front. As a result, the guerrilla war between the leftist forces and the punitive forces has entered a new phase. In other words, the Korean People's Guerrilla Army, an organization that the North Korean Democratic People's Republic of Korea government can unilaterally command the guerrilla war in the South, was established in July 1949, and the organizational system was reorganized through the full-fledged support of the North Korean regime, and the guerrilla warfare was developed in the direction of the North Korean leadership, thus transforming into a system competition between the North and the South.

It was a good idea.[422]

3. Left and Right Youth Organizations

Right-wing youth organizations, which had voluntarily helped the U.S. military administration to make up for the country's lack of physical strength during the general strike and large-scale uprising of the leftists in September and October 1946, came to the forefront of nation-building activities in earnest after the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved in July 1947.

As we have seen, the leftist forces did not live in the period before September and October 1946.

In the use of local violence and youth organization it had a relative advantage over the right. However, in September and October 1946, left-wing forces began to become increasingly outlawed, and right-wing youth organizations gained the upper hand. In other words, the left-wing youth organizations had a strong advantage over the right-wing youth organizations until August and December 1945, but from the autumn of 1945, when the Provisional Government and Rhee Seung-man returned to Korea, the right-wing youth organizations that tried to make up for their inferiority were formed by Rhee Seung-man's tour of various parts of South Korea from March to June 1946, and they formed the "Korean Liberation Youth Association" and the "National Youth Organization for the Promotion of Korean Independence."

---

[422] Lee Sun-ah, "The Formation and Activities of Partisans Before and After the Korean War," Historical Studies No. 13, (Seoul: Institute of History, 2003), pp. 187-188.

The General Federation' and the 'Korean Independence People's Association Youth League' showed their power[339] and entered into fierce competition with the left-wing youth groups. In fact, Rhee was the most adept of any politician of his time at mobilizing the masses through private organizations, and according to a report by the Soviet Military Government of March 28, 1946, Kim Won-bong estimated the number of people under Rhee's influence to be about 100,000.[340] Later, in September and October 1946, the left-wing youth organizations that were put on the defensive became underground organizations from 1948 onwards.

The youth organizations that first emerged during the liberation period were active between August and September 1945, when the confrontation between the left and the right wing was not in full swing, and there were many cases where the left and right wings were united together. These organizations are summarized in the order of formation as follows. 1. National Security Corps (August 16, 1945)→2. Konkuk Student Corps (August 16-August 25, 1945)→3. Korean Student Corps (August 25-September 25, 1945). The biggest reason why the left and right wings were able to unite together without opposing each other at that time was the weakness of human resources immediately after liberation, as mentioned above.

Immediately after liberation, 80% of the Korean police officers disappeared between August 15 and September 8 due to the social atmosphere of the "pro-Japanese" faction, creating a huge gap in human resources capable of maintaining social and economic order and public

---

339)이경남, “경향신문”1987 년 6 월 24 일「청년운동 반세기: (33)광복청년회」.

340)『러시아연방 국방성 중앙문서보관소 소련군정문서, 남조선 정세 보고서』,1946 ~ 1947 Ⅰ. 러시아연방국 방성 중앙문서보관소 문서군 172, 목록 614631, 문서철 12 5.「구두 정보 보고 № C-6」, 1946 년 3 월 28 일.

safety in the country. Therefore, when the chaos reached its peak immediately after liberation, human resources consisting of almost all classes and strata had to be mobilized in order to maintain immediate security, and intellectuals, thugs, and collaborators with the Japanese were all united under the banner of the Preparatory Committee, regardless of their political leanings. For example, A literati like Kim Dong-in had to be mobilized as the commander of the security battalion,[341] and Kim Doo-han also organized a special security inspection team, composed of 65 percent of the members of the National Security Committee, who were ex-convicts, to work for the National Founding Committee.(426) In addition, the security forces of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Republic of Korea were also organized mainly by Korean police officers and had the Jongno Police Station as its headquarters[342]), and Paek Nam-gwon, who was a former lieutenant in the Japanese army, also testified that after liberation, he was promoted by the Namdo Department of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Republic of Korea to disarm the Japanese army as a police captain dressed in Japanese military uniforms.[343)]

On the other hand, the Chosun Students' University and other organizations, in cooperation with other youth organizations, began to take over and manage Japanese-owned enterprises in all industrial sectors. The purpose of this was to destroy the social and economic structure of the colonies that had been backward and to lay the groundwork for the establishment of material and economic resources for the establishment of a new nation-state.[344]Nonetheless, left-wing

[341])이영근, 1990.
[342])『매일신보』,1945 년 8 월 17 일「조선건국준비위원회 보안대 조직」.
[343])『제 4 부 백남권」, 한국민족문화연구원, 한민족문화연구소편, 2001. pp. 177.
[344])김행선,『해방정국 청년운동사』, (서울: 선인, 2004), pp. 58-59.

youth organizations formed faster than right-wing youth organizations, largely under the influence of the Provisional Government and Yeo Un-hyung's Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Republic and the People's Republic, which had been dominated by the left before Rhee Seung-man's return. The main activities of left-wing youth organizations since the liberation in August 1945 are summarized as follows.

Date of formation [345]and activity	Organization Name	Activities
18 Aug 1945	(1) Korean Communist Youth League	It was organized by the Chang'an Communist Party, but became an outlying organization of the Korean Communist Party due to the reconstruction of the Cho Son Communist Party in September.
23 Aug 1945	(2) Korean Academic Ward Wing	Led by the returned soldiers, Wang Ik-kwon and Lee Chun-ying are the chairmen and vice committee members, respectively.

[345])김두한, 『피로 물들인 건국전야 : 김두한 회고기』, (서울: 연우 출판사, 1963), pp. 97-99.

		It was formed by the general and played the role of the former great power of the Communist Party of Korea. C. On September 10, 1945, immediately after the landing of the US forces, the raid on Jongno-seo was temporarily successful, and in particular, on January 18, 1946, the attack on the anti-Tak National Student Federation of the right-wing camp provided an opportunity for the full-fledged armed conflict between the left and right youth organizations to begin. All of them.

25 Sep 1945 →9 Jan 1946	(3) Joseon Student College	On September 10, 1945, immediately after the landing of the U.S. forces, they raided Seongbuk-seo and succeeded in temporarily taking over the Korean Students' Union, but the right-wing students of the leadership who opposed the operation of the National Preparatory Committee withdrew and formed the Korean Student Students' Association and the Korean Student Students' Union, advocating the theory of the Provisional Government's Vice-Presidential Unit. It was dismantled.[430]

December 11, 1945	(4) Korean Youth Federation	Until the previous period Founding Preparatory Committee and The Left Wing Scattered Around the People's Republic It was the first group of youth organizations to come together.
1946 - 1946 pure January 9 Mid-February	(5) Finance and Economics Students' Action Unification Promotion Meeting	As the student corps, which was composed of a coalition of left and right, split, a group formed by left-wing students. It was a sieve.431)
1946 pure Mid-February	(6) Seoul Student Unification Association	Unification of Finance and Economics Students' Actions It was an organization that changed its name.432)

25 Apr 1946	(7) Korean Democratic Youth League	As the trusteeship was decided by the decision of the Moscow Three-Phase Conference, the confrontation between the right wing that opposed it and the left wing that supported it began in earnest, and the rival parties, (1) the Communist Youth League of Korea and (4) the General Youth League of Korea, merged to form the Communist Party of Korea, the National Front for Democracy, and the Workers' Party of South Korea. They said that the trusteeship plan decided at the Moskva Tripartite Conference
		On the other hand, he worked to win over the workers and peasants.

5 June 1947	(8) Democratic Patriotic Youth League of Korea	Led by the Left in September and October 1946 After the general strikes and demonstrations in January, the Jeju Incident of April 3, 1947 and the General Strike of February 8, 1948 turned the activities of the Communist Party into a non-legal armed struggle, and they too became the most militant armed struggle organizations following the line of the Communist Party of Korea and the Workers' Party of South Korea. You will be active.[433]

Table III-6) Trends of Major Left Youth Organizations in the Period 1945-50

In particular, the strongest movement was the Korean Democratic Youth League, formed on April 25, 1946, which led the nationwide general strikes and riots in September and October. According to documents from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Soviet government

counted a total of 22,900 people (strikes: 12,600, riots: 10, 300) who participated in strikes and riots in South Korea from September 23 to November 11, 1946, half of which

[430] Dong-A Ilbo, November 30, 1971, "Dialogue between North and South Korea: (26) Until the Division of the People."

[431] Kyunghyang Sinmun, November 23, 1946, "Statement of the Academic President's Invitation to the Resumption of the Establishment."

[432] Kyunghyang Sinmun, January 28, 1947, "Celebration of the Anniversary of the Unification of Students."

[433] Ryu Sang-sang, "Organization and Activities of Left and Right Youth Organizations after August 15," Perceptions of the History of the War and Post-Liberation 4, (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1989), pp. 68-100.

More than 14,000 people were identified as members of the Korean Democratic Youth League.[346] When the U.S. military government was deregistered as a terrorist organization by Executive Order No. 2 issued on May 17, 1947, most of them converted to the Korean Democratic Patriotic Youth League and launched a full-fledged armed struggle, but some[347] of them infiltrated into the Korean National Defense and Security Forces, the police, and right-wing youth organizations. Next, a brief summary of the major leaders and activities of the major right-wing youth organizations in the early years of the U.S. military and the Republic of Korea by the date of their formation is as follows.

Date of Formation	Organization Name	Activities

[346])박종효 편역, 2010,「1946 년 9 월 23 일-11 월 11 일 까지 남조선에서 발생한 파업에 참가한 조선민주청년 동맹원」, pp. 218-219.

[347])박헌영은 1949 년 3 월 5 일 스탈린과의 회담에서 북조선 사람을 남조선 군부에 이미 침투시켰으나 아직 노출시키지 않고 있다고 증언하고 있다. 박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 3 월 5 일: 스딸린과 김일성을 단장으 로 한 조선정부 대표단과의 회담」,pp. 312.

21 Dec 1945	(1) Korea Independence Promotion National Federation of Youth Organizations	Lee Seung-man and Kim Koo were elected as governors and vice governors, and former Jin Han, Yoo Jin-san, and Yun Bo-sun were the main forces.
9 Apr 1946	(2) Korean Democratic Youth League	Lee Seung-man, Kim Koo, and Kim Kyu-sik were appointed as honorary chairmen, and Shin Ik-hee was appointed as advisors. Chairman Yoo Jin-san and Inspector General Kim Doo-han played the main role.
15 Apr 1946	(3) Korean Liberation Youth Association	From the Liberation Army

		Insisting on the orthodoxy of the Liberation Army Vice President Yu Dong-yeol Division 'Korean Armed Forces Preparatory Committee' In the five rays that were founded After Ji Chengchen's return, it was reorganized into the Daedong Youth League.436)
13 May 1946	(4) Korean Independence People's Youth Group	He was divided between Lee Seung-man and Kim Gu. Korea Independence Agency 437) was composed of young people who supported Rhee Seung-man. After the founding of the country, he took the lead in spreading

		Japanese democracy. Yu Hua Qing as the leader, and the founding of the country It was called the avant-garde.[438]
31 Jul 1946	(5) Anti-Tak National Student Federation	These groups, organized by university students, are headed by Lee Cheol-seung, Lee Seung-man, Kim Koo, Cho So-ang, Shin Ik-hee, Eung Hang-seop, Jung In-bo, and Jang Deok.

		He was encouraged by Su and Kim Do-yeon, and was funded by Kim

		Sung-so, Jeon Jeon-soon, etc. Was.439)
12 Sep 1946	(6) Korean Independence Youth Group	Even though he is a person in the sports world, he is deep in politics and finance. The Democratic Party of Korea With Seo Sang-cheon as the leader, Lee Seung-man as the governor and Kim Koo as the vice governor It was formed by a follow-up. They were members of the National Youth Council, which was in charge of security along with the leftist forces immediately after liberation.

		With right-wing forces as the mother, Lee Beom-seok's The Korean National Youth League was taking Revolt against the middle line and a full-fledged confrontation with the communist forces It was proclaimed.440)
9 Oct 1946	(7) Korean National Youth Group	Lee Beom-seok, Ahn Ho-sang as general manager and vice president

		It was established mainly by the 2nd Zone of the Liberation Army. They commissioned instructors such as Kim Koo, Cho Soang, Shin Ik-hee, Bae Jackie Chan, and Jung In-bo to the training center opened in Suwon in November 1946 to produce 300 trainees. After the dissolution of the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee in July 1947, it was officially sponsored by the US military government and rapidly grew into the largest right-wing youth

		organization with 200,000 members and 1.2 million members by the end of 1947 and 1948, respectively.
November 30, 1946	(8) Northwestern Youth Association	It was inaugurated by electing Sun Woo Ki-sung as the chairman of the executive committee of the

		Chong Chung-chung.

		Although they were active as the mainstay of the General Federation of Annual Organizations, these "North-West Youth Associations" were organized around August 1946 with a focus on the youth of South Korean Pyongan Province. With door sewing as a leadership Those who were active through the

		Jeju 4.3 Incident in 1947 were the most active right-wing youth organizations. The people were high. Later, in September and December 1948, they merged with the Daedong Youth League and the Korean Youth League, respectively. All of them.
5 Jul 1947	(9) General Federation of Young Koreans	As the successor of the Korean Democratic Youth League, when the Korean Democratic Youth League was disbanded due to

		the beating death of a left-wing union member by Kim Doo-han, its leader, Yoo Jin-san, was elected

		It was a holy thing.441)
21 Sep 1947	(10) Daedong Youth Group	It was formed with Ji Cheong-chun, the commander-in-chief of the Liberation Army, and Oh Kwang-gwang, the commander of the Liberation Army, as the leader and vice-commander, and declared their support for Lee, and later in September 1948 In December 1948, it was merged with the

		Northwestern Youth League.
December 19, 1948	(11) Korean Youth Group	It was formed with the aim of unifying all right-wing youth organizations. Later, on January 15, 1949, the largest right-wing youth organization, the Korean National Youth League, was merged with Lee Beom-seok, and Shin Shin-mo was appointed as its leader.

22 Apr 1949	(12) Student Protection Bureau	The first Minister of Education, Ahn Ho-sang, was inaugurated as the head of the organization. Repealed in May 1960
		Was.

Table III-7) Trends in Major Right-Wing Youth Organizations from 1945-50

These major right-wing youth organizations are broadly divided into 1. The 'Korean Independence Choksung National Youth Organizations Federation' and the 'Northwestern Youth Association', which were formed mainly by young people in their 20s and 30s from North Korea to South Korea, 2. Kim Doo-han and Yoo Jin-san were the center-led members of the Korean People's Youth League and the Youth Korean General League, 3. The 'Korean Independence Youth League', which was led by Seo Sang-cheon and others and advocated a full-fledged confrontation with the communist forces, 4. It can be divided into four groups: the "Korean National Youth League" and the "Daedong Youth League," which were formed by Lee Beom-seok and Ji Cheong-cheon from the Provisional Government and advocated a nationalist centrist line. Among them, the right-wing youth organizations belonging to 1 and 2 began their activities, and the right-wing, which had been relatively inferior to the left-wing, It began to make up for its strength and gain the upper hand. In this turn of the tide, the Northwestern Youth League played a big role. On August 21, 1946, young men in their 20s

from Pyongan Province, who were resentful of the rapidly shifting South Korean politics among the displaced South Koreans fleeing communism, attacked the red-trade union affiliated with the left-wing National Council of Korean Labor and won the victory.(442) These northwestern youth groups, which started with about 1,000 members, were funded by businessmen Bang Eung-mo, Park Heung-sik, and Choi Chang-hak from Pyongan Province, and were supported by the U.S. military administration.

---

[436] Dong-A Ilbo, March 4, 1946, "Disbanded Liberation Army Majority National Defense. Incorporated into the Coast Guard."

(437) According to the documents of the Soviet military government, it was not Rhee Seung-man who held the initiative of the Korean Independence People's Assembly, but Kim Koo and the Lim administration. 『Soviet Military Administration Documents, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Report on the Situation in South Korea』, 1946~ 1947I. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Document Group 172, List 614631, Folder 12 5. "Oral Information Report No C-6," March 28, 1946.

[438] Kyunghyang Sinmun, February 11, 1987, "Half a Century of the Youth Movement: (14) The National Assembly for Independence."

[439] Seo Jung-seok, 『A Study on Contemporary Korean National Movements: The Movement for Building a Nation-State and the United Front after Liberation』, (Seoul: History and Criticism, 1991), pp. 333-334. ; Lee, Cheol-seung, 1976.

[440] Dong-A Ilbo, September 13, 1946, "18 Youth Organizations Unite to Form the Korean Independence Youth League."

441) Yoo Se-yeol, Kim Tae-ho, 1984.

[442] Lee Kyung-nam, Kyunghyang Sinmun, December 3, 1986, "Half a Century of the Youth Movement: (6) Northwestern Youth Association."

It grew to 200,000 members through the officials' redundancy.[348] On the other hand, they transferred more than 6,000 students from North Korea who were unable to submit documents related to higher education to the university through negotiations with President Moon Yoo Uk-kyum, thus

---

[348])이경남, 『경향신문』,1986 년 12 월 17 일「청년운동 반세기: (7)서북청년회」.

supporting the anti-tak National Federation of Students, a right-wing university student organization led by Lee Cheol-seung and others.
All of them.[349]There were several reasons for their rapid growth. First, more than half of the people who fled North Korea to South Korea were young people in their 20s and 30s, who were middle-class or higher. Compared to the politicians from the North, who were able to comfort themselves with the middle-class political party cadres in the right-wing camp, they had a deep sense of discomfort and fear of South Korean society, which seemed to be becoming communist faster than North Korea. And these young refugees, who had been wandering around the streets after defection, homeless and beggars, gradually organized by sharing the fact that they could not survive unless they did not fight against communism with their whole bodies. I started to get angry. [350]Considering that 6,000 of the 200,000 members went to university due to the decision of the Ministry of Education, at least 3% of them had a high school diploma or higher. Considering the fact that 0.2% of Korean police officers during the Japanese colonial period had a high school diploma or higher[351, it] can be seen that they were a relatively highly educated group.

In this way, the Northwestern Youth League, which was one of the best human resource groups of the time, possessed an active mental armament and excellent intellectual ability to support its ability to act, was added to the financial support of high-ranking officials and wealthy people from the East who formed a great power in the US military administration, and the Northwestern Youth League grew rapidly into a

[349])이경남, 『경향신문』,1986 년 12 월 24 일「청년운동 반세기: (8)서북청년회」.
[350])김행선, 2004, pp. 93-95.
[351])내무부 치안국,『한국 경찰사』,(서울: 광명인쇄공사, 1972), pp. 983.

core organization among right-wing youth organizations in a short time. As a result, their role gradually increased, such as helping the police stations and police stations in Gyeonggi and Gangwon provinces, which were adjacent to the 38th parallel, which were in a hurry to maintain domestic security at the time, and were dispatched to various places to find out the operatives who were departing from North Korea and to subjugate the public funds.

It was called the "White Terror Organization" or the "Fascist Vanguard Organization" and became known as the U.S. Military Administration.

I was harassed by the disbandment order of the[447)]

On the other hand, as already mentioned above, the public safety ball following the mass withdrawal of the USFK

When right-wing youth groups that witnessed the white began to voluntarily help the U.S. military government and the police, the U.S. military government incorporated them into the police and the Korean National Defense Guard on a large scale in order to fill the shortage of security and defense manpower. Accordingly, the size of these right-wing youth organizations also grew significantly, and by January 14-15, 1947, the Soviet press, citing the projection of the U.S. military, estimated that there were about 2 million right-wing groups that could prepare for a large-scale uprising in sympathy with Rhee's anti-trusteeship lectures.[448)]

However, behind the rapid growth of these right-wing groups was also the infiltration and absorption of members of left-wing youth organizations, which had been relatively dominant. When the left-wing youth organization of the Korean Democratic Youth League, which had been the most active, was deregistered by the US military government, some of them infiltrated into the right-wing camp of the "Korean National

Youth League" and worked freely with their help.[449] Sun Woo Jong-won, who served as an ideological prosecutor at the time, also pointed out that leftist forces had infiltrated members of the Korean Democratic Youth League into the right-wing youth organization, the Korean National Youth League, in order to create a "second democratization." In other words, he wanted to gain legitimacy and establish a safe zone through this, and he testified that the Chungcheongbuk Province police commissioner and several other officers he arrested were members of the Namro Party wearing the guise of members of the Korean National Youth League.(450) Soviet military government documents also assess that Yi took a neutral stance on the whole. Lee Beom-suk himself stepped down after consulting with his subordinates about the police's notification that all leftist elements in the Korean National Youth League would be eliminated.

---

[447] Lee Kyung-nam, Kyunghyang Sinmun, January 7, 1987, "Half a Century of the Youth Movement: (9) Northwestern Youth Association."

[448] Park Jong-hyo (ed.), 2010, "Leuita-Tas, January 4, 1947," pp. 234-235.

449) HQ, USAFIK G-2 periodic report, Vol. 5, 1989. No.687, November 18, 1947, pp.224.

450) Sunwoo Jongwon. 『Ideological Examination』 (Seoul: Keimyungsa, 1986). pp. 86.

The police replied that they would carry out the operation to clear the pterodactyl and not interfere in the matter. At that time, the Communist Party was building a strong base in the local organizations of the Korean National Youth League, and its organizational base was somewhat weak only in the organizations of South Jeolla Province.[352][353] However, in South Jeolla Province, in the case of Naju Province, members of the

---

[352])『러시아연방 국방성 중앙문서 보관소 소련군정문서, 남조선 정세 보고서』, 1946~1947 Ⅷ.러시아연방 국방성 중앙문서보관소 문서군 172, 목록 614632, 문서철 41 8. 「남조선 정당 사회단체의 당내 정세에 대한 정보자료, 김영준」, 1947 년 11 월 25 일.

[353])HQ, USAFIK G-2 weekly summary 4 권,1990. No.111, 1947 년 10 월 30 일, pp. 385.

Korean Democratic Youth League took control of the branch and officially registered as members of the Korean National Youth League. The reason why this was possible was that the cadres of the Korean National Youth League, which at that time was advocating a non-political and pro-democracy line, accepted the leftist youth members as members and tried to convert them to the right-wing camp. As a result, the Korean National Youth League, which, unlike other right-wing youth organizations, did not directly express an anti-communist line but advocated opposition to terrorism, came to play the role of a hiding place for left-wing youth organizations such as the Korean Democratic Youth League and the Korean Democratic Patriotic Youth League.452)

On October 9, 1946, Yi Beom-seok, a former member of the Korean Liberation Army, established the Korean National Youth League, and the U.S. military government, which realized that tactical and police forces alone were not enough to maintain the system through the September general strike and the October People's Uprising, officially supported them, and it grew rapidly into the largest right-wing youth organization in South Korea. At the time, the U.S. military government paid $335,000 to the Cho Son National Youth League to establish a leadership training school and dispatched U.S. Army Colonel Ernest E. Voss as a policy adviser to help train them.[354] Originally, Hodge, the commander of the U.S. military administration, had proposed the establishment of an army in order to achieve the rapid withdrawal of the US forces and to make up for the collapse of the military power caused by the large-scale withdrawal of the US troops. However, when the U.S. government, fearing that it would interfere with negotiations with the Soviet Union, opposed the move, the U.S. government sponsored the

[354])Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, 1972.

Korean National Youth League in order to expand the country's physical power against the leftists and to train the leadership of South Korea after the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The reason why the US military government officially sponsored the Korean National Youth League was that the existing right-wing youth organizations that put anti-communist struggle activities at the forefront, such as the Northwestern Youth League, suffered from the bad reputation of the U.S. and South Korean media as "fascist war workers" or "foreign legions hired by the Korean People's Party with money." Although they relied heavily on them to the extent that Cho Byung-ok, who was the head of the police, pointed out that "without the West Office, it would have been difficult to secure South Korea," they were limited in their ability to build a nation by maximizing their nationalist ideological resources.[355][356] The Northwestern Youth League was notorious for being dispatched to the whole country to execute leftist forces through terrorism and other means, and a representative example of this was the assassination of Chung Su-bok, a prosecutor who was suspected of being a secret member of the South Korean Workers' Party, and Pak Kyung-young, the president of the Daesun Brewery, who was the president of the leftist Chosun Sinmun and the chairman of the Gyeongnam region of the Democratic National Front.455)

On the other hand, the Korean People's Agency led by Yi Beom-seok, a former chief of staff of the Korean Liberation Army, was

---

[355])그러나, 극우성향의 우익청년단체들 역시 민족주의적 정통성에 의거한 이념적 권력자원을 활용하려고 하 였다. 예를 들어 청년조선총동맹 회장이었던 유진산은 조직원들에게 보낸 격문을 통해 자신들이 임시정부 의 건국이념을 표현하기 위해 쓰던 홍익인간의 건국이념을 지도 이념으로 삼고 있다고 주장하였다. 『동 아일보』,1947 년 10 월 7 일「청년조선총동맹회장 유진산, 동맹원에 격문」.

[356])이경남,『경향신문』,1987 년 1 월 14 일「청년운동 반세기: (10)서북청년회」.

advocating strong national discipline based on the belief that the nation and the nation were supreme, instead of the anti-communist struggle that had been the standard slogan of the right-wing youth organizations in the past[357. 358] It was a right-wing youth organization that was most in line with the policy of the US military government, which was supporting Kim Kyu-sik in accordance with the US State Department's policy of supporting the centrist wing at the time,[359] as it suffered from strong criticism from the existing far-right youth organizations whose main purpose was to fight against communism by insisting on non-violence against the left, while devoting itself to non-political movements without launching the anti-communist struggle in earnest.

In fact, Lee openly called out against terrorism and sought to differentiate himself from the existing right-wing youth organizations that relied heavily on terrorism by eliminating terrorists from the organization.[360] The Korean Federation of Youth Organizations, which was dissatisfied with Lee's political line, criticized the Korean National Youth Organization as an anti-official youth organization based on a middle line that is neither left nor right.[361][362] In addition, other right-wing youth organizations also said, "While others are bleeding to beat up the Communist Party, the tribal government is just playing fresh in the hotbed (education center). The blood is shed by us (right-wing youth groups), and the grain is picked up by the tribal and piled up the rice stilts. Since the Jokcheong claims to be non-politically neutral and turns

---

[357])『조선일보』,1946 년 6 월 5 일「광복군참모장 이범석 귀국」.

[358])이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 8 월 26 일「청년운동 반세기: (42)조선민족청년단」.

[359])이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 7 월 1 일「청년운동 반세기: (34)대한독립청년단」.

[360])USAMGIK. 이길상,『미군정 활동 보고서』, 5 권, 1990,「National Economic Board」, NO. 29, Feburary,1948, pp.218-220; USAMGIK. 이길상,『미군정 활동 보고서』, 6 권, 1990,「National Economic Board」 NO. 31 April., 1948, pp.204.

[361])『현대일보』,1947 년 8 월 6 일 ; 김행선, 2004. pp. 392.에서 재인용.

[362])이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 9 월 9 일「청년운동 반세기: (44)조선민족청년단」.

a blind eye to the struggle for anti-aircraft power, the leftists of the Namro Party and the Minae Agency who have been hiding underground are using the Jokcheong as a legal hideout. Is the Jokcheng, which is turning into a den of rednecks, really a national camp or an opportunist group?" I blamed him.461)

However, full-fledged material support for the Korean National Youth League by the U.S. military government was only possible after the dissolution of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee in July 1947. In fact, the U.S. military government's support for the Korean National Youth League, which was only 5 million won in 1946[363, increased] almost fourfold to 19 million won in 1947. Accordingly, the full-fledged activities of the Korean National Youth League began in September 1947, when the U.S. goal of establishing a single government on the Korean peninsula through negotiations with the Soviet Union began to be frustrated, and in early 1948 the expansion and reorganization of the organization began in earnest. This change occurred on October 20, 1947, when Charles Helmic, the acting secretary of state of the U.S. Armed Forces, announced that the heads of all departments and agencies of the U.S. military administration, This is clearly shown in the "Memorandum on the Purpose and Activities of the Korean National Youth League" sent to the advisers. In this memorandum, the purpose of the Korean National Youth League was twofold: first of all, to carry out the U.S. military's stabilization program in south Korea, and to train future leaders in South Korea. However, according to a report by the CIC (US Military Counterintelligence), Kim Doo-han, who was in prison at the time, was planning a terrorist attack on Halmick with Kim Kyu-sik, a centrist. Through this, we can indirectly guess how the right-wing youth

363)대한민족청년단, 『민족과 청년 : 이범석 논설집』, (서울: 백영회, 1948).

organizations at the time felt about Halmick and the Korean National Youth League sponsored by Halmick.[364]) Accordingly, for a while after its establishment, the "non-political luck" of community service and unit training

The Korean National Youth League, which focused only on the East, emerged as the central pillar of right-wing youth organizations, and in solidarity with right-wing youth organizations such as Yi Cheong-chun's Daedong Youth League and the Northwestern Youth League, which were rivals, it supported the US military government in its policing and security maintenance activities and confronted the leftist forces that were trying to prevent the holding of the general elections scheduled for May 10, 1948.[365] In other words, right-wing youth organizations led by the Korean National Youth League voluntarily joined the Hyangbodan, a police auxiliary organization organized by the U.S. military government to oppose the leftist forces that were trying to prevent the South Korean election alone, and carried out enlightenment work to prevent voting methods and abstentions, and managed the overall election by guarding polling stations and government offices against the leftists' sabotage of elections.

By October 1947, the first anniversary of the training at the Central Training Center, the Korean National Youth League had produced 199,000 trainees, and by the fall of 1948, when 85,000 had been trained at the local training camps, the number had increased to 1.15 million.[366] In addition, many of the graduates of the Central Training Center of the

---

[364])"Annual Progress Report For 1947". pp.88-89.

[365])임종명, "조선민족청년단(1946.10~1949.1)과 미군정의 '장래 한국의 지도세력'양성정책,", 『한국사연 구』 제 95 호, (한국사 연구회, 1996), pp. 179 ~ 211.

[366])Record Group 319 Office of the Chief of Military History Investigative Record Repository(IRR) Box#327/ Case# XA531861 Pom Suk Yi, 중앙일보 현대사연구소 편, 1996. pp. 652.

Korean National Youth League had a high level of education, which had a high impact. In other words, 81 percent of the trainees were those with a junior high school diploma or higher, which is equivalent to today's university graduates, and they went down to the city, province, and county to establish and operate local training centers, and the organization increased exponentially.

At the same time, the Korean National Youth League opened its doors to other right-wing youth organizations such as the Northwestern Youth League, the Korean Democratic Party, the Korean Independence Choksung National Association Youth League, and the Korean Independence Youth League, with good facilities, high-quality instructors such as Jung In-bo, Bae Seong-dong, Cho Soang, and Cho Bong-am, as well as the scientific curriculum. The result was a consolidation.[367] Through this, the education system of the Korean National Youth League, which is comparable to civilian military academies, has been rapidly spreading, enabling the right-wing youth organization to compensate for the capabilities of the country, which is weak in terms of personnel, material, economy, and ideology.

4. Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the Township Brigade

Lacking the state's ability to establish violence, the U.S. military government was forced to rely on the Hyangbo group, which was composed mainly of members of the right-wing Youth League, from the

[367])이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 9 월 9 일「청년운동 반세기: (44)조선민족청년단」.

time of the elections to the Constituent Assembly for the birth of the Republic of Korea. Since the Republic of Korea has relied on the violence of right-wing youth organizations since its birth, they have since entered the military and police or participated in the construction of a modern nation by directly assisting the state in violence. For example, in the period of state formation in 1948-50, the ignition of the state monopoly of the armed forces apparatus was necessary for the building of a modern state, but the period of about two years around August 1948 was too short a period for the state to completely monopolize and stabilize the violent apparatus, and since the two leftist struggles gradually turned into guerrilla warfare and intensified, it was only when the right-wing youth organizations were incorporated as part of the state organs of the police and the army that the police and the army could function as the only state gangs. The two leftist struggles were led by the National Front for Democracy and the Southern Workers' Party.

This led to the February 7, 1948 struggle for the salvation of the country and the struggle to directly oppose the May 10, 1948 elections. First, the February 7 Salvation Struggle was fought on a nationwide scale from February 7 to 20 under the leadership of the Southern Workers' Party. In just two weeks, there were 103 demonstrations, 204 beacons, 30 strikes, 25 union walkouts, and 55 clashes, with a total of 8,497 arrests.[368]The struggle against the May 10 elections intensified into a more direct armed struggle, including intensive attacks on election offices and police stations. The Namro Party, which organized the "National Committee for the Struggle Against the Single Line in South Korea," organized underground organizations such as the White Bone Brigade, the Guerrilla Army, and the People's Youth Army, and during

[368])김남식, 『남로당연구』, (서울: 돌베개, 1984), pp. 306.

the month of May, the police, the media, and the news agencies. They attacked transport agencies and staged demonstrations. In particular, from 8 to 10 May, just before the elections, they attacked electoral registers, polling stations, and police stations almost every day, clashing with the police and the township officials who tried to force the election process.

Cho Byung-ok, the head of the police department, said there were 80 incidents of raids on election offices.

He explained that 35,000 police officers alone could not protect the 13,800 polling stations, so he organized a township group.[369] In principle, the members of the incense troop did not have jurisdiction, but some of them were accused of excessive behavior, such as using violence against reporters.[370][371]) In spite of these side effects, the reason why they had to rely on the government rather than the incense was due to the lack of capacity of the state. In fact, when we look at the specific scale of the damage and the damage, the damage was great to the police stations and police officers, who are supposed to maintain public safety as the owners of public authority, and administrative means such as railways, telephones, and telephone poles, and it was evaluated as the first in the history of national police policing. Table III-8) Amount of damage during the election period470)

	Attack	arson	destruction	bloodflesh (Hospital)	injury
Election Offices	134 cases	32cases			

[369])『조선일보』,1948 년 4 월 17 일「조병옥, 향보단 조직에 대해 언명」.
[370])『경향신문』,1948 년 5 월 18 일「대 검찰청장 이인, 향보단의 탈선과 그 임무에 대해 담화 발표」.
[371])『서울신문』,1948 년 5 월 18 일「조병옥, 남로당계 총선반대투쟁 진상 발표」.

terrorism	612cases				
Government offices	301 cases (mainly police stations)	16Results		11cases	47Results
police station		16Results			
Yang Min		69Results		107cases	3 8 7 reviews
locomotive			71Results		
Passenger wagon					
Rail Lines			65Results		
Telephone lines			541 tendon		
Utility pole			543 tendon		
Election Relations				116Results	
Election Officials				15cases	61Results
Member of Parliament				2Results	4Results
policeman				51Results	1 2 8 reviews

Police Officer Goes				7cases	16Results
tribe					
Road Express Bridge				48cases	

As a result, the Hyangbodan will be renamed Minbodan (民保團) and will remain alive even after the elections. Although the Minbodan was also[372] accused of excesses and excesses[373] in the Ongjin District 38th Parallel, it was recognized for its role by directly participating in the battle of the Korean Army that was engaged with the People's Army during the clash at the 38th Parallel in the Ongjin district and contributing greatly to the elimination of public expenses.[374] In order to compensate for the lack of physical violence in the Republic of Korea, these minbo groups participated directly in the skirmishes against the leftist forces with the help of the police along with the right-wing youth members, and also received military training[375] and conducted simulated combat drills with the police[376][377], which later became the basis of the militia organization envisioned by Rhee Seung-man.476)

However, the fact that right-wing youth groups have become part of the state's violence has led to the following side effects, as Henderson

372)『서울신문』,1948 년 9 월 12 일「각종 기부금 징수의 폐해」.
373)『서울신문』,1949 년 2 월 8 일「대검찰청과 경찰수뇌부, 민보단의 월권행위와 관련해 대책 강구」.
374)『연합신문』,1949 년 6 월 28 일「옹진지구 38 선 충돌사건에 대한 옹진주민의 지원증대」.
375)『영남신문』,1949 년 8 월 30 일「민보단 경상북도단부, 단원들에게 군사훈련을 실시」.
376)『국도신문』,1949 년 8 월 10 일「서울시경찰국 주최로 경찰·민보단 합동 모의전투훈련을 실시」.
377)『자유신문』,1949 년 12 월 3 일「이승만 대통령, 청년방위대 20 만 명 조직 등에 대해 기자와 문답」.

points out: First, because these youth organizations were forced to rely on illegal funds due to the lack of a state budget, the forced or voluntary contributions they made amounted to almost half of the national revenue. Second, Korean politics was divided into formal and informal organizations, and the state became dual.[378] As this informal organization exceeded the authority of the official state and caused serious adverse effects on the administration of state affairs, Rhee ordered the official dissolution of the Korean National Youth League, which still existed after Yi Beom-suk's voluntary declaration of dissolution, in September 1953.

5. Jeju 4.3 Incident

On the other hand, the resistance of the leftists began with the general strike of September and October 1946 and the Daegu Incident, followed by the general strikes of March 1947 and February 1948, and then the Jeju 4.3 Incident.

The Jeju 4.3 Research Institute said about the Jeju 4.3 incident, "On March 1, 1947, the police

Starting from the firing incident, it is defined as an incident in which a large number of villagers were sacrificed in the course of the armed conflict between the armed forces and the punitive forces that occurred in Jeju Province from April 3, 1948, when the armed forces of the Jeju Island Party of the Namro Party took up arms under the banner of resistance to the suppression of the police and the Northwestern Youth League, and opposition to the unity and decision, until the full opening of the Hallasan Geumjok area on September 21, 1954."

However, in the perspective of the Jeju 4.3 incident, conservatives and progressives are sharply opposed, and this incident, which is

[378])핸더슨, 2000. pp. 226.

intertwined with complex and diverse causes, cannot be explained by a single factor, but[379] it can be found that it is deeply related to the fundamental limitation that the state has a clear monopoly on violence and has not established public authority. As mentioned above, at that time, the division within the right-wing camp over the establishment of a single South Korean government led to the inability to fully absorb nationalism in the process of nation-building, and the leftist forces that had rioted were carrying out propaganda in earnest that they were proceeding with anti-nationalist state-building. In other words, They claimed that Rhee, the Korean Democratic Party, and Japanese officials were helping the United States colonize Korea after Japan, and that the Japanese army would soon land in Korea again and subjugate them. In addition, the police, the army, and the right-wing youth members, who were deeply aware of the incompetence of the state, overreacted to their propaganda and exercised tyrannical power, but the state could not control them.

First of all, the Jeju region has a complex change of power at the center due to regional specificity.

and continued to accept the authority of the People's Committee organized by the Founding Preparatory Committee. In other words, as can be seen from the fact that more than 95% of the workplaces of Jeju Island, including the police and government offices, participated in the People's "March 10 General Strike" led by the People's Committee in protest against the police firing, the public authority of the US military government in the Jeju Island area did not have sufficient authority from the residents compared to other areas. The reason for this is that, as

[379])제주 4.3 사건진상 규명 및 희생자 명예회복위원회, 『제주 4.3 사건 진상보고서』, (서울: 선인, 2003), pp. 533.

already mentioned above, the 6th Division, which arrived at the ROK at the last of the 24th Corps of the US Army, occupied Jeju Island only on November 10, 1945. This is because it was not in the second stage of occupation by tactical units. The U.S. military personnel were finally able to establish an administrative force on January 14, 1946, but only two months later, on March 15, 1946, 40 of the 6th, 7th, and 40th Divisions withdrew to their home countries, forcing the 6th and 7th Divisions, which had a drastic 44,352 men, to redivide the occupied territory.[380)]

In the midst of this series of processes, the American military government with a lot of administrative power

The U.S. military administration, which was suffering from a shortage of personnel and Korean officials, was unable to establish an administrative power in the geographically independent Jeju Island area, so that the administration of the Jeju Island area could continue to be administered by the existing Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Republic of Korea and the People's Committee. However, on March 1, 1947, when the people of Jeju Island, excited by the police firing, attacked the police station, the US military government saw this as an opportunity to establish public authority and took a hard line against it. In other words, when the two seats allocated to Jeju Island were occupied by members of the People's Committee, Yeo Un-hyung interpreted this as a neutral administration of the governor of Jeju Island, and the US military government also changed its policy in the process of holding the elections in May 1948 because he thought that the local officials were implementing a policy of favoring the people of Jeju Island rather than faithfully following the policy of justice for the US military.

[380])Hoag, 1992, pp. 160.

The U.S. military government replaced all local leaders, including the governor of Jeju Island, and went abroad

The police were deployed. In addition, in order to make up for the lack of physical violence, a large number of Northwestern Youth Corps members consisting of 500-700 refugees from Pyongan Province were dispatched from Seoul.

It was.[381] However, as a result, more than 500 people were arrested and 2,500 people were detained in one year, and the people of Jeju Island, who enjoyed a high degree of independence due to regional specificity, rebelled. Sasaki also pointed out that the Northwestern Youth League, which was dispatched to Jeju Island, contributed to the collapse of the district party organization of the South Korean Workers' Party led by Jeju Island in cooperation with the police, but at the same time, the farmers' committees, including the joint labor unions[382], and the farmers' committees in various cases were violently confronted and disturbed in Jeju Island, which led to further turmoil inside Jeju Island. In addition, the continued appointment of Buil officials, who were geographically isolated and had a low turnover rate compared to other regions, also increased the anger of the people of Jeju Island.

Taking advantage of the sentiments of the people of Jeju Island, the forces of the South Korean Workers' Party launched an armed struggle on April 3, 1948, and[383] these leftist forces, which quickly numbered about 1,500 people, carried out the largest partisan activities before the Korean War. By May 1, 1948, the Communists had occupied several areas around Jeju City and waged a large-scale partisan war, destroying two bridges, cutting almost all telephone lines, entering

[381])핸더슨, 2000. pp. 225. ; 이경남, "경향신문"1987 년 1 월 21 일「청년운동 반세기: (11)서북청년회」.

[382])사사끼. 1977. pp.265-266.

[383])제주 4.3 사건진상 규명 및 희생자 명예회복위원회, 2003. pp. 534-536.

villages, robbing goods, and kidnapping.[384] After that, Song Yo-chan, who had experience in guerrilla subjugation in Manchuria during the Japanese colonial period, was brought in, and Jeju had been in a lull for a while. 4. 3 Incidents occurred about two months after the establishment of the new Republic of Korea Government, and after the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, the Rhee Seung-man government launched a scorched-earth suppression campaign that was more tough than anywhere else, and Jeju became a place where the legitimacy of the new Republic of Korea and the good fortune of the regime were staked on the line. At that time, the extermination operation in Jeju had the character of a prelude to the Korean War between the North and the South. In fact, On April 3, 1950, Kim Dal-sam, the leader of the Jeju partisans, came to Pyongyang in the utmost secrecy to report on the situation of the partisan movement in Jeju Province and to receive instructions from North Korea.[385]

Therefore, the Rhee government deployed not only the police but also the military to subdue them.[386] From October 11, 1948 to March 1, 1949, three battalions of the 9th Regiment and the 2nd Regiment were mobilized to form the Jeju Island Guard Command. However, left-wing sympathizers within the army sent to exterminate them joined in and assassinated their new regimental commander. The situation was complicated by the assassination of their new regimental commander. In other words, left-wing soldiers were sent to exterminate the army without sufficient work within the army, and the incident escalated in

384)박종효 편역, 2010,「1948 년 따스 통신 극동정보과」,pp. 287.

385)박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 4 월 10 일 소련 대사관 참사관 이그나찌예프가 외상 븨쉰스끼에게 보낸 극 비 암호전문」,pp. 398.

386)박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서: 남조선 정치 사 정」, pp. 336.

connection with the left-wing forces. Eventually, from March 2 to May 15, 1949, the troops originally dispatched were replaced with four battalions of the 2nd Regiment. In the end, a large-scale extermination was carried out by replacing the troops originally dispatched with four battalions of the 2nd Regiment. So, In spite of strong opposition from the moderate forces and those from the provinces, the most intense extermination was carried out[387, resulting in] the destruction of more than 95% of the villages in the middle and mountains, the loss of many lives, and the forcing of more than 20,000 of these villagers to the mountains. On the other hand, more members of the Northwestern Youth Corps have been deployed in Jeju Island than any other region.

Due to frequent friction with the people of Jeju Island, they became the object of fear and hatred. In particular, they were gnashing their teeth and thinking of them as enemies by arbitrarily smuggling the livestock of the people of Jeju Island in order to procure them on their own in a state where they did not receive sufficient support due to the lack of human and material resources of the state. Accordingly, even Yoo Jae-heung, who was dispatched on March 2, 1949 as the commander of the Jeju Island District Combat Command, and who was trying to eradicate them and restrain them from doing so through his adjutant from Pyongyang, pointed to the aggressive behavior of the Northwestern Youth Brigade as a factor in the deterioration of the situation.

The excessive behavior of the members of the Northwestern Youth Association and the extreme antipathy of the people of Jeju Island toward it was one of the main reasons for the outbreak of the April 3 incident. Yoo Jae-heung testified that the incident was aggravated by the

---

387)『서울신문』,1948 년 9 월 7 일, "독립신보"1948 년 9 월 8 일「제주도사건 진상조사단 및 근로인민당 등, 토벌 즉시중지를 요구하는 성명을 발표」.

fact that the members of the Northwestern Youth Association beat up the villagers and harassed the people of the province in the name of "Sweeping the Red Gangs", and[388] that the policemen who had lost many of their colleagues and family members to the armed leftist forces were vengeful and harassed the families of the leftists with vicious means, causing the villagers who could not bear the violence to go into the mountains.[389]About 500-1,000 members of the Northwestern Youth Corps have been mobilized in police uniforms or military uniforms since the April 3 incident. In other words, 200 members of the Northwestern Youth Association voluntarily enlisted in the police on April 6, 1948 at the request of Police Chief Cho Byung-ok, and became the first combat police battalion in Korea, and by May, an additional 500 members were dispatched to form the "Seocheong Jeju Riot Police" and cooperate with other right-wing youth organizations.[390391)] The role of these right-wing youth members was more active than anywhere else. For example:

Well, in Jeju, the state monopolized physical violence and the 180 soldiers and 140 police soldiers were killed in order to establish a modern state.

4.3 The total number of victims of the Northwestern Youth Group who died during the incident was much higher, at 639.

In this way, these right-wing youth groups functioned as de facto state organizations in Jeju, a quasi-liberated zone that had been the land of collapsed public power.

However, this does not mean that all of this is an inevitable process in the process of establishing a modern state. For example, if we look at the

[388])유재흥.『격동의 세월』, (서울: 을유문화사, 1994), pp. 96-98.

[389])사사끼. 1977. pp. 288-289.

[390])건국청년운동협의회,『대한민국건국청년운동사』,(서울: 건국청년운동협의회총본부, 2007), pp.

[391] -1352.

statistics of victims reported to the Jeju 4.3 Incident Truth Investigation and Victims' Honor Restoration Committee,

It can be seen that the proportion of punitive squads, which accounted for 78.1 percent (10,955 soldiers), was overwhelmingly higher than that of the Communist armed forces, which accounted for 12.6 percent (1,764 soldiers), which is in line with the U.S. military report that more than 80 percent of the victims were killed by punitive squads. Next, children under the age of 10 (5.8%, 814 people) and the elderly over the age of 61 (6.1%, 860 people) accounted for 11.9% of the total victims, and the victims of women (21.3%, 2,985 people) were high.

In addition, the "court-martial for the April 3rd Incident," which was held on 2,530 people in December 1948 (871 people) and June 1949 (1,659 people), was just a formality as there were no records of the proceedings and there was no trial, or the sentence was only notified when they went to the prison, and 345 people were buried in secret without death sentence in three days, but it was not reported in the domestic media at all.[392] In fact, the South Korean government's official announcement at the time stated that 15,000 people were killed, but North Korean sources claimed that 30,000 people, including ordinary people and partisans[393,] were killed.)

As such, as the state failed to establish a definite administrative power and monopolize violence, the human, material, and economic resources of the right and left wings were instead injected, and since it was the place where the North and the South waged proxy wars before the Korean War, Jeju Island could only be a nightmare island and a

[392])제주 4.3 사건진상 규명 및 희생자 명예회복위원회, 2003, pp. 535-538.

[393])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서: 1) 남조선 정치 사정」, pp. 336.

shadow of a nightmare for both the Northwestern Youth League and the residents of Jeju, where the largest number of victims occurred among the regions that were injected.[394] The Jeju 4.3 incident, in which a significant number of innocent people were sacrificed without due administrative procedures, can be understood as a dark shadow found in the process of establishing a modern state in the Republic of Korea, a vulnerable country, along with the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, which will be described later. And, it was certainly due to the inability of the state to monopolize violence and establish public authority.

IV. Nation Building of the Republic of Korea (1)

Even on August 15, 1948, when the government of the Republic of Korea was established after many twists and turns, no one expected a smooth future. First, Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik did not believe that the Republic of Korea would last long. According to the testimony of Song Nam-heon, a centrist who served as Kim Kyu-sik's chief of staff when he was the chairman of the South Korean Transitional Legislative Assembly and participated in North-South negotiations as a representative of the National Independence League, Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik will soon collapse as the Republic of Korea was established through the May 10 elections. [395] Therefore, I thought that the Rhee Seung-man government would not last long.[396]The report of John J. Muccio, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Korea, reflects a more objective foreign view. In his November 27, 1949 report, he pointed out that the

[394])이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 1 월 28 일「청년운동 반세기: (12)서북청년회: “제주는 준 해방구”조병옥 SOS」.

[395])「제 2 부 송남헌」, 한국정신문화연구원 한민족문화연구소 편, 2001. pp. 112.

[396])「제 2 부 송남헌」, 한국정신문화연구원 한민족문화연구소 편, 2001. pp. 107.

Korean government, though stronger than it had been two months earlier, was still fundamentally weak and had a generally poor administration. He also wrote that the administration at the national level was incompetent, but even worse at the local and sub-levels, and that incompetent administration was deteriorating the relationship between the government and the people. [397] Regarding the reality of the Republic of Korea at that time, the following statement by Ahn Jae-hong, a centrist nationalist who served as Minister of Civil Affairs during the US military occupation, was made in the Chosun Ilbo on August 10, 1948, implicitly summarized: Ahn Jae-hong had already anticipated that the Republic of Korea would become dependent on the United States in terms of diplomacy, defense, and finances.

> There is no denying that there is a tendency to be weak toward the new government, but I admit that President Lee is a little decisive in his own judgment. Of course, there will be considerable restrictions on diplomacy, defense, finance, etc., but it will have independence in other areas. I hope that there will be no restrictions that I was subjected to during the time of the Minister of Civil Affairs.[398)]

Kim Dong-chun points out that the Republic of Korea formally had the appearance of a state, but it was a state that could hardly be considered to have the appearance of a complete state because it did not have enough infrastructure to feed its people[399400]. In other words, the

---

[397])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 11 월 27 일 (1 급 비밀, 69 호)「무쵸 주한미특별대표부 특사, 한국의 정치·경제·사회 등 각 분야에 대해 미 국무부에 상황보고」, pp. 947~952.

[398])『조선일보』,1948 년 8 월 10 일「김구·조소앙·안재홍, 정부수립 등에 대해 기자회견」.

[399])김동춘, 2007. pp. 186.

[400])「제 2 부 김인식, 원장길」, 한국정신문화연구원 한민족문화연구소 편, 2001. pp. 178.

state with weak material and economic resources was unable to establish its administrative power due to the lack of human resources, and the punitive forces, which were supposed to be the source of the national finances, were sluggish, and the vicious cycle was repeated. Kim In-sik, who served as the first member of the National Assembly and chairman of the Special Investigation Committee on the purge of the pro-Japanese faction, compares the environment at that time to a wasteland or an empty field.

That's when I was in the middle of nowhere. You go into the wasteland and make it all. There's nothing.

Build a country out of a wasteland.[498]

First, as mentioned above, the lack of material and economic resources prevented the formation of a capitalist class to assume the power of the infrastructure. Because the U.S. military government began to discredit some of the imputed property left behind by the Japanese in March 1947, the number of cases was only 513 for businesses, 839 for real estate, and 916 for other cases. Among them, only about 10-20% of the total number of companies that were affiliated to small companies were disbursed, and the disbursement of large-scale companies such as mines and banks was postponed after the establishment of the First Republic. However, due to extreme inflation, the proceeds of the sale of the property were devalued, and the delinquency of the unpaid payment was also severe due to the loss of productivity due to the lack of production facilities. Thus, the effect of the sale of imputed property on the government's finances was also very low, and from 1949 to 1955, the amount of income from the sale of imputed property that was actually transferred to the general fiscal revenues averaged

It was only 1.5 percent.

In the end, as I will explain in detail in terms of the fiscal and tax apparatus, even in 1949, the second year of the establishment of the government, 60% of the government's appropriations were in deficit, and the amount of money was also higher than at the end of the US military administration.

Although prices doubled and doubled, industrial output was only 18.6 percent of what it was in 1944 at the end of the Japanese occupation.[401] In 1948, industrial productivity was only 80% of pre-war levels, and the prospects for economic growth were bleak due to high inflation, food shortages, skilled workers and power shortages, and a growing number of refugees and returnees.

The fragility of the country's material and economic resources is such that the following

It is evident from this. In other words, the fact that Chung In-bo, the head of the Inspector General's Office, who was in charge of investigating corruption by public officials, suggested to the president an emergency solution that took into consideration the necessity of guaranteeing a minimum livelihood for civil servants and the impact of the increase in civil servants' salaries on prices, rather than cold-hearted law enforcement and corruption monitoring, shows the situation in the Republic of Korea at the time.[402] Thus, the Republic of Korea lacked the material and economic resources to provide sufficient salaries to the officials who were supposed to complete the modern state by establishing state power by taking charge of the administration of the state. Therefore, even the Inspector General, who is supposed to closely

---

[401])강만길, 2011. pp. 273-275, pp. 283.

[402])『서울신문』,1948 년 10 월 26 일「정인보 감찰위원장, 공무원 최저생활 보장 필요성을 대통령에 건의」.

monitor the corruption of public officials, had no choice but to admit the reality of public servants committing corruption first, and he wanted to create conditions in which civil servants could live at a minimum level so that the structure of corruption could be eradicated.

Despite this lack of economic and material resources, North Korea took advantage of the U.S.

By shifting the blame, the propaganda tactic of stirring up nationalist sentiments that began in early 1947 was intensifying, and this had already spread widely within South Korea at the time of the Jeju 4.3 Incident and the Yeosu and Suncheon Incidents in 1948, which had agitated the public and the public. In other words, North Korea claimed that the South Korean economy had been devastated since the day the U.S. imperialists landed in South Korea and had destroyed its industries in order to turn it into a supplier of raw materials to the United States and a consumer market for U.S. products, and that the U.S. was trying to divide the North and South and strengthen the puppet government of Rhee Seung-man by holding elections for the South Korean National Assembly in order to enslave South Korea.[403][404] Furthermore, North Korea claimed that the U.S. imperialists controlled 90 percent of South Korea's economy, which formerly belonged to Japan, in material goods and natural resources. Moreover, the U.S. business owners, who have a monopoly on goods and resources, are colonizing south Korea through the U.S. government and taking control of the trade area and destroying the business and national economy, and that the U.S. is mobilizing its military organization and the Seungman puppet government to realize its plan of destruction under the guise of aid.502)

[403])이는 북조선 국가계획위원 전준택의 논문을 인용한 것으로 북한과 북한을 추종하는 좌익 세력들의 일관 된 논지 중 하나였다. 박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 6 월 10 일(민주조선)」, pp. 474-475.

[404])박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 민주산업 제 2 호」, pp. 457.

Therefore, until the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents in October 1948 and a major national security crisis arose, it became imperative for the Republic of Korea to show that it fully embraced nationalist aspirations in the process of nation-building in order to actively respond to their propaganda. Furthermore, the government attempted to compensate for the lack of economic and material resources by maximizing the resources of ideological power based on the nationalist cause, and the process of drafting the Constitution, which will be discussed later, was a clear example of this.

Already from the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, Rhee Seung-man announced the revival of the Republic of Korea after 29 years. He made a promulgation statement, and consciously used the name "30 years of the Republic of Korea" in the official gazette that published the enacted constitution.[405] In addition, the ministers of the First Republic also consciously tried to utilize their ideological power resources by revealing that they were inheriting the ideology of the Provisional Government, the Three Disciplines, in their policies. For example, Lim Young-shin, the first Minister of Commerce and Industry, stated in his report to the plenary session of the National Assembly, "Since the Korean Constitution requires the establishment of an equal society for all human beings, the equal distribution system should be further strengthened."[406Kim] Hoon, the 2nd Minister of Commerce and Industry, also stated, "For the democratization of commerce and industry administration, the administration should not be focused on a few privileged classes or classes, but should enlighten and promote the

[405])함재학, “대한민국 헌법사를 어떻게 읽을 것인가?: 1948 년 헌법의 위상과 헌법이론의 빈곤,”, 한국미래 학회 편, 『제헌과 건국』,(서울: 나남, 2010), pp. 16-55. pp. 339.

[406])『제 1 회 국회속기록 제 83 호』,1948 년 10 월 6 일「임영신 상공부 장관, 제 1 회 83 차 국회 본회의에서 시정

ideology of equality of opportunities and social life of coexistence and co-prosperity so that the majority of the business and industry can develop in a balanced way," and Yi Kyo-seon, the 3rd Minister of Commerce and Industry, said, "The ideal of the founding of the country lies in the construction of an equal society of coexistence and co-prosperity for all people."(506) In addition, the first Minister of Social Affairs, Jeon Jeon-han, also emphasized "the improvement of the current medical administration for the enjoyment of equal medical care for all citizens without discrimination between rich and poor, in line with the constitutional spirit of equality of national interests in the administration of medical treatment for diseases, and equality of disease prevention and medical protection without discrimination between rich and poor."507)

At the same time, voices were being raised through the National Assembly that the U.S. military government and officials of the Japanese imperialist period should be excluded in the name of nationalist causes,[508] so the Constituent Assembly recommended to the State Council the purge of pro-Japanese elements in the government and at the same time created a special committee.(509) Ten days after the inauguration of the government, Lim Moon-hwan, the vice minister of commerce and education, was forced to resign after a scandal arose over his involvement in the act of cooperation with Japan.510 There was a strict social atmosphere. In this atmosphere, 94 percent of the senior civil servants at the rank of section chief and above were replaced, despite the recommendation of the US military government, which wanted to maintain the state administration system and bureaucracy established at the end of the military regime for fear of an administrative vacuum.[511] Accordingly, Rhee Seung-man said of the situation at the time, "Those who had experience in administration were not allowed to use the anti-

people (anti-people), and there were many difficulties in using newcomers." He recalled.[512)]

Policy Report," pp. 512-515.

[505] "Free Press," May 11, 1950, "Kim Hoon, the new Minister of Commerce and Industry, expresses his aspiration to boost production and develop trade."

[506] "The Second Year of the Korean War," May 1, 1952, "Minister of Commerce and Industry Yi Kyo-seon's Commerce and Industry Policy," pp. 128-129.

[507] First issue of the Monthly Bulletin on Municipal Administration, January 6, 1949, "Minister of Social Affairs Advances Reports on Municipal Policy at the First Plenary Session of the 83rd National Assembly," pp. 29-42.

[508] At that time, Kim Hyo-seok, a member of the Constituent Assembly, proposed to the president that the incoming government not appoint the current military administration to the heads of the State Council or administrative departments, and it had been formally billed by the National Assembly. Seoul Shin Mun, August 2, 1948, "The 37th Plenary Session of the National Assembly Debates the Sculpture Issue."

[509] Seoul Shinmun, August 21, 1948, "The Provisional Special Committee of the National Assembly Plans to Recommend to the State Council the Liquidation of the Pro-Japanese Faction in the Government."

[510] Kyunghyang Sinmun, August 25, 1948, "Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry Lim Moon-hwan submits resignation due to cooperation with Japan."

511) McDonald's. 2001. pp. 238-240.

And, according to this social atmosphere, the first cabinet was also able to anti-Japanese

It was built around reformists and people who were loyal to nationalist causes such as struggles. At that time, Rhee attempted to accommodate nationalist demands in the process of nation-building as much as possible by including in the first cabinet the Provisional Government, which had refused to participate in the government, advocating the establishment of a unified nation-state, and the centrist figures, as well as former leftist figures who had denied the Republic of Korea, while keeping in mind the equality of power between the political factions, and excluded as many as possible those from the Democratic Party of Korea, who had gained power during the US military administration. Jang Taek-

sang and three other members left the party immediately after entering the cabinet, resulting in Kim Do-yeon being appointed as finance minister.

First of all, the first cabinet consisted of one prime minister and a total of 17 ministers. Other prominent figures include President Lee Seung-man, Vice President Lee Si-young, National Assembly Speaker Shin Ik-hee, and Supreme Court Chief Justice Kim Byung-ro, all of whom were prominent anti-Japanese activists during the Japanese imperialist period.

department	name	Tenure	Career	Affiliations
prime minister	Lee Beom-seok	48.7.31-50. 4.11	Commander of the Liberation Army, Director of the Korean National Youth League	Korean National Youth
Interior	Chiyoung Yoon	48.8.348.12. 24	Seungman Lee, Secretary, Constituent Assembly Member	South Korea Leaving the Democratic Party immediately after entering → Cabinet

Foreign ministry	Jang Taek-sang	48.8.4-48.12.14	Metropolitan Police Commissioner, from abroad Independence Movement and Claim Fraud	South Korea Leaving the Democratic Party immediately after entering → Cabinet

[512] The Free Press, May 13, 1950, "President Rhee Seung-man Answers Question to Reporter That the Present State of War Is Not Cold War."

			Imprisoned	
Treasury	Doyeon Kim	48.8.22-50.4.22	As a professor 3.1 Ahead of the Movement He was imprisoned for leading the 2.8 Declaration, In 1942, he was imprisoned for the incident involving the Korean Language Society.	Democratic Party of Korea

Justice	This Inn	48.8.22-49.6.6	Attorney General of the U.S. Armed Forces and free defense of independence activists during the Japanese occupation.	South Korea Leaving the Democratic Party immediately after entering → Cabinet
Pentagon	Lee Beom-seok	48.8.4-49.2.28	Concurrent Prime Minister and Instructor at the New Military Academy, Northern Military Administration Participated in the Qingshan-li counter-espionage as a belonging.	Korean National Youth
Ministry of Education	Ahn Ho-sang	48.8.4-50.5.4	Professor, Seoul National University	Korean National Youth
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	Jo Bongam	48.8.2-49.2.23	socialist movement, Imprisoned for the March 1st	Former Communist Party of Korea

			Movement and the Communist Party in 1930	

			Involved in the case Served 7 years in prison and served as an employee of the Police Bureau of the Shanghai Provisional Government	
Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Lim Young-shin	48.8.4-4 9.2.23	The Western and American Committees and Involvement of the Shanghai Provisional Government, establishment of Central Women's University, 3.1 Imprisoned for	Women's Nationalist Party

			participating in the movement,	
Department	Min Hee-sik	48.8.4-4 8.10.4	Japanese Governor-General, U.S. Military Minister of Political Affairs and Transportation	
Postal Service	Yoon Suk-gu	48.8.4-4 9.6.14	National Founding Preparatory Committee, Legislative Council, Hwangpu Military Academy 2nd Class, Shanghai Provisional Government Transfer of military funds to operatives.	Korea Independence Party

Social Affairs Department	Advancing	48.8.3-4 8.12.24	Labor Movement	Confederation of Independent Labor
Free Places	Lee Cheong-cheon	48.8.12-48.9.24	Commander-in-Chief of the Liberation Army, founding of the Korean Revolutionary Party, Captain of the new military academy and formation of the Koryo Revolutionary Army.	Daedong Youth Group
	Yoonyoung Lee	48.8.12-52.7.27	Pastor, Vice Leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, Imprisoned for Participating in the March 1st Movement.	Democratic Party of Korea
Office of Public Information	Dongsung Kim	48.8.12-49.8.12	President of Joint News Agency	
General Affairs Office	Byungyeon Kim	48.8.1248.11.30	Director of Pyongnam Gift Industry	Democratic Party of Korea

			Promotion Association	
Ministry of Legislation	Eugene Oh	48.8.4-4 9.6.7	Dean, Graduate School of Korea University, Member of the Law Drafting Committee	
Planning Office	Lee Soon-tak	48.8.1249.7.22	Lotus Prize Professor, Hee Sang Yeon Imprisoned for the incident. To the new publication Involved Hong Myung-hee, Paik Nam-woon, and left and right On the joint venture route Active centrist nationalists	

Table IV-1) List of First Cabinets of the First Republic

In addition to this, Jung In-bo, who called for the succession of the Provisional Government's ideology, the Three Strains Principle,

Efforts were made to overcome the shortage of economic and material resources by maximizing the resources of ideological power by appointing human resources with nationalist legitimacy by appointing human resources with nationalist legitimacy by [407]appointing moderate figures such as the Inspection Committee, which monitors and supervises the misconduct of public servants as the predecessor of the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the Supreme Finance Review Body, which confirms the settlement of the total state budget in accordance with the Constitution and supervises the finances of each state institution.

In other words, Kim Koo, Kim Kyu-sik, and others insisted on inter-Korean negotiations and refused to participate until the end.

Therefore, Rhee Seung-man held a general election with them at that time, and issued a statement stating that the establishment of a transitional government, which is the basis of the reunification of the North and the South, was an urgent matter, and that the Provisional Government should not be an issue now, but that the Provisional Parliament and the Provisional Government should take over the Provisional Government after the establishment[408] of the Provisional National Assembly and the Provisional Government, and included in the government those who had defended the legitimacy of the Provisional Government until the establishment of the Republic of Korea and tried to form a unification government based on the cooperation of the left and the right. For example, Rhee Seung-man insisted on the theory of the Provisional Government's reconciliation to the end, Paek Hong-gyun, who had pushed for the formation of a unification government through the

[407])『자유신문』1949 년 2 월 11 일「명제세 심계원 위원장, 심계원 업무에 대해 담화를 발표」.
[408])『서울신문』,1947 년 5 월 11 일「이승만, 과도정부 수립과 임정봉대 문제에 관해 성명서 발표」.

cooperation of Woo, was appointed vice minister of the Postal Service.[409] In addition, moderate nationalists Ko Chang-il and Kim Ju-rin, who participated as elected members of the South Korean Transitional Legislative[410] Assembly[411], and Choi Myung-so of the Korea Independence Party) were [412]also assigned as vice ministers of foreign affairs and inspector generals.

However, the shortage of human resources was worse than expected. He was a close confidant of Lee Seungman

According to Dawn Oliver's statement, as the new government began to take shape, it was necessary to appoint a large number of officials, but no one with administrative or political experience could be found, and problems that needed to be resolved without delay were piling up every day.[413] However, most Koreans had no experience with modern government, including those who had left their homeland in China since 1919 and had little ability to run the government[414]. However, as already mentioned above, the figures

---

[409])백홍균은 독립촉성국민회 내의 임시정부 계열을 대표하는 인물이기도 했다. 이에 대해서는 다음을 참조 할 것.『서울신문』,1947 년 5 월 7 일,「독촉 국민회 임정 봉대파, 임정 추지회 구성」;『동아일보』,1947 년 6 월 25 일「한독당 선전부장 백홍균, 반탁데모에 대한 담화 발표」.

[410])상해 임시정부 출신의 독립운동가 였던 고창일은 해방 후 김병로, 원세훈, 김약수 등과 함께 한국 민주 당을 탈당하여 중도 성향의 민중동맹을 창설한 주요 멤버였다. 김규식 등이 주도한 남조선과도입법위원회 의 관선의원을 지낸 고창일은 제 1 공화국 초대 내각에서 외무부 차관으로 임명되었으며, 외무부장관 대리 를 역임하기도 했다. 이후, 좌, 우 합작을 추진했었던 김붕준, 박건웅, 여운홍, 장자일, 송남헌 등과 함께 민족자주연맹에서 활동했었던 그는 6.25 전쟁 시기에 인민군에 의해 처형당하였다.『경향신문』,1946 년 12 월 8 일「입법의원 관선의원 선임서와 성명서 발표」;『서울신문』,1948 년 8 월 10 일 「제 4 차 국무회 의, 각부 차관 임명과 정부기구문제 등 토의」;『조선중앙일보』,1949 년 3 월 4 일「민족자주연맹, 부서와 임원을 개선」;『조선일보』,1950 년 11 월 10 일「납북요인들 행방불명」.

[411])『경향신문』,1946 년 12 월 8 일「입법의원 관선의원 선임서와 성명서 발표」;『독립신문』,1949 년 2 월 22 일「감찰위원회의 조봉암 농림부장관 파면 결정서」.

[412])『동아일보』1946 년 4 월 23 일「한독당 중앙부서 결정됨」;『한성일보』,1948 년 8 월 29 일「국무회의, 감 찰위원회 구성」.

[413])Oliver, 2002. pp. 288.

[414])맥도널드. 2001. pp. 242.

from the Provisional Government, such as Song Ho-sung and Cho Gae-ok, who had been used by the US military regime in order to maximize their ideological resources in the process of nation-building by gaining nationalist causes and support, showed their lack of ability.

The shortage of human resources was a problem for both the North and the South, and North Korea also had the problem of human resource vulnerability, which lacked experienced and skilled human resources in state institutions and social organizations, as well as high-skilled manpower in industry, transportation, and agriculture.[415Han] Hong-gu points out that, contrary to popular preconceived notions, North Korea implemented a policy of liquidation of personnel that was quite lenient in the process of forming the government, because the Japanese imperialist strength did not end in a short period of time and all those who served in the Japanese imperialists could not be dealt with harshly. In other words, since it was impossible to build a new country with only those who had lived as partisans in Manchuria, it was required to actively involve people with specialized knowledge in the founding process, so in the process of building the People's Army in the early days, officers from the Japanese army and the Manchurian army were accepted.[416] However, as mentioned above, North Korea has been in North Korea since shortly after August 15, 1945.

Since Koreans with Soviet nationality were sent to key state institutions and important positions in society, the situation was relatively better.[417] In addition, with the full support of the Soviet Union from the time of the

---

[415])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서:6) 북조선 경제 사정」, pp. 340.

[416])한홍구,「대한민국사 1」, (서울 : 한겨레 신문사, 2003), pp. 106-107.

[417])박종효 편역, 2010,「소련이 1945 년 8 월 15 일 이후 북조선에 파견하여 조선에서 근무하는 소련국적 고 려인에게 북조선 정부가 훈장수여 동의를 소련정부에 요청한 고려인 명단」,pp. 495.

visit on August 15, 1945, we were able to successfully lay a material foundation. The Soviet Union continued to support the two-year plan for the development of the national economy, and provided large-scale economic aid and experts amounting to $4-50 million, thus building an economic, material and human base.[418][419] Accordingly, by April 15, 1950, two years after the commencement of the two-year plan for the development of the national economy, systematic development of the state was made possible by the continuous improvement of measures for the economic, material and human resources of the state and the continuity of policies, [420]such as the self-assessment that the people's material life had improved and the level of culture had improved rapidly due to the successful achievement of the two-year plan for the development of the national economy.

However, in the case of the Republic of Korea, as we have already seen, from the inception of the country,

Compared to North Korea, international political variables did not work smoothly. First, friction between South Korea and the United States surfaced during the transfer of power. Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Yi Beom-seok and Foreign Minister Jang Taek-sang strongly protested that the United States would retain command of the South Korean National Defense Guard and police until the withdrawal of troops was completed through an agreement on the transfer of power, calling it an infringement[421] of sovereignty. Hodge, fearing that this would delay his return to Korea, requested the U.S. to dispatch Mucho promptly, and with the mediation of Mucho who arrived in Seoul on 23 August, the ROK succeeded in taking over the police on 3 September, but agreed to retain command of the South Korean National Defense Guard until the

[418])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 3 월 5 일: 스딸린과 김일성을 단장으로 한 조선정부 대표단과의 회담」, pp.

[419] .

[420])박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 4 월 15 일(조국전선)」, pp. 471-472.

[421])FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 8 월 18 일「Jacobs to Marshall」, pp.1282-1283.

U.S. forces completely withdrew.[422] Therefore, two months after the inauguration of the government, the administrative vacuum is still
It was going on. In fact, Minister of Social Affairs Jeon Jeon-han confessed that the administrative power of the state had not sufficiently permeated the people until November 1948 by stating that "the government's policies up to this time had not penetrated the people" through the reports of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents and the flood recovery districts.[423)] Lee Seung-man twice asked for a list of people who could be used, but he complained that it would take a long time for everything to go smoothly because there was no news from him.[424)] Because there was a severe shortage of people who could be used in national affairs, Rhee asked the members of the National Assembly to vote to recommend a person who could be used in national affairs.[425] In addition, due to this lack of human resources, Rhee was forced to appoint to high positions the members of the Democratic Party of Korea and its successor, the Democratic Kuomintang (KMT), with whom he had political conflicts, as well as Shin Shin-mo and Song Ho-seong, the spearhead of the Creationist faction who had impeached him during the Shanghai Provisional Government.

In the face of such an absolute shortage of human resources, only a small number of Koreans experienced the Japanese colonial system, which introduced this modern administrative and state apparatus to Korea.[532] Accordingly, in an interview with the Seoul Shimbun on November 12, 1946, before the liberation, Rhee expressed his belief that

---

[422])FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 8 월 24 일「Jacobs to Marshall」, pp.1287.

[423])『동광신문』,1948 년 11 월 1 일「전진한 사회부장관, 여순사건과 수해복구 등에 대해 담화를 발표」.

[424])Oliver, 2002. pp. 292.

[425])「제 2 부 김인식, 원장길」, 한국정신문화연구원 한민족문화연구소 편, 2001.

the participation of Japanese collaborators was inevitable for the rapid construction of a modern state.

> Since our environment cannot solve this problem, if it is submitted in advance, it will only confuse the public and hinder reunification. It is in order to take action after the restoration of sovereignty. If even the most ardently pro-Japanese elements are given a chance to establish a public service that will benefit the nation, there may be hope of atonement for the long and evil in the future, so it will not be too difficult for them to endure the situation that they have endured for 40 years. We can only proceed with the restoration of national sovereignty in a unified manner.533)

Rhee's thoughts on the pro-Japanese faction's participation in state-building were expressed by members of the Constituent Assembly. It can be summarized in the following remarks about Rhee Seung-man by Kim In-sik, who served as chairman of the Special Investigation Committee on the purge of the pro-Japanese faction.

> He wasn't pro-Japanese. I hated it. The Japanese people... But the government Joe In order to lead the government, you have to get those people to work, and that's how it works.534)

This perception was shared not only by Rhee Seung-man but also by Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok, who was a member of the Liberation Army, and he gave a more specific reason. In other words, Lee Beom-seok

---

531) Divine Sook. My Life. (Seoul: Ilsinsa, 1962). pp. 61.
532) McDonald's. 2001. pp. 228.

[533] Seoul Shinmun, November 12, 1946, "Re-election of the Pro-Japanese Party, Announcement of Dr. Lee's Statement."
[534] "Part 2: Kim In-sik, Wonjang Gil," ed., Institute of Korean Ethnic Culture, Korea Institute of Spiritual Culture, 2001. pp. 189.

In an interview with the Seoul Shimbun shortly after the establishment of the government on August 20, 1948, he did not propose a meek opposition to the punishment of pro-Japanese officials, but expressed the idea that if officials were to be punished for their past as pro-Japanese vices, the weakness of the newly developed Republic of Korea, which lacks human resources, would be further aggravated.

The natural development of gaining independence and forming a sovereign state lies in a unique political ideology. In other words, it is national self-determination, and I believe that this self-determination lies in the spirit of our nation, which has fought for a long time throughout history. Today, we have been striving for the establishment of a DPRK government, but I do not wish to exclude you. If we reject you, we will lose that many talents. However, while we have been running other people's errands for a long time, our national culture has been corrupted without a doubt. Such matters should be liquidated as soon as possible, and they should be gradually liquidated so that they can have the self-governing power to eliminate the smell of corrupt bureaucracy and to raise the dignity of the nation. There are no individuals who have left the state, and there are no officials who have left the nation. Therefore, the duckling that is wandering in the harbor is absolutely unacceptable in this government. You, too, should hope and practice full cooperation against the enemy of these vicious ducks. The shape and weakness of the sculpture that are always controversial are not in the sculpture, but only in the fulfillment of the government's purpose. The government of the Republic of Korea will only be strengthened from today. This is the first time that a new535)

Accordingly, in an interview with the Minju Ilbo on August 20, 1948, at the beginning of the establishment of the government, Rhee

stated that although the general public opinion in the country is turning in favor of liquidating the pro-Japanese faction, this is not possible due to the reality of the Republic of Korea, which has not yet established a solid foundation, and that it is inevitable to appoint officials who cooperate with Japan for the time being.[536] Above all, Rhee was afraid that the absence of these men would disrupt the construction of a modern state, according to an article in the Seoul Shimbun of September 15, 1948.

---

[535] Seoul Shinmun, September 15, 1948, "President Rhee Seung-man. Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok's first lecture to government officials after the transfer of executive power."

[536] Minju Ilbo, August 20, 1948, "President Rhee Seung-man warns officials not to be negligent in administrative vacuum caused by administrative transfer."

Immediately after I returned to Japan, public opinion in the country was first of all in favor of the execution and liquidation of the pro-Japanese faction and national traitors. There are a considerable number of pro-Japanese factions in the police and government. At that time, I said that it would be better for us to restore our sovereignty as soon as possible and then enact laws to punish them, rather than for the nation to quarrel over this issue. Among the officials gathered here today, there are some officials who have been the subject of national complaints and criticism throughout the past 40 years and three years of military rule.

This is not to say that I embrace the pro-Japanese officials of the past. However, in order to put our government on a solid footing in the future, I believe that the execution of the pro-Japanese elements is still too early. Since we have endured 40 years of Japanese imperialism and three years of military rule, we should be patient a little longer and deal with it gradually in accordance with the law. There is also a view that countries around the world doubt our political capacity and political management due to the division and dispute between the nations and that we cannot entrust the political power to the Koreans. However, in the opinion of the world, it was agreed that the government should be allowed to the Korean people, and today the sovereignty of the government has been transferred to us. However, if some elements who hope and hope that the

government will not run well are bent on dividing the nation, fomenting conflict between the National Assembly and the government, and vying for power and erosion of power between political parties, the future fortunes of the country will fall into a situation of misery even worse than that of the Japanese imperialist tyranny of the past 40 years. We hope that you will inherit the remarkable inheritance of the 4,000-year history of the country that the nation has maintained, and put aside personal interests, conveniences, inconveniences and erosion of power, and devote yourself to the spirit of sacrifice through the unity and cooperation of the nation. The government of our hands, whether it worked well or not, would be better than the Japanese government or the military government, if not worse. Therefore, I urge you to obey the orders of the higher authorities absolutely, not to be swept away by external agitation, but to do your utmost to restore national power.537)

The Great Purge of France, by journalist Joo Seop-il, who was a French correspondent, criticizes Rhee Seung-man's First Republic for appointing pro-Japanese collaborators, citing de Gaulle's France as an example of the post-war execution of Nazi collaborators and the establishment of a national order.(538) However, according to the work of Mazower, an authority on European history who has challenged the existing interpretation of modern European history, contrary to de Gaulle's boasts, among the 850,000 French civil servants,

[537] Seoul Shinmun, September 15, 1948, "President Rhee Seung-man; Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok's first lecture to government officials after the transfer of executive power."

[538] Joo Seop-il, The Great Purge of France, (Seoul: JoongAng Press, 1999).

Only about 6,500 people, or 0.7647 percent, were laid off.[426)] This reflects the fact that it is difficult to train and replace officials in charge of state administration, which requires a high degree of expertise. In

[426])Mazower, 1999. pp. 316-319.

particular, in the case of the Republic of Korea, where the people had no experience of self-government and no training to perform administrative and technical tasks, the importance of highly specialized state management was even greater.[427][428] Rhee Seung-man also said that officials who work in state organizations are easy to do because of their professionalism.

They were well aware that crab was irreplaceable, and even before the establishment of the Republic of Korea government, they requested the U.S. government to lend them the human resources necessary for the operation of the country for the time being and to hand over their own database, which they had identified, in a press conference held at the end of July 1948. However, as mentioned above, it had no choice but to accept the public opinion that in order to maximize its ideological power resources, it was necessary to exclude all officials who had worked for the Japanese imperialists and the US military administration, so it was experiencing great difficulties in establishing administrative power due to the mass replacement of high-ranking officials at the rank of general and above.

However, most believe that the handover will be completed within August 15. I asked the commander of the U.S. military to lend me some advisers and technicians from the Korean government, and that if he would make a list of what would be useful to us and give us a list of some of them, we would choose from among them and use a few, and so the heads of the Korean ministries should continue to hold their positions and wait for their successors, and I hope that there will be no change before then. When our new government is inaugurated, all the U.S. advisers, engineers, and Korean officials will be

[427])Oliver, 2002. pp. 285.

[428])『서울신문』,1948 년 7 월 23 일「이승만, 총리인선 문제 등에 대해 기자회견」.

screened out at once, and there will be no one who would be happy to see new people enter, but that is impossible, so only the top cabinet members will come forward and take over the government, and all the officials below will be quoted according to their skills, diligence, and qualifications.
This is the first time that a new541)

However, the new Republic of Korea was born in October 1948 after the Yeosu and Suncheon Rebellions.

This led to the greatest crisis. Accordingly, despite the problem of declining public support due to the decline in political legitimacy, the government had no choice but to continue to allow Japanese bureaucrats with experience and skills in professional administration and policing to remain in the government by disbanding the Special Committee on Anti-National Affairs, which had been taking concrete action through the enactment of the National Security Law and the enactment of a law to punish pro-Japanese factions.

At the time, U.S. government officials in Seoul, including U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Mucho, also argued that the Rhee Seung-man government was facing a serious situation of confrontation, confronting the communist rebels within and hostile military forces outside, and that the foundation for political stability and economic development in South Korea could only be laid if the U.S. military withdrawal was delayed for the time being and South Korea's security[429] was guaranteed. Accordingly, Mucho formally requested that the United States adopt Rhee's resolution requesting that the U.S. military remain in[430] Korea

[429])FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 11 월 12 일「주한미국 특별대표부 무쵸, 한국 정부의 현 상황과 향후 전망에 대해 미국 국무장관에게 보고」, pp. 1325-1327.

[430])FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 11 월 9 일「주한미국 특별대표부 무쵸, 이승만 대통령이 장면 한국유엔대표에 게 보낸 지시내용을 보고」, pp. 1323.

for the time being, and the U.S. Government also accepted Rhee Seung-man's request to postpone the withdrawal of the USFK, judging that it was rampant to overthrow and sabotage the inexperienced and inexperienced Korean government[431], and decided to postpone the withdrawal of the U.S. forces until June 1949 by amending the plan for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces, which had been supposed to be completed by December 31, 1948, in accordance with the decision of NSC 8.

As evidenced by the number of unemployed people who were 674,000 on May 1, 1949, the Republic of Korea, which had a serious economic and material base of serious vulnerability,[432] faced serious national security problems, and the help of the United States was necessary to overcome them. The United States also feared that South Korea, which would be completely dependent on U.S. assistance for the foreseeable future, would not be economically self-sufficient and would not be able to cope with the threat posed by North Korea, and would be in great danger of collapsing, but if it did, it would greatly damage the prestige of the United States. Therefore, The U.S. extended the withdrawal date until June 30, 1949, promising to provide economic aid to South Korea in the hope that it would be able to compete with the North Korean regime by providing economic assistance to South Korea, even if it did not provide South Korea with sufficient military strength or military commitments to attack North Korea.[546] At the same time, however, the U.S. government was declaring that it would cut off economic aid if it did not reduce the budget deficit and inflation, so the ROK government was forced to balance its budget by drastically cutting government expenditures such as defense, judicial and police expenditures, and

[431])FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 11 월 19 일「이승만 대통령, 트루만 대통령에게 미군 육해군 대표부의 한국 설 치를 요망」, pp. 1331-1332.

[432])박종효 편역, 2010,「북조선과 남조선의 중요사건일지: 5 월 남조선 중요사건 일지」, pp. 361.

administrative expenses. In fact, on April 1, 1949, 20,000 people were cut from the central government departments, and on April 5, 23% of the total budget was announced to be allocated to national defense.[547] Fearing that this would lead to a decline in the already inadequate security and defense capabilities, the government merged the right-wing youth organizations to form the Korean Youth League, which trained them in military affairs and entrusted them with the work of a quasi-military organization, while selecting certain members from among them and incorporating them into the army and police organizations.

In addition, as national security emerged as an important task in the process of state building, he advocated a transitional ideology of one democracy, which included both the tripartite doctrine and the contents of national security, and disseminated it as a kind of national movement for nation-building at the level of the state. On the other hand, student organizations such as the Students' Patriotic Flag Association emphasized democracy from the perspective of national security, and government agencies and other sectors of society provided material resources that could not be secured by the financial capacity of the state through patriotic flag dedication campaigns. As a result, the problem of national security began to improve by supplementing the country's lack of human, material, and economic resources, and in June 1949, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul issued a statement about the security situation at the time, saying, "Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the withdrawal of the USFK, which serves as a stabilizing mechanism for the military-private balance between the North and the South, will lead to an all-out war, there is a significant military balance between the North and the South.

546)National Security Council Report 8/2, March, 22. 1949, DNSA(Declassified National Security

Archive), ; FRUS 1949, March 22, 1949, "NSC 8/2 Report on the U.S. Position on Korea, Submitted by the U.S. National Security Council to U.S. President Truman," pp. 969-978.

[547] Pak Jong-hyo (ed.), 2010, "Diary of Important Events in North and South Korea: Diary of Important Events in South Korea in April," pp. 360.

It's happening." I was very appreciative.[433)]

On the other hand, due to the lack of all resources, the voices of the masses demanding nationalist causes were accepted in exchange for mobilization in the process of building a state, and positive results were achieved, such as land reform and the implementation of compulsory national education. In addition, as the political legitimacy of the country improved and the people gradually agreed to the mobilization of resources and the sense of belonging to the state increased, the autonomy of the state began to improve little by little, improving the problem of vulnerability at the material and economic level. As the centrist forces began to participate in the process of building the Republic of Korea in earnest through the election of the 2nd National Assembly on May 30, 1950, the issue of political legitimacy and nationalist causes began to be maximized.

Thus, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the country was re-elected

By achieving political balance and suppressing internal rebellions by the partisans, they were seeking political and economic stability. On April 28, 1950, a U.S. government official told the Associated Press that the Republic of Korea had escaped a political and economic crisis and that although many difficulties awaited, it was hoped that the foundation for

433)FRUS 1948, VI, 1948 년 11 월 9 일「주한미국 특별대표부 무쵸, 이승만 대통령이 장면 한국유엔대표에 게 보낸 지시내용을 보고」, pp. 1046-1057.

the country's existence and democratic development would be established.

If the current economic revival continues due to the passage of the Balanced Budget Bill, Korea will be able to become economically independent within a few years, and the work of the Economic Stabilization Council, which is composed of members from both the ROK and the United States, is greatly contributed. In addition, the 2nd National Assembly elections, which elect 200 members of the National Assembly, are expected to have a fair election, with political parties that refused to run for the Constituent Assembly elections on the grounds that fair elections would not be held, and about 1,400 candidates are expected to run. Meanwhile, the South Korean military is now able to maintain its sovereignty against communist-controlled North Korea unless the Soviet Union aids North Korea. You will be able to do it. Currently, there are 93,000 Army, 7,000 Navy and 50,000 police forces in South Korea that are being trained by 500 U.S. military advisers, and the results are very satisfactory. In fact, some 5,000 guerrillas have been killed in the Communist guerrilla and other anti-peninsular campaigns since October 1949, and they have been virtually wiped out of South Korea. Thus, there are signs that South Korea has emerged as a more democratic country with an improved standard of living, and will soon be able to become self-reliant once the threat from North Korea is removed.549)

Despite these achievements, the Rhee Seung-man government will not have sufficient military power.

Contrary to the U.S. government's fears that it would attempt to unify by force, from the second half of 1949 onwards, a large number of experienced Korean divisions from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) returned home from China, and between April and May 1950, the Soviet Union supplied North Korea with a large number of military trucks, tanks, aircraft, and heavy weapons, thus giving North Korea an absolute advantage in both the number of troops and the number of ordnance in

the balance of military power between North and South Korea.[550] It was Rhee Seung-man and the South Korean government who were most aware of the situation in North Korea. As early as September 1949, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs had sent a letter to the 21 governments that had recognized the ROK government, urging them to take active steps to prevent the Korean War, and the Minister of National Defense, Shin Shin-mo, predicted that North Korea would invade in March 1950.[551] Accordingly, as late as 15 June, six days before the outbreak of the Korean War, Rhee also demanded from John Foster Dulles, a US State Department adviser, and Mucho, the U.S. ambassador to Korea, that the United States would make a clear security commitment to Korea, assuring them that if something was done, the Cold War would be lost.552)

The United States, on the other hand, was basically skeptical of the possibility of war until the outbreak of war and did not actively deal with it. In other words, the United States, due to the deterioration of the situation in China, increased the strategic importance of South Korea, and decided to give South Korea a larger scale than before.

---

[549] The Free Press, April 28, 1950, "U.S. Government Assesses Korea Has Avoided Political and Economic Crisis."

550)FRUS 1950, May 11, 1950, "U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Drumwright Reports to U.S. Secretary of State on North Korea's Military Capabilities," pp. 84-85.

551) Macdonald's, 2001. pp. 108.

552)FRUS 1950, June 19, 1950, "Memorandum of Allison, Director of the Northeast Asia Bureau, on the Meeting between President Rhee and U.S. State Department Advisor Dulles," pp. 107-109.

However, it was only in the context of economic and ideological blockade that Korea could not commit direct military force because its strategic value was inferior to that of Greece, Turkey, and Japan, and therefore meant that Korea would have to survive without the provision of U.S.

military protection. It was the U.S. policy that if Korea continued to survive in this way, it would continue to support South Korea as a model for the success of the Truman Doctrine.553)

The NSC-68, submitted in early April 1950, suggested that the United States would have to budget $50 billion in defense expenditures, much more than before, in order to respond effectively due to the Soviet Union's global military contribution,[554] but it was difficult for the Truman administration, which was under the pressure of domestic public opinion to further cut defense spending after his miraculous re-election, and much less to the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, when the United States was strategically deprived. In other words, although the strategic importance of Korea increased due to the communization of mainland China, and the United States also increased its economic support for Korea, Korea was still only the seventh most important country. The United States, which was committing resources in almost every part of the world against the Soviet Union, feared that communism on the Korean peninsula would lead to a decline in the prestige of the United States, but it hoped that the balance of power would be maintained as much as possible, so that the effect of the economic blockade would be achieved, and no further injection of resources would be made and no military force would be used. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and China tolerated North Korea's aggression in anticipation that the United States' attitude of abandoning mainland China and Taiwan would continue on the Korean peninsula, which led to the outbreak of the Korean War.

553)National Security Council Report 61, January, 27, 1950, DNSA(Declassified National Security

Archive), pp.1-6.

554)National Security Council Report 73, July, 1, 1950, DNSA(Declassified National Security Archive), pp.1-3.

1. Police

With the establishment of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948, the number of police officers increased to 48,010 in 1950, and[434435] the proportion of police-related budgets in the national budget increased significantly, but it was still far below the share of administrative and administrative expenses. Accordingly, the atmosphere at the end of the US military regime that the Buil police should be used temporarily in order to establish public authority against the violence of leftist forces continued into the early days of the establishment of the Republic of Korea.

Table IV-2) Police Expenses at the Beginning of the First Republic (1948-1950) 556)

year		1948	1949	1950
General Finance		31.3 billion won	KRW 77.6 billion	105.6 Wbn
Police Fees	amount	2.4 Wbn	10.6 Billion KRW	13.4 Billion KRW
	ratio	7.7%	13.7%	12.7%

However, at the same time, the voices for police reform, which have been high since the time of the US military administration, are also

[434])내무부 치안국 편, 『경찰 십 년사』, (서울: 내무부 치안국 ,1958), pp. 397.

[435])내무부 치안국, 『한국 경찰사 2』, (서울: 내무부 치안국, 1973), pp. 295; 서주석, 2008, pp. 295. 년

With the inauguration of the First Republic, it began to take shape in earnest. In other words, at the 37th plenary session of the National Assembly on August 2, 1948, at the beginning of the Constituent Assembly, Shin Sung Kyun of the Korea Independence Party (KPP) agreed to request the President to "give the government that will be established in the future a system that will not be concerned about militarism or becoming a police state[436]." Rep. Noh Il-hwan, a member of the minority faction who was active in the law on punishment of anti-national actors, mentioned the police question and pointed out that there are 80 job police officers who have been employed since the Japanese era.(558) Against this backdrop, on September 7, 1948, shortly after the inauguration of the First Republic, representatives [437]of the new police of the Daejeon Third Provincial Police Agency demanded the retirement of the old officers. This incident was a blatant incident in which the old police officers and the new police officers openly demanded that the new police officers resign from the new government by electing about 50 representatives who had been in the police force since the Japanese colonial era.[438)]

Thus, from the beginning of the First Republic, there were many voices in the society calling for police reform and the expulsion of those who had experience in Japanese service. According to public opinion at the time, the prevailing opinion was that during the three years of the US military administration, the pro-Japanese forces were politically and

---

[436])『서울신문』,19488 월 2 일「제 37 차 국회본회의, 조각문제로 격론」.

[437])『제 1 회 국회속기록 제 59 호』, 1948 년 9 월 7 일,「제 1 회 59 차 국회 본 회의, 반민족행위자 규정에 대한 노일환 의원의 발언」, pp. 1117.

[438])『부산신문』,1948 년 9 월 14 일「대전 제 3 관구 경찰청 신임 경찰 대표들, 기존경관 퇴직을 요구」.

년

economically organized and colluded with politicians who were burning with political ambitions, and that they should be purged.[439]In addition, according to the Anti-National Punishment Bill, those who served as high officials, gendarmes, and high police officers during the Japanese colonial period could not be appointed to the civil service before the expiration of the prosecution period, which caused a lot of agitation among civil servants.[440][441]In particular, in the case of the prosecution, Article 5 of the Anti-Nationals Law stipulates that "a person who held a public office of the second rank or higher of the rank of a high officer or above the rank of fifth rank or higher, or a military policeman, assistant gendarmerie, or a high police officer under Japanese rule, shall not be appointed as a public servant before the expiration of the statute of limitations under the Anti-Ethnic Law."(562) Accordingly, while the cadres of the Metropolitan Police Agency among the incumbent police officers who served in the Japanese imperialist era announced that they were stepping down for the sake of national discipline, 20 senior officers led by Kim Tae-il, deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Agency, visited Yun Chi-yong and submitted their resignations and proposals.[442]In order to calm the rumors that front-line police officers are being agitated by the statement that only the senior police officers of the Japanese colonial era are going to be replaced, Yoon Chi-young issued a statement saying, "The rumors about the former police officer's resignation are nothing but incitement and not facts, and I urge you not

[439])『세계일보』,1948 년 9 월 10 일「정치적 도구로서의 친일파 지위: 김우송」.
[440])『서울신문』,1948 년 9 월 24 일「반민족 행위처벌법 공포를 즈음한 고위 공직자들의 모습」.
[441])『국제신문』,1948 년 9 월 24 일「반민족행위처벌법 제 5 조에 해당하는 이상기 대법관, 이명섭 고등법원장 의 신상발언」.
[442])『자유신문』,19488 월 16 일「수도 경찰청 간부, 민족정기 양양을 위해 퇴진한다고 성명」.
년

to be disturbed by this and to do your best in the police work."[443][444] At the same time, the issue of the transfer of police power could not proceed smoothly due to the conflict between Cho Byung-ok, who was in charge of the police under the US military government, and Yun Chi-yong, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and President Yi Seung-man announced that the issue of punishment of the Buil police officers should be temporarily covered up and carried out after the complete transfer of power.

Since the regime is still in the process of being transferred, there is a concern that executing someone will cause confusion. After the transfer of power, let's create a special court and execute them. Americans have been confusing people because they cannot distinguish between pro-general traitors, so those who have worked hard for the country even under the military government should be punished. It is said that supplies keep leaking, and this is due to the agitation of the police officers due to the anti-civilian law. When the transfer of power is complete and ordered, let's get rid of it.565)

However, as the issue of national security emerged as a top priority in the wake of the Yeosu and Suncheon rebellions, the atmosphere of society also changed rapidly. First, the administration, which had perceived that it had entered a quasi-civil war, chose to return to the system of having a police agency in each province as it did during the U.S. military administration, citing the urgency of the domestic situation, and asked the National Assembly to pass the proposal. However, the National Assembly rejected the government's

443)『서울신문』,1948 년 8 월 29 일「윤치영 내무부장관, 경찰 업무에 진력할 것을 요하는 담화」.
444)『자유신문』,1948 년 10 월 2 일「이승만 대통령, 반민족 행위처벌법, 민족경제원조 문제 등을 기자와 문 답」.

년

proposal on the grounds that it would create a police state, and changed the name of the bill to the "Act on Temporary Measures Concerning Local Administration" and promulgated it with a validity period of six months.

All of them.[445] As a result, even the media at the time, which was indignant at the government's reckless appointment of pro-Japanese elements to key positions in various sectors, praised the formation of a special anti-people committee to punish the pro-Japanese elements as a great achievement of the Constituent Assembly. And the reason is that we set up a barricade in front of each police station in the city.

This was because the celebration gave the impression of a battlefield and created a tense situation, and the issue of security and security was emerging as the most important issue for the survival of the new republic.[446] In other words, the National Security Law, which was passed by the National Assembly on November 20, 1948, was promulgated and implemented on December 1, 1949, and on February 6, 1949, the National Assembly rejected the proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops. In fact, after the end of 1948, a total of 2,300 Communist guerrillas were recruited from North Korea on 10 occasions and joined forces with more than 2,000 leftist forces in South Korea who fled to the mountains after the February 1948 general strike, the Jeju 4.3 incident, and the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents. Joined forces with more than 2,000 leftist forces in South Korea to wage fierce guerrilla warfare. According to Table IV-3 below, before the outbreak of the Korean War

---

445)『경향신문』,194812 월 29 일「제헌국회의 회고 (1)-(2)」.

446)『서울신문』,1949 년 1 월 20 일「신성모 내무부장관, 치안문제와 지방시찰 소감 등에 대해 기자담화」.

on June 25, 1950, A total of 6,620 armed leftists were active in the country.

Date	48.11-49.9	49.9.30	49.12.15	50.6.24
	1st round (48.11.12, Odaesan) - 180 people	Eungbongsan 100 pass.		Eungbongsan 70 people
	2nd (49.6.1, Odaesan) - 400 people	Odaesan	Odaesan 60 pass.	Odaesan
	3rd (49.7.6, Odaesan)- 200 people		Gyebangsan Mountain	Gyebangsan Mountain
	4th (49.8.4, Ilwolsan) - 300 people	Taebaeksan 250 pass.	Taebaeksan 450 pass.	Taebaeksan 100 pass.
	5th round (49.8.12, Yongmunsan) - 15 people	Gukmangbong		Gukmangbong
	6th round (49.8.12, Yongmunsan) - 40 people	Mt. Ilwol	Mt. Ilwol	

년

	7th (49.9.20, Taebaeksan) - 360 people		Bamboo Spirit	Bamboo Spirit
	8th (49.9.28, Yang		Dongdaesan	Dongdaesan

년

	Both counties) - 50 people			20 pass.
	9th round (49.11.6, 100 young workers)		Mt. Bohyun	Mt. Bohyun 80 pass.
	10th (50.3.28, Odaesan - 700 people)			
	Jeju 4.3 Landslide(48.4.3) -1,500 people			
	Yeosu, Suncheon Rebellion(48.10.18)-350 people			
	Daegu Rebellion (48.11 -49.1)-112 people			
		Hallasan Mountain 300 pass.	Hallasan Mountain 100 pass.	Hallasan Mountain
system	4,300 people	1,000 people	860 pass.	460 pass.

Table IV-3) Communist guerrilla and partisan activities before the Korean War[447)]

[447])정석균, 『대 비정규전사』, (국방부전사편찬위원회, 1988), pp. 26-75.

On the other hand, if we look at the Soviet and North Korean sources of the time, the existence and scale of these partisans was much more threatening. First, according to a report sent to Stalin by the Soviet ambassador to North Korea, about 2,000 partisans were active in South Korea, conducting 2,000 operations in 1949 alone.[448] According to a report by the North Korean newspaper "Democratic Joseon" on April 25, 1950, in March 1950, about 63,000 partisans fought 1,083 battles in South Korea, killing 570 policemen.

Executed 459 people. Meanwhile, 17,400 partisans in the Taebaeksan area conducted 351 operations, and 20,000 partisans participated in 273 operations in the Odaesan region.[570)]

Accordingly[449], on April 15, 1949, the police established a special security force in the Jirisan district, and on the 26th, they established a railway police force at major railway stations to ensure railway security and to be in charge of exterminating partisans near the railways. In 1950, the police were put in charge of the partisan campaign that had been carried out together with the military, and for this purpose, a total of 10,000 combat police units consisting of 22 combat police battalions were formed. In fact, the number of police officers increased from 35,000 around August 20, 1948 to 48,010 in 1950[450)], indicating that the increase was to increase the number of combat police to exterminate the partisans. However, Since the police force was only about 3,000 recruits, excluding the addition of combat police, right-wing youth organizations had to be brought in to solve the policing work that had increased dramatically since the establishment of the First Republic.

---

[448])박종효 편역, 2010,『1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서: 남조선 정치사 정〉, pp. 336.

[449])박종효 편역, 2010,『1950 년 4 월 25 일 민주조선: 남조선 실정』, pp. 472.

[450])내무부 치안국 편,『경찰 십 년사』, (서울: 내무부 치안국, 1959), pp. 397.

At that time, Rhee Seung-man was simultaneously serving as Minister of the Interior and head of the Korean Youth League, to Shin Shin-mo, who had spearheaded the impeachment of him during the Shanghai Provisional Government, in order to resolve the crisis[451452, which shows that the] police and military, which failed to monopolize the legal violence characteristic of the modern state, relied heavily on youth organizations for state security as the First Republic faced a kind of civil war from the very beginning of its existence. At that time, the total number of anti-communist youth organizations was more than 6 million, and they became the most powerful force in Korean politics. He was largely credited with maintaining public order in the May elections. In addition, they were not only in charge of policing by assisting the police, but they were also deployed in the security sector, and the 50,000 members of the Armed Forces who would be formed within the Armed Forces were also to be selected from within the youth group.[453] At the same time, North Korea, stimulated by the withdrawal of the USFK, has been working with South Korea since the beginning of 1949.

With the support of the public, the idea of invading the South was actively considered. The leadership of the Central Party of the Workers' Party of South Korea, which had been informed of the plan to invade the South by the North Korean side around May, was also formulating four liberation plans from April to May 1949, in May, June, and September. Accordingly, the police were also making all-out efforts to collapse the South Korean Workers' Party and arrest the leftist forces. In fact, for about a year, beginning with the collapse of the Workers' Party of Seoul in March 1949

[451])『관보 제 26 호』,1948 년 12 월 31 일「국무위원 사령」.

[452])『민국일보』,1948 년 12 월 26 일「신성모, 대한 청년단 단장에 취임」.

[453])『동아일보』,1948 년 12 월 29 일「신성모 대한청년단장, 대한청년단의 임무는 방공(防共)이라고 밝힘」.

and ending on June 25, 1950, more than 200,000 people were discarding the party.(575) This meant that the use of police officers with special skills could be tolerated, which resulted in the collapse of the Anti-National Special Committee during this period.

In this way, as the importance of security issues has been highlighted, from the National Police Agency to the National Police Bureau.

Despite the fact that the governor of the province had the police authority as the chief officer of the police after the reorganization of the organization, an official letter was sent to the governors of each province in the name of Kim Hyo-seok, Minister of the Interior, to temporarily hand over the main police administration to the commissioner of the police. Accordingly, in view of the present situation, the duties of the police should be similar to that of the military, and the security and maintenance of confidentiality should be entrusted to the Commissioner of Police, and in view of the peculiarities of the police administration, the personnel and accounting matters of the police officers should also be entrusted to the Commissioner of Police.(576) However, as mentioned above, Kim Hyo-seok was a person who advocated at the beginning of the National Assembly that officials of the U.S. military and Japanese colonial periods should not be appointed to the Cabinet and the government as much as possible. In other words, from the standpoint of nationalism, he reflected the public's desire in the National Assembly to liquidate as much as possible the remnants of the Japanese and American periods and to build a new nation. However, the delegation of police administration to the police that he ordered had already been made during the period of the US military administration. In other words, on December 27, 1945, the U.S. military government separated the local police powers, which had been under the authority of the provincial governor, and placed them under the direct control of the Central Police

Bureau, and on October 23, 1946, the provincial police department was abolished and replaced with the police department. Police work was transferred to the Provincial Police Department.

For example, a person who advocated maximizing nationalist ideology in the process of nation-building has also become a necessity for administration as national security emerges as a top priority.

---

575) Sunwoo Jong-won.1986. pp. 121-169.

[576] Busan Ilbo, April 7, 1949, "Interior Minister Kim Hyo-seok sends an official letter to the governors of various provinces to temporarily hand over major police administrations to the commissioner of the National Police."

He realized that he had no choice but to accept the police's claims. In this way, from the beginning of the inauguration of the ROK government, there were many voices calling for the punishment of the Buil police, but as the state of war developed due to the outbreak of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, the national security gradually became the top priority, and the voices were gradually lost.

2. Military

Until the Second US-Soviet Joint Commission was dissolved in July 1947, the US military administration had basically assumed that a regular Korean army would be established when Korea gained independence. Therefore, in order to withdraw troops at an early stage through amicable negotiations, the Korean Defense Guard was established, a reserve force of about 25,000 police officers, with the aim of dividing security duties and maintaining public order in South Korea, with the aim of building a reserve police force that would not be

misunderstood by the Soviet Union and capable of dealing with internal subversive activities. It was maintained. As a result, the ROK Army was not an offensive weapon, but only possessed a defensive type of armament suitable for small-scale border skirmishes or for maintaining public order, but the Soviet Union was engaged in the development of a regular army by sending experienced Soviet military advisers and providing active military and technical assistance, so the North Korean army was provided with the latest offensive weapons rather than defensive weapons.

However, from the spring of 1948, as the policy of establishing a single South Korean government became visible, the question arose of arming and training the National Defense Guard as part of preparations for the rapid withdrawal of US troops. Under the NSC 8 Plan of April 1948, it was envisaged that infantry division-type equipment to sustain the ROK Army for six months would be provided free of charge, and a 250-member Temporary Military Advisory Group was established to organize and train the ROK Army.[454] On July 17, 1948, the Ministry of National Defense was established by the promulgation of the Constitution and the Law on Government Organization, and on August 16, the Korean Guard and the Korean Coast Guard were formally incorporated into the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea through the Ministry of National Defense Decree No. 1 issued by the first Minister of National Defense, Yi Beom-seok. At the time, the National Defense Guard, which had five brigades and 15 regiments, consisted of 1,403 officers and 49,087 enlisted men, while the Coast Guard had 3,000 men and 105 ships.

year	1948	1949	1950

[454])National Security Council Report 8, April, 2, 1949, DNSA(Declassified National Security Archive).

General Finance		31.3 billion won	KRW 77.6 billion	105.6 Wbn
Defense Expenditures	amount	8.1 Billion KRW	24.0 Billion KRW	25.1 billion won
	ratio	25.9%	30.9%	23.8%

Table IV-4) Defense Expenditures of the First Republic (578)

Thus, from 1948, when the establishment of the Republic of Korea government was formalized, the proportion and amount of defense expenditures increased significantly, as shown in Table IV-4 above. Nonetheless, as we have seen, due to the fragility of society, the state was responsible for production and consumption, so it was government expenditures that accounted for the highest proportion of the state finances. However, due to the U.S. demand to curb inflation and tighten the fiscal deficit, the proportion of defense expenditures had to be reduced, so the proportion of defense expenditures in 1950 was lower than in 1949.

At that time, the salaries of South Korean and North Korean soldiers of the same rank also differed significantly, as follows:

Teething. i.e. 2. Unlike the South Korean army lieutenant, who was earning a monthly salary of $4, the North Korean lieutenant was earning $260 a month, more than 100 times higher. Lieutenants and captains in the South Korean army, who were paid $12, $2 and $13.2 respectively, received only a meagre amount of money, 1/20 to 1/30 of the monthly salary of the North Korean soldiers, who were still paid $280 and $300, although the gap had shrunk significantly.

[578] Public Security Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, 『History of the Korean Police 2』, (Seoul: Public Security Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, 1973), pp. 295.

	ROK [455][456][457]Army[579])	North Korean Army580)
so-called	US$ 2.4	$260
first lieutenant	US$ 12.2	$280
Captain	US$ 13.2	$300

Table IV-5) Comparison of salaries of military officials in the Republic of Korea and North Korea

This level of defense expenditure is not enough for internal and external competitors.

Unable to deal with the security threat[458],) Rhee was hoping for a more definite security commitment from the United States. Lee, who had already asked Mucho in May 1949 to issue a statement agreeing to the withdrawal of the USFK[459,] made a [460]direct appeal to US President Truman, who had

[455])사사끼. 1977. pp. 147.

[456])박종효 편역,「1950 년 2 월 2 일 소련 외무성에서 소련 주재 북조선 대사관에 보낸 외교문서」,2010. pp.

[457] .

[458])이는 1949 년 5 월 4 일 송악산에서 발생한 전투에서 적나라하게 드러나고 있다. 당시 남, 북 간의 대대급 전투에서 남측은 대대장을 포함하여 39 명의 전사자를 냈는데, 이 전투에도 우익 청년단과 주민들이 전투 지원을 위해 투입되었다. 제 1 사단장 김석원은 전투 후에 남북교역금지법을 위반하고 북으로 송출된 명태 를 압수하고 이를 남대문 시장에 내다팔아 전투에 참여한 우익 청년단과 주민들에게 보수를 지급했다. 이 후 경무대에까지 보고되었던 이 사건은 국가가 최소한의 국방비마저 지불할 능력이 없자 이를 보다 못한 군 지휘관이 민간에게 손을 벌려 경비를 모금하지 않고 스스로 대안을 모색하려 했던 사건이었다.

[459])Oliver, 2002. pp. 314.

[460])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 5 월 9 일「이승만 대통령의 철군반대 여론선전에 대해 애치슨 미 국무장관이 무쵸 주한 미대사에게 지시한 대처방안」, pp. 1014.

asked him to issue a statement that he considered an attack on South Korea to be an attack on the United States.[461] At the time, however, the United States agreed to support South Korea, but it wanted to achieve maximum effect at the lowest possible cost in areas of non-primary strategic importance, such as the Korean Peninsula. Thus, Rhee's attempt to elevate U.S. military aid to the United States, which was supposed to be $11 million, to $200 million was too much to bear.

Thus, as we have seen, the Hyangbo or right-wing youth groups had no choice but to assist the military in its security work. For example, the Hwanghae branch of the Northwestern Youth League was in charge of patrolling the border with the police and arrested North Korean operatives who were being sent to the South.[462] In addition, these right-wing youth groups were involved in border defense and military intelligence work, assisting the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), an intelligence agency under the US military government, to collect military information on North Korea while operating mainly in the Ongjin Peninsula and Kaesong, which border the 38th parallel.[463][464] Furthermore, under the slogan of "Completely occupying the entire Ongjin county within 31 days and turning it into a liberated zone," they participated in the battle in which more than 2,000 North Korean soldiers invaded under the command of the North Korean puppet regime and played an active and important role by inflicting casualties equal to that of the ROK army

---

[461])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 8 월 20 일「이승만 대통령이 트루만 미국 대통령에게 군사원조를 요청한 서한」, pp. 1075-1076.

[462])이경남,『분단시대의 청년운동 상』, (서울: 삼성개발, 1989), pp. 140.

[463])정용욱,「해방직후 주한미군 방첩대의 조직 체계와 활동」,『서울말 연구』 제 53 집, (서울: 서울대학교,

[464]), pp. 455-456.

and the police.[465Paek] Sun-yup also recalled that Hill 292, Yu En Highland, and Pigeon Hill, which had been taken away by the North Korean army on May 4, 1949, were regained by mobilizing all the anti-communist youths.[466467] Eventually, the combat units of the Northwestern Youth Corps dispatched from Seoul operated together with the ROK Army to suppress the leftist rioters.(589) Nonetheless, as can be seen from Table IV-6), already in 1948

Since the South Korean army was lagging behind the North Korean army, Rhee tried to increase the number of South Korean troops in order to catch up, and as a result, the number of South Korean troops almost doubled in three years. In addition, in order to secure the necessary reserve troops in case of emergency, the Patriotic Army, which is a standing army, was established on November 20, 1948, and by 1949 the number of troops had increased to about 50,000 people,[468 and in] early January 1950, the Youth Defense Corps was established, consisting of 200,000 members, led by the Korean Youth League.

However, as mentioned above, the United States has As its strategic importance grew, it was decided to provide economic and military aid to South Korea on a larger scale than ever before, but since it could not commit its own military force, it had to survive without U.S. military protection.[469] At the same time, the United States suppressed economic aid as much as possible, citing the fact that Rhee Seung-man

---

[465])『평화일보』,1949 년 6 월 8 일「국군, 옹진지구 38 선 충돌에서 내습한 적 2,000 여 명 격퇴」.

[466])백선엽.2010. pp.75.

[467])『조선일보』,1949 년 4 월 26 일「거제도사건의 발생 원인과 국군의 전과」.

[468])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 14 일 평양 소련 대사관에서 뚠낀이 외무성에 보낸 암호전문」, pp. 331. : 박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서: 남조선군 실정」, pp. 338.

[469])National Security Council Report 61, January, 27, 1950, DNSA(Declassified National Security Archive), pp.1-6.

was trying to reunify the country by invading the North, fearing that the increase in military power would fuel the budget deficit and rising inflation and cause South Korea to follow in the footsteps of the Kuomintang government in mainland China.

In a March 15, 1949, Everett Drumright, acting U.S. Special Representative to Korea, sent a report to Etchson, in which Drumwright warned that Rhee was nominally calling for the expansion and improvement of the security forces, citing the possibility of a North Korean attack on South Korea and the possibility of a North Korean rebellion against the Soviet Union, but envisioning the absorption of North Korea into North Korea, a dangerous attitude.[470] In particular, the United States has imported Soviet-made airplanes since August 1949, with about 20

Compared to the North Korean army, which had about 40 planes flying near Pyongyang, the ROK Air Force, which was not prepared to set up a technical training center until February 1950[471], was regarded as a kind of fraud.[472]

In other words, the U.S. demanded that South Korea's attempts to build up its military capabilities be suppressed as much as possible and that the U.S. focus on economic reform so that the minimum amount of economic support from the United States would produce tangible results. The Truman administration feared that if South Korea's fiscal crisis continued, as it did in China, the U.S. efforts would prove ineffective, giving the Republican Party an excuse to attack.

---

[470])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 3 월 15 일「드럼라이트 주한미특별대표부 특사대리가 이승만 대통령의 미국에 대 한 군사원조요청과 관련하여 애치슨 국무장관에게 보내는 전문」, pp. 966.

[471])"서울신문"1950 년 1 월 14 일「김정렬 공군 총 참모장, 공군의 발전상황을 피력」.

[472])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 7 월 13 일〈무쵸 주한미대사가 본드 미 국무부 극동국 부국장에게 보낸 한국군 증 가문제에 대한 서한〉, pp. 1060-1061.

Accordingly, the proportion of national financial expenditures in 1949 was actually lower in 1950 than in 1948 when the Korean War broke out.

In comparison, North Korea has been active in the Soviet Union and China since 1949.

With the reinforcement of troops and weapons, the balance of power between the North and the South was disrupted, which led to the Korean War. The following table, which charts the military buildup between South Korea and North Korea in 1948-50, shows that the South Korean army was already in absolute inferiority to the North Korean army in 1950.

category		Sep. 1948	May 1949	September 1949	June 1950
South Korean Armed Forces	army	50,490 people	71,086 people		94,974 people
	navy	3,541 people	5,450 people	1,200 pass.	7,715 people
	marine corps			5,000 people	1,166 people
	air force				1,897 people
South Korean Army Totals		54,031 people	76,536 people	85,000 people	105,752 people
North Korean Armed Forces		77,000 people		97,000 people	198,360 people

Table IV-6) Buildup of Forces in North and South Korea (1948-1950)[595]

Kim Il-sung and Pak Hun-yong had already been saying that the North Korean military was stronger around March 1949.

(595) First, the South Korean military data referred to the following sources: FRUS 1949, June 27, 1949, "Memorandum from the U.S. Department of the Army to the State Department on the Possibility of an All-Out Attack on North Korea Following the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea from South Korea," pp. 1046-1057. ; Korean Ministry of National Defense Transcription Committee, ed. 1967, pp. 109. ; Next, we referred to the following data on the build-up of the North Korean military.

C. Pak Jong-hyo (ed.), 2010, "Code Message from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tum Kin, September 14, 1949," pp. 331-333. ; Jang Jun-ik, 『History of the North Korean People's Army』, (Seoul: Seomundang, 1991), pp. 134.

Therefore, I thought that the South Korean army was not scary. In addition, from about September 1949 onwards,[473474] the North Korean People's Army was considered superior to the South Korean National Defense Army in terms of weapons (tanks, artillery, planes), military equipment, discipline, political consciousness and morale compared to the South Korean army, which had very poor training of officers and did not systematically provide military education. However, he has not yet 1. Insufficient number and training of Air Force pilots, 2. Lack of naval vessels, 3. Due to reasons such as inexperience in handling large-caliber artillery and lack of ammunition, they realized that they could not start a war now because it would be disadvantageous to North Korea if the civil war was prolonged, and they asked the Soviet Union and China for assistance. [475] In 1950, the Soviet Union had signed an agreement with North Korea to provide weapons, ammunition, and munitions worth about 112 million rubles, and the Soviet ambassador to North Korea was requesting the Soviet government to provide two additional warships,

[473])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 3 월 5 일: 스딸린과 김일성을 단장으로 한 조선정부 대표단과의 회담」, pp.

[474] .

[475])박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 3 월 8 일 조선 주재 소련대사 쉬띄꼬프가 소련외상 븨쉰스끼에게 보낸 보 고서」,pp. 334.

one motorcycle regiment, and the weapons needed for the remnants of an infantry division.[476] On February 13, 1950, Kim Il-sung, through the Soviet ambassador to North Korea, requested the early delivery of a total of 146 types of automatic rifles, including 8,213 automatic rifles that the Soviet Union had agreed to provide.[477] On February 22, 1950, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea supported North Korea's request to send 22 Soviet naval advisers to supplement South Korea's inferior naval power, and requested that 54 Soviet advisers be dispatched, an increase of 32 from their request.[478] In addition, already participated in many battles with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang army in June 1949,

He had practical experience and was armed with U.S.-made and Chinese-made weapons[479)] about 2

When the Chinese Civil War ended in early January 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had transferred two divisions of Koreans serving in the Chinese People's Liberation Army to North Korea, and the Koreans serving in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) at that time were numbered at the level of 2 division commanders, 5 regiment commanders, 87 battalion commanders, 598 company commanders, 1,400 platoon commanders, and 1,900 noncommissioned officers.(603) The support of the trained elite cadre-level troops was enormous enough to upset the military balance between the North and the South in one fell swoop.

---

[476])박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 1 월 6 일 조선 주재 소련대사 쉬띄꼬프가 소련 외무성에 보낸 암호 전문」, pp. 390-391.

[477])박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 3 월 8 일 조선 주재 소련대사 쉬띄꼬프가 소련외상 븨쉰스끼에게 보낸 보 고서」, pp. 446-447.

[478])박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 3 월 8 일 조선 주재 소련대사 쉬띄꼬프가 소련외상 븨쉰스끼에게 보낸 보 고서」, pp. 444-445.

[479])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서: 13) 중국 인민해

Accordingly, by September 1949, the North Korean army had already begun to gain superiority over the South Korean army in terms of military discipline and equipment, so when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, South Korea had only the upper hand in naval power. The following table, which summarizes and analyzes the documents, shows the difference in the size and equipment of the troops of North and South Korea around September 1949.

	South Korean Defense Forces	North Korean People's Army
Infantry Division	7 (each division 9,000-10,000) Approx. 63,000-70,000	5 (only for each division) 50,000 people
Infantry Brigade	none	1 brigade, 6,000 men
Mechanized Troops	2 Tanks Usually	1 Brigade
cavalry	1 battalion	2 tank battalions, 1 artillery battalion
Independent Infantry Corps	5 Bags	2 artillery regiments
Artillery	1 division	2 artillery regiments
navy	57 ships (33 warships)	9 ships (3 small destroyers, 5 torpedo boats,

Arrival of the Korean Army in the Defense Army", pp. 343.

[602] Pak Jong-hyo (ed.), 2010, "Code Transcript No. 54611 from Soviet Military Representative in Beijing, China, May 18, 1949 to the Intelligence Department of the Soviet General Staff," pp. 322-323.

[603] Pak Jong-hyo (ed.), 2010, "Code Letter from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Shtykov in Pyongyang, January 8, 1950," pp. 390.

		1 dropship[480])
constabulary	60,000	42,000 (2 brigades: 38th parallel, 1 brigade: railway guard, 1 brigade: government security)
Tanks and armored vehicles	61 cars	144 cars (T-34 tanks: 87 units, 57 grenade armored personnel carriers)
aircraft	There are 40 planes, but only 3 can be used. (Training: 16, Practical: 24 cars)	75 cars (Fighters: 32, Ground Attack Aircraft: 24, Others: 19)

Table IV-7) Comparison of the size and armament of the North and the South in September 1949 (604)

U.S. officials who were already in South Korea at the time also believed that the ROK military needed American planes because the ROK military had a superior air force with more than 180 planes compared to the ROK

480)박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 14 일 평양 소련 대사관에서 뚠긴이 외무성에 보낸 암호전문」,중 331-335 쪽. ; 박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비보고서」,중 335-346 쪽.

Army, which had only 30[481] planes, although the ROK military had superiority in ground forces, and that the ROK military would lose its superiority in the ground forces in the event of a North Korean invasion.

Drumwright's request for military assistance from the U.S. in a reversal of his previous claims[482,] Mucho continued to emphasize to the U.S. government that additional aid was needed to preserve Korea's independence and freedom, and said, "Unfortunately, there is a great deal of tension between North Korea and South Korea.

In the event of a war, the $10 million stipulated by the U.S. government will not be enough."[483] As late as June 15, six days before the outbreak of the Korean War, Rhee also demanded that U.S. State Department adviser John Foster Dulles and Ambassador Mucho make clear U.S. security commitments to Korea, arguing that the Cold War would be lost if something was done.[484]) However, after his miraculous re-election, domestic public opinion calls for further cuts in defense spending.

It was difficult for the Truman administration to accept this and did not take active measures until the outbreak of war. On the contrary, despite the fact that World War II had just ended and the United States was in a state of oversupply of fighter jets, and the United States was delivering fighter jets to Argentina for only one month, the U.S. government feared that the supply of fighter jets to the ROK would upset the balance of power on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, the U.S. set the role of the ROK military as a security maintenance unit, and refused to hand over

---

[481])『서울신문』,1950 년 6 월 1 일「무쵸 주한 미국대사, 미국은 한국에 전투기 제공을 고려하고 있다고 언 급」.

[482])FRUS 1950, 1950 년 4 월 20 일「드럼라이트 주한미국대리대사, 군사원조의 빠른 증강을 촉구하는 서한 을 발송」, pp. 46-47.

[483])도널드 스턴 맥도널드(Donald Stone MacDonald). 2001, pp. 152.

[484])FRUS 1950, 1950 년 6 월 19 일「이승만 대통령과 덜레스 미 국무부 고문의 회담에 대한 앨리슨 동북아 시아국장의 비망록」, pp. 107-109.

the 30 light bombers it had in its possession to the ROK military at the time of the withdrawal of the USFK. Disassembled them into scrap metal and sold them. It was not even possible to purchase domestically produced fighter jets. Accordingly, Kim Jong Il, the first Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Air Force, which was born on October 1, 1949, recalled that he was able to raise 10 training planes from Canada around May 14, 1950 by promoting the patriotic flag dedication campaign as a unique measure.[485)]

On the other hand, in the midst of such an absolute military inferiority, the ROK military was also gradually departing from its initial tendency to maximize its ideological resources in the process of nation-building by taking advantage of the social division that wanted to inherit the legacy of the provisional government as a security crisis developed into a de facto civil war due to rebellion and partisan activities within the military.

First of all, in the early days of the establishment of the Armed Forces, personnel from the Provisional Government and the Liberation Army There was a prevailing social atmosphere that it should be the center. Establishment of the South Korean government

As this was confirmed, the U.S. military government expanded the military system of the Provisional Government, headed by Yu Tong-yeol, a former deputy general of the Provisional Government, and appointed Brigadier General Song Ho-sung from the Provisional Government as the commander of the 1st Brigade among the troops consisting of a total of 3 brigades due to command and control reasons, and controlled the 3rd Brigade Commander, Colonel Lee Eung-jun, who was from the Japanese Army, and Colonel Won Yong-deok, the 2nd Brigade Commander from

485)김정렬. 『항공의 경종: 김정렬 회고록』,(서울: 대희, 2010). pp. 118-119.

the Manchurian Army.[486] In addition, following the withdrawal of the USFK, the Korean Guard was increased from 25,000 on March 10, 1948 to 50,000, and the 5th brigade commander of the two brigades that were added from April 29, 1948 was appointed by Colonel Kim Sang-kyum from the Provisional Government. On the other hand, the Navy also has 3,000 men and 105 ships from the Coast Guard.

Son Won-il, a former member of the Provisional Government, begins the establishment of the army. After graduating from the Department of Navigation at Central University of China in 1930, Son Won-il passed the Foreign Athletics Examination of the Chinese Navy and worked for the U.S. Merchant Marine Company in Hamburg, where he had been in the Shanghai Coast Guard for 33 years. After the liberation, Son Won-il, who returned to Korea and was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Coast Guard, the predecessor of the Navy, in 1946 and was promoted to Chief of Naval Staff in August 1947, led the establishment and reinforcement of the Navy.[487] In addition, prior to the establishment of the government, the cadres of youth organizations such as the Northwestern Youth Association and the Daedong Youth League were putting pressure on the political circles by demanding that the complete disbandment of the Korean National Defense Guard be promoted as a precondition for the reorganization of the Armed Forces, taking issue with the theory of the Liberation Army and the leftist elements within the military. The newly formed ROK Armed Forces also appointed Lee Beom-seok to the position of Minister of National Defense, the highest military leadership of the armed forces, and the Vice Minister of National Defense and the

[486])이미 전술했듯이 이 두 사람은 임시정부 출신 인사들과 밀접한 관계를 맺고 있었고 해방 직후에는 자신 들의 경력을 부끄러워 하며 기회가 있을 때 마다 임시정부와 광복군 출신의 인사들이 국군의 중심이 되 어야 한다고 강조하고 있었다.

[487])사사끼. 1977. pp. 534.

Commander-in-Chief of the Army Choi Yong-deok and Song Ho-sung from the Korean Liberation Army were appointed to command Chae Byung-duk, Chief of Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, and Lee Eung-jun, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Utmost efforts were made to ensure that orthodoxy could exert its practical power. In addition, at the beginning of the First Republic, the first defense minister and former Korean Liberation Army soldier Lee Beom-seok

Since the general declared that he would "inherit the fighting spirit of the Liberation Army in fostering the Korean Armed Forces," Lieutenant Colonel Choi Deok-shin, a former member of the Korean Liberation Army, was appointed as the 6th Principal of the Korean Army Academy, which was officially established on July 29, 1948. Since then, the 7th Principal (January 15, 1949 – June 10, 1950), General Kim Hong-il → the 8th Principal (June 10, 1950 – July 8, 1950), General Lee Jun-sik → the 9th Principal (October 30, 1951 – November 10, 1952) and General Ahn Chun-saeng have all been appointed from the Korean Liberation Army.[488]At the same time, the Korean Liberation Army, which had not enlisted in the National Army due to the delay in returning to Korea and the Korean Liberation Army, put forward the justification that the Korean Army should be organized as the parent body, and the remaining unenlisted Liberation Army soldiers who had not joined the National Guard and were still waiting for the establishment of the Korean Army outside the system were commissioned as specialties of the 7th and 8th Army Divisions or were specially commissioned to include the Kwangbok soldiers as much as possible. For example, the Ministry of National Defense has hired nine people with military experience as part of the expansion of the senior officer corps in the Armed Forces, and despite

[488])한용원,「남북한 군대 창설과정 비교」, 이철순 편, 2010. pp. 170-172.

the absolute lack of numbers, Lee Joon-sik, Four former members of the Liberation Army, including Oh Kwang-sung and Ahn Chun-saeng, were appointed as mid-level military officers at the rank of major and colonel[489].

According to an article at the time, President Rhee Seung-man proposed the creation of South Korea's National Defense Force.

To the extent that MacArthur officially denied the P'yongyang television report that he had sent a special military mission that included 78 Japanese officers, it was a very sensitive issue for those with Japanese military experience or elements of the Japanese military.[490] Accordingly, in the early days of the establishment of the ROK Army, when deciding on the five brigadier generals, the highest rank in the military, despite their absolute numerical inferiority, they tried to make considerable arrangements, including two from the Kwangbok Army, two from the Japanese army, and one from the Provisional Government. In particular, at the inauguration ceremony of these five generals, Kim Hong-il, a former member of the Liberation Army, consciously tried to present themselves as former members of the Liberation Army, such as reading aloud an oath of allegiance to the country and the president on behalf of the five generals.[491]

Nonetheless, as a national security crisis arose, at the end of 1947 Former Japanese soldiers in their 50s and 60s, who had been self-serving because of their military history during the Japanese colonial era,

---

489)『평화일보』, 1948 년 12 월 23 일「국방부, 이준식, 김석원 등 군사경력 9 명을 고급장교로 기용」.

490)『자유신문』,1948 년 9 월 12 일「이승만 대통령, 일본군 장교 78 명을 초빙했다는 평양방송 보도를 부 인」.

491)준장 5 명의 명단과 그들의 출신은 다음과 같다. 광복군 출신 3 명: 김홍일, 송호성, 손원일, 일본군 출신: 채병덕, 이응준. 그런데, 전술한 것처럼 이응준은 유동렬이 친 혈육 처럼 여기는 사이었고 일본군 출신

joined the army along with those who had served in the Chinese army who were returning home at the time. From 1948, they were deployed on the front lines of Jeju Island, Yeosu, Suncheon, and Ongjin districts to work hard to save the new Republic of Korea.

First of all, in 1947, he was a member of the 26th Japanese Army Corps and served as a lieutenant colonel.

In August 1948, Kim Seok-won, a member of the 27th Japanese Army, who had been refusing to enlist in the army, was enlisted in the army in recognition of his ability to repel the attack of one division of the Chinese army with only two companies.

At the same time, Yoo Jae-heung's father, Yoo Seung-ryeol, who had served as a colonel in the 26th Army of the Japanese Army immediately after the end of World War II, also joined the army. Following them, Shin Tae-young, a former lieutenant colonel from the 26th Japanese Army who witnessed the incident in Yeosu and Suncheon, joined the army as a colonel in November 1948. In December 1948, Lee Hyung-seok, a former lieutenant colonel in the Japanese army who served as the head of the Jeju Island Police Department, was appointed. In 1949, Kim Jun-won, a member of the 26th Japanese Army Corps, enlisted in the army at the age of 60 due to the encouragement of those around him. Finally, at the end of June 1949, Lee Chong-chan, who had been promoted as a major in the 49th Army of the Japanese Army, but had refused to join the army while awaiting punishment for his own punishment because of his military strength, enlisted in the army, and almost all of the former Japanese soldiers who could be deployed were mobilized.

In addition, these former Japanese soldiers, who were reluctant to join the military during the US military administration, began with Song Yo-chan and Yoo Jae-heung, who were deployed to resolve the Jeju 4.3 Incident that occurred on April 3, 1948, and showed results based on

their abundant experience in the field, and the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents that occurred in October.

Chae Byung-duk, who hated the Japanese even though he was a slave, had a close relationship with the nationalists before and after the liberation. In the end, it can be seen that nationalist ideological resources were considered as the top priority in the recruitment of former Japanese military generals. Peace Ilbo, December 23, 1948, "Kim Hong-il and five other generals were crowned."

Kim Baek-il, a former Japanese soldier who had a hum, appeared as a firefighter in the South Korean army, and became active on the front line in earnest. In other words, the veterans of the Japanese main army in their 50s and 60s, who joined the army to solve the biggest national crisis that intensified starting with the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, together with young officers in their 20s and 30s, such as Chung Il-kwon, Baek Sun-yup, and Gong Kuk-jin, suppressed the internal rebellion and stabilized the country in a short time. On the other hand, as mentioned above, in July 1947, the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved.

The U.S. military government, whose main goal was to withdraw from the Korean peninsula as soon as possible through negotiations with the Soviet Union, did not take into account the ideology of the officers when it established the National Defense Guard and the Military English School in 1946. However, at the center of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents and the Jeju 4.3 incident, which occurred immediately after the inauguration of the government, a large number of military officers with communist ideology became involved. In fact, the leftist forces within the military constantly revolted as follows, and they joined forces with the leftist partisans who had fled to the mountains to wage an armed struggle inside South Korea and threaten the new Republic of Korea.

The main rebellions by leftist forces within the military were as follows: First, in 1948

On October 20, 1948, the troops that were scheduled to be dispatched to resolve the Jeju 4.3 incident caused the Yeosun and Suncheon incidents, and about 700 soldiers who had participated in the rebellion entered Jirisan with about 1,300 civilians and engaged in guerrilla warfare. Next, soldiers of the 6th Regiment revolted in the Daegu area on November 2, 1948, and two more rebellions took place in the Daegu area until January 30, 1949.[492] Thus, between 1948 and 1949, the military undertook a large-scale purge, carrying out a large-scale purge of ideologically important persons from the military.[493] Prior to the Korean War, the purge was carried out four times, and a total of 1,327 people were dealt with under the National Security Law.[494] In addition, about 10 percent of the graduates of the military English school, which was established by the U.S. military government, were found to have a tendency to sympathize with communism.

In this way, as the social atmosphere became more important for national security, the members of the Liberation Army were divided among themselves, which dealt a heavy blow to the orthodoxy of the Liberation Army. In other words, Prime Minister Yi Beom-seok, who was from Gwangbok County, claimed that Oh Dong-dong, an officer from the Korean Independence Party, had caused the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents for the purpose of promoting Kim Koo, and Oh Dong-dong, who was dispatched to Yeosu, also discovered that Song Ho-sung, who had supported him, was committing corruption through his relatives, resulting

[492])강만길, 2011. pp. 282-283.

[493])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비보고서: 남조선군 실정」,pp. 339.

[494])국군보안사령부,『대공 30 년사』, (서울: 국방부, 1978), pp. 172.

in the shrinking of the Liberation Army's participation in the military, which was a numerically minority group. In other words, as the division between the North and the South began in earnest, the ideology of the former Liberation Army members, who had not adapted to this reality and were still following the Sammyunism, which emphasizes cooperation between the left and the right based on nationalism, came under suspicion.

First, Song Ho-sung, a former anarchist and former commander of the Liberation Army,

Immediately after the establishment of the government, he was publicly scolded by Yi Beom-suk for his remarks that ideological differences were not important at all in the task of nation-building, and his opposition to the dispatch of troops in 1948 when discussing the dispatch of troops to Jeju Island in order to suppress the 4.3 incident at an early stage, saying, "There should be no conflict between our own people[495]." In addition, according to Sasaki, Song Ho-sung undermined the nationalist cause by indulging in making money by using his position as a Chinese military officer habitually did. In other words, Song Ho-sung considered the practice of not having to work as a division commander for only three months to make a living for the rest of his life, as a reward for his lifelong service to the independence movement, and designated his relatives as suppliers of corrosion to take profits. However, this corruption was discovered when Oh Dong-dong, who had been dissuaded from resigning by Song Ho-sung, showed the courage to report it as soon as he was dispatched to Yeosu. To make matters worse, Song Ho-sung's incompetence was exposed through the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, and he was relegated to the position of adviser to the Youth Defense

[495])유재흥.1994. pp.88.

Corps, moving away from the center of military power.[496] Beginning with the fall of Song Ho-seong, the phenomenon began to disappear without any of the former members of the Liberation Army, who might have been at the center of the military's legitimacy if there had been no war, without being able to override the group from the Japanese military that had emerged as a central force after the Korean War, and without anyone becoming the chief of staff.[497)]

In other words, with the presence of internal partisans and the external North Korean army that threatened the survival of the new Republic of Korea, the most important virtue for a soldier began to be the ability to perceive security rather than the ideological resources of nationalist legitimacy. As the country plunged into a de facto state of civil war and the extreme situation of military operations and wars unfolded, the experience and tactics learned in Japan, Manchuria, and China became useless, and it became important to be able to adapt well to the newly developed situation, gain trust, and carry out integrated operations.[498] However, as we have already seen in the case of Song Ho-sung and Kim Sang-kyum, the commanders of the armed forces from the Provisional Government, who were old and did not have sufficient field experience, showed their lack of competence from the very beginning of the establishment of the government. And among those who showed their abilities in the Japanese military, there were more and more major generals in their 20s and 30s who were able to harmonize with the U.S. military and quickly acquire their military skills rather than those in their 50s and 60s.

---

[496])사사끼. 1977. pp.312-316.
[497])핸더슨. 2000. pp. 485.
[498])사사끼. 1977. pp. 23-24.

The members of the armed forces can be broadly divided into those who were trained at the Tokyo Military Academy and the Manchurian Military Academy, which are Japanese officer training institutions, academic officers from universities, small groups of officers and noncommissioned officers who used the 1938 Special Volunteer Corps system, and those who served as enlisted men in the National Defense Guard and were promoted to cadres from late 1946 to 1948 after being drafted into the Japanese army,[499] and those who served in the local army of China or the Korean Liberation Army.

The most powerful group of these were those who had been trained at the Tokyo Military Academy and the Manchurian Military Academy, as well as university officers, for the following reasons. First, while there were more than 390,000 Koreans who served in the Japanese army, only 35,000 were from the Kwangbok Army, including the Korean Red Army soldiers who escaped from the Japanese Army. Second, there were many soldiers from the Japanese army who graduated from regular military academies and experienced modern warfare, but those from the Liberation Army came from a variety of backgrounds and served in the Chinese army. It was natural that a large number of agents were selected, and thirdly, because the Liberation Army maintained its position that it would not participate in the Guards unless the legitimacy of the Liberation Army as the mainstream was guaranteed, and because the

[499])한편, 이들 중 강제적으로 일본 제국주의에 의해 동원된 일본 학병 출신자들을 일본군 경험자라고 하여 친일세력으로 매도하여 출발부터 창군이 일본군 계열에 의해 주도되었다고 보기는 어렵다. 이른바 지원병 을 제외하더라도 학병의 경우에는 나중에 광복군의 일원으로 귀국한 경우도 적지 않았기 때문에 이들을 단순히 일본군 복무 경험이 있다는 이유만으로 비판하기는 어렵기 때문이다. 군사영어 학교 출신 중 일본 학병의 비율은 61.8%에 달하며, 이 수치는 자발적 일본군 경험 체험자라고 분류할 수 있는 일본육사, 만 주군, 일본지원병 출신을 모두 합친 36.4%에 비해 월등히 많은 숫자이다. 또, 이들 중 대장 진급자는 4 명이, 중장은 12 명이 배출되어 가장 많은 높은 승진률을 기록하고 있었다.

main force of the Liberation Army was staying on Chinese soil until June 1946[500], the enlistment of the Liberation Army was very late.
It was because it had come true.[501]

As a result, the South Korean Defence and Security Force's cadres are numerically superior.

A large number of former Japanese soldiers were recruited, and the U.S. military advisers favored them. After the establishment of the First Republic, in order to suppress internal rebellions and to survive as a modern state by monopolizing the violence of the state, the top command of the military, which had been occupied by former members of the Liberation Army, was gradually taken over by those former members of the Japanese army. Among those who had military experience before liberation, 226 from the Japanese Army (26 from the Japanese Army, 95 from the Japanese Army, and 105 from the Japanese Army) accounted for the largest distribution compared to the 44 from the Democratic Army and 32 from the Liberation Army.

However, as we have already seen, even after the outbreak of the Korean War, the nationalist cause and the position of attaching importance to the legitimacy of the Liberation Army dominated society, so it was only after the Korean War that these former Japanese soldiers came to the forefront of the military. In other words, as mentioned above, the Minister of National Defense, Yi Beom-seok, enlisted members of the right-wing youth organization until 1949 and made them the central

---

[500])당시 장개석은 광복군을 다가올 중공군과의 내전에 동원하여 활용하고자 하는 의도를 가지고 있었고 이 에 김구 역시 동의했었다. 따라서, 총사령관 이청천 역시 일군의 무장해제 완료 시 인도될 무기와 한적 장병의 완전한 편입을 기대하며 1946 년 까지 중국에서 대기하고 있었다. 『중앙신문』,1945 년 11 월 30 일 「이청천, 장개석의 원조 하에 광복군을 개편, 훈련할 계획」.

[501])한용원,「남북한의 창군: 미. 소의 역할을 중심으로」, 한배호 편, 2008. pp. 194-195.

force of the military[502, and] he was succeeded by Shin Shin-mo, who was also from the Provisional Government, who was appointed Minister of National Defense, and took control of the military in conflict with the elders of the Japanese army. In addition, If former Japanese military personnel such as Chung Il-kwon, Kim Baek-il, and Principality Jin were mainly used to exterminate the communist partisans in the Jirisan area, the two main axis, the Taebaeksan area, was assigned as the combat commander of the Taebaeksan area, and Lee Seong-ga, a graduate of the Central Army Military Academy of the Chinese Republic of China, was used to dilute and balance the antipathy that only former Japanese soldiers were being used.

At the same time, in clashes between former Japanese soldiers, seniors and juniors during the Japanese colonial period

His relationship with the nationalists was much more important than his seniority. At that time, the person with the highest age and rank among the Japanese soldiers, except for Lee Eung-jun, was Kim Seok-won, a 56-year-old colonel in 1948 who had more than 100 combat experiences during the Pacific War since the Japanese invasion of mainland China. However, due to his indiscretions, he joined the army late, and he was commanded by Chae Byung-duk, who was 20 years younger than him as a junior in the 22nd class of the Japanese Military Academy, and when they clashed due to disagreements, he won the favor of the nationalists, including Lee Beom-seok, instead of Kim Seok-won, who had the ability and authority as a senior president but had flaws in terms of nationalism. Byung-deok[503)] led to the victory.

---

[502])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서: 4) 남조선군실 정」, pp. 338.

[503])김정렬.『항공의 경종: 김정렬 회고록』,(서울: 대희, 2010). pp.97-98.

This continued immediately after the Korean War, as can be seen from the following incidents. In other words, when Kim Hong-il died in an airplane accident during the Korean War, Defense Minister Shin Sung-mo, a former member of the provisional government, read the eulogy at the funeral and publicly insulted the veterans of the Japanese and Manchurian armies, such as Lee Eung-jun, Kim Seok-won, Shin Tae-young, and Won Yong-deok, saying, "If these old men had commanded our army, we would have already entered the sea off Busan."

All of them.[504] However, at that time, the former Japanese soldiers did not even respond appropriately to this except by sending letters to express their indignation.

On the other hand, he was educated in the Western style of the Navy from the Provisional Government, and his ability

In fact, the navy headed by Son Won-il was the number one contributor to the suppression of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents despite its poor equipment, and the Marine Corps, which was established on April 15, 1949, also showed outstanding fighting ability that surpassed that of the army, and greatly contributed to the establishment of a stable public power by monopolizing physical violence in a situation where security became the top priority.

3. Finance and Tax Organizations

The National Finance Organization of the First Republic, which was established with the establishment of the Government on August 15,

[504])이응준. 『회고 90 년: 이응준 자서전』,(서울: 산운 기념사업회,1982). pp. 297-298.

1948, consisted of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning, and the Temporary Foreign Investment Management Agency under the direct control of the President and the Prime Minister, and within the Ministry of Finance were the Disasters Bureau, the Tax Bureau, the Accounting Bureau, the Customs Bureau, and the Monopoly Bureau. When the National Assembly deliberates and decides on the budget proposals submitted by these agencies, and the settlement of accounts for the transparent execution of state budget expenditures is[505] carried out under the supervision of the Secretariat of Inquiry, the National Assembly reviews them again, formally establishing the framework of a modern state. By the way, As can be seen from the existence of the Provisional Foreign Capitalization Administration, even after the establishment of the First Republic, the country still relied on economic aid from the United States for a large part of its finances, and it also inherited the pattern of economic instability caused by the US military administration.

In conclusion, the First Republic had been inaugurated, but the bourgeoisie had not yet been developed to bear the burden of taxation, and the tax rate was extremely sluggish, leading to large expenditures, fiscal deficits, and high inflation rates. To make matters worse, as mentioned above, the administration was not carried out properly due to the large-scale movement of civil servants in the absence of a proper transfer of administrative authority from the US military administration, and since October 1948, the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, the Jeju 4.3 incident, and the appearance of partisans have brought the country into a state of de facto war, and large-scale defense expenditures were inevitable to recover from this.

---

[505])심계원은 국가 수입과 지출의 결산, 검사를 임무로 하고 있었으므로 특히 세금 등의 재원조달이 어렵고 투명한 예산 집행이 필수적이었던 신생 국가에게는 매우 중요한 기관이었다.

Appropriations					Three-mouthed				
category	1948		1949		category	1948		1949	
	amount	%	amount	%		amount	%	amount	%
Administrative Expenses	2.12	6.8	3.44	4.4					
Judicial Landscape Chalvi	4.45	14.2	12.20	15.7					
Defense Expenditures	8.09	25.9	23.95	30.9	tax	5.5	17.8	13.6	14.9
Education	2.74	8.8	7.33	9.5	Income from taxes	0.5	1.5	0.9	1.0
Social Bulletin Gunbee	1.52	4.9	2.50	3.2	Income from official business	12.6	40.8	0.5	0.7
Industrial Economics Measures	4.31	13.8	13.78	17.8	Miscellaneous mouth	1.8	6.0	2.4	2.5
Fat Scope Aid	1.88	6.0	4.41	5.7	Aid Funding			0.2	0.2
Public Affairs UPS	1.76	5.5	4.31	5.6	Borrowing gold	9.9	32.0	45.1	49.5
Debt guitar			3.25	4.2	national debt gold			9.0	10.0
Other Accounts	3.72	11.9			Special	0.6	1.9	19.4	21.2

Transference					Accounting transfer				
system	31.30	100	77.59	100	system	30.8	100	91.1	100

Table IV-8) General Account Revenues for 1948-49 (Unit of KRW billion, each fiscal year period is April to March of the following year)[506)]

Table IV-8) shows that tax revenues were still sluggish because the economic environment of the US military regime continued as it was, and there was still no capitalist class to bear the burden. This is because the US military government, which wanted to withdraw its troops from the Korean peninsula as soon as possible through a compromise with the Soviet Union, did not actively disallow the accumulated assets, which accounted for 90 percent of the country's assets. As early as January 1949, it had been pointed out that the key to industrial revival was the prompt resolution of the accumulated assets[507508, and] Rhee Seung-man also personally instructed the government in March 1949 to promptly sell the imputed properties that were not subject to nationalization even before the bill on the disposal of imputed properties was passed by the National Assembly[509510, but since this was not dealt with] until March 1950, a

[506])국사편찬위원회,『실록 대한민국사 자료집: 한국경제 정책자료 1(1948.8-1949.12)』,2010, pp. 691.

[507])「시정월보 창간호」, 1949 년 1 월 5 일,『실록 대한민국사 자료집: 한국경제 정책자료 1(

[508] .8-1949.12)』,2010. pp. 36.

[509])『자유신문』,1949 년 3 월 26 일「이승만 대통령, 귀속재산 처리법안의 국회통과 이전에도 국유화 대상 이 외에는 귀속재산을 매각토록 지시」,국사편찬위원회,『실록 대한민국사 자료집: 한국경제 정책자료

[510] (1948.8-1949.12)』, 2010. pp. 220.

capitalist class capable of paying taxes was not formed.[511] In the end, as it did during the US military administration, it was inevitable that it would appear as a result of expenditures, the middle of the budget deficit, and the prevalence of inflation. Therefore, in order to solve this problem, it was necessary to inject state funds in the same way as during the US military administration, and the weak state prevented this, but the problem was solved by the increase in US economic aid to Korea.

At the same time, however, he equated the situation in Korea with the communism of mainland China.

The U.S., fearing a growing budget deficit and widespread inflation, has made it clear that there will be no aid without reforms. In fact, the formation of the budget deficit was inevitable in many respects at a time when the country was in a de facto state of war, when defense expenditures were rapidly increasing and the organization of the civil service had to be expanded in order to infiltrate the administrative power of the modern state. President Xi and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and the ECA (Economic Cooperation

Citing a joint report issued by the Ministry of Finance, it is pointed out that in 1948, the amount of donations received by various institutions and quasi-governmental organizations was 22.5 billion won, which was several times the amount of tax revenue at that time.[512)] This is due to the absence of a capitalist class that can increase the taxes needed by the state.

It can be said that the state, which had been solving everything, was unable to infiltrate the administrative power sufficiently and raise the

[511])홍진기,「귀속재산에 대한 법적 과제-귀속성의 불식의 시급성,」,『신천지』 제 5 권, 제 3 호(1950 년 3 월), pp. 22-29, 국사편찬위원회,『실록 대한민국사 자료집 2: 한국경제 정책자료 2: (1950.1-1950.6)』, 2010. pp. 380-387.

[512])서주석, 2008. pp. 264.

necessary funds for the operation of the state due to the lack of administrative power and budget due to the inability to expand the number of civil servants. However, the U.S. ignored this and demanded only fiscal balance and economic stability from the South Korean government in exchange for aid. Fortunately, Yi Soon-tak, the director of the Planning Department, was able to continue to provide economic aid from the United States by using his ingenuity to create a surplus budget through the formation of a special account, but this could not be a fundamental solution.

Accordingly, at the same time as the establishment of the government, the government, which had been preparing an independent tariff policy by reforming the customs administration and system that had been in use since the Japanese period,[513] established the Statistics Bureau of the Public Information Service to reform the tax system and actively capture tax sources, and to[514][515] implement various major policies necessary for the national census by identifying the population, resources, and industrial facilities of the whole country.(637) However, this alone was not enough to solve the fundamental problem, so much so that a third of the civil service was cut.638)

In this way, the fiscal and economic policies of the early Republic of Korea were also the beginning of the Cold War.

---

[513])김태명, 조성제,「우리나라 관세정책, 제도의 변천 및 향후 과제」,『경영사학』,Vol.47, (서울: 한국경영 사학회, 2008), pp. 157-161.

[514])재무부 차관 김유택은 100 억 정도의 조세수입에 머무르는 이유를 담세부족이 아닌 일반 국민의 납세의 식 빈약과 당국자의 세원 포착이 불충분한 것으로 보고 있는데, 이 경우에도 국가의 인적자원이 부족해서 행정력이 미치지 못했음을 유추해 볼 수 있다. “자유신문”1950 년 5 월 17 일「김유택 재무부 차관, 1950 년 도 예산관리 방법 언명」, 국사편찬위원회,『실록 대한민국사 자료집 2: 한국경제 정책자료 2:

[515] .1-1950.6』, 2010. pp. 609.

It can only be understood when considering both the international political context in which U.S. aid to Korea could have increased with the opening up, and the difficulty of building a modern state in a new Third World country. Even after the establishment of the ROK government on August 15, 1948, the U.S. government, which had not changed its policy of withdrawing U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula with minimal economic assistance, established the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) as a new agency to establish a plan for assistance to Korea as the U.S. military occupation ended, and Truman instructed Secretary of State Marshall on August 25, 1948, to transfer the economic assistance plan to Korea to the Office of Economic Cooperation (ECA) on January 1, 1949, and to conclude a related agreement with the Korean government.

All of them.[639] From January 1949 to June 1951, $201,867,000 in aid was provided to Korea under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).[640] However, after 1947, when the communization of mainland China became certain, Asia

Korea's strategic importance as an outpost against communism gradually grew. Accordingly, in early September 1948, Saltzman, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Territories, pointed out that it was in the interest of the United States to provide a total of $130 million in free aid over a three-year period to prevent the overthrow of Korea by communist elements. In particular, the US State Department's stance that it was uncertain whether the ROK government would be able to continue surviving due to the unconventional long-term free aid was very encouraging compared to the US State Department's attitude in the previous phase, considering the ROK as a kind of anti-air support and insisting that aid was inevitable.

[637] Official Gazette No. 3, September 13, 1948, "Presidential Decree No. 3 on the Transfer of Administration, Matters Concerning the Takeover of the Transitional Government of South Korea."

[638] Seoul Shinmun, April 2, 1950, "Government Cuts 300 Civil Servants to Correct Deficit Finance," National History Compilation Committee, Memoirs of Korean History 2: Korean Economic Policy Data 2: 1950.1-1950.6, 2010. pp. 380-387.

639)FRUS 1948, August 25, 1948, "U.S. President Truman Directs Administrative Adjustment for Continuation of Economic Aid to Korea," pp. 1288~1289.

640) Hong, Sungyu, 1962. pp. 94.

In conclusion, the U.S. government has decided to focus on the ideological and political effects of economic aid to South Korea rather than the economic effects.[516] Of course, there were proviso that the U.S. government had no obligation to provide continued aid and that it could cut off aid at any time if the South Korean government violated the agreement.[517] In fact, from 1945 to 1949, South Korea was the largest recipient of aid among Southeast Asian countries, receiving $25.57 million, or 28.8 percent, while the U.S. provided only 8.7 percent of the total foreign economic aid to Southeast Asia.[518][519] The reason why South Korea received the most aid among Southeast Asian countries was also the communization of China in 1949, and the amount of U.S. foreign economic aid to South Korea was not that large until the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved in July 1947. In fact, the following table shows that U.S. foreign aid has more than tripled since 1947.

GARIOA	OFLC

[516])FRUS 1948, 1948 년 9 월 7 일「미국 국무부 점령지역 차관보 살쯔만의 대한경제원조 정책안에 대한 비 망록」, pp. 1292~1298.

[517])FRUS 1948, 1948 년 10 월 1 일「미국 경제협조처장 호프만, 한국경제원조계획의 의회제출계획을 밝 힘」, pp. 1312~1313.

[518])국회도서관 입법조사국, 1964. pp. 150, pp. 156.

[519]) 이대근,『한국전쟁과 1950 년대 자본축적』, (서울: 까치, 1987), pp. 140.

1945	1946	1947	1948	1947
4,934 thousand dollars	49,496 thousand dollars	175,371 thousand dollars	179,592 A Thousand Dollars	24,528 thousand dollars

Table IV-9) Receipt of Periodic Aid to the U.S. Armed Forces (644)

Therefore, as Korea's strategic importance as an anti-air base increases, The surge in U.S. economic aid to the Republic of Korea and the preparation of a long-term reconstruction plan was very encouraging for the ROK government. However, in the negotiations between the ROK and the United States, which began on October 4, 1948, a disagreement arose between the ROK and the United States over the handling of foreign exchange and the establishment of a rationing mechanism, which disrupted the schedule for the transfer of work to the Office of Economic Cooperation (ECA), which was scheduled for January 1, 1949.645 The U.S. Ambassador Mucho asked Rhee to persuade the people and the National Assembly of the need for foreign aid by appealing to the people and the National Assembly through a radio broadcast.[646] In fact, the presence of U.S. economic advisers on the premise of economic aid is one of the interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea, and that if the U.S. interferes in politics and exploits the country with the logic of capitalism, it may become a colony of the U.S. rather than a colony of the U.S., and it may become another treaty for the protection of the U.S. If it is exploited by the logic of capitalism, it will be reduced to a colony rather than a colony of the United States. Accordingly, Treasury Minister Kim Do-yeon said that the spirit of the Constitution, which stipulates a

controlled economy as the purpose of U.S. economic aid for the recovery of the Korean economy, is also They replied that they emphasized control and fiscal balance through trade, and since the lawmakers were not unaware of the urgent need for economic aid due to the lack of material and economic resources, they agreed to the aid agreement with 109 votes against, 84 in favor and 0 against.(647) Accordingly, on 17 January 1949, the Finance and Tax Authority under the Prime Minister.

---

645)『RG 59, SD Decimal File, 895』, 50 RECOVERY/12-1148, Enclosure No.4 dated Despatch no.
110. dated December 11, 1948, from American Mission in Korea, Seoul, National Archives(NARA)II,「Transmittal of Agreement on Aid Between the United States and the Republic of Korea 1948. 12. 11」. Korean History Archives 18: Documents of Political Advisers of the USFK
I (Aug. 1945-Feb. 1946), (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee, 1994).

646)『RG 59, SD Decimal File, 895』, 50 RECOVERY/11-148, National Archives(NARA)II,「Transmittal of radio address on Aid Agreement, delivered by Foreign Minister, 1948. 10. 30」.
Korean History Sourcebook 18: Political Advisers of the USFK Document I (1945.8-1946.2), (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee, 1994).

[647] "Shorthand Theory of the 1st Plenary Session of the 1st National Assembly 127th National Assembly", 『Memoirs of Korean History: Korean Economic Policy Data 1(1948.8-1949.12)』, 2010. pp. 95-106.

The Office of Overseas Financing was established to oversee all affairs related to U.S. aid to Korea, and the Office of Economic Cooperation was established to efficiently operate and supervise U.S. aid in Korea. However, in order to control the ROK Government's aid plans and imports and exports, the U.S. Government has the absolute authority to intervene not only in Korea's financial policy but also in all economic policies, including industrial policy, by agreeing with the ROK Government to make all foreign exchange of Korea, including aid funds, through

consultation and agreement with the U.S. aid cannons.[(648)] The ECA (Office of Economic Cooperation) support program began on July 1, 1949. Aid began and continued until June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War.

However, the Truman administration, which focused on the economic recovery of Japan and Europe, reduced the ECA (Economic Cooperation Agency) proposal from $200 million to $150 million. It was again delayed when Republican lawmakers, who had seen the failure of the Truman administration's China policy, refused to approve it in Congress on June 7, 1949, and finally settled on $120 million in February 1950.

item	FY 1950	ratio
1. Groceries	$119,000	0.1%
2. Fertilizers and agricultural supplies	32, $851,000	27.4%
3. Petroleum products	$7,862,000	6.6%
4. Medical Supplies	$226,000	0.2%
5. Raw materials and semi-finished products	$27,702,000	23.1%
6. Industrial Facilities & Supplies	$3,973,900	3.3%

648)『RG 59, SD Decimal File, 895』, 50 RECOVERY/12-1148, Enclosure No.3 to Despatch no. 110. dated December 11, 1948, from American Mission in Korea, Seoul, National Archives(NARA)II, 「Transmittal of Agreement on Aid Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 1948. 12. 11」. Korean History Sourcebook 18: Political Advisers of the U.S. Forces Korea (1945.8-1946.2), (Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee, 1994.)

7. Revival Plan	$33,958,000	28.3%
8. Survey Fishing Contract	$1,980,000	1.7%
9. Ocean Freight	$5,244,000	4.3%
10. Technical Assistance	$3,512,000	2.9%
11. Economic Cooperation Administrative Expenses + Reserve Expenses	$2,573,000	2.1%
sum	$120,000,000	100%

Table IV-10) 1950 Economic Assistance to Korea Budget Breakdown of the Office of Economic Cooperation (ECA) 649)

However, due to delays in congressional approval, the U.S. Congress decided to spend $60 million on the Emergency Spending Act in July and October, and allocate an additional $50 million after Congressional approval, but due to the Korean War, the U.S. Congress did not have time to allocate funds, and in the end, $84,703,000 was allocated about $25,297,000 short of the original plan of $110 million. As a result, the South Korean government was faced with great difficulty in using aid materials appropriately. In addition, as mentioned above, the U.S. government, which equated Korea's situation with mainland China, threatened to cut off economic aid if it did not reduce the budget deficit and inflation, so the ROK government had no choice but to balance the

budget by drastically cutting government expenditures such as defense, judicial police, and administrative expenses.

---

[649] Bank of Korea Research Department, 『Bank of Korea Survey Monthly』, (Seoul: Bank of Korea, 1951), pp. 233. ; Hyunjin Lee, 『A Study on the U.S. Economic Aid Policy for Korea in the Period of the First Republic』, (Seoul: Ph.D. dissertation, Ewha Womans University, 2004), pp. Requoted in 48.

Therefore, the minimum amount of water needed to run the country through U.S. economic aid

Prior to the Korean War, the enemy and economic infrastructure could be supported, but at the same time, it was difficult to prepare a long-term plan for economic revival, which was essential for the development of a modern nation. In other words, the ROK side tried to lay the foundation for economic development for the future by using the aid money to build industry, transportation facilities, and mines, but the United States tried to use the aid money to import consumer goods to cool inflation. Thus, while South Korea received aid through the U.S. Office of Economic Cooperation (ECA), Rhee had frequent disagreements with the U.S. side.650)

By the way, the fiscal and tax policies at that time were basically the economy from the United States.

In spite of the fact that it was most affected by international politics in terms of aid assistance, the following special situation was taking place at the time, and it can be found that voluntary efforts were being made within the Republic of Korea. In other words, the situation was not only improved by unilateral help from the United States, but by discussions and proposals of improvement measures by South Korea, it was able to achieve fiscal balance very quickly compared to other vulnerable countries that received tens or hundreds of times more financial support than South Korea about 60 years later.

First of all, because ideological resources were relatively abundant in the absence of various resources, and the government had to pay the price for resource mobilization to gain political legitimacy and be able to continuously mobilize resources, even when seeking the consent of the National Assembly for economic aid from the United States, it was convinced that it was part of the effort to maximize ideological power resources by mobilizing the Constitution, and this situation was very unique to the process of forming a vulnerable state. For example, even situations related to the economy could only be agreed upon after communicating in ideological language, not economic language.

In addition, the newly established Bureau of Statistics of the Office of Public Affairs will carry out the following activities to expedite

He helped formulate concrete and realistic fiscal and tax policies. First, the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Public Information identifies the living conditions of citizens in 15 cities, including Seoul, by occupation.

---

650)Oliver, 2002. pp. 300.

By revealing that 1/5 of the total population is unemployed, and that the number of industry, commerce, and office workers, which can be said to be the vocations of urban citizens, is much lower than the number of unemployed, the high cost of living in the city and the stagnation of the industrial economy, which was the main national policy at the time, were calculated with numerical statistics.[520] Next, the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information, in collaboration with the Research Department of the Bank of Korea, conducted a survey on the cost of

[520])『대동신문』,1949 년 2 월 11 일「공보처 통계국, 15 개 시,도 작업 실태 조사결과 발표」.

living of salaried people in order to prepare basic statistics to find solutions to the worsening problems of people's livelihood. Through this, it was intended to establish standards for determining appropriate wages and salaries, and to regulate the supply and demand of daily necessities by calculating the appropriate price of grain.[521] In the end, the correlation between the actual effect of monetary tightening on people's lives and prices was revealed.(653) In the end, the economic departments of the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, with the support of the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Public Information, were able to draw up and implement various plans to revitalize the industrial economy through the revival of key national projects more quickly and achieve fiscal parity.

[521])『경향신문』,1949 년 12 월 21 일「공보처와 조선은행, 생계비 조사를 위한 조사 요강을 마련」.
653)『상공일보』,1950 년 5 월 14 일「통화긴축 정책하의 봉급생활자와 근로 생활자의 생활실태」.

V. Nation Building of the Republic of Korea (2)

Voices calling for the establishment of a nationalist state have not disappeared since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in August 1948. Accordingly, the Republic of Korea made efforts to absorb nationalism as much as possible from the beginning of its inauguration, and as part of these efforts, the formation of the first Cabinet that embraced the centrists, the old Kim forces, and the leftists who opposed the establishment of a single government and the establishment of a unilateral government, and the promotion of the punishment of the pro-Japanese faction through the Anti-People Special Committee.

However, as mentioned above, when the crisis of national security came to the fore and the very existence of the new state was threatened, the National Security Law was enacted and the anti-people special committee was defeated, and efforts to absorb nationalism and improve its ideological resources were put on the back burner. In particular, as the top commanders of the North and the South, who had been entangled by the bad relations of the Japanese imperialist period, clashed with deep-rooted hatred and hostility toward each other, the ROK made it increasingly difficult for the ROK to assimilate nationalism by maximizing propaganda that stirred up nationalist sentiments.

At that time, it was North Koreans who were sent to the front to solve the national security crisis faced by the new Republic of Korea. They had already been high-ranking bureaucrats since the beginning of the US military administration, and the Northwestern Youth Corps was making up for the lack of security capabilities, but as the existence of the Republic of Korea was in jeopardy in the wake of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, military personnel from the North began to play a

big role. For example, Lee Eung-jun, who was an elder of the Korean army and took the lead in the founding work, Most of the generals such as Kim Baek-il, Baek Sun-yup, Jung Il-kwon, and Yoo Jae-heung, who were urgently dispatched to the Suncheon and Jeju 4.3 incidents and the extermination of partisans in the Jirisan district, and who recovered the situation in a short time, were detachments from the North. In particular, the partisan punitive squad, led by Chung Il Kwon and Kim Baek Il, succeeded in repatriating 40 percent of the peninsula and surrendering 2-3,000 civilians by mid-April 1949.[654)]

In addition, the soldiers who fought hard under them were also from N. Korea. There were many. In a situation where the overall strength of the North Korean army, including ground firepower and training conditions, proved to be superior to that of the ROK army, the ROK Army, which had just finished fighting in close to regular warfare by operating several battalions for the first time since the founding of the Republic of Korea around October 1949, was lightened and the number of troops that could concentrate in case of emergency was limited. In such an absolutely unfavorable situation, the driving force behind the ROK forces in the Ongjin area being able to switch to a counterattack and restore the front line was to a large extent the hostility of the new soldiers in North Pyongan Province.[655] At the same time, however, their presence was also the main reason for the inciting of hostility in the North and the beginning of the conflict between the North and the South to the level of war. Chung points out that after the establishment of the government in 1948, as people from the northwest with Japanese and Manchurian military experience were assigned to the main commanders near the 38th parallel, tensions began to rise as the North and the South engaged in confrontation using all the brutal means and methods at their disposal. In particular, The hatred of the North Korean leadership, including Kim Il-

sung and Choe Hyun, was directed at Kim Seok-won, the commander of the 1st Division in Kaesong, and Kim Baek-il, the commander of the Ongjin district, who had defeated them as members of the Manchukuo-gando special detachment.

North Korea's leaders, including Kim Seok-won, have turned pro-Japanese into pro-U.S.

Following the extermination of the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces of the Japanese imperialist era in Xinhai, it was thought that they were attempting an attack on North Korea. The fear and hatred of the North Korean leaders who came from anti-Japanese partisans, including Kim Il-sung, toward the commanders of the Korean army who had left the Japanese army was beyond imagination. They had clear memories and grudges against the brutality of the Japanese military during the Japanese colonial era. In particular, Kim Il-sung, who believed that Kim Seok-won was the commander of the Hamhung regiment that clashed with him during the Battle of Gansambong, was exasperated and said, "The agents of the Japanese imperialists have now become agents of the United States and are playing with fire against the northern half of the DPRK at the 38th parallel," adding, "Our comrades who fought against him in the Paektu jungle in the past

---

654) Sasaki. 1977. pp.399.

[655] National Defense Transcription Committee.1981.pp.518.

Today, I'm fighting against him again at the 38th Parallel," he said, exploding in anger. Finally, on June 25, the day of the Korean War, he said, "Kim Seok-won, I'm going to arrest you. Now you will not be able to escape my grasp.' Meanwhile, North Korea's mass propaganda media incited nationalist hostility by naming Japanese names and careers of former South Korean commanders.

For example, the Rodong Sinmun and the Typhoon were published in South Korea with Japanese military experience.

Military commanders were touted as "pro-Japanese hawks," and other media also ridiculed Lee Eung-jun and Chae Byung-deok, who served as chief of staff, by calling them Lieutenant Kayama and Lieutenant Oshima, respectively. It was also reported that King Yong Chin, a former major general in the Japanese army, would be appointed chief of staff of the Korean army.[522] In fact, the military leaders of North Korea and China, who had experienced harassment by the Japanese military during the Japanese colonial period, feared the Japanese and former Japanese soldiers, and intensified propaganda to stir up nationalist sentiments to prevent them from intervening. In other words, as mentioned above, at the time of the Jeju 4.3 incident and the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, rumors were rife that a large number of Japanese military officers had been dispatched to subdue leftist forces, or that Japanese troops had landed in Korea and were suppressing the protests by force.

In spite of the fact that North Korea was stirring up nationalist sentiments, the South Korean government, which was facing a severe security crisis at the time, had no choice but to rely on military personnel with experience in the Manchukuo Special Corps, including Kim Seok-won. In early 1949, when the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea began in earnest and the Soviet Union's direct military support for North Korea increased, the South Korean government decided to use military forces to prevent the rise of North Korea's military power due to Soviet support and to maintain U.S. continued U.S. intervention on the Korean peninsula. In terms of diplomacy and the like, they were doing everything possible. At that time, the South Korean leadership was skeptical that the United

[522])정병준.『한국전쟁: 38 선 충돌과 전쟁의 형성』,(서울: 돌베개, 2007).

States would continue to support the Republic of Korea. Prime Minister Yi Beom-seok believed that Britain's recognition of the Communist People's Republic of China was tantamount to recognizing North Korea, and that the United States should expect to follow Britain's lead in abandoning Taiwan, and that the same would be true for the Republic of Korea. Rhee also judged that the international situation was unfavorable because the United States had no intention of going to war only for South Korea from the beginning.[523] Accordingly, the question of national security, nation-building, and the undermining of nationalism

Ilminism emerged as an ideological resource to solve the problem at the same time, and Kim Seok-won, an old man in his 50s who had the most practical experience among the former Japanese soldiers, was appointed as the front-line combat commander in the Ongjin district as he insisted on the theory of the North despite his nationalistic flaws. However, the U.S. government, convinced that the Soviet Union would commit North Korean aggression and wanted to maintain a state of military balance between the North and the South without provoking the Soviet Union, disapproved of Kim Suk-won and did everything in its power to stop Rhee Seung-man's attempt to appoint him as the Chief of Staff of the Army.

> In other words, from the time of the first pearl, I had a bad feeling towards the people who were from the Japanese army.

The U.S. side, which did not have one, suspected that Kim Seok-won would take advantage of the border dispute in the Ongjin area to follow Japan's tactics of expanding its aggression into Manchuria and mainland China in the wake of the Yuzogu Incident and the Nogu Bridge Incident.

---

[523])박종효 편역, 2010,「1950 년 1 월 28 일 쉬띄꼬프 대사가 외상 븨쉰스기에게 보낸 암호 전문」, pp. 394.

In fact, Kim Seok-won and other high-ranking members of the ROK Army, who had long guarded the border in Manchuria, interpreted that it was possible to cross the border as necessary in order to avoid the indignity of violating the border, based on the principle of "not invading and not invading." If this led to a full-scale battle, it would mean that the United States would also be plunged into a situation where it would have to prepare for a major battle on the Korean peninsula that would be enough to unite with the Soviet Union.

In the midst of this, the Army Chief of Staff, Chae Byung-duk, also sympathized with the U.S. position, fearing that if the conflict between the North and the South in the frontline Ongjin district escalated to the level of war in the situation of the shortage of all resources, it would be more difficult to subdue the partisans in the Taebaeksan and Jirisan areas. In other words, from July 20 to August 3, 1949, "Songaksan 7. In the Battle of the 25th, the North Korean army, supported by the Soviet Army, used the most advanced weapon, the 122mm howitzer, and the division commander Kim Seok-won and the regimental commander Choi Kyung-rok, who managed to repel the North Koreans after a close skirmish, reported it to the Chief of Staff, Chae Byung-duk, and the U.S. military advisers.

> However, U.S. military advisers have warned that the North Koreans are using the latest 122mm guns.

It officially denied this, fearing that if it were officially acknowledged, it would lead to the withdrawal of the U.S. policy of limiting the combat power of the ROK military to the level of defense expenditures and the supply of state-of-the-art weapons to the ROK military. Chae Byung-duk also sympathized with the U.S. position, fearing that if the border dispute along the 38th parallel escalated amid a shortage of all resources, it would be impossible to subdue the guerrillas in the Taebaeksan and

Jirisan districts due to the dispersion of combat forces. Eventually, the conflict between Chae Byung-deok and Kim Seok-won, who had opposing views, exploded through the North-South trade incident. Both Chae Byung-duk and Kim Seok-won were dismissed from their positions on October 3, 1949 and transferred to the reserves, which sealed the conflict for the time being, but only Chae Byung-duk was reinstated and emerged as the winner. As mentioned above, Chae Byung-deok was a person with strong anti-Japanese tendencies despite being from the Japanese military. In other words, Chae Byung-duk, who was not sent to the front because of assaulting the Japanese and stayed as an ordnance officer, had a close relationship with nationalists such as Yeo Woon-hyung, and had a good relationship with Yi Beom-seok after liberation.

While Chae Byung-duk was supported by forces with nationalist causes, Kim Seok-won, a former colonel in the Japanese army, was heavily criticized and eliminated because he had the flaw of his experience as a subordinate to Japan and was suspected by the United States of trying to undermine the U.S. policy of using the border conflict to undermine the balance of power. Accordingly, Ambassador Mu Cho of the Republic of Korea, U.S. military advisers, James Hausman, and other U.S. officials did everything in their power to thwart Rhee's plan to reinstate Kim Seok-won as chief of staff and reinstate Chae Byung-duk as chief of staff.

On the other hand, he was from the same Japanese army as Kim Seok-won, and he was also active in the Gando Special Corps.

Paek Sun-yup personally visited Chae Byung-deok and asked Kim Seok-won, who had requested an increase in firepower in response to the North Korean provocation, to withdraw the firepower build-up, saying that the temporary build-up of troops and firepower would only lead to a vicious cycle of endless clashes and retaliations, citing the 1939

Nomonhan incident of the Japanese army and the Janggobong incident on the Tumen River[524 as examples.] In this way, young officers such as Paek Sun-yup, who were able to quickly accept the standards demanded by the United States without causing friction with the United States, although they were from the Japanese Army, became the center of the military, surpassing their predecessors in the 50s and 60s, who were constantly in conflict with the U.S. military and were severely criticized. In other words, from August 1948 to September 1949, I studied in the United States for one year.

As Lee recalls, the young officers clashed with the U.S. advisers, but they were exposed to the standards of a democratic country called the United States and actively accepted them. In particular, this intensified when the early South Korean military was led by Lee Beom-seok, the former leader of the Korean National Youth League, who was spreading the standards of the U.S.-style modern state to the entire Korean society, and his three followers. In particular, in the case of Paek Sun-yup, he gained deep trust through accurate shooting and tactical operation, unlike Kim Seok-won, who was criticized by the US military for being inferior to a junior officer because he had blind faith in the old-fashioned hand-to-hand attack centered on the "charge forward" tactic of the main Japanese army and had no interest in accurate shooting.

Baek Sun-yup and Jung Il-kwon, who had a history of guerrilla subjugation in the Japanese army. Yoo Jae-heung, etc.

The officers of the Northwest were quickly appeasing the United States and subduing the partisans and partisans in the South. Accordingly, on January 15, 1950, the Jirisan District Combat Command was disbanded, and on February 5, the martial law declared in Honam was lifted, nearly one year and

[524])백선엽, 2010. pp. 76.

three months after the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents. By the time the Korean War broke out in late June 1950, the political situation had stabilized in a short time, with an estimated 200 remaining guerrillas in the south. In the midst of this gradual stabilization of the situation, the state, led by Rhee Seung-man, who was playing the role of a mediator-like magistrate, reflected the nationalist voices that had been pushed aside in the process of prioritizing national security through land reform and the implementation of compulsory education in elementary schools. Through this, the traditional landlord class centered on the Democratic Party of Korea collapsed, and a new capitalist class began to be formed centered on the North Korean men, who had already accumulated capitalist capabilities and skills during the Japanese colonial period. At the same time, the peoples who were allotted land and benefited from education had a greater sense of belonging to the state. On the other hand, the centrist politicians who observed this changed their initial stance of refusing to participate and began to participate in the nation-building process in earnest with the election of the 2nd National Assembly, and through their participation, the state that was confronting nationalism was able to reflect its nationalist demands in the process of nation-building, thus providing an opportunity to escape the criticism that it was building an anti-nationalist state. At the same time, the achievement of fiscal balance was clearly recognized externally just before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 that it was possible to completely move out of the stage of national collapse and enter the stage of full-fledged economic development and national development.

1. The Constitution

As mentioned above, instead of the human, material and economic resources that the country lacked,

The effort to maximize ideological power resources was one of the most significant features of Korea's early modern state-building and administration. On the other hand, in the process of quickly establishing a government, the Republic of Korea, which had failed to absorb nationalism from the birth of the state by failing to involve former members of the provisional government such as Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, who opposed the establishment of the government, and the moderate centrist forces that followed them, systematically carried out efforts from the beginning to maximize its ideological power resources by satisfying the nationalist aspirations of the masses to inherit the legacy of the provisional government and increasing the legitimacy of state power by gaining support, and one of the representative of these was the enactment of the Constitution. On the other hand, the social-democratic elements of the Constitution, which are still in question to this day, reflect the economic reality of the time, when the bourgeoisie could not be formed due to material and economic weakness, and the state had to take on the role of the main agent of production and consumption.

First of all, the Constitution of Korea after liberation has been largely prepared in six stages.

It was enacted through a process, and the table is briefly as follows.

name	date	Key Persons/Characteristics
Public Administration Research Committee Proposal	1946 March	Shin Ik-hee

Democratic House of Representatives		1946 March	Cho So-ang, Kim-jun
The original constitution of the legislation law not	Draft Committee on Administrative Organization Act	1947 February	Shin Ik-hee (Chairperson)
	With South Korea Draft	1947 March	Seo Sang-il (Hanmindang)
	Draft of the Provisional Constitutional Period	1947 April	-Joon Kim (Moderates in the Legislative Assembly)
	Joseon Temporary Covenant Constitution	1947 August	South Korea and Leap Leap Eye Compromise in the Provisional Constitutional Drafting Committee

Table V-1) Main Contents of the Constitution of the U.S. Armed Forces

Overall, with the exception of the "Transitional Leap Forward Constitution for South Korea" drafted by Suh Sang-il of the Korean People's Party, the preparatory process for the Constitution was led by Shin Ik-hee, Cho So-ang, and Kim-jun from the Provisional Government. Accordingly, the constitutional experience of the Provisional Government was inherited even after the liberation, and the parliamentary system favored by the Korean People's Party and intended by the "Constitution for the Transition of South Korea" based on Suh Sang-il was also not

adopted due to the opposition of the lawmakers from the Provisional Government, who favored the presidential system.[525] First of all, Shin Ik-hee, who was the head of the Provisional Government's Ministry of Internal Affairs, was a former high school official under the Japanese Empire.

The Administrative Research Committee was organized with more than 70 experts to implement the Provisional Government's founding program and to implement the administrative measures that inherited the Provisional Charter of the Republic of Korea drafted by the Provisional Government in 1044. In March 1946, the draft of the Administrative Research Committee was later compromised into the "Yu Jin-oh Joint Draft" along with Yu Jin-o's draft constitution in 1948 and submitted to the Constitutional Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly.

On the other hand, the Democratic House of Representatives draft in March 1946 was also submitted to the Constitutional Drafting Committee. Due to the influence of Kim-joon and Cho So-ang, who participated as bandits, it was drafted by amending the Provisional Charter of the Republic of Korea. In addition, those who came from the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, who wanted to inherit the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Korea in 1944, preferred a dual system of government, in which the elements of the presidential system and the parliamentary system were present at the same time, although there was a difference between the direct election system and the indirect election system of the National Assembly.

Accordingly, the form of government that was finally decided by the Constituent Assembly was also 1. Eugene Oh Draft

[525])대한민국 국회 편, 『남조선 과도입법의원 속기록』, (서울: 선인문화사. 1999), pp. 67-68.

(May 1948)→2.Yu Jin-oh Joint Proposal (May 1948)→3.Constitutional Drafting Committee Proposal (June 1948)→4.Founding Constitution (July 1948). After four stages, the Provisional Government finally chose an indirect electoral system in which the president was elected by the National Assembly, centering on the dual system of government, in which elements of the presidential system and the parliamentary cabinet system appeared at the same time.[526]Although Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, who served as president and vice president of the Provisional Government, did not participate in the 1948 elections to the Constituent Assembly, the members associated with the Provisional Government formed a considerable force within the Constituent Assembly. In other words, Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, who had tried to establish a unification government with the help of the United Nations Committee on Korea, decided not to participate in the Constituent Assembly but to let their representatives in,[527] and some of them made it to the Constituent Assembly.

First, if we look at the distribution of the political parties of the 198 elected members of the Constituent Assembly,

There were 56 members of the Korean Independence Choksung National Party, 29 members of the Democratic Party of Korea, 13 members of the Daedong Youth Group, 6 members of the National Youth Group, 1 member of the Korea Independence Party, 1 member of the Democratic Party of Korea, 10 members of other small organizations, and 83 independents.[528It] was estimated that about 30 of the 83 independents

[526])김성호, 최선, "제 1 장 1948 년 건국헌법에 나타난 혼합적 권력구조의 기원: 미군정기와 제헌국회의 헌법 안 및 헌법논의를 중심으로,", 한국 미래학회 편,『제헌과 건국』,(서울: 나남, 2010), pp. 13-61.

[527])국사편찬위원회, 전현수 역, 2004,「1948 년 8 월 2 일」, pp. 161.

[528])『조선일보』,1948 년 5 월 14 일.

were followers of Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, and the forces of the provisional government were scattered among the Korean Independence Choksung People's Association, the Daedong Youth League, and the Korean National Youth League. On the other hand, all the candidates from the right-wing youth group lost. In addition to Yoo Jin-san, the leader of the Youth Federation of Korea, and Seo Sang-cheon, the leader of the Korean Independence Youth League, candidates from the Northwestern Youth League, such as Sun Woo-ki, also joined the Daedong Youth League, but all but Kim In-sik were defeated, and they hardly made it to the National Assembly in subsequent elections.[529)]

In the case of the 'Independence Choksung People's Party', which produced the largest number of elected members, it was established by two Yeong-su, Rhee Seung-man and Kim Koo, and there was a fierce struggle for leadership between the two factions, and this struggle continued even after the Constituent Assembly elections in 1948, and the Independence Choksung People's Association was divided into three factions.[530] Therefore, the schema of the pro-Rhee Seung-man forces (conservatives) and anti-Rhee forces (progressives) alone can never be used to understand the political world and ideological distribution of the time, and although the Independence Choksung People's Association supported President Rhee Seung-man, Rhee Seung-man did not completely control the Independence Choksung People's Assembly. After the election of the Constituent Assembly, the Independence Choksung Provincial People's Association split into four members, including Shin Ik-hee, Lee Cheong-chun, Myung Je-se, and Lee Yun-young, who were

[529])선우기성, 『어느 운동자의 일생』, (서울: 배영사, 1987), pp. 299-300.
[530])『경향신문』,1948 년 8 월 25 일「대한독립촉성국민회, 신당 조직을 둘러싸고 3 파로 분열」.

vice chairmen.[531] At the same time, other factions, on the other hand, were allied with the centrist faction in order to thwart the Democratic Party of Korea's takeover of the government.

In addition, the independent district was divided into the 3.1 and 6.1 districts, led by National Assembly Speaker Shin Ik-hee and National Assembly Vice Speaker Kim Yak-so[532]. The Secretariat of the Secretariat has already submitted a proposal to Rhee Seung-man to support the faction participating in the regime from the Provisional Government[533].[534] In other words, Yi Cheong-chun, who was elected as a member of the Daedong Youth League, proposed that the presidential election and the vice presidential election be held at the same time in order to realize Vice President Kim Koo. Li Chung-chun, who was elected with the most votes in the Constituent Assembly elections, was able to establish a one-man government. Recognizing the reality of the Republic of Korea, Kim Koo hoped to remain vice president until the unification government was formed, and 14 lawmakers from the Daedong Youth League (led[535] by the independent Gurak Party) tried to realize the plan of Vice President Kim Koo.

On April 21, 1947, Li Chung-chun, who had returned from the United States with Rhee Seung-man on a plane provided by Chiang Kai-shek, organized the Daedong Youth League to promote the unification of right-wing youth organizations. Many of the figures who appeared

---

[531])『경향신문』,1948 년 11 월 12 일「여순사건 후 각 정당의 동향」.

[532])『경향신문』,1948 년 6 월 5 일「국회의원들 3.1 와 6.1 구락부 발기」.

[533])특히 국회 무소속 구락부 국회의원 53 인은 1. 남북통일, 자주 독립의 평화적 전취와, 2. 민주주의 민족 자결 국가 건설, 정치, 경제, 문화, 인권의 균등 사회 구현을 목표로 한다고 밝힘으로써 임시정부의 삼균 주의 이념의 계승을 뚜렷이 하고 있었다. 『서울신문』,1948 년 6 월 15 일「국회 무소속 구락부, 통일과 균 등사회 다짐」.

[534])『서울신문』,1948 년 7 월 20 일「각 정당의 대통령과 부통령 후보에 대한 견해」.

[535])「제 2 부 김인식, 원장길」, 한국정신문화연구원 한민족문화연구소 편, 2001. pp. 183.

immediately after liberation emerged in a political situation where they were losing public credibility in the course of the struggle between the left and the right[536] Since the expectations and popularity of Yi Cheong-chun, the former commander-in-chief of the Liberation Army, were absolute[537]. The Daedong Youth League also grew to a huge size with 49 branches and 3.5 million members in just over eight months. All right-wing youth groups also had a reason to reject the unification promoted by Lee Chung-chun, who rejected both the far left and the far right. Had.

However, when the confrontation between Kim Koo and Rhee Seung-man over the establishment of a one-man government surfaced, the youth of the Independence Choksung National Assembly and the Northwestern Youth League refused to join the unification promoted by Lee Cheong-cheon, who was affiliated with Kim Koo, and his rival Lee Beom-seok's Korean People's Youth League did not join the coalition. However, when the United Nations resolution on the Korean peninsula was concluded with a general election in South Korea alone, the Daedong Youth League also abandoned its original line of supporting Kim Koo and participated in the Constituent Assembly. I came into the election with a shape. In addition, the Daedong Youth League, which ran for election under the slogan of national socialism based on the so-called "Three Kyuns" principle, elected 13 official candidates and 20 members and[538] sympathizers, becoming the third party among the political factions that did not have an independent affiliation, following the Independence Choksung People's Party, the Democratic Party of Korea, and the Democratic Party of Korea. As a result, despite the fact that Kim Koo did not actively participate in the vice presidential election, he received the support of 65 and 62 members

[536])이경남,『분단시대의 청년운동 하』, 1989, pp. 185.
[537])선우기성,『한국청년운동사』, (서울: 금문사, 1973), pp. 736.
[538])이경남,『분단시대의 청년운동 하』, 1989, pp. 236-239.

of the 198 lawmakers in the first and second rounds, respectively, based on the strength of the Daedong Youth League, which is about one-third of the total number of lawmakers. By the way, the person who was elected vice president was also Lee Si-young, who came from the provisional government and supported Rhee Seung-man's line and participated in the construction of a modern nation.[539]When Vice President Kim Koo's card failed, the independent Rakbu again gathered signatures from more than 100 members of the National Assembly, mainly from the Korea Independence Party, and suggested to President Rhee Seung-man that Cho So-ang be appointed prime minister. Although the Democratic Party of Korea, which had been adhering to the idea of Kim Sung-so, the leader of the party, as prime minister, strongly opposed it, saying, "It would be a short-lived government if it is composed of people with unclear personalities," and Rhee Seung-man also opposed it, saying that it would not be difficult until Cho So-ang's suspicion of opposing the decision was resolved[540]. The fact that it went to Lee Beom-seok was returned to the Provisional Government

It shows that the ideological resources of nationalist legitimacy were forming a formidable influence within the first National Assembly.

According to Table V-2 below, until the establishment of the Democratic People's Party in December 1949, the independents affiliated with the Provisional Government, the Korean Independence Choksung Association, and the Daedong Youth League formed the largest political force. The Democratic People's Party (DPP) also had a leadership team consisting of Shin Ik-hui and Yi Cheong-chun, both from the Provisional

---

[539])이시영은 이미 1946 년 가을 한국독립당 등 임정 계통의 모든 정치단체와 관계를 끊는 비장한 성명을 발 표하고, 김구와 김규식에게 마음을 돌려 반쪽 정부나마 세우는데 협력하자고 권유한 바 있었다. 『경향신 문』,1948 년 7 월 4 일「이시영, 부통령 출마설 등 제 문제 기자회견」.

[540])『동아일보』,1948 년 7 월 23 일「국회 무소속 구락부, 총리에 조소앙 임명을 이승만에게 요구」.

Government, so those from the Provisional Government held a large proportion throughout the Constituent Assembly. In other words, in the reality of the time, when all resources were scarce, many people hoped that the resources of the Provisional Government's nationalist ideology would be realized in real politics.

	1948 May	1949 June	1949 December	1950 March
Independent	85 pass.	102 pass.	30 pass.	29 pass.
Democratic Party of Korea	29 pass.	29 pass.		
Democratic Nationalist Party			71 pass.	71 pass.
Korean Nationalist Party				68 pass.
Korean Independence Chokseong National Association	55 pass.	53 pass.		
Ilmin Gurakbu			53 pass.	30 pass.
Theocratic Assembly			23 pass.	
Korea Workers' Party			23 pass.	
Daedong Youth Group	12 pass.	14 pass.		

Korean Nation Youth Corps	6 pass.			
Korean Independence Chokseong Federation of Labor	1 person			
Korean Independence Chokseong Farmers' Federation	2 people			
guitar	10 pass.			

Table V-2) Distribution of seats in the Constituent Assembly (1948-50) (675)

Against this [541]backdrop, the Constitution was drafted with the aim of inheriting the constitutional spirit of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in order to reflect the nationalist aspirations of the people, and the Constitutional Constitution proposed the harmony between political democracy and socio-economic democracy as its basic ideology. Establishment of a National Socialist State" (Seo Sang-il),[542] "Harmony between Political Democracy and Economic and Social

[541])중앙선거관리위원회,『대한민국 선거사 제 1 집』, (서울: 중앙선거관리위원회, 1973)와 김성희,『정치 사』,(서울: 박영사 ,1976), 236 쪽. 을 참조하여 작성.

[542])서상일의원은 유진오가 기초한 초안이 민주주의에 입각한 민족사회주의국가 수립을 하는 원칙하에 기초 한 것이라는 원칙의 대체 설명을 실시했는데, 이에 따르면 초안의 중점은 특권계급을 인정치 않는 것과 근로자의 권리와 의무를 존중한 것, 국회로서 단원제를 채택한 것, 정부조직은 대통령책임제로 한 것, 국 민경제 수립에 중점을 두었다는 것이었다.『서울신문』, 1948 년 6 월 24 일「제 17 차 국회본회의, 헌법초안 상정」.

Democracy" (Yu Jin-oh)[543] Shanghai Provisional Government. It can be linked to the "union of egalitarianism and democratic shareholders" or "democracy based on political, economic, social, and cultural equality" that the Korea Independence Party and Cho Soang[544] pursued.

The Shanghai Provisional Government's founding spirit of the Three Disciplines is the economic order

The nationalization of land in Esau, politics. Emphasizing equality in the economy and education, the government stipulated equality in the public education system and education, and in the constitutional documents of the Provisional Government prepared accordingly, it was possible to run small and medium-sized enterprises on the principle of nationalization of large enterprises, natural resources such as land, and the industries of transportation, banking, telegraph, and transportation, for the establishment of an equal livelihood for each citizen and for the development of the nation and the country as a whole. On the other hand, it was somewhat distant from the capitalist market economy by prohibiting the inheritance and sale of land, nationalizing it, giving priority to distribution by differentiating it according to the degree of economic wealth, nationalizing confiscated capital and real estate, and protecting the socially disadvantaged by giving basic social rights such as the right to work, the right to rest, and the right to relief.

---

[543])국회의 헌법 및 정부조직법기초위원회 전문위원이며 헌법기초에 중심적 역할을 담당한 유진오는 23 일 국회본회의에서 다음과 같이 설명하였다. “지금 상정한 헌법초안의 근본정신은 정치적 민주주의와 경제적 사회민주주의체제 실현에 있는 것이다.”『서울신문』,1948 년 6 월 24 일『제 17 차 국회본회의, 헌법초안 상 정』.

[544])신우철,「대한민국헌법(1948)의 ‘민주주의 제(諸) 제도 수립」, 한국미래학회 편, 2010, pp. 111 각주 30). 서상일과 최운교의 대화를 보면 헌법이 정치, 경제, 사회의 삼균주의를 확실히 계승해서 있는가 라 는 최운교의 질문에 서상일이 “헌법 전문을 보면 모든 영역에 있어서 전부가 만민균등주의를 확인할 수 있다.”고 대답하고 있다.

In addition, under the influence of the Constitution of the Provisional Government, the Constitution of the Provisional Government, which supported the progress of the agrarian reform by stating in Article 86 that "agricultural land shall be distributed to the peasants, and the method of distribution and the limits of ownership, as well as the content and limits of ownership, shall be determined by law" in the original rule of the Constitution for the state-owned and state-owned systems of important resources and important enterprises, which were stipulated in Articles 85, 87 and 88 of Chapter 6.

For example, it was very unconventional that the right to equal education in the field of education, the compulsory compensation of free education in primary education, the guarantee of the right to work in the field of labor, the right to equal distribution of profits of workers, and social security to the people were discussed at that time. In fact, in the field of labor, Article 17 of the Constitution stipulates that "every citizen has the right and duty to work" and that "the work of women and boys shall receive special protection." Article 18 also states that "workers' right to organize, collective bargaining and freedom of collective action shall be guaranteed within the scope of the law. In a private for-profit enterprise, the worker has the right to an equal share of the profits as prescribed by law." The fact that such unconventional rights in the capitalist economic order were attempted in the Constitution is due to the fact that the problem of system competition with North Korea and the cause of inheriting the Constitution of the Shanghai Provisional Government dominated the political reality. A newspaper editorial at the time also conveyed the atmosphere at this time as follows:
All of them.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea rejects dictatorship as a means and is based on the principle of social democracy, which reconciles civil rights and social justice or the dual power of political democracy and economic state planning. In addition, the platform policies of each existing political party almost invariably have strong social democratic overtones. This is the reason why foreigners have concluded that there is no theoretical right-wing in Korea [545]. However, this can be seen as a trend of the times, as it came from the intention of the backward people, awakening to the defects of political democracy, to achieve economic democracy at the same time.679)

Regarding the Constitution, Park Chan-pyo said that the Constitution is based on its contents.

It points out that the Constitution broadly accepted the demands of the general public raised during the founding of the country, such as land reform, the three rights of labor, the right of workers to share the profits of enterprises, and the provisions on the basis of punishment of anti-national actors, and that the Constitution, which stipulated broad state control while establishing a free economic system in the socio-economic clause, also contained democratic social elements that aimed for an equal society, such as the three rights of labor and the right to equal share of workers' interests. In addition, the provisions containing social democratic content are not only the three mysteries of Cho So-ang, which was the founding ideology of the Provisional Government, but also the socialist ideals and the Third Way. It can be seen as a reflection of the various searches that have been pursued as ideals to a certain extent[546]. Park also argues that the reason why the Constitution was closer to a social and social democratic constitution that stipulated strong state

[545])『국민신문』,1948 년 10 월 14 일「사설 : 민족사회주의란?」.
[546])박찬표, 2007. pp. 403-404.

intervention rather than a liberal market economy was to follow the tradition of republican intervention by the state in the economy since the Provisional Government[547.]

However, Jeon Kwang-seok said that the Constitution inheriting the spirit of the Provisional Government was adopted by the Provisional Government. Pointing out that the Constitution also has limitations, he summarizes them as a system of mixed ideologies and incompleteness[548)] and finds the cause in the limits of the political, economic, and social order. Accordingly, it is pointed out that the understanding of the economic order has to change depending on how the articles that presuppose the nationalization of public works and the private ownership of the means of production are understood. For example, even the drafter of the Constitution, Eugene Oh, adopted a controlled economy. In addition, it did not mean that the principle of a controlled economy was an exception to the free economy, and that the specific economic order was reserved by law, which was a very vague and inconsistent explanation. In fact, the controlling economic constitutional order adopted in the Constitution was eventually codified and replaced with a constitution of a liberal economic order through the constitutional amendments proposed by the government on January 24, 1954, which were criticized for depriving business of vigor and rationality and undermining the growth of productive forces.[683)]

---

[683] Park Tae-kyun, 2010 〈The Policy of the Government of the Republic of Korea in the 1950s and Its Characteristics through Public Documents during the Presidency of President Rhee Seung-man: Release: Government-Proposed Constitutional Amendment of January 23, 1954 (AA0003857〉 , National Archives of Korea, Presidential Archives of Korea (December 2, 2010), pp. 11-12.

---

[547])박명림. 2008. pp. 450.

[548])전광석,「제 5 장: 건국헌법의 사회경제질서 구상」,한국미래학회 편,2010, pp. 245.

article	Phrase Sentence	New Condolences
Article 85	Minerals and other important underground resources, aquatic resources, hydropower and economic natural power are state-owned. The patent for the development or use of the patent for a certain period of time due to public necessity or the cancellation of the patent shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law.	The disposal, extraction, development or use of minerals and other important underground resources, aquatic resources, hydropower and natural forces available for economic purposes shall be as prescribed by law.
Article 87	Enterprises with major transport, telecommunications, finance, insurance, electricity, repair, water, gas, and utilities shall be state-owned or public-owned. The patent or revocation of the patent of private business on the basis of public demand shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law. Foreign trade is under the control of the state.	A company with a public character may be licensed as a state-owned or public-owned enterprise, but as prescribed by law. Foreign trade shall be under the control of the State in accordance with the provisions of the law.
Article 88	Urgent for national defense or national life Bureaus private enterprises as per need Share or Share or control and manage its management in accordance with the provisions of the law.	Except in cases where there is an urgent need for national defense or the people's livelihood, and as specifically provided by law, private enterprises

		may not be transferred to state-owned or state-owned enterprises, or control or manage their operations.
Article 89	In the case of revocation of a patent or the use or restriction of a right pursuant to Articles 85 to 88, the provisions of Article 85, Paragraph 3 shall be applied. All of them.	In the case of expropriation of agricultural land in accordance with the provisions of Article 86 or the transfer of private enterprises to state-owned or public property in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article, the provisions of Article 15, paragraph 3 shall apply.

However, the nationalization of private enterprises and the control and management of private enterprises stipulated in the Constitution have further strengthened the role of the state in shaping the national economy, regardless of whether they are implemented or not. Kim Il-young points out that the Constitution showed an asymmetry in favor of the state in terms of state-social relations from the beginning, and that the socio-state, state-controlled, and interventionist economic provisions have continued to this day without much change in essence, although they were slightly relaxed in the subsequent constitutional revision process.[549] Of course, these contradictory aspects clashed with

[549])김일영, "농지개혁을 둘러싼 신화의 해체,",한국정치학회 엮음,『한국정치연구의 쟁점과 과제』, (서울: 한울, 2011), pp. 33.

the development of the security state and liberal democratic economies, but at the same time, they made possible the intervention of the state and the strong self-control of the state over society. In other words, the Constitution remains a question for us to this day, but at the same time, it justified the cause of state intervention that enabled state-led economic development.

However, as mentioned above, these questions about the Constitution can be naturally resolved if one considers the realities of the fragile state at that time. In other words, the idea that the state would allow a free economy while owning and operating major corporations based on the principle of a controlled economy by the state was contradictory and incomprehensible at the present time when the liberal capitalist system was well established, but it was a very appropriate provision in the reality of the time when the state had to operate and manage the enterprises left behind by the Japanese Empire while acting as the main agent of production and consumption due to the weak material and economic foundation.

For example, Article 85 of the Constitution stipulated the nationalization of underground and fishery resources in order to realize the principle of socialist equality, but these were also state-owned before that. In addition, Article 87 of the Constitution, which stipulated the state-owned or publicization of companies with public characteristics such as transportation, telecommunications, finance, insurance, electricity, water, gas, etc., was also run by Japanese individuals during the Japanese period, but after liberation, all of them were processed as multiplication and became state-owned or public-owned by the U.S. military administration. Lastly, the nationalization of private enterprises for national defense or for the needs of the people's livelihood In addition, Article 88, which allows for the management of control by law, directly

states that even in Eugene Oga's time, important non-integrated enterprises were often constrained by the vulnerability of the country's human, economic, and material resources, and that it was not a big problem in terms of the amount of capital or the size of the capital.[685]

In conclusion, the founding constitution embraced the trifecta of the Provisional Government's representation of the three-fold doctrine as Yu Jin-oh revealed, and sought to harmonize political democracy with economic and social democracy by accurately reflecting the economic and social situation at the time, when all resources were lacking while maximizing ideological power resources politically.[686]

2. Anti-National Special Committee

On the other hand, in the process of building a modern state, attempts to maximize ideological power resources appear as efforts to increase the political legitimacy of the state by satisfying the aspirations of the masses through the liquidation of the pro-Japanese people based on nationalist causes, a typical example of which was the enactment of a law to punish pro-Japanese factions through the Special Committee on Anti-People

C. In addition, the Rhee Seung-man government, which had already tried to absorb nationalism as much as possible in the process of nation-building by including the Kim Koo faction, the centrist forces, and even those who had participated in the leftist movement in the past, at the time of the formation of the first Cabinet, also initially carried out the activities of the anti-national special committee and punished the pro-Japanese faction.

[685] Yoo Jin-oh, Basic Theory of the Constitution, (Seoul: Ilsak, 1956), pp. 141-142.

[686] Park Tae-kyun's aforementioned study expresses doubts that since the situation at the time was immediately after the war, it does not seem to correspond to the facts to say that the clause that covers resources and important companies, rather than all companies, suppresses the "freedom and creativity" of individuals. Park, Tae-Kyun, 2010. pp. See 12.

He tolerated the promotion of the law.

However, amid the country's lack of human resources and weak material and economic foundations,

As the issue of national security emerged as a top priority starting from the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, this was bound to be frustrated and eroded the ideological weakness of state power.

Kim Kyu-sik, who has been sponsored by the U.S. military government since the time of the South Korean Transitional Legislative Assembly.

The law on the punishment of pro-Japanese factions was being discussed by the center-right faction. In other words, the "draft special law on the punishment of national traitors, collaborators, war criminals, and crooks" had been presented to the plenary session by the centrist lawmakers of the government election. In particular, the law dealt with the issue of the purge of the pro-Japanese faction at a relatively high level, and even had a special chapter on the punishment of war crimes in order to severely punish the pro-Japanese activists at the end of the Japanese imperialists. The Special Anti-National Law, enacted after the establishment of the First Republic, inherited the spirit of the Law on the Punishment of Pro-Japanese Factions by the Legislative Assembly, and also referred to Japan's expulsion of public officials, China's Chiang Kai-shek's handling of war crimes, and the North Korean People's Committee's bill to punish pro-Japanese factions in a concrete and practical way.

Public opinion is also influenced by the nationalist causes they value.

Because it leaned toward advocacy, the Democratic Party of Korea lawmakers had no choice but to cooperate. The law on the punishment of anti-national acts was quickly submitted on August 16, 48, the day after the establishment of the government, and was passed with the absolute support of 103 votes in favor out of 141 members present. Accordingly, the Rhee government also signed the law on September 22 and promulgated it as a law.

The Special Anti-People Committee is the Special Investigation Committee in charge of the investigation[550], the prosecution and the prosecution Special Prosecutor in charge of nothing[551], Special Tribunal in charge of trials)[552] were set up separately in the National Assembly. In addition, in order to prevent the investigation and trial from being hindered by the non-cooperation of government agencies, the law stipulates that the government must cooperate with the activities of the anti-people special committee. The Special Prosecutor's Office, which began its activities on January 5, 1949, arrested Park Heung-sik and Lee Jong-hyung on January 8 and 10, respectively. In addition, on January 25, the former pro-Japanese police officer Roh Deok-sul was arrested[553], which led to a great turning point in his activities. However, Soon after, the Jeju 4.3 incident and the October 1948 incident in Yeosun and Suncheon

Following the rebellion, partisans and armed forces appeared, which led to a national security crisis, and the new government entered a state of de facto civil war, which led to the enactment of the National Security

---

[550])이 명단의 특징은 반민특위에 적극적으로 찬성한 의원들 뿐만 아니라 이 법에 반대한 한국 민주당 계열 의 김준연 등이 포함되어 있다는 점이다. 『자유신문』,1948 년 10 월 13 일.

[551])역시 마찬가지로 이 법을 사실상 발의한 김웅진과 적극적으로 찬성한 노일환과 이 법을 반대한 곽상훈, 서성달 등이 동시에 포함되어 있었다.『서울신문』,1948 년 12 월 2 일.

[552])『서울신문』,1948 년 12 월 2 일.

[553])『연합신문』,1949 년 1 월 26 일.

Law and the formation of the Korean Youth League, a paramilitary organization of right-wing youth organizations. In particular, socially, the crisis was escalating as the conventional warfare stage was unfolding around the Ongjin, Taebaeksan, and Jirisan districts, amid rumors of riots and North Korean aggression centered on the members of the South Korean Workers' Party.

Accordingly, Rhee Seung-man, who initially agreed with the logic of liquidating pro-Japanese officials in order to respect the nationalist cause and maximize ideological power resources, promulgated the Anti-National Acts Punishment Act, and made a statement in a radio broadcast speech until January 11, 1949 that pro-Japanese factions and national traitors would inevitably be punished even if they had contributed to the founding[554] of the country.

On February 2, 1949, Rhee Seung-man wrote, "In the context of the operation of leftist forces,

If it is not for the skills of the police, the situation will get worse,' and the gist of the statement was that in order for the Republic of Korea to maintain the security necessary for its existence as a modern nation against internal insurgents, it is necessary to have all the skills of the Buil police, and that the Buil police should wash away the sins of the past by making efforts to establish national security [555].

The next thing I would like to say is that we cannot help but take seriously the issue of public safety, and at a time when the insurgents and saboteurs are now murderous and arson in the places where human lives are in danger, and the underground work is urgent, it would be difficult if it were not for the skill and

[554])박종효 편역. 2010.「북조선과 남조선의 중요사건 일지: 1 월 남조선 중요사건 일지」. pp.357.
[555])『한성일보』,1949 년 2 월 3 일「이승만 대통령, 반민족행위특별조사위원회의 친일파 검거활동을 제한할 것을 주장하는 담화를 발표」.

energy of the police, but it would be a wise policy to put the guilty law on hold and settle the crisis in the country, save lives, and maintain order. If there is an imminent impasse in order to intervene in the affairs of the king, it will not be allowed by the government or the people, so it is necessary to embrace the police technicians as they are still involved, and therefore, when the anti-communist struggle is raging, it has been stated many times that the police technicians will perform their duties and atone for the public safety, and since it has been stated many times that the police technicians will do their duty and atone for the public safety, the members of the investigating committee are advised to take careful measures in this regard, both in view of the prestige of the government and as a measure to remedy the people's feelings.
Therefore, I would like to request the National Assembly to agree on the above conditions, and I hope that Mr. Je, a member of the National Assembly, will have sufficient cooperation in this regard.692)

This led to a heated debate in the National Assembly,[556] Kim Sang-duk's Special Committee for the Investigation of Anti-National Acts When the chairman of the committee issued a statement refuting the President[557's statement], Rhee Seung-man issued statements stating that the police and their families, who are in charge of policing with special skills, should not be agitated because they are already suffering enough threats and damages, and that the anti-people special committee should not be tolerated because it is interfering with public safety and violating the principle of separation of powers[558], and ordered the disbandment of the

[556])『조선일보』,1949 년 2 월 17 일「제 2 회 32 차 국회본회의, 반민족행위특별조사위원회에 대한 이승만 대통 령 담화로 격론」.

[557])『대동신문』,1949 년 2 월 18 일「김상덕 반민족행위특별조사위원회 위원장, 이승만 대통령의 담화를 반박 하는 성명서를 발표」.

[558])『서울신문』,1949 년 2 월 22 일「이승만 대통령, 반민족특별조사위원회의 활동을 강력하게 비판하는 담 화를 발표」;『서울신문』,1949 년 4 월 15 일「이승만 대통령, 반민족특별조사위원회는 조사활동에만 국한 하고 특경대를 해산할 것을 요구하는 담화를 발표」.

special police force and the release of Roh Deok-sul. Accordingly, Kim Sang-don, vice chairman of the Anti-People Special Committee, objected[559, and Kim] Byung-ro, who was the head of the Special Anti-People Special Court, issued a statement requesting the government's cooperation, but the bill to amend the Anti-People Law was presented to the plenary session of the National Assembly. In particular, the members of the minority faction of the National Assembly, who were leading the anti-people special committee, were detained in connection with the National Assembly corruption case, which forced them to curtail their activities.

On June 6, 440 police officers from the Seoul Metropolitan Police Inspection Division submitted their resignations demanding the replacement of the anti-people special committee's officers, the disbandment of the special police force, and the security of the police's identity, and 40 police officers attacked the anti-people special police unit and arrested 22 police officers. On June 7, more than 9,000 members of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Department sympathized with the protests and pressured the government, saying that they would resign if they did not comply. In addition, the development of this situation was similar to the situation in which the US military government discouraged the punishment of the pro-Japanese faction, which was promoted by the centrists of the South Korean Transitional Justice Party. Under the law of the time, about 860 administrative and police officials of the U.S. military government were subject to judicial review under the Pro-Japanese Punishment Act, but even the Democratic Party of Korea (MDP) was conscious of public opinion that aspired to nationalist legitimacy and

559)『평화일보』,1949 년 4 월 24 일「김상돈 반민족특별조사위원회 부위원장, 위원회 활동을 조사에만 국한하 라는 이승만 대통령의 담화를 반박」.

could not actively resist it. In the end, the U.S. military government, fearing that the administrative vacuum would disrupt the schedule for the withdrawal of US troops, withheld the ratification.

As already mentioned above, more than 70-80% of all police officers were in the police force before liberation.

Human resources with no experience in the police were newly hired, and since these human resources alone could not maintain basic security in the reality of the time, when all resources were scarce, they were forced to appoint officials with specialized skills and experience. Nonetheless, as soon as the government was established, the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents occurred, and the subsequent rebellions and partisans threatened the existence of the new country, and the U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea at the time, Mu Cho, was also expressing concern about the pro-Japanese punishment law, which could hinder the establishment of the administration.[560Rhee] Seung-man also judged that the establishment of a modern state would be impossible without the cooperation of the officials who cooperated with Japan, so he felt a great burden on the collective action of the Buil police officials. In other words, as already mentioned, 70-80% of the police force was occupied by human resources who had no experience in the police before the liberation of the country, and it was very certain that if the law of the Anti-National Special Committee were to punish high-ranking police officers who had specialized skills and experience in policing, it would aggravate the difficulties of the country, which was in desperate need of human resources.

---

[560])FRUS 1949, 1949 년 1 월 27 일,「무쵸 주한 미 특별대표부 특사, 한국의 정치·경제·사회 등 각 분야에 대해 미국무부에 상황보고」, pp. 947~952.

By the way, Yi In, who had a high reputation for defending independence fighters during the Japanese colonial period and who had left the Democratic Party of Korea and actively cooperated with the left-right cooperation of the centrists,[561 also] pointed out the problems of the anti-people law in an interview with the Minju Ilbo on August 27, 1948, when the Anti-People Special Act was enacted, citing the following reasons. In other words, from an individual standpoint, he thought that it was necessary to bring to justice the three pro-Japanese forces who had only sought to reinforce themselves, and he said that he had hatred for them in his heart and a list of punishments against them. However, The scope of punishment should be limited to 4-500 military officials who bullied Koreans at the time, and the question of whether a thorough punishment could be carried out in the current low level of funding was the reason for his skeptical attitude toward the anti-civilian law.

Needless to say, traitors must be dealt with by the strict standards of the law. In the name of the nation, we must condemn it thoroughly, and if we leave it as it is, we will not worry about the future. Of course, we will thoroughly investigate the evidence of the blatant anti-national acts before executing them. However, the anti-national actor I am talking about is not the same as being a member of the Gangan. It's not a matter of being a Chang, it's not a problem that you were an official during the Japanese colonial era. Of course, those who have chosen that path in order to wage a legitimate struggle among the members of the Donna Viceroy are also not eligible. Bully the people of this land Even if we include the military rulers, from the top officials to the military chiefs below, it seems that there are about four or five hundred people. However, I don't think all of them will be subject to purges, so I don't think there is any need to worry about the spread of the virus. Originally, the execution of traitors was supposed to be

[561])무소속 구락부에 소속되어 중도, 소장파 의원으로 분류되고 있었던 이인은 중도파 의원들의 정책을 잘 이해하고 찬성하는 의원 중 한명이기도 했다.『경향신문』,1949 년 7 월 16 일.

done within a week of the enactment of the law, with full preparation and investigation, just like the currency reform, but I am worried about whether it is ready now[562]. It is said that under the Vichy regime in France a certain prosecutor kept a diary for four years, and later kept a record of the deeds of the traitors for the purpose of executing them, but I have written down the deeds of some anti-people activists that cannot be erased from my heart.699)

The first Attorney General, Lee In, said that he had experience in the establishment of the state.

In other words, Jang Taek-sang[563] and Cho Byung-ok had already expressed their anger at the memory of the torture and beatings they had suffered at the hands of the Buil police during the Japanese colonial period, but the state did not have enough to bear their punishment due to the severe economic and social turmoil immediately after liberation.[564)]

On June 7, Rhee Seung-man, who promised the police a good job and called for them to return to work, said on the same day, "The dissolution of the special police force of the anti-people special committee is his own order, and the Constitution permits only the executive branch to have this police power, but this principle is being shaken by the anti-people special committee, so we cannot afford to drag it out. Therefore, the National Assembly, which is requesting the postponement of the disbandment of the special police force, tried to extinguish the conflict as much as possible by stating that if the special committee draws up a secret list of those to be prosecuted, the police will arrest all the indicted persons, whether they are a thousand or ten

[562])『민주일보』,1948 년 8 월 27 일.

[563])장택상의 경우에는 1938 년 청구회 사건으로 투옥될 당시 자신을 고문했었던 이구범과 가창현을 직접 서 장으로 승진시키기도 했었다.『경향신문』,1977 년 4 월 15 일「비화 한 세대 (110)군정경찰 〔41〕 고문경찰 의 발탁」

[564])조병옥, 1959. 장택상. 1992.

thousand, and resolve the situation at once."[565] On the other hand, the police, who were promised clemency by Lee Seung-man, also announced that they would return to work on June 8 and promised to do their best to ensure public safety. [566] Accordingly, the Anti-People Special Committee also requested the National Assembly to investigate the truth about the attack on the Anti-People Special Committee, and the lawmakers of the minority faction who supported the Anti-People Special Committee joined the revision of the Parliamentary Cabinet system to pressure Rhee Seung-man by requesting the government to restore the Anti-People Special Committee and punish those responsible, but the situation gradually developed in a direction that was unfavorable to the Anti-People Special Committee.

On July 6, 1949, the second amendment to the Anti-Civil Law was passed, and on July 7, all members of the Special Investigation Committee, including Chairman Kim Sang-duk, as well as some of the Special Prosecutors' Inspectors and Special Judges,[567 resigned.]Afterwards, the first Justice Minister Yi In was appointed as the new chairman of the Anti-People Special Committee, but Judge Suh Soon-young, who acquitted Kim Sung-so's brother, Kim Yeon-so, submitted his resignation[568], and even Yi In[569, lamenting the delay in the prosecution due to the statute of limitations, submitted his resignation and] reported to the National Assembly[570).]

---

[565])『동아일보』,1949 년 6 월 8 일「대통령, 경찰의 반민특위 특경대 해산이 자신의 명령이라고 발표」.

[566])『연합신문』,1949 년 6 월 10 일「서울시경찰국 과·서·대·교장, 이승만 대통령의 선처 약속에 따라 업무복귀 를 선언」.

[567])『조선중앙일보』, 1949 년 7 월 7 일.

[568])『경향신문』,1949 년 8 월 12 일.

[569])『한성일보』,1949 년 9 월 17 일.

[570])『서울신문』,1949 년 9 월 20 일.

In this way, it is difficult to say that the reason for the frustration of the anti-people special committee, which started with the support of the masses, was the resistance and obstruction of the pro-government bureaucrats, as in the existing general positions. In other words, it is true that there was considerable resistance and opposition from these groups, but as we have already seen, the Republic of Korea, which lacked all the resources necessary for nation-building, had to form a government quickly in a tight schedule for the transfer of executive power in less than a year because the support of international political resources was also poor.

C. Thus, in spite of the fact that nationalist aspirations had to maximize the ideological power resources, it was not possible to exclude the non-Japanese forces within the state apparatus because of the lack of human resources.

In addition, the Yeosu and Suncheon rebellions that occurred immediately after the establishment of the government and the subsequent national security crisis threatened the very survival of the new state. For example, the occurrence of these incidents has exposed the weakness of the country's fundamental administrative ability and human resources, and it has come to the realization that it will be difficult for the state to survive if it does not actively embrace the agitated non-Japanese forces, especially the police force, which has the security skills to monopolize domestic violence, which is the most necessary for the state. This was a domestic problem that the new Third World countries had due to difficulties in the process of building a modern nation, but the United States, which had an absolute influence on Korea's nation-building at the time, was also afraid that its external prestige would be damaged if the new Republic of Korea collapsed due to the difficulties in establishing its administration due to the punishment of Japanese officials.

However, the main reason why the pro-Japanese faction was not punished was because it was necessary for the construction of the state.

The limitations and lack of capabilities of the Republic of Korea, a vulnerable country that lacked all the necessary resources, does not mean that it is unconditionally indulged in the First Republic's inadequate punishment of the pro-Japanese faction. And one of the main reasons for this is that, as evidenced by the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents and the Jeju 4.3 incident, the continued appointment of Buil officials aroused a great backlash among the people who longed for nationalist legitimacy, but the Buil police and officials shifted the blame to Kim Koo and the Korea Independence Party, thereby dividing the country, thus eroding the ideological power resources they had. In addition, the communist forces took advantage of their anger as the main justification for their rebellion, and many people who did not follow the leftist ideology sympathized with or aided the leftist rebellion, and the process of the country's material, economic, and ideological resources continued to decline and recover.

In fact, at the time of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, which will be described in the next section, the rebels claimed that the Yeosu police were trying to attack them with the Japan Sea Army, and that they were against the dispatch of Jeju Island, which would cause fratricidal conflict. They argued that they had no choice but to be loyal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea because the Republic of Korea had to be crushed in order to thoroughly wipe out the pro-Japanese factions, national traitors, and police officers and realize the gratuitous confiscation and free distribution of land.

Furthermore, they criticized the smuggling of food by the pro-Japanese forces that had monopolized economic power through the unfair seizure of houses and tried to confiscate their bank deposits. In addition, the

incident escalated rapidly by the sympathy of those who were in opposition to Rhee Seung-man, who had established a South Korean government through the May 10 elections in favor of Kim Koo's establishment of a reunification government through inter-Korean negotiations, and the residents who were dissatisfied with the economic situation and the police at the time because food rations were not properly distributed.

And, much of the incident was due to the undermining of the nationalist cause. Despite the fact that it was expanded through the participation of disgruntled people, the reality of the vulnerable country at the time was that the material and economic resources were damaged and the nationalist ideological resources were also damaged by the introduction of Kim Baek-il, who had experience in subjugating the communist guerrilla forces in Manchuria during the Japanese period, and Kim Jong-won, who was also notorious as a Buil policeman, became the object of resentment for his excessive violence[571].

3. Yeosu and Suncheon Incident

The Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion Incident was an incident on October 19, 1948, two months after the establishment of the Korean government, in which a series of South Korean Workers' Party-affiliated officers, including Lieutenant Kim Ji-hoe and Sergeant Ji Chang-su, led by more than 2,000 enlisted men rose up in Yeosu County, South Jeolla Province. In the early days of the founding of the Army, the U.S. military

[571])김계유, "손가락질 하나로 빨갱이 된 무고한 죽음" 『월간 말』. 1994 년도 5 월호(통권 95 호), pp.214~216.

government guaranteed complete freedom of thought to its soldiers, so many members of the Southern Workers' Party who infiltrated without background checks were able to recruit sympathizers from within the military and start a rebellion within the military.

Baek Sun-yup, who was directly involved in the resolution of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents at the time, recalled that the incident, which occurred two months after the establishment of the government, was a major test of the capabilities of the new Republic of Korea and was no different from a declaration of war against the Republic [572] of Korea.[573)] A brief table of the course of events is as follows.

date	case
1.1948 Oct. 19	Soldiers of the 14th Regiment carried out more than 70 right-wing figures and their families, including the Yeosu Police Chief, 10 temple staff, members of the Daedong Youth League, and the Korean People's Party. Homicide.
2.October 1948 20th Afternoon	The 2,000 soldiers of the 14th Regiment occupied Yeosu and in the afternoon they marched to Suncheon. Escalation, murdering the inhabitants and committing looting and arson.

[572])백선엽, 『조국이 없으면 나도 없다』(서울: 월간아미, 2010). pp. 55-56.
[573])사사끼. 1977. pp. 295.

3. October 21-22, 1948	On the 21st, they passed through nearby Bulgyo, Boseong, Goheung, Gwangyang, and Gurye, and on the 22nd, they captured Gokseong. On the other hand, martial law was imposed in the Yeosun area on the 21st. Lee Seung-man proclaimed subjugated Brigadier General Song Ho-sung Appointed commander-in-chief,[711] and ordered ten battalions to be mobilized to suppress it.
4.October 1948 22 days	At 3 p.m., the suppression forces launched an attack on Suncheon. At this time, the main forces of the rebels were in Gwangyang and nearby Retreating into the mountains, only lightly armed students and leftist forces remain.
5. October 23, 1948	In the morning, the suppression army that recaptured Suncheon annihilated the main rebel forces in the Gwangyang area. Trying to recapture. However, there was an ambush at the entrance of the water fountain Due to the raid of the rebels, the commander Song Ho-sung The brigadier was shot in the helmet and his eardrums burst. Fell from an armored car and injured his back As.

	In the meantime, the main forces of the rebels are Baiyun Mountain and
	They fled to Jirisan, and Yeosu was occupied by some agitators, local leftist forces, and more than 1,000 students.
6.October 1948 25th - 26th October	In place of the wounded Brigadier General Song Ho-sung, Kim Sang-kyum (712) from the Liberation Army, but due to stubborn resistance, it did not have much effect and street fighting continued. Kim Sang-kyum was also replaced, and troops led by former Japanese soldiers Kim Baek-il, Choi Kyung-rok, Baek Sun-yup, and Baek In-yup joined the navy and succeeded in seizing the victory.
7. October 1948 27 days	The incident was completely suppressed. However, as a result of the large-scale search for collaborators targeting civilians, some innocent civilians were unjustly murdered, and simple collaborators were classified as active participants, some of whom were

	summarily executed, and others were imprisoned.

Table V-3) Yeosu and Suncheon Incident

Kim Deok-joong is one of the 10,000 victims of the Suncheon rebellion Leftists and rebels claim to have killed only about 500 people, while 95 percent were killed by the National Army and the police. In other words, according to him, in the case of the leftists, the targets of the massacre were relatively clear to the pro-Japanese police, the forces of the Democratic Party of Korea, and the right-wing youth groups who took the lead in suppressing the leftists, while in the case of the rightists, they carried out a scorched-earth operation in which they could be summarily executed even if there was no direct evidence of cooperation with the rebels. As a result, a number of innocent civilians were executed, including

711) Sunyup Baek, 2010. pp. 57.

[712] Kim Sang-kyum, who had also been active in the Polish Army, was the deputy commander-in-chief of the "Korean Armed Forces Preparatory Committee," which was composed of former members of the Liberation Army immediately after liberation, advocating support for Rhee Seung-man and the orthodox theory of the provisional government. Mae Ilshin, November 1, 1945, "Organization of the Preparatory Committee for the Korean Army and the General Headquarters of the Korean Army."

Students who did not directly believe in leftist ideology but were partially sympathetic to them, those who fed the rebels or carried the belongings they left behind, and right-wing supporters, such as the junior high

school principal and the prosecutor who was not on good terms with the police, who were sympathetic to the leftists, were also killed without even having a chance to make a lame excuse.[574] According to a top-secret report sent to Stalin on September 15, 1949 by the Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang, Shtykov, the ROK government stated that 1,170 of those who participated in the Yeosu and Suncheon uprisings were shot by a military tribunal between October 12 and November 2, 1948, but more than 10,000 were actually executed.

I was looking at it.[575)]

By the way, at the time of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, innocent people were victimized and personal

Behind the fact that executions could be carried out by a grudge was the vulnerability of the authorities responsible for violence. As already described in the Jeju 4.3 incident, such incidents were commonplace, and one year later, Baek Sun-yup, who served as the commander of the 5th Division in North Jeolla Province, pointed out that the people's sentiments were aggravated by the residents' desire for personal vengeance, such as a military officer setting fire to a village in order to avenge the humiliation he had suffered in the past.[576] In fact, in the wake of the Yeosu and Suncheon rebellions, on October 28, 1948, Rhee Seung-man made an appeal to the army and police to deal with the urgent crisis of the country, in which he pointed out that the army and the police were peaceful warriors who protected the outskirts of the country and internal security, respectively, and was acutely aware of the most elementary task of the modern state to defend against aggression from the outside

[574])김득중, 『빨갱이의 탄생: 여순사건과 반공국가의 형성』, (서울: 선인, 2009).

[575])박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서: 3) 남조선 정부 의 치안」, pp. 338.

[576])백선엽. 2010. pp. 73.

and to maintain public order through the monopoly of physical power within the state. However, the situation was exacerbated by the failure of the weak state to live up to his perception at all.

[577]Comrades! The army is the stronghold that protects the outskirts of the country, and the police are the peaceful warriors who ensure internal security. When the two sides firmly bond the relationship between the two sides and run smoothly, the western state will flourish, the nation will prosper, and independence will be solidified, but for whom is it that the military and police go so far as to engage in friction, persecution, and slaughter? Ponder calmly on Zhang Zhang Qiuya! Drop guns and knives and embrace them in fratricidal love! I firmly believe that the liberation of the country can only be expected from the unity of the military and the police. Do not miscare the history that will be left for generations to come.716)

If we take the report of the National Assembly Investigation Team that investigated the incident at the time, it shows that a mob of only 40 people instigated and recruited disgruntled soldiers from anti-government groups and the armed forces, which led to a great rebellion, and[578] when the police were emotional about the people's dissatisfaction and resentment, some leftist elements within the military took advantage of the situation in the military, which had been in conflict with the police since the time of the US military rule, and stirred up nationalist sentiments against the police, which led to the incident escalating out of control. In fact, [579]580 In just a few hours, the police were killed and 150 wounded, and the number of Korean soldiers killed reached 150. For example, the power of public authority has been completely broken to the point where only the logic of survival of

577)『동아일보』,1948 년 10 월 28 일「이승만 대통령, '군경동지에게 보내는 권고문'을 발표」.
578)『한성일보』,1948 년 11 월 6 일「콜터 주한미군사령관, 여순사건에 대해 발표」.
579)『서울신문』,1948 년 11 월 3 일「국회 여순사건조사단 최윤동 의원 귀환 보고」.
580)『민주일보』,1948 년 11 월 14 일「미국 타임지 기자가 본 여순사건」.

the fittest dominates everything. In other words, when a U.S. military reporter asked a woman he met in a house in a suburb of Yeosu which side he was on, she replied, "I'm on your side. Because you are the strongest.'(719) In fact, the Jeollanam-do Police Bureau dismissed 509 police officers and suspended 63 of them in the six months following the incident, with the main reason for their dismissal being dereliction of duty.[581]In this way, the police officers who were supposed to be in charge of public safety did not perform their duties properly, and even the remaining police officers had to flee in fear. [582]In addition, according to the testimony of Park Seung-hoon, the commander of the 14th Regiment, who escaped from Yeosu at the time of the incident, the leftist forces arrested and shot a large number of right-wing youth members, who were assisting the police and playing the role of a de facto quasi-state organization, making the situation worse so that the public authorities could not exert any power at all.721)

The same was true for the military. He was the first commander-in-chief of the Korean Army at the time.

Dawn Song Ho-sung personally went down to the field and led the rebellion and tried to suppress the rebellion, but he himself was caught in an enemy ambush and was wounded in the deaf and back injuries, which greatly demoralized the army. In comparison, the vanguard of the rebels, who stopped the Korean army and demonstrated accurate and rapid marksmanship, was ironically Lieutenant Kim Ji-hoe, who was trained by the ROK Armed Forces.[583] In addition, the rebels, under their systematic guidance, always acted as a concentrated army, defeating the

---

[581])『동아일보』,1949 년 5 월 8 일「전라남도 경찰국, 여순사건 이후 6 개월간 경찰관 509 명을 파면」.

[582])『서울신문』,1948 년 10 월 29 일「박승훈 제 14 연대장, 여수에서 탈출하여 사건 경위를 설명」.

[583])『국제신문』,1948 년 11 월 2 일「여순사건,<지리산 전투 종군기 : 방경린」.

Korean army one by one through ambushes and ambushes, and confronted the Korean army in a form close to regular warfare.[584585] In the end, due to incompetence and lack of qualifications, Chae Byung-duk was appointed as the Chief of Staff of the Army in place of Song Ho-sung, who showed the current state of the Republic of Korea, and took charge of the case.(724) However, due to the lack of various resources, the government was pushing for the construction of a state with ideological resources at the forefront, so even Chae Byung-duk, who was urgently deployed to solve the urgent problem of national security, was a military officer with no combat experience. At that time, Chae Byung-duk was able to become the chief of staff of the Army, surpassing senior officers from the Japanese army, such as Kim Seok-won, who had a lot of combat experience, because he had a good relationship with the nationalists. In other words, Yi Chong-chan asked Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yi Beom-seok, who had begun the election of the chief of staff, "Why don't you replace Chae Byung-deok, who is popular among some national activists?" [586] According to some studies, Chae Byung-duk was a member of the Founding Alliance organized by Yeo Woon-hyung before liberation and had promised to supply weapons to Yeo Woon-hyung and the Founding Alliance in case of emergency.[587]In this way, the chief officer of the army, who was supposed to suppress the rebellion in the country, was suppressed by the rebels, but the new chief officer who was sent to replace him was also a mechanic with no combat experience,

[584])사사끼, 1977. pp. 386.
[585])『서울신문』,1948 년 10 월 29 일「채병덕 육군참모총장, 여순사건 경위에 대하여 담화를 발표」.
[586])강성재,『참군인 이종찬 장군』, (서울: 동아일보사, 1987), pp. 30.
[587])정병준,『몽양 여운형 평전: 머리가 희일수록 혁명 더욱 붉어졌다』, (서울: 한울, 1985), pp. 103~104.

because the reality of the Republic of Korea was weighed down by the nationalist cause.

On the other hand, the summari action of the army and police deployed to subdue the rebels resulted in innocent victims, and[588] an urgent motion was submitted to the National Assembly demanding a retrial of those who have been wrongfully sentenced and are serving prison sentences. In other words, they requested a retrial of those who passively participated in the People's Congress at the time of the rebellion or wore armbands, and who were serving severe sentences of 10 or 20 years, even though they had not actually committed any crimes.[589] In addition, according to the report of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang at the time, the South Korean government's

According to official reports, 1,170 people who participated in the Yeosu and Suncheon uprisings were shot by a military tribunal between October 12 and November 2, 1948, but it was believed that more than 10,000 were actually executed.

All of them.[590]Despite the fact that executions were carried out unofficially, not by the state, but by private violence, the state could not control them.

The fact that such harsh punishments and executions of simple participants were carried out on an informal basis shows that the state did not have a unified command system for state violence, which was not properly established. At that time[591], the Republic of Korea was a country where the

---

588)『경향신문』,1949 년 10 월 7 일「제 5 회 14 차 국회본회의, 여수·순천사건 당시 즉결처분 문제 등에 대해 질의응답」.

589)『국도신문』,1950 년 5 월 25 일「서민호 외 19 의원, 여순사건 복역자 재심을 요구하는 긴급 동의안을 제 출」.

590)박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 9 월 15 일 대사 쉬띄꼬프가 스딸린에게 보낸 극비 보고서: 3) 남조선 정부 의 치안」, pp. 338.

591)『서울신문』,1949 년 1 월 29 일「곡성군 시국대책위원회 대표, 여순사건에 따른 주민부담 경감을 호소」.

executive power was completely out of reach to the people, to the extent that the central government could not control it at all, even though the people were strongly opposed to the wrongly exercised state violence. Therefore, Even the president knew that in order to improve the situation of human rights violations committed in the name of homeland defense, it was necessary to unify the investigative agencies[592, but] this could not be realized.

On the other hand, in the post-incident investigation, the poor ability and administrative efficiency of the state were also clearly revealed. At that time, the total amount of damage in the Yeosun incident was estimated to be about 10 billion won, and the number of victims and the number of people in the case were estimated to be about 10,000 in 1,600 houses[593, but no] proper remedy was put in place until a year later. In fact, according to recently released documents, President Rhee Seung-man ordered the release of the person on December 24, 1948 in connection with the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents, and the person with the same name was released from prison due to an administrative mistake by a public official, and it was not until seven months later that the court ruled on someone else. There was even a laughable incident in which the minister was instructed to report on what action had been taken against the erroneous official.[594)] These countries are surprisingly quick to dig up the damage of the incident.

---

592)『국도신문』,1949 년 10 월 8 일「이승만 대통령, 수사기관 일원화를 찬성하는 등 국정현안에 대해 기자문 답」.

593)『독립신문』,1948 년 11 월 9 일「여순사건, 여수의 근황 : 잿터 에서 방황하는 실신한 읍민들」.

594)박태균, 2010「이승만 대통령 시기 공개문서를 통해 본 1950 년대 대한민국 정부의 정책과 그 특징: 자 료 해제: 실책 공무원 처벌 보고 요청에 관한 건(AA0000059)」, pp. 34.

By being evil and quantifying, it was possible to formulate a rough policy plan and allocate a budget[595], but in the face of calls for the resignation of the entire Cabinet, the new state was very limited in what it could do. Even Hwang Doo-yeon, who was wrongfully victimized,[596] was also on the verge of emphasizing that the people should help him to run the government properly.

As our National Assembly, as representatives of the people, we are the government that we have established for the government, so to this government This person thinks that we should all work together to help each other and work together so that we can serve as a government.[597]

However, although it is true that the lack of capacity of the state basically aggravated and exacerbated the situation in Yeosu and Suncheon, behind the outbreak was the public anger against the officials who were still employed in the administrative organs for cooperation with Japan. At that time, public opinion also demanded the liquidation of leftist sympathizers in the military and police sectors as a solution to the problem, but pointed out that it was necessary to reconcile public sentiment through the liquidation of pro-Japanese remnants. The following is an article in the Hansung Ilbo of November 5, 1948.

However, we would like to take this opportunity to reiterate that while there should be a careful consideration of the formation of the Armed Forces, it is

595)『제 2 회 국회속기록 제 13 호』,1949 년 1 월 25 일「이윤영 사회부장관, 여순사건·제주사건 피해·구호상황 에 대해 제 2 회 13 차 국회본회의에서 보고」, pp. 243-245.

596)당시, 여수, 순천 사건의 내막을 수사하였던 선우종원은 순천지검 검사 박찬현과 국회의원 황두연의 희 생을 안타까웠다고 회고하면서 거룩한 희생으로까지 표현하였다. 선우종원. 1986. pp.110.

597)『제 1 회 국회속기록 제 93 호』,1948 년 11 월 1 일「제 1 회 93 차 국회본회의, 여순사건에 가담했다고 보도 된 황두연의원이 출석하여 경위를 보고」, pp. 723~733.

also necessary to reorganize the police and other government offices, and to make wise personnel in their appointments, so that the people can trust the authorities. Therefore, first of all, the administrative organs should completely wipe out the malicious pro-Japanese remnants and appoint a large number of conscientious and patriotic figures to ease the general public's mind. This is not limited to the immediate handling of the rebellion case, but it will be the first task in dealing with all the problems that will come your way. The fact that no one other than a pure young man dares to go out on a limb at the risk of water is something that has been experienced many times since the liberation, that is, the government authorities should take this opportunity to completely eliminate the impure government and at the same time recruit a large number of ardent patriotic troops to the government or the armed forces who will take on the shoulders of the DPRK government in the future.[598)]

Therefore, it is necessary to eliminate a certain amount of unemployed management even in order to protect the people's feelings. On the contrary, by shifting the blame to other places, such as blaming Kim Koo and other members of the Korea Independence Party, the internal conflict was amplified[599]. However, the reason why Yi Beom-seok mentioned Kim Koo and other members of the Korea Independence Party was an excessive reaction to deny rumors that he might collude with the provisional government to seize power, and to reject the movement to unify right-wing youth organizations, which was being promoted by Yi Cheong-chun's Daedong Youth League. In other words, As national security became more prominent, the country, which was

[598])『한성일보』,1948 년 11 월 5 일「여순사건 처리에 중요한 것은 친일잔재 처단과 민심 수습」.

[599]) 당시 국무총리 겸 국방장관 이범석은 1948 년 10 월 21 일 기자회견에서 “이 사건은 정권욕에 눈이 어두 운 몰락한 극우정객이 공산당과 결탁해 벌인 정치적 음모이며 국군 내의 주모자는 여수 연대장이었던 오 동기”라고 주장한다. 부일 세력이었던 수도 경찰청장 김태선 역시 이에 가세하여 10 월 1 일 발생한 ‘혁명 의용군 사건’과 이를 연관시켜 김구와 한국독립당의 사주를 받은 오동기의 주동 하에 여수, 순천 사건이 발생하였다는 쪽으로 사건을 몰아간다.

desperate for survival, came into direct conflict with the nationalist trend and antagonized it.

As mentioned above, the Korean National Youth Organization serves as a hideout for left-wing youth organizations.

Since Yi Bum-suk, who had joined the provisional government along with Yeo Woon-hyung,[600] was also classified as a member of the Kim family[601], there were constant rumors that Yi Bum-suk might collude with former members of the provisional government led by the Korean National Youth League to stage a coup d'état. In fact, foreigners at the time were already assessing that Yi Beom-suk had built a political organization comparable to President Rhee Seung-man on the basis of the 1 million Korean National Youth League.[602] In other words, in the elections to the Constituent Assembly on May 10, 1948, most of the candidates of the far-right youth organizations who made great contributions by carrying out anti-communist struggle activities in earnest were defeated, while a large number of candidates from the background of the Daedong Youth League and the Korean National Youth League, which did not carry out anti-communist struggle activities but were organized by former members of the Provisional Government and had nationalist legitimacy, were elected. Led by the fact that Yi Cheong-cheon of the Daedong Youth League was elected with the highest number of votes, and the Daedong Youth League[603] became the third largest force in the National Assembly, the Korean National Youth Association secured 20 seats in the National Assembly against the backdrop of the petition.742)

---

[600])이범석의 임시정부 입문은 여운형을 직접 찾아간 이범석 자신이 여운형과 상해까지 동행함으로써 이루 어졌다. 이경남,『경향신문』,1987 년 9 월 12 일「청년운동 반 세기 (40)조선민족청년단」.

[601])이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 8 월 19 일「청년운동 반 세기 (41)조선민족청년단」.

[602])이경남,『경향신문』,1987 년 9 월 9 일「청년운동 반세기: (44)조선민족청년단」.

[603])류상영,1989,중 95 쪽.; 이경남,『분단시대의 청년운동 하』,(서울: 삼성개발,1989), pp. 196-197.

However, since the establishment of the government, in order to strengthen the Armed Forces, officers from the Liberation Army

Yi Beom-suk, who had enlisted his students in the army and founded the Hoguk Army, stubbornly refused to allow the Korean National Youth League to participate in the Korean Youth League, which was formed on December 19, 1948, by uniting all right-wing youth organizations on the basis of ideological homogeneity of the anti-communist struggle in the wake of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents. In fact, rumors were circulating such as "There are two presidents in the country, the real president is Lee Beom-seok, and Rhee Seung-man is only the nominal president" and "There are many officers of the Liberation Army in the military who were in the country, so they don't know what will happen." Therefore, When Rhee demanded that Yi Beom-suk choose between his position as head of the State Council and the Korean National Youth League, Yi announced on January 20, 1949 that the Korean National Youth League, which at that time had 1.3 million members, would be voluntarily disbanded.[604)]

Nonetheless, the organization of the Korean National Youth League remains firmly alive

In 1952, when a political crisis arose due to the Pusan political upheaval, which led to the resignation of Vice President Kim Seong-so and his own impeachment, Rhee appointed Yi Beom-seok as Minister of Internal Affairs. However, soon after, Rhee Beom-seok became the vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party and ran for vice president based on the Korean National Youth League, which had grown rapidly to 400 million, and the members of the Korean National Youth League also threatened Rhee's own political position and the authority of the official

[604])이경남, 『경향신문』,1987 년 9 월 23 일「청년운동 반세기: (46)조선민족청년단」.

state organization in various parts of the Free Democratic Party and the state apparatus, and in 1953 Rhee ordered the official elimination of the Korean National Youth League.[605)]

4. The National Security Law and Democracy

On the other hand, as the existence of the new state became uncertain due to the crisis of national security, the society also took extreme measures to save the country beyond the legal dimension. In other words, on 1 November, just four days after Rhee Seung-man issued a statement ordering a thorough search for those involved in the Yeosun rebellion[606, the] National Assembly's Legislation and Judiciary Committee drafted the National Security Law for the purpose of defending national sovereignty and preventing interference with the homeland defense and the national constitution.[607] As a result, a motion to abolish it was proposed by lawmakers from the minority faction who had advocated the withdrawal of US troops, and[608] the National Security Law, which was openly advocated by the Dong-A Ilbo and the Chosun Ilbo[609, and] even the proponents were sufficiently concerned about the possible abolition[610 of the law], was finally implemented. And the reason for this is that the limitations of the Republic of Korea have deepened to such an extent,

---

605)Record Group 319 Office of the Chief of Military History Investigative Record Repository(IRR) Box#327/ Case# XA531861 Pom Suk Yi, 중앙일보 현대사연구소 편, 1996. pp. 648.

606)『수산경제신문』,1948 년 11 월 5 일「대통령, 여순사건 가담자의 철저한 색출을 지시하는 담화를 발표」.

607)『자유신문』, 1948 년 11 월 3 일「국회 법제사법위원회, 국가보안법 초안을 기초」.

608)『서울신문』, 1948 년 11 월 17 일「제 1 회 105 차 국회본회의, 국가보안법 폐기동의안을 놓고 논전」.

609)『조선일보", 1948 년 11 월 14 일「사설 : 국가보안법을 배격함」.

610)『동아일보』, 1948 년 12 월 3 일「사설 : 국가보안법 운용에 신중을 기하라」.

and it has already been widely judged that its existence as a modern nation is in danger.

This is evident in a statement by Attorney General Yi Yin on December 2, 1948, in which he stated the purpose of the implementation of the National Security Law, which was to prohibit all illegal acts of sabotage of the government and thus lay the foundation for the state.

To consolidate the foundation of the state by prohibiting all associations and groups that deny the existence of the central government of the Republic of Korea, which has been established by the consensus of 30 million people and the resolution of the United Nations, or to recognize and follow the unlawful destruction of the government or the puppet regime other than the government of the Republic of Korea.[611]

For example, the Republic of Korea, which is just taking its first steps as a modern nation,

They recognized that it could be destroyed by the forces that challenged the wealth. On the other hand, pro-democracy lawmakers Rep. Cho Han-baek and Rep. Kim In-sik respectively said, "The Republic of Korea is neither a complete Republic of Korea nor a healthy Republic of Korea," and "If we do not enact such laws for the sake of the restoration of our country, there will be no way for the new Republic of Korea to survive." [612]), showing the leadership's urgent awareness that all measures must be taken to address the imperfection of the Republic of Korea and its future in which its survival as a nation is uncertain, transcending the legal and ethical dimensions.

---

[611])『서울신문』, 1948 년 12 월 2 일,「이인 법무부장관, 국가보안법 시행에 대해 담화를 발표」.

[612])『제 1 회 국회속기록 제 105 호』,1948 년 11 월 16 일,「제 1 회 105 차 국회본회의, 신익희 국회의장의 국가 보안법 상정과정 설명과 찬반 토론」, pp. 945~953.

At the same time, the government announced on November 2 and 3, 1948 that the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents

When the 20-member National Assembly Committee on Municipal Measures and Probation resolved to dissolve all youth organizations in Korea and form the Patriotic Army, on December 19, 1948, the Korean Youth League, which united all right-wing youth organizations, was established to serve as a paramilitary organization for national security. In other words, they were trying to protect the sovereignty and the homeland by helping the national army and the police to ensure public safety, and by training militias for nationwide organizations and supporting the national army.[613] In fact, the Korean Youth Corps has expanded its organization nationwide to include male and female regular members.

In August 1949, 720 young cadres were selected to enter the infantry school to complete short-term military training, and were commissioned as second lieutenants in the reserve to conduct military training for the Korean Youth Corps.[614][615] In this way, the Youth Defense Corps was established to carry out the duties of the Reserve Army, and on April 28, 1950, the Minbo Corps, which had been criticized for its many failures, was disbanded and incorporated into the Special Unit of the Youth Defense Corps.754)

On the other hand, the establishment of the Korean Youth League was promoted and all right-wing youth organizations were united, but only Yi Beom-seok's Korean National Youth League refused to do so, so Rhee Seung-man ordered the forcible dissolution of the Korean Youth League, as described

[613])『조선일보』,1949 년 1 월 16 일.
[614])육군본부 군사연구실,『한국전쟁 시 학도의용군』(육군본부: 1994), pp. 49.
[615])『자유신문』,1950 년 6 월 14 일.

above, and thus had the political effect of checking Yi Beom-seok and Cho Sun-min Youth, who were threatening his power. Immediately after the Constituent Assembly elections, members of the National People's Congress for Independence and some members of the Daedong Youth League, led by the Korean Independence Party, were pushing for the formation of a first party with Rhee Seung-man as the supreme leader, but since their ultimate goal was to appoint Rhee Seung-man as the head of the country and form a government centered on former members of the Provisional Government, Rhee made a statement rejecting him.[616][617] Afterwards, Rhee Seung-man appointed Lee Cheong-chun, the leader of the Daedong Youth League, who was a rival of Yi Beom-seok, as the minister of the non-appointment and accepted the bicameral system, thus nullifying the Cabinet responsibility system proposal submitted by the members of the Daedong Youth League, and at the same time checking the rapidly rising Yi Beom-seok.756) However, the Korean Youth League, in its declaration of formation, said, "Dr. Rhee's command

> Resolve to contribute to the establishment of world peace by obliterating communism and urgently completing the reunification of the North and South[618] through absolute obedience, and it became necessary to present a guiding ideology for nation-building that was appropriate for this, and this was expressed through Il-minism.

In other words, insurgents such as partisans inside are sponsored and armed by North Korea from the outside.

> As national security emerged as a top national task by dispatching government officials, Rhee Seung-man refused to exchange economic affairs because he thought it was impossible to achieve reunification

[616])『경향신문』,1948 년 5 월 23 일「이승만, 선 국권회복, 후 신당건설 천명」.
[617])『대동신문』,1949 년 1 월 13 일「내외정평: 개헌운동과 정당, 각파 세력의 동향주목 (1)-(2)」.
[618])『경향신문』,1948 년 12 월 21 일.

through dialogue and compromise with the North Korean leaders[619, and Yi Cheol-won, the director of the Office of Public Affairs, also described the national anthem of the Republic of Korea in October 1949 as a decisive war against communism, and ideological resources representing national security became necessary at the national level, but many people still preferred the content of Sammyunism, which had a nationalist cause and legitimacy that was familiar to them from a long time, rather than the ideology of national security.

However, the trifecta, which emphasizes left-right cooperation, is a left-wing policy to protect national security.

Since there was a lack of an ideology suitable for the national and contemporary needs of the time, and it was not suitable for the struggle against interests, it sought to spread the one-democracy doctrine that is faithful to national security at the level of the people's movement with the new doctrine of the Three Kinds of Doctrine, and to use it as a bridgehead for ideological power resources for nation-building. Seo Jung-seok, who evaluated Il-Democratism as having a fascist character, also

Il-democracy is evaluated as a transitional ideology put forward in the context of the times immediately after the establishment of the government, before anti-communism emerged in earnest. In other words, according to him, Il-democracy is a political logic put forward by the followers of Yang Woo-woo and Ahn Ho-sang immediately after the establishment of the government in order to unite as one people to lay the foundation for democracy and to oppose the communists.759)

In this way, Il-democracy includes the content of national security based on tripartite principles.

619)『동아일보』,1949 년 10 월 8 일.

It contained almost all the ideological resources needed for the building of a women's nation, and when the government began to spread democracy at the level of a national movement, right-wing youth organizations and student defenders groups used it in the context of national security.

In fact, on April 6, 1949, the Government Press Office launched the weekly newspaper "Jubo" [760] and distributed about 2,000 copies every week to various institutions in the country, including the article "What is Il-Democracy?" and Nos. 3 and 4, which were published under the title "Il-Democracy and Nationalism," directly addressed Il-Democracy at the forefront. In addition, in 1949, the Ilminism Promotion Association was formed, consisting of Honorary Chairman Lee Beom-seok, advisors Jung In-bo, Ahn Ho-sang, Bae Eun-hee, Yoon Chi-young, Yoon Bo-seon, and Kim Hyo-seok, and the right-wing youth group of Il-Min-ism.

---

[759] Seo Jung-seok, 『Rhee Seungman's Political Ideology』, (Seoul: History and Criticism, 2005).

[760] Office of Public Affairs, "Celebrating the First Issue," Bulletin No. 52, (Seoul: Editorial Division, Publication Bureau, Ministry of Public Affairs, 1950), pp. 2-4.

It was widely disseminated around this.

Yu Hwa-cheong, who was the head of the right-wing youth group of the Korean Independence People's Association Youth Group and was at the forefront of the spread of Japanese democracy at the time, pointed out that "Il-democracy is not something that can be the party of any political party, but should be developed as a people[620's movement"]), and Bae Eun-hee argued that Il-democracy is a combination of national self-determination, economic equality, and democracy based on a single

---

620)『동아일보』,1948 년 10 월 23 일「대한독립촉성국민회 간부회, 일민주의 당시화 논란」.

nation.[621622Yun] Byung-koo, an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of Public Affairs, who will serve as chairman of the Il-Democracy Promotion Association, also asserted that "30 million people should be reborn through the one-man democracy that President Yi advocates," and proposed the three principles of Il-Democracy: (1) freedom of all people based on justice and humanitarianism, (2) equality of all nations, which has the duty to work together for the survival and development of the whole nation and the establishment of a democratic country from their respective standpoint, eliminating class distinctions between business, agriculture, public and business, and (3) philanthropy, in which those who have knowledge give knowledge to those who do not know, and the rich seek relief to their poor compatriots.763)

Rhee Seung-man himself announced through the Seoul Central Broadcasting Station on April 20, 1949 that the Ilminju

According to the discourse on the spirit and the national movement, Il-Democratism sought to establish a political party under the four platforms in order to reject communism and lay the permanent foundation for democracy, but since its activities were minimal and partisan strife was expected, it was argued that it wanted to develop its doctrine first, and the four platforms were as follows:

(1) Through the absorption of democracy that advocates equality for all people transcending class and clan,

(2) Establish the foundation, and (2) enjoy equal rights and welfare without discrimination between rich and poor, and for this purpose, seek to distribute land and land for a fee. In addition, the proceeds from the sale of land should be

621)『주간서울』,1945 년 12 월 5 일「나를 왜 일민주의자라 하나: 배은희」.

622)『자유신문』,1949 년 4 월 14 일「윤병구 외무부, 공보처 고문, 일민주의에 입각한 민족통일을 주장하는 담화를 발표」.

invested in industry to contribute to individuals and the national economy. (3) Achieve equality between men and women. (4) Eliminate regional discrimination and break down the formation of partisanship that pursues the interests of a particular group to promote the common interests of 30 million people.[623)]

On the other hand, the forces of the North Korean army, consisting of the People's Army, the Security Service, and the Interior Secretariat, It was estimated that there were about 130,000 troops in total, but since Korea's economic power could not sustain even 6-70,000 troops, the Student Protection Corps was established in December 1949 under the leadership of Ahn Ho-sang[624, Minister of Education.] In just nine months, the student defense corps has grown to about 270,000 members, and by adopting drill subjects as official subjects[625, they] will play a major role in solidifying the students' ideological inclinations to the cause of building a new nation. [626] In other words, as mentioned above, Ahn Ho-sang, who was an advisor to the Il-Democracy Promotion Council, emphasized nationalist Il-Democratism with the aim of dismantling the communist ideology by combining the Sammyunism and the Hwarang spirit that led to the unification of the three countries.

Ahn Ho-sang's Il-Democracy advocated a kind of North-Punishment that aimed to collapse the communist ideology by incorporating the organization of the Hakdo Hoguk Corps, which inherited the Hwarang spirit, as follows.

---

623)『경향신문』,1949 년 4 월 22 일,「이승만 대통령, 일민주의 정신과 민족운동에 관하여 담화를 발표」.

624)『서울신문』,1949 년 3 월 9 일,「서울시 학도호국단 결성」.

625)『서울신문』,1949 년 12 월 6 일,「안호상 문교부 장관, 학도호국단원 수는 27 만 명이며 교련을 정과목으 로 할 것이라고 기자회견」.

626)『국도신문』,1949 년 12 월 31 일,「안호상 문교부 장관, 학도호국단 이외의 학생단체는 해산해야 한다고 경고」.

First of all, Il-democracy is politically about overcoming classism and ensuring that all rights and righteousness

It pursues a uniform politics that allows people to enjoy nothingness equally, which reflects the ideology of the Three Kinds of Principles, which guarantees equal political rights. Next, we strive to nurture skilled people who learn one skill at a time, and this is also a development of the educational spirit of Sammyunism, which emphasized unemployment education.

C. In addition, the economic ideology of Il-democracy rejected the capitalist economy based on laissez-faire or the communist economic ideology based on the planned economy, and pursued a unified community economy in which the rich and poor lived well together, and a fair economy in which each individual was treated equally according to the quantity and quality of work. In other words, the economic ideology of Il-democracy also re-describes the economic ideology of Sammyunism, which aimed for an equal economy, by digesting it in Ahn Ho-sang's own language.[627] Lastly, Ahn Ho-sang wanted to boost the morale of the Silla army through personal sacrifice and link Hwarang Gwanchang and Hwarangdo, which achieved the unification of the three kingdoms with the support of the powerful Tang Dynasty, with the political situation of the time. In other words, even though they knew that it was practically impossible to punish the North in a situation where they lacked all resources and were inferior to the North Korean army supported by the Soviet Union, they made up for the lack of national resources through the dedication of the young people and at the same time, through their sacrifices, they tried to prevent the withdrawal of the

[627])안호상, 『일민주의의 본바탕』, (서울: 일민주의 연구원, 1950). pp. 24-85.

USFK from the United States and expand the US intervention on the Korean peninsula to achieve reunification.

In this way, they are moving forward in earnest with a new orientation of national security.

Prior to this, various efforts were made to overcome the vulnerability of insufficient material and economic resources by using Il-Democratism as an ideological bridgehead, and in fact, in July 1949, 36 members of the Students' Protection Corps were dispatched to rural areas, the 38th parallel, and the Ongjin combat zone[628]. In addition, this has spread to the whole society, and activities have been carried out in the private sector to make up for the weakness of the country's insufficient material and economic resources. In other words, the campaign for the dedication of the aircraft for the development of the North Korean Punishment Movement for the Restoration of Actual Land[629] and the issuance of patriotic bonds were carried out by the Korean Youth Corps and the Students' Patriotic Brigade, It was carried out in almost all fields, including members of the State Council and civil servants, until the Korean War.

For example, through the enactment of the National Security Law and the formation of the Korean Youth League and the Student Protection Bureau, the Korean society tried to unify national opinion and concentrate all resources on the ideology of national security in order to survive as a nation in earnest and to accomplish the task of building a modern nation in a short time. Of course, in the past, almost all political groups tried to maximize the ideological power resources in the process of nation-building by satisfying nationalist causes and acquiring political

628)『국도신문』,1949 년 7 월 15 일.

629)당시 국가 사회주의적 경제정책에 반감을 가지고 있었던 주한 미국 대사관은 항공기 헌납운동을 전술한 것처럼 일종의 사기극으로 간주하고 있었다.

legitimacy by emphasizing the tripartite ideology of the provisional government, but as national security gradually came to be prioritized, the transitional Japanese democracy emerged as an ideological power resource.

But, basically, these movements were the result of the fact that the state at the time of July 1949

Despite the fact that the tax collection rate was only 24% due to the lack of administrative capacity, and it was done for the purpose of solving the problem of national security, which is the first stage of state building, by mobilizing insufficient human, material and economic resources in the name of ideological resources, the state solved the scarce resources through the so-called voluntary donations of quasi-state organizations, and as the state resolved the scarce resources through the so-called voluntary donations of quasi-state organizations, the authority of the quasi-state organizations exceeded the authority of the official state apparatus, as already mentioned above, and serious adverse effects occurred in the management of state affairs. In addition, as the problem of resource shortage intensified after the Korean War, Rhee Seung-man ran the country through the excessive use of ideological resources such as anti-communism and anti-Japan, so the people became irritated with the abuse of ideological resources that were used as imputations, and their value plummeted.

Therefore, through the ideological resource of Il-democracy, human, material, and economic resources

The youth groups and the student protection groups gradually disappeared, and the Ilminju Party also came to an end. However, as similar acts were inherited by power-oriented governments, only negative images and memories of Il-democracy were reproduced and reduced to the point of contempt, and the original purpose of Il-

Democracy was forgotten in history as it mobilized scarce human, material, and economic resources in the name of ideological power.

5. Land Reform

On the other hand, President Rhee Seung-man, who played the role of consul mediator, tried to improve the material and economic resources of the fragile state by cultivating the bourgeoisie by promoting land reform from a neutral standpoint, and to gain political legitimacy through the support of the peasants, who made up the majority of the population. Through this, it was possible to reflect the nationalist demands in the process of state building, which had been undermined by the continued appointment of bureaucrats due to the limitation of human resources and the issue of national security, and to compensate for the ideological power resources to some extent. However, this process was also made possible by advocating the Sammyunism, which was the nation-building ideology of the Provisional Government, which had political legitimacy among the people at the time.

The First Republic pursued a policy of land reform based on expropriation and distribution of compensation. These are 1. Succession of the line of the U.S. military administration and the Provisional Government of Shanghai and Chongqing, 2. It was a response to the Democratic People's Party (DPP) challenging its power, and 3. Accept the arguments of the centrist and progressive forces and use them as their own support, 4. It was motivated by the intention of blocking the offensive of North Korea and

the left through land reform.[630] Land reform was a reservoir of all problems at the time, as Park pointed out[631][632], but as the first Vice President Lee Si-yong said on February 3, 1949, it was also inevitable for the realization of democracy, even though the timing and method had to be appropriate to the actual situation of our country.773)

On the other hand, North Korea, which completed land reform in 1946, also has a large land reform

Recognizing that this was one of the necessary measures for the communization of the Republic of Korea, it was decided to establish a land reform legislative committee headed by Hong Myong-hui and submit the land reform bill to the Supreme People's Committee and the Cabinet by the end of May 1949.[633] Therefore, it was a task that had to be dealt with urgently, as it would not be able to absorb the arguments of the centrist and progressive forces calling for nationalist state-building and to block the leftist offensive on land reform in North Korea. In addition, Rhee was able to succeed in cultivating a new ruling class that could inherit the line of the U.S. military administration and the Provisional Government of Shanghai and Chongqing, and to counter the Democratic Nationalist Party (DPP) challenging its authority.

The U.S. military government also sold land owned by former Japanese nationals that belonged to the government.

After deciding in 1947, 487,621 acres of land had been sold before the May 10, 1948 elections. As a result, the number of peasants, which in 1945 constituted about 75 percent of the population, was reduced to

---

630)백영철, 『제 1 공화국과 한국 민주주의 : 의회정치를 중심으로』,(서울: 나남출판, 1995).

631)박명림, 『한국 1950: 전쟁과 평화』,(서울: 나남출판, 2002). pp. 7.

632)박종효 편역., 2010,「1949 년 2 월 3 일(동아일보)」, pp. 367.

633)박종효 편역, 2010,「1949 년 6 월 23 일 조선 주재 소련대사 쉬띄꼬프가 외무성 극동 제 1 과장 페도렌꼬 에게 보낸 북조선 내각결정과 정당 사회단체에 관한 신문보도: 가) 내각결정」, pp. 354.

about 33 percent. This weakened the influence of communism among the peasants and strengthened their cooperation in the elections.[634]The reform [of] farmland carried out by the US military administration was the only way to resist the leftist forces, and it was an important means to ensure that the South Korean system could survive the withdrawal of the US troops without being overthrown. In other words, it strengthened the legitimacy of political power by relieving the discontent of the rural society to some extent, and in the long run it served as a factor in making the political form of the peasants more conservative[635].

In the first place, the US military government intended to transform the landlord class, which had been severely damaged and weakened by the defeat of the Japanese imperialists, into capitalists in order to perform a new economic function because it was necessary to unite with the capitalist forces in the absence of various institutional mechanisms. [636][637] Regarding the achievements of the US military government in the fields of agriculture and land, Park Chan-pyo acknowledges that the US military government carried out the work of counter-revolution to crush the people's demand for radical change, as well as the work of liberal reform of the anti-feudal system. He draws attention to the issue raised by Jeon Sang-sang, who pointed out that the formation and administration of the state under the US military administration was the work of counter-revolution, but not a simple return to the old system. For the sake of social stability, the dissolution of the old ruling class through the distribution of land and the full-scale

[634])핸더슨. 2000. pp.244.
[635])이혜숙. 2008. pp.579-580.
[636])이혜숙. 2008, pp.596-597.
[637])박찬표, 2007. pp. 21.

expansion of citizenship through universal suffrage led to the formation of a national political community.778)

The land reform policy of the First Republic, which was carried out in response to the policy of the US military government, also contributed greatly to the improvement of the power of the state's infrastructure by cultivating a bourgeois class capable of taking charge of the country's economy and leading to an upward leveling of the people. Through the promotion of the land reform policy, it integrated the people who had remained in the pre-modern stage into the people and laid the foundation for the formation of a modern nation-state, and by cultivating a bourgeois class that could take charge of the country's economy and leading to the upward leveling of the people, it improved the power of the substructure of the state in a relatively short time. In 1949, when 70 percent of the economically active population was farmers, and more than 80 percent of them were tenant or own-owned farmers, the distribution of agricultural land was a very important issue.

In the sense that they were [638]allocated farmland in accordance with the Agrarian Land Reform Act passed by the Council of Ministers on February 6, 1949[639], their sense of belonging to the Republic of Korea increased), and the national identity of the Republic of Korea was laid down by the agrarian land reform, and the nationalization was achieved through the education of farmers who sympathized with the sense of belonging and national identity. Suh Sang-il, who was the chairman of the industrial committee of the first National

638)『조선일보』, 1949 년 2 월 6 일「농지개혁법안, 국무회의를 통과」.

639)실제로 이승만이 추진한 농지개혁 조치에 따라 총 소작지 면적의 40%에 해당하는 땅이 유상매입, 유상 분배의 원칙에 따라 소작농들에게 분배되었다. 정부분배 농지의 45%가와 지주처분 농지의 55%가 자작 화 됨으로써 해방 당시 35%에 불과했던 자작지 면적의 비율이 92.4%라는 획기적 수치로 증대되었다.

Assembly at the time, called the agrarian reform bill an expression of a legal social and economic revolution.

I was insisting.[640] By comparison, what was done to the landlords was relatively very meagre, and even this was almost wiped out by the skyrocketing prices and losses caused by the war.

All of them.[641] This was followed by the unintended collapse of the landlord class, the weakening of the base of the conservative party against this backdrop, and the strengthening of the people's desire to rise in social status. In fact, most of the landowners of the Japanese colonial era failed to convert into industrial capitalists and their status declined, and the emerging inherited class, which had relatively little to do with them, emerged as the prototype of the Korean capitalist class. In this way, the agrarian reform, which was carried out in earnest after the establishment of the First Republic, provided the basis for overcoming the semi-feudal landlord land ownership and establishing peasant land ownership.

So what kind of people came from the core of the emerging capitalist class? The case of South Korea shows that, unlike in most developing countries, there is not a relatively large proportion of people from landed countries, but instead the people who were only small shareholders, small traders, and small entrepreneurs have transformed into the dominant capitalist class.[642)] Minse Ahn Jae-hong has a weak material and economic base, so the bourgeoisie explains the situation at the time when it was not formed.

---

[640])『서울신문』,1949 년 3 월 9 일「서울신문사, 농지개혁법 초안에 대한 좌담회를 개최」.

[641])핸더슨. 2000. pp. 314.

[642])이혜숙. 2008. pp. 522-527.

In Korea, out of a total of 530,000 landowners, there are only 2,200 landowners who own more than 200 hectares of land, and among them, there are very few Korean landowners. In addition, the power of national capital is also weak.[643)]

In addition, Suh Sang-il, general secretary of the Democratic Party of Korea, who led the agrarian land reform plan as chairman of the National Assembly's Industrial Committee, also stated in an interview with the Seoul Shimbun in March 1949 that he had the following:

I am neither a landowner nor a tenant, but in general, there are only about 500 landowners with about 50 hectares (132 acre, 150,000 pyeong).[644)]

Thus, Oliver, who was an aide to Rhee, points out that the problem in Korea at that time was not the oligopoly of land by a small number of landowners, but the shortage of farmland, which averaged only 1 hectare per farmer. According to him, there were only 272 landowners with 100 hectares of land at that time, 5,448 people who owned 5-10 plots, 45,692 owners of 1-2 plots and 213,453 farmers
He owned less than 100 acres of land.(786) If so, is the 50 information that Seo Sang-il refers to as the standard of a landowner?
How much land are you talking about? As will be explained later, people at that time presented 3 information as a standard for educating their children without worry. However, if we apply Oliver's point above, there were a minimum of 5,500 and a maximum of 45,000 people who owned more than 3 pieces. On the other hand, Cummings points out that, according to the classification of Korean scholars, a person who owns about 5 square meters of land than he can cultivate is tended to be called

643)『서울신문』,1945 년 12 월 10 일「안재홍, 민족통일전선 동태에 관한 문답」.
644)『서울신문』,1949 년 3 월 9 일「서울신문사, 농지개혁법 초안에 대한 좌담회를 개최」.

a landowner. 50 points is the standard for land ownership. Based on this, he quoted the Annals of the Korean Economy published in 1948. In 1942, there were 1,628 Koreans with more than 50 hectares.(787) Harvest and earth between 1943, before liberation, and December 1946, after liberation

According to the following table, which analyzes the decline in the number of states and the area under cultivation, the number of landowners who harvested more than 500 seats in 1943 was 1,630, almost the same as the 1,628 in 1942, a year earlier. Therefore, although there is a gap of one year, considering that Japan is waging a war, it can be assumed that 50 is the standard for a large landowner who can harvest more than 500 seats.

	Number of Holding Owners			Harvest (Stone)			Area (Information)		
	1943 year June	194 six years December	Prison Personnel	1943 June	1946 December	Reduction	1943 year June	1946 year December	reduction area
sir	244 pass.	206	38	363,567	282,342	81,22	31,4	3,611	7,886

786)Oliver, 2002. pp. 303.

787)Cumings, 2001. pp. 81.

energy		name	name			5	79		

Chungbuk	30 pass.	13 pass.	17 people	28,612	15,170	13,442	2,531	1,780	851
Chungnam	288 pass.	90 pass.	198 people	314,674	95,509	219,165	24,774	9,297	15.279
Fore North	333 pass.	270 people	63 people	476,327	303,191	173,136	35,136	21,983	13,153
Former M	271 pass.	220 people	51 people	354,919	253,880	101,039	31,660	20,667	10,993
Gyeongbuk	178 pass.	125 people	53 people	208,309	178,365	29,944	20,409	18,603	1,888
Kyungnam	244 pass.	151 people	93 people	327,004	171,270	155,734	23,870	17,606	6,264
Kangwon	42 pass.	9 pass.	33 people	33,430	6,780	26,650	2,773	1,398	1,375
system	1,630 people	1,084 pass.	546 people	2,106,842	1,306,507	800,335	172,731	114,945	57,689

Table V-4) Survey table of large landowners over 500 seats harvest)[645]

[645])조선은행조사부, 『조선경제통계요람』, (서울: 조선은행, 1949); 이혜숙, 2008. .pp. 303.

However, in 1946, the number of large landowners who could harvest more than 500 seats had decreased by about 33.5 percent to 1,084 from three years earlier in 1943, and the harvest and land area had also decreased by 34.2 percent and 33.4 percent, respectively. With a population of about 20 million, landowners in 1946 accounted for only 0.00542% of the population, and in 1943, when productivity and yields were good, the percentage of landowners was only 0.00815%. On the other hand, applying Oliver's statement above, the proportion of people who owned 500275% of the prize was 0.02724% of the population at the time, and the proportion of people who owned 3 or more was between 0.00275% and 0.225% at the maximum. Lastly, the proportion of people who own at least one acre of land was only 0.22846 percent.

The fundamental reason why the proportion of people who owned even 100 hectares of land was only about 0.23 percent, but the proportion of people who owned 500 hectares, which is 500 times the amount of land, was only 0.005 percent of the total population was that the Japanese, who monopolized land during the Japanese colonial period, could not distribute the land abandoned by the general public and were managed by the state, so there was an absolute shortage of farmland that could be cultivated. In fact, Table V-12, quoted above, shows that the land area declined by about 34% in the three years between 1943 and 46.

In the end, this shows that the Korean economy was in an absolutely fragile state at the time, and as Oliver pointed out above, the problem in the country at that time was not the oligopoly of land by a small number of landowners, but the shortage of farmland, which averaged only 1 hectare per farmer. The problem of lack of farmland began to change rapidly in 1947, when the state began to actively deprive civilians of farmland. The following table, which shows the change in the number and proportion of landlords and tenants between 1945-49,

illustrates this fact. The following table shows that the number of landowners and peasants more than doubled from 358 in 1947 to 925 in 1949. By comparison, the number and proportion of tenants have been reduced by almost half.

	Viscount			Tenant land			sum
	paddy field	field	Subtotal	paddy field	field	Subtotal	
1945	363	416	779	895	552	1,447	2,226
horse							
(%)	30.5%	44.2%	35%	69.5%	55.8%	65%	100%
1947	419	448	868	861	509	1,325	2,193
(%)	32.7%	46.8%	39.6%	67.3%	53.2%	60.4%	100%
1949 June	696	544	1,240	540	290	830	2,071
(%)	53.3%	65.5%	59.9%	40.7%	34.7%	40.1%	100%

Table V-5) Change of Landlord and Tenant Land (Unit: 1,000 Information) 789)

In addition, the following table shows the number of land users between 1947 and 1949 and

It shows that the proportion was increasing and the number of landlords and independent farmers was increasing rapidly.

	Landowner, Sharecropper (%)	Cropping (%)	Cauterization (%)	Recipients (%)	sum (%)

End of 1945	285 (13.8%)	716 (34.6%)	1,010(48.9%)	55(2.7%)	2,065 (100%)
End of 1946	337 (15.8%)	810 (37.9%)	924(43 .2%)	66(3.1%)	2,137 (100%)
End of 1947	38 (16.5%)	834 (38.4%)	914(42 .1%)	66(3%)	2,172 (100%)
1949 June	925 (36.2%)	1,022 (40%)	526(21 %)	80(3.1%)	2,553 (100%)

Table V-6) 1945-49 Changes in the number of farmhouses by viscount and sharecropping (unit, No. 1000) 790)

---

[789] 1945, ed., Research Department, Korea Development Bank, Ten Years of the Korean Industrial Economy 1945-1955, (Korea Development Bank Research Department, 1955). In 1947, the Survey Department of the Korean Federation of Finance Unions, 『Korean Agricultural Yearbook』, (Survey Department of the Korea Finance Federation, 1955). 1949, Economic Yearbook, ed., Research Department, Bank of Korea, (Seoul: Bank of Korea Research Department, 1955); Lee, Hye-sook, 2008. pp. 521. Requoted in.

790) 1945-46 by the Research Department of the Bank of Korea, Annals of the Korean Economy, (Bank of Korea, 1948), I-28, 1947 by the Research Department of the Bank of Korea,

On the other hand, the area with the largest number of large landowners was the base of the Democratic Party of Korea.

Since it was North and South Jeolla, if only the Democratic Party of Korea voted in favor of it, land reform could be carried out with much ease. And, as mentioned above, since the agrarian land reform bill was led by Seo Sang-il, the general secretary of the Korean Democratic Party, it was only a strong resistance and had to be passed in the end.

However, in the middle of this process, Rhee's political efforts, which seemed to be trying to satisfy almost all classes, were largely partly important. When the Agrarian Land Reform Bill [791], which was

passed by the State Council on February 6, 1949, was presented to the National Assembly on April 20, 1949, Rhee Seung-man made a gesture that seemed to reflect the position of the landowners to a large extent by emphasizing the industrial capitalization of land capital as the basic direction of the agrarian land reform through a number of speeches. At the same time, however, apart from this, he appointed Cho Bong-am, who was opposed by the Democratic Party of Korea, as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Cho Bong-am appointed centrist people who respected Sammyunism in their political orientation to key positions in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.[792] Thus, the agrarian reform bill that was finally promoted in the First Republic avoided opposition from the peasants and landowners, and reconciled the positions of the two on the point of view of state neutrality. Park Sung-jin points out that in the agrarian land reform law, which was finally decided, Rhee Seung-man was active in the agrarian reform itself, but in the process, it was not the interests of the landowners or farmers, but the government's own understanding of fiscal savings, and that the agrarian reform was both reformist and anti-reform. In addition, If we look at the process of legislating the agrarian reform, it is argued that Rhee tried to break through the resistance of the landlords and the DPP in the National Assembly through a strategy of mass mobilization and pressure, because Rhee was uniting the peasants with himself through the agrarian reform.793)

Economic Yearbook, (Bank of Korea, 1948), I-29, 1949 by the Bank of Korea Research Department, Korean Silver Survey Monthly Report, (Bank of Korea 1953 2 Month), No. 54. pp. 87. ; The 1949 statistics, which were calculated by estimating five counties and several aspects that could not be surveyed due to security concerns, are Lee Hye-sook, 2008. pp. 522. Requoted in.

[791] Chosun Ilbo, February 6, 1949, "Agrarian Reform Bill Passed by State Council."

792) Sungjin Park, 2010. pp. 244-245.
793) Sungjin Park, 2010. pp. 255.

However, Lee pointed out that the implementation of the Agrarian Land Reform Act is an urgent issue.

The fact that he sent a letter to Shin Ik-hee, the chairman of the National Assembly, demanding the speedy passage of the 520 million won special budget for the implementation of the agricultural land reform, and[646] the fact that he issued a statement appealing to the police to immediately report to the police for protection if they were intimidated by some unscrupulous landowners who threatened to sell their farmland illegally under the pretext of their sharecropping rights[647] shows that Rhee Seung-man was putting a lot of effort into the farmland reform.

For example, Rhee Seung-man said that in order to cultivate the bourgeoisie for the construction of a capitalist state,

He judged that land reform was absolutely necessary, and he used his position as a mediator consul to force the state to mediate the positions and interests of the existing landlords and peasants from a neutral standpoint. Furthermore, on January 00, 1950, when Rhee received a report that there was a delay in distributing or selling land even after the implementation of the agrarian land reform, he reported the reason and ordered that the land be sold immediately as well as distributed, thus making efforts to defend the interests of the peasants.[648][649] In other words, through the process of negotiation to provide social reform

646)『국도신문』,1950 년 1 월 19 일「이승만 대통령, 농지개혁 실시 특별예산의 조속 통과를 요구하는 서한을 국회의장에게 발송」.

647)『서울신문』,1949 년 2 월 12 일「이승만 대통령, 불법으로 농지를 강매한 악질지주를 보고하라는 담화를 발표」.

648)박태균,「이승만 대통령 시기 공개문서를 통해 본 1950 년대 대한민국 정부의 정책과 그 특징: 자료해 제- 2) 경제정책 관련 자료들: 농지개혁법 실시 연시(延施)에 관한 건(AA0000103)」, 2010. pp.

649 -15.

through land reform to the peasants, who were the biggest target of the state's mobilization of various resources at the time, Rhee Seung-man sought to acquire the social mechanism necessary for the construction of a modern state, namely political legitimacy, and at the same time to equip the bourgeoisie with an economic mechanism.

Even before the establishment of the government, Rhee Seung-man said that one of his principles was to be of each political party.

By stating that it was an equal distribution, the position of the arbiter was revealed.

When I organized the National People's Assembly and the General Headquarters for National Reunification, I openly selected representative figures from among the members of the Korean People's Party and the Korean German Party, organized a cadre, and tried to unify the country with equal authority, but each of them considered their party relations to be more important than the national movement or national reunification, and it was difficult to achieve the purpose of the group, so it was inevitable that they would be excluded from all but and they were organizing people who were not related to the political party and advancing their affairs. I have insisted on uniting for the sake of the state alone, but since this is unifying, each party has taken this cause for itself and has made it a caution and spirit, and I have not made a public statement, but I have insisted that this is what the coalition cabinet has done.[650)]

Regarding the friction between the General Federation of Labor of Korea and the Korean Youth League even after the establishment of the government.

Rhee Seung-man, who emphasized his role as a mediator by instructing fraternity not to infringe on each other's rights[651, was] able to win the support of the masses in the process of land reform by maximizing the

650)『동아일보』,1952 년 1 월 30 일「국민당 성명에 대한 이승만 박사의 담화 하」.

651)『자유신문』,1950 년 4 월 9 일「이승만 대통령, 대한노동총연맹과 대한청년단의 마찰에 친목을 지령」.

ideological power resources based on the nationalist cause in front of the tripartite system, which is the legacy of the provisional government, and the bureaucrats with political inclination to follow it.

Regarding the ideology of agrarian reform in the early days of the First Republic, a document issued by the Agriculture and Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry states that "the method of paid purchase and distribution was adopted under the sacred spirit of the Hongik people as stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea."[652] Chang Chang-young, who later became the owner of the Korea Times, pointed out that "the issue of agrarian land reform is the practice of the ideology of an equal state as expressed in the Constitution," and[653] other media also expressed that "the agrarian land reform project has been carried out in order to achieve an equal society by giving land to landless peasants in accordance with the principle of economic freedom."[654] In this way, since the First Republic was putting pressure on the landlord class by pushing for agrarian land reform with ideological power resources at the forefront, Suh Sang-il, who was leading the agrarian land reform law as chairman of the industrial committee of the first National Assembly, believed that the legal revolutionary work could be completed only through the passage of the agrarian land reform and form the cornerstone for the construction of national socialism and the construction of an equal society for all people.

---

652)『주보 제 6 호』,1949 년 4 월 27 일「농지개혁의 근본이념: 농림부 농림국」, pp. 3-8.

653)『자유신문』,1950 년 1 월 1 일, 1950 년 1 월 4 일「전환기 경제의 회고와 전망: 장기영>(1)-(2)」.

654)『부산일보』,1950 년 1 월 6 일「농림부, 지주자본을 규합하여 거대 주식회사를 세우는 방안을 강구」.

Since the economic situation of Korea today is developing in the direction of national socialism, the inevitability of agrarian reform cannot be denied by any force. If there is a landowner who thinks that he will play and eat for the rest of his life as before, it can only be regarded as a delusion.[802)]

On the other hand, Chung Hyun-joon, who was one of the key drafters of the agrarian land reform bill and the agrarian land reform bill of the First Republic of the U.S. military and the South Korean transitional law lawmaker, as chief of staff to Yi Sun-tak, the director of the Planning Department, also emphasized the implementation of a planned economy for the construction of an equal society, which is the national ideology under the Constitution, as follows:

The political ideology of the government of the Republic of Korea is... It aims to build a nation of national democratic reform and to build a society of equality for all. In other words, politically, it aims to build a nation-state, to focus on building an equal society in terms of policy, and to adopt progressive reformism methodologically to achieve the initial task of nation-building. ... An economic policy that is in line with this basic state policy will naturally adopt a system in which the interference of the state will be relatively abundant, and the so-called liberal economic policy will naturally be dismissed and the call for a conscious and planned economic policy will be subordinate to the economic conditions. It is not a sin of the term to preconceptively associate a planned economy or the planning of economic policy with a predatory dictatorship or a revolutionary economic system, but to the shortness of its political success.803)

---

[802] Seoul Shinmun, March 9, 1949.

803) Sungjin Park, 2010. pp. 386-387. Requoted in.

Although many studies still differ on the timing of the completion of the agrarian land reform and the true intentions of Rhee Seungman,

the transformation of the Republic of Korea into a 'country of small farmers' by realizing equality of land ownership through the reform of agricultural land announced on June 21, 1949 is of great historical significance. In other words, by putting into reality the equal ownership of land advocated by the ideology of the Provisional Government, the Three Strains Principle, it maximized the ideological power resources based on the nationalist cause, and at the same time improved the weak economic and material foundations, thus creating an environment in which the bourgeoisie could be formed. In fact, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry at the time said, "The agrarian reform only values the principle of economic equality. Rather, it is to convert land capital into urban commercial capital to promote the regeneration and health of national capital."[655] As a result of these agrarian reforms, the proportion of independent farmers rose from 14.2 percent in 1945 to 80.7 percent in 1951, and the proportion of net tenant farmers decreased from 50.2 percent to 3.9 percent. More importantly, the proportion of the landlord class owning more than three acres has been reduced from 2.3 percent to 0.1 percent, effectively dismantling the landlord class.[656]In addition, the law guarantees that tenant farmers, who until the Japanese colonial era had devoted more than 50% of their total harvest to sharecropping, could own their land by paying only 30% of the rent for five years, and in 1951 96% of the total arable land was owned by the peasants, thus leading to the collapse of the existing landlord class. Through this, the landlords who had been restricting the freedom of the peasants for thousands of years disappeared, and all members of the state were able to be reborn as members of the modern state. In short,

[655])『서울신문』,1950 년 10 월 20 일「농림부 장관, 농지개혁을 계속 실시할 것이라는 담화를 발표」.
[656])김성호 (외),『농지 개혁사 연구』,(서울: 한국농촌경제연구원, 1989), pp. 1034.

an upward leveling was achieved. In conclusion, in the midst of land reform, many existing landowners Capitalists
and fell. Kim points out that in the process of this massive social reorganization, those who had accumulated economic experience during the colonial period on their behalf emerged as a new capitalist class with their own resourcefulness. In other words, according to his research, the proportion of people who emerged as capitalists in the 1950s was very low among those who had been managers or engineers of the industry since the colonial period. They buy a large amount of securities at a low price after the price plummets under severe inflation and pay them as a non-payment for their imputed property. Take control of the management and operate it, or have the skills of the industry from the beginning of the period. They were the ones who were.[(806)] If so, instead of the existing landowners, including the majority of the Democratic Party of Korea,
Who were the groups that emerged as the new capitalist class? As far as we have seen through this study, these groups from North Korea, who fled the communists in North Korea, are the most probable. According to a study by Mitsuhiko Kimura and Keiji Abe, Japan dispatched the best engineers and managers from mainland Japan to develop its industry in order to actively utilize the North Korean region as an outpost for expansion into mainland China. In particular, in the case of North Korea, there were relatively more people working in general companies than in South Korea, and the proportion of all Korean engineers working for general companies was also higher in South Korea. It was high compared to the region. This resulted in the implantation of modern capitalist management techniques and technologies in North Korea, and most of the rubber factories and shoe factories were run by Koreans.807)

Thus, as mentioned above, on the basis of the class base of the middle, small peasants and more,

Those who came from the North were able to accumulate capitalist competence and experience as bureaucrats and engineers from the Japanese colonial period, and they had already entered high-level bureaucratic positions from the time of the US military administration based on their background of Christianity and high educational standards. In addition, as we have already seen, they had sufficient capacity to support the Northwestern Youth League and others through the disembarkation of the Red Bush and the distribution of aid, and through them, the people of South Korea participated in the process of industrial reconstruction by the US military administration on behalf of the leftist forces.808)

---

806) Kiwon Kim. 『Economic Structure of the U.S. Military Government: Focusing on the Handling of Affiliated Enterprises and Workers' Self-Management Movement』 (Seoul: Blue Mountain,
1990).

807) Mitsuhiko Kimura and Keiji Abe ; Translated by Cha Moon-seok and Park Jung-jin. "North Korea's Military Industrialization, a Country Made by War",
(Seoul: Miji Books, 2009).

[808] National History Compilation Committee, translated by Jeon Hyun-so, 2004, July 17, 1947, pp. 98.

In addition, Rhee Seung-man, who had received financial support from wealthy people from the northwest since the time of the US military administration, made efforts to actively cultivate people from the north as social leaders immediately after the establishment of the government in 1948. Having just entered South Korean society, they had no base and could only rely on Rhee Seung-man, so they could not become a rival force like the Democratic Party of Korea. In addition, because they had a strong hostility to communism and devoted themselves to nation-

building in almost every field, including defense and public security, it was necessary to reward them for their continued loyalty.

First, Rhee nominated Lee Yun-yong, who was from the North, as the first prime minister.

The Democratic Party of Korea, which read Rhee's hidden intention to cultivate a force to check the Korean Democratic Party, changed its initial friendly attitude by not fielding a candidate in Lee's district and easily elected him, and actively rejected his appointment as prime minister at the National Assembly. Next, Rhee actively tried to break down the existing landlord forces centered on the Democratic Party of Korea and foster a new capitalist class through land reform. In other words, Rhee had the political necessity to cultivate a new force instead of the landlord class, which was financially supporting the Democratic Kuomintang (KMT), which had emerged as a strong political rival by proposing a constitutional amendment to the cabinet system. In addition, the balance of power was maintained by the collapse of the existing landlord classes and the emergence of a new capitalist class by those from the North, who had possessed modern capitalist management techniques and techniques since the Japanese colonial period, and Rhee was able to consolidate his position as a consul ruler.

6. National compulsory education in elementary schools

On the other hand, the agrarian reform also had an impact on education, and the educational impact of the agrarian reform was the explosion of educational institutions and the formation of large-scale high-quality labor in conjunction with it. In other words, many peasants who experienced the enormous social changes of the Japanese colonial

era and the U.S. military occupation came to realize that education was the only asset they could pass on to their children. The peasants, freed from the traditional tenant taxes through the agrarian reform, put the profits generated into consumptive expenditures such as education rather than agriculture. The reason for this was that rural parents saw their children's college education as the most reliable legacy they could pass on to their children.[809] Park Sung-jin, referring to Rep. Kim Byung-hoe's remarks at the 55th plenary session of the National Assembly on March 16, 1949, points out that the issue of agrarian land reform was linked to the approach from the perspective of equal rights in education. Although Park reconnects this to the Korean War, as we have already seen, the explosion of educational institutions and the enthusiasm of the general public for education began during the period of the US military occupation. In addition, the phenomenon of social leveling of the people of the whole country due to the agrarian reform has further stimulated the explosion of educational enthusiasm for upward mobility among the general public who are on a new starting line.

> If a person does not have about 300 acres of farmland, it is very difficult to educate him. Of course, this can be affirmed. However, in education, too, I do not know if it is right to recognize a privileged class and educate only one class, but we give the people the same rights in all respects. Moreover, we must not forget that there is absolute equality in education.810)

For example, despite the establishment of the Republic of Korea, its members did not yet identify as members of the Republic of Korea, so the establishment of the government in 1948 could have been nothing more than a jurdical state. At the time of the 1945 visit, the literacy rate in Korea reached 78 percent, and there were about 7,500 university

graduates, accounting for only 1 percent of the population. Therefore, education was the most basic and important part of various works to create the identity of the people of the Republic of Korea.

809) Sungjin Park, 2010, pp. 283-289.

[810] "Proceedings of the 55th Plenary Session of the Second National Assembly," March 16, 1949,

> Education in the early years of the country's founding and in the 1950s was part of the process of transforming the inhabitants of a given territory into citizens of the Republic of Korea, and the state sought to demand and instill the rebirth of a new nation through extensive schooling, mass rallies in the press and propaganda, and an emphasis on new consciousness and life. In fact, at that time, the Public Information Office was emphasizing the need for the government to be delivered to the end of the country by launching the "Bulletin" with the aim of making the people voluntarily cooperate in the construction of the Republic of Korea by widely informing them of the government's policies, plans, and laws so that they would voluntarily cooperate in the construction of the Republic of Korea and to increase the people's law-abiding spirit and the rate of fulfilling their obligations[657][658].812)
>
> Accordingly, the Basic Law on Education and the Law on School Education, prepared by the Ministry of Education of the First Republic, also had as its core points the establishment of an education system based on the fundamental ideology of democratic national education, the emphasis on equal educational opportunities for all classes, the emphasis on science, unemployment, and normal education, and the promotion of

[657])공보처,「창간을 맞이하며」,『주보 52 호』, (서울: 공보처 출판국 편집과, 1950), pp. 2-4.

[658])공보처,「시국과 선전의 중요성」,『주보 39 호』, (서울: 공보처 출판국 편집과, 1949), pp. 27-31.

adult and social education.[659]In particular, the First Republic advocated the broad implementation of the principle of equal education for men and women and equal educational opportunities, which the Provisional Government had already emphasized from the very beginning of its existence,[814] and this is also evident in Rhee Seung-man's remarks in his speech on the Liberation Day in 1951:

> This government is the government of each individual of the common people. This government does not belong to a monarch or a prince or any other class of power. In other words, we men, women, rich and poor, rich and ignorant, belong to the general public. All citizens have equal rights under our Constitution. All government officials, including the president, are public servants of the country. For this reason, we place the utmost importance on universal education. Only when each person learns and educates their children can they know how to govern the country and have welfare benefits.[660)]

In addition, the first Minister of Education, who had already emphasized the importance of national education.

In his [661]remarks at the plenary session of the National Assembly in October 1948, Ahn Ho-sang also emphasized the need for equality of education in order to give equal educational opportunities to the majority of the people as part of the way to eliminate the discrimination between class and rich and wealth, and to instill in the national consciousness of a complete nation-state. [662)] Furthermore, a year later, at the

---

[659])『연합신문』,1949 년 2 월 15 일「문교부, 교육기본법, 학교교육법의 내용을 확정」.

814)『서울신문』,1948 년 9 월 9 일「학제개혁에 대한 논의 (1)-(3)」.

[660])『한국전란 2 년지』,1951 년 8 월 15 일「이승만 대통령, 8·15 기념사」, pp. 137-139.

[661])안호상은 민족교육의 중요성을 역설하면서 "민족교육이라면 자본주의적 교육도 아니고 제국주의적 교육 도 아니고 공산주의, 파쇼주의 혹은 독재정권 하에 교육도 아니고 민주주의적 교육이라는 것입니다" 라고 진술한 바 있었다.『제 1 회 국회속기록 제 82 호』,1948 년 10 월 5 일,「안호상 문교부 장관, 제 1 회 82 차 국 회 본 회의에서 시정방침을 보고」, pp. 493-496.

[662])『제 1 회 국회속기록 제 82 호』,1948 년 10 월 5 일「안호상 문교부 장관, 제 1 회 82 차 국회 본회의에서 시정 방침을 보고」, pp. 493-496.

plenary session of the National Assembly in November 1949, he said: By referring to the term Hongik-man, which was the ideology of the Provisional Government, he was trying to show that the education policy of the First Republic was an inheritance of the educational ideology of the Provisional Government. In other words, it attempted to absorb nationalist elements in the process of nation-building through education.

> This education bill is not fully understood by the Education and Social Affairs Committee and the authoritative educators.
> It is the most pedagogical and philosophical thing that has come out, so the phrase Hongik Man, which is the best word that comes down from the partridge, should be absolutely included.[663)]

On the other hand, in accordance with this atmosphere, from June 1, 1950, the compulsory education system in elementary schools was implemented to eradicate illiteracy and to educate the people based on the policy of Hangeul-only. As already mentioned above, the literacy and Hangeul-only policies are of great significance because the state can lay the foundation for legal codification by increasing the population that can decipher the alphabet by eradicating illiteracy through education, and by raising the collective consciousness of the power of the state, it can increase administrative power. In addition, the compulsory education system in elementary schools was also very important for the formation of a modern nation, and the necessity of it was raised from the time of the US military administration, but it could not be implemented due to the limitation of various resources and the inability to invest sufficient funds

663)『서울신문』,1949 년 11 월 4 일「제 5 회 31 차 국회본회의, 교육 법안에 대한 안호상 문교부 장관의 답변 을 청취」.

for the rapid withdrawal of the US forces, and the First Republic boldly pursued a policy that was expected to be implemented only around 1952.

Through these measures, a turning point was provided for the development of a modern nation-state by continuously disseminating consciousness that could shape the identity of modern people to all the people. Even as early as 1949, when the budget for the security sector was inevitably increasing, Yi Soon-tak, the head of the Planning Department, emphasized the need to complete the implementation of compulsory education in schools and the social education system and to ensure the equalization of education.[819] In order to realize this, the Ministry of Education uses the 1946 census table as the basis for each year.

The actual number of children of appropriate age was calculated,820 and a six-year plan for the completion of compulsory education (1949-1956) was promoted. In addition, in order to implement compulsory education in elementary schools, despite financial difficulties, elementary school teachers who are in charge of basic education were paid as much as possible to ensure their social status. This is evident in a joint survey conducted by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Information and the Research Bureau of Cho Sun Bank to prepare basic statistical data to find solutions to people's livelihood problems, and at that time, the salary of elementary school teachers was ranked third among salaried workers.821)

In this way, land reform with ideological power resources at the forefront is a way to improve economic and material resources.

Not only did it increase, but it also encouraged the people's enthusiasm for education and laid the foundation for the implementation of compulsory education in elementary schools, leading to an increase in human resources for nation-building. In addition, the people gradually

became able to quickly use state power through education, which had the effect of increasing administrative power and promoting centralization.

[819] Seoul Shinmun, July 12, 1949, "Planning Minister Yi Soon-tak Announces Budget Policy for Fiscal Year 4283."
[820] Municipal Monthly Bulletin No. 2, March 10, 1949, "Ministry of Education Establishes Six-Year Plan for Completion of Compulsory Education (1949~1956)," pp. 108~110.
[821] Kyunghyang Sinmun, December 21, 1949, "Public Information Office and Bank of Korea Prepare Survey Outline for Cost of Living Survey."

7. Participation of the centrist in nation-building

On the other hand, as the First Republic, whose very existence seemed to be in jeopardy at the beginning of its inception, overcame domestic and external crises and gradually took shape as a state, the centrist forces that refused to participate in the elections to the Constituent Assembly on May 10, 1948 gradually participated in the nation-building of the First Republic. In fact, unlike Kim Koo, who cynically responded to Rhee Seung-man's mention of the succession of the Republic of Korea government at the opening ceremony of the National Assembly, saying that he did not see any conditions for the succession of the laws of the Republic of Korea in the form of the current lawmakers. [664] The majority of the members of the Provisional Government and the moderates gradually accepted the founding of the Republic of Korea as a reality and actively participated in it.

Cho So-ang, the proponent of Sammyunism, had a very positive and active stance on the establishment and participation of the Republic of Korea. He was being mentioned as a candidate for the first prime

[664])『서울신문』,1948 년 6 월 8 일「이승만, 기자회견에서 대통령 중심제 및 임정계승 등 언급」.

minister, and he said, "If it were the business of the Republic of Korea, I would be the principal of an elementary school, not the prime minister, and it is pleasant to know that a new government has been established."[665666] Furthermore, he made a statement on the status of the Republic of Korea and its founding program, and he broke away from the Korea Independence Party, which refused to participate in the First Republic, and promoted a new party

The Republic of Korea in Seoul declares that its predecessor is the skeleton of the March 1st Movement covered in a scroll of blood, the enemy of the 5,000-year-old independence nation, and the supreme organization of the national camp. There is no reason to reject the Republic of Korea on the grounds that its party's policies have not been implemented and its sovereignty and territorial integrity have not been completed because of its non-participation. Therefore, the duty to transcend the theory of people and policies and develop the Republic of Korea to the highest degree is prescribed.824)

In addition[667], Ahn Jae-hong continued to establish a single nation-state in which the North and the South were united as one. While promoting the Republic of Korea, it gradually embraced the Republic of Korea and presented its future.

The Republic of Korea, which is confined to South Korea, was established as a suboptimal policy by the support of the resolution of the majority of the United Nations and will be achieved with the approval and support of the majority of the countries in the future. Above all, however, there remains the question of how to build a kind of equal society and a public state in which the institutions of land and industrial economy can be built in order to gradually implement

665)『조선일보』,1948 년 8 월 10 일「김구·조소앙·안재홍, 정부수립 등에 대해 기자회견」.

666)『서울신문』,1948 년 10 월 13 일「조소앙, 대한민국의 지위 및 건국강령의 내용 등에 대해 성명서를 발 표」.

667)『한성일보』, 1948 년 10 월 17 일「＜한민족의 진로 : 안재홍＞」.

democratic politics that enjoys the trust and support of the majority of the people in South Korea.(825) Accordingly, already at the time of the May 10 elections to the National Assembly of the Constituent Assembly, unofficially,
Kim Kyu-sik, who had encouraged members of the National Independence League in various parts of the country to run for office[668], also came to positively support the establishment of the Republic of Korea while advocating the dream of establishing a peaceful North-South unification government through North-South negotiations in his speech commemorating the March 1, 1949 Section.

As we now celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Kimi Movement, this year's commemoration of March 1st is completely different from the commemoration of the past 30 years, as South Korea has received UN recognition even though the North and South have not yet been reunified. In other words, the commemoration should not be limited to the ceremonial formalities, the conditions of sentiment and hope, and the three cheers and protest processions, but should be a substantive commemoration in name and reality, and whether it suits the heart of each individual, whether it suits the heart of each individual, whether it is good or bad, it is of great significance both historically and realistically.
You can't.[669)]

A week after Kim Kyu-sik's speech, Kim Kyu-sik and the National Independence League

As more than 20 people, including Baek Sang-kyu, joined the Democratic Nationalist Party in early 1949, it was pointed out that the future of the Democratic Independence League was progressing from the

[668])김재명, 『한국 현대사의 비극: 중간파의 이상과 좌절』, (서울: 선인, 2003), pp. 83.
[669])『서울신문』,1949 년 3 월 1 일「김규식 민족자주연맹 위원장, 3·1 절 기념사에서 평화적 남북통일을 주 장」.

conventional idealistic politics to realism. [670][671] Accordingly, the Democratic People's Party, which had already tried to replace Rhee Seung-man as its presidential candidate from the beginning of the Constituent Assembly, was negotiating Kim Kyu-sik's participation through Seo Sang-il.829)

In the end, many of the centrists who boycotted the 1948 Constituent Assembly elections were elected as independents in the second National Assembly elections held on May 30, 1950. [672] In particular, Cho So-ang, the father of Sammyunism, was elected with the most votes in the whole country, and according to Cho So-ang's rival at the time, Cho So-ang's propaganda was because the voters' sympathy was focused on him as he lived in exile while suffering all kinds of hardships abroad as a provisional government factor while the elements of the provisional government were not in power.[673] In this way, the 2nd National Assembly was in an atmosphere where centrist elected members such as Ahn Jae-hong, Cho So-ang, Won Se-hoon, Yoon Ki-seop, and Oh Ha-young were vowing to lead the centrist independents and launch a new politics.

In particular, this is due to the national security developed by the Rhee Seung-man government after the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents. This was despite the fact that the people were actively participating in the sell-out, and rumors of the outbreak of war were circulating throughout society at the time. In other words, the fact that the masses supported the Republic of Korea, which is striving for national security for its current survival, did not give up on the dream of reunification of

[670])『동아일보』,1949 년 3 월 9 일「남북통일을 지상목표로 민족진 통합 지향」.
[671])『연합신문』,1949 년 10 월 28 일.
[672])로빈슨. 1988. pp. 277-278.
[673])조병옥, 1959. pp. 278-279.

the North and South, which is the ideal of nationalism, shows that the people were pursuing stability and transformation at the same time. For example, while realistically acknowledging the necessity of building a modern state in South Korea, the people were still undeterred from their dream of building a unified nation-state based on the cause of the people. And, what is even more interesting is that the number of members of the Constituent Assembly who have been re-elected

Only 31 members, less than 15 percent,[674] and independents make up 60 percent of the National Assembly.

Regarding the results of the election for the 2nd National Assembly, which increased to 126 members, many newspapers at the time regarded it as a trial against the forces of the Korean Democratic Party, not a judgment against Rhee Seung-man. Even before the elections, public opinion polls showed that 72 percent of the people opposed the proposal to revise the cabinet system promoted by the Democratic People's Party, led by the Democratic Party of Korea.[833] In fact, Rhee's popularity at the time was not too bad, and Drum Wright, acting special envoy of the U.S. Special Mission to Korea, reported in a telegram to the Secretary of State on March 28, 1949:

> After a shaky launch, the South Korean government is now stabilizing. The cabinet has been considerably strengthened, and the efficiency of the government is gradually improving, albeit at a low level by Western standards. Rhee still holds control within the government and enjoys the immense popularity he had when he took office. Despite being quite independent of the executive branch, the National Assembly is likely to support Rhee in the event of any danger.[834]

---

[674])이들 중 에서도 서울에서 재선된 의원들은 광복군 총사령관 출신인 이청천과 역시 임시정부 출신인 신

In other words, Rhee Seung-man, who had already functioned as a mediator through the launch of the Korean Youth League and the land reform process, was once again demonstrating his role in a political situation that was being reorganized around the centrist forces around the 2nd National Assembly elections. As a result, many media outlets were eager for a new politics to be unfolded by the alliance between the centrist forces and Rhee Seung-man's faction, and many centrist leaders such as Cho So-ang and Won Se-hoon supported Rhee Seung-man and were pushing for a merger or joining the Korean Nationalist Party, which was functioning as the de facto ruling party.

First, the Socialist Party, led by Cho So-ang, was making considerable progress on the specific merger with the Korean Nationalist Party, and Won Se-hoon, who led the Peasants' Party.

It was Ikhee.

[833] Yonhap News, March 10, 1950.

834)FRUS 1949, March 28, 1949 (Top Secret, No. 308), "Drumwright's Message from the Acting Special Envoy to the Secretary of State on the Present Situation in Korea," pp. 979~980.

The media was announcing his intention to dissolve the city's peasant party and withdraw from Kim Kyu-sik's National Independence League.[675][676] In addition, the Korean Nationalist Party was negotiating with Ahn Jae-hong and Yoon Ki-seop of the centrist faction, and the person in charge was Yun Chi-young, who was Rhee Seung-man's secretary and the first interior minister. However, in a letter to Rhee Seung-man in 1927, he compared Rhee Seung-man to Napoleon of France, Mussolini of Italy, and Kemal Pasha of Turkey, and recommended

---

[675])『서울신문』,1950 년 6 월 8 일「대한국민당과 사회당의 합당 교섭」.

[676])유영익.『이승만 동문 서한집 상』, (서울: 연세대학교 출판부, 2009). pp. 31-32.

that Rhee Seung-man "become a leader with the status and power of a consul, emperor, and president," and asked him to present a national defense strategy in detail as the father of the nation.(836) Rhee also appealed not to elect moderates during his local campaign.

He did not oppose their election, but only expressed his intention to be president, and said that their candidacy itself showed support for the government of the Republic of Korea, and that since they were elected by the people, they would be able to cooperate well with each other in the future. Since the end of the Constituent Assembly, Rhee Seung-man, who had been plagued by the proposed amendment to the cabinet system proposed by the Democratic People's Party, had no choice but to pursue an alliance with the centrist faction, which had rapidly emerged as the largest political faction, in order to stop it. In other words, When a proposal to amend the Cabinet Responsibility System was submitted to the National Assembly at the suggestion of Rep. Suh Sang-il and 78 other members of the Democratic People's Party, Rhee actively opposed it, and[677] even after it was rejected, he reiterated his opposition to the Cabinet Responsibility System[678,] so he needed a force to oppose the Democratic People's Party.

On the other hand, apart from the close relationship between Cho So-ang and Rhee Seung-man, who had recommended Rhee Seung-man to the position of de facto consul since the days of the Shanghai Provisional Government[679], the Korean Nationalist Party's platform,

---

[677])『동아일보』1950 년 2 월 7 일「이승만 대통령, 헌법 개정에 반대한다는 의견서를 국회 개헌안과 함께 공 고」.

[678])『서울신문』,1950 년 3 월 15 일「이승만 대통령, 개헌안 부결에 대해 담화를 발표」.

[679])조소앙은 상해 임시정부가 대통령 이승만을 탄핵·면직하고 두 달이 지난 시점인 1925 년 5 월 16 일 이 승만에게 보낸 편지에서 대한 무력 쿠데타를 권유하고 있었다. 그는 또 다른 방안으로 하와이에서

which had actively supported Yi Seung-man, also incorporated the program of the Three Kyuns by stating that it would "promote the welfare of the people equally in all fields such as politics, economy, and education." The election tactic of the Korean Nationalist Party, which was based on the so-called one-democracy doctrine, was also to "stimulate the psychology of the masses of the people who are cooperating with the government's policies under the slogan of building a society of political and social equality under the banner of one-democracy[680.")]

Even before the 2nd National Assembly elections, the Korean Nationalist Party, which had already reached an agreement with the center-right through Bae Eun-hee and Shin Heung-woo to form a political party under the name of the People's Party (PPP) with the center-right and progressive Socialist Party's Cho So-ang, Ahn Jae-hong of the New Saeng Party, Lee Hoon-gu of the Korea Workers' and Peasants' Party, and Myung Je-se of the Korea Workers' and Peasants[681' Party, had moderate] and progressive-leaning lawmakers such as Cho Bong-am, Yoon Suk-koo, Kim Woong-jin, Kim Myong-dong, Hwang Doo-yeon, Cho Ok-hyun, and Lee In. It was emphasized.[682] In other words, they tried to promote the people's participation in nation-building by absorbing the ideology of the Provisional Government, Sammyunism, centered on the mediator-like consul Rhee Seung-man, and using it as an ideological power resource.

임시 의정원을 소집해 새 정부를 조직하자는 급진적인 '권력 만회 구상'을 제안하기도 했다. 유영익.『이승만 동문 서한집 하』, (서울: 연세대학교 출판부, 2009). pp. 312-313.

680)『서울신문』,1950 년 5 월 15 일「각 당의 선거운동 전략」.

681)『서울신문』,1949 년 12 월 23 일「대한민국당. 사회당. 대한노농당. 신생회, 평민당 결성에 잠정합의」.

682)『자유신문』,1948 년 10 월 10 일「대한국민당 발기회, 위원장을 선출하고 정강을 결정」.

On the other hand, after the mass defeat of the Korean Democratic Party lawmakers, the Democratic People's Party, whose leadership was led by Shin Ik-hee and Lee Cheong-chun,[683] also actively sought the recruitment of Kim Kyu-sik, and discussed the formation of an anti-communist bloc in the next National Assembly with the ruling Korean Nationalist[684] Party, and Rhee Seung-man was mediating the equality of power between the centrist faction, which actively participated in the nation-building of the Republic of Korea and emerged as the main political player, and the forces of the ruling and opposition Korean Nationalists and the Democratic Nationalist Party. Thread Zero, Even before the elections, the Korean Nationalist Party had proposed that all political parties and groups remove their signboards and realize a ruling party-style grand government at[685] once, and the equality of power among the political forces mediated by Rhee Seung-man was justified by the fact that it was perceived by the people at the time as cleverly linked to the ideology of the Provisional Government, the Three Disciplines. In other words, the following article, published by the Free Newspaper in December 1948, shortly after the Provisional Government's return, reflects the general public's perception of the Provisional Government's politics as a kind of equality of power.

---

683)한국 민주당과 통합하였지만 지도부의 상당수를 임시정부 출신 인사로 내세웠던 민주국민당 역시 그 정 강에서 1. 경제적 기회 균등을 원칙으로 민족 자주경제의 수립을 기하고, 2. 교육 및 보건의 기회 균등, 3. 8 시간 노동제, 최저 임금제의 원칙 확립, 4. 철도, 기타 교통기관, 통신 기관의 국영 또는 국가관리, 5. 농민본위의 토지분배의 조속실시, 6. 실업보험 및 기타 사회 보험 제도의 실시 등의 항목을 통해 삼균주 의의 계승과 임시정부로부터의 영향을 분명히 하고 있다.

684)『서울신문』,1950 년 6 월 8 일「대한국민당과 사회당의 합당 교섭」.

685)『한성일보』,1950 년 1 월 21 일「신당운동, 개헌작업을 둘러싼 정치계의 동향」.

The Provisional Government is at the present present a union of the three forces of revolutionary thought, not only ideologically, but de facto. Therefore, we support this and at the same time demand equality of power.[686)]

Therefore, the term "Il-democracy" itself rallies all political parties around themselves.

[687] [The] Korean Nationalist Party (KMT) was also criticized as an instrument of President Lee Seung-man, who made no announcement on the party's policies except for his sole belief in Japanese democracy.[688] However, in any case, a situation has arisen in which this so-called "smooth relationship between the two countries" has developed, which has been made possible by the following backgrounds.

First of all, Rhee Seung-man, who had extensive ties with both the right and the nationalist left through the Hongup District before liberation, was consolidating his reputation and popularity as the best leader who could encompass the entire nation through the shortwave broadcasting incident during the Pacific War[689,] [and] this was solidified through the founding of the Republic of Korea. Accordingly, the conservative opposition forces from the Democratic Party of Korea to the Democratic Nationalist Party at that time[690)] [and the leaders of the centrist forces851 had] a close relationship with Rhee at one time or another, and their transformation into an opposition party was also due to their alienation from Rhee, so there were few opposition forces that doubted Rhee's authority. Had.

---

[686])『자유신문』,1945 년 12 월 27 일「자유사회 건설 자 연맹, 시국수습대책 결의 발표」.

[687])『주간서울』,1949 년 1 월 1 일「신년 정국의 동향과 전망」.

[688])『대동신문』 1949 년 1 월 13 일「내외정평: 개헌운동과 정당, 각파 세력의 동향주목 (1)-(2)」.

[689])정병준, 2005.

[690])민주 국민당의 신익희는 일민주의가 루소의 천부인권설에 공명한 이승만이 제창한 것으로 민족은 하나

Next, the agrarian reform fundamentally changed the existing structure of the ruling elite.

As a result, the existing landlord class had almost collapsed, and the political power of the opposition parties, such as the Democratic Party of Korea and the Kuomintang Democratic Party, which were the most organized opposition to Rhee, was limited for a time. This, combined with the growth of anti-communist ideology, created a political vacuum that made Rhee's dominance possible for a while.

caused.852)

8. Acquisition of National Character and Planning

As the First Republic gradually stabilized, the spontaneous Aspects of human development were also beginning to appear. In particular, Lee Soon-tak, the head of the Planning Department, and the centrist bureaucrats of the Planning Department, which he was heading, showed the face of the Republic of Korea, which was still in the early stages of a modern state, as a "knowledge country," which is almost the final stage of modern national development, and laid the foundation for disaster relief, land reform, and self-reliance finance.

The Planning Department, the predecessor of the present Economic Planning Institute, was ordained by the transitional government to the Central Economic Commissioner of the Provincial Government, the Central Administration of Goods, the Central Administration of Prices, the Ministry of Finance, the Four Seasons Bureau (in charge of affairs related to the finances of the state) and the Central Administration Office. The planning department

He had vigorously defended that all politics is all for the people. Seoul Shinmun, January 11, 1949, "National Assembly Speaker Shin Ik-hee Answers Questions to Reporters on Political Unification at the Founding Ceremony of the Kaesong City Party of the Korean Nationalist Party."

[851] Ahn Jae-hong stated that the People's Party of Japan's political party has not yet gone beyond the stage of discussion that is only carried out in words, but it can be the first step in the cooperative unity of the national camp as a united national movement. Hansung Ilbo, January 1, 1950 "Ahn Jae-hong Announces 1950 New Year's Address." In addition, Paek Hong-gyun, the head of the Socialist Party's Organizing Department, who had adhered to the orthodox theory of the Provisional Government to the end, left the Socialist Party and joined the Korean Nationalist Party with the aim of strengthening the national camp and nationalism. Seoul Sinmun, January 18, 1950, "Paik Hong-gyun, head of the Socialist Party's Organization Department, leaves the Socialist Party and joins the Korean Nationalist Party."

852) Xi. 2008. pp. 141-142.

Based on this, the Secretariat, the Budget Bureau, the Economic Planning Bureau, the Goods Planning Bureau, the Price Planning Bureau, and the Provisional Administrative Bureau were in charge of the government's budget and financial statements, the preparation of a comprehensive plan for the national economy, and the establishment of a comprehensive plan for price supply and demand and price policy.853)

In the meantime, in the existing research, he has been in charge of planning since 1948.

It stated that the head of the Planning Department was a subordinate position to the ministerial level and had less authority.(854) However, as can be seen from the fact that there were many cases where the person who was actually the head of the Planning Department was transferred to the position of Minister of Commerce and Industry, or the person who was the Minister of Commerce and Industry served as the Director of the Planning Department, the Planning Office was a very important institution that played many roles in the early days of the First Republic.

Park points out that in order to realize the spirit of the planned economy and the realization of economic control contained in the Constitution, it was necessary to have an administrative body that could exert strong administrative power under rational and meticulous planning, and the Planning Office was established through the Government Organization Act enacted on July 17, 1948. In addition, Yi Soon-tak, who was appointed as the first director of the Planning Department, was a person who understood the Constitution better than anyone else at the time, and he maintained the position that it was necessary to establish a comprehensive plan for the state because liberal economic policies could not solve the immediate problems.(855) In fact, Yi Sun-tak left the Korean People's Party during the days of the US military regime and maintained a middle line of left-right cooperation, leading land reform as a member of the government-elected legislative assembly, and immediately after the inauguration of the First Republic, he advocated the gradual decline of land, and prepared a bill for the reform of farmland through the repayment of 200% of the annual average harvest at 20% annually over 10 years. In addition, he said that the liberal economic promotion during the US military regime is not suitable for our situation, and that a planned economy is necessary. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea stipulates that

---

[853] Seoul Sinmun, October 8, 1948, "Planning Minister Yi Soon-tak Announces Progress of Office Transition from Transitional Government."

854) Park Jong-chul, "Aid, Import Substitution Industry, and Agricultural Policy", ed. Han Bae-ho, 2008, pp. 444.

855) Sungjin Park, 2010. pp. 377-378.

I thought that the purpose of the planned economy in terms of the economy was fully revealed.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea is fully planned in its spirit and in its expression, as well as when examining the economic aspects. In other words, in its spirit, it aimed at "equal improvement of economic vitality," and in terms of its specific expression, "the Republic of Korea has the obligation to define economic governance" (see Article 5), and "the economic order of the Republic of Korea is based on the realization of social justice and the development of a balanced national economy that enables all citizens to meet the basic needs of life" (see Article 84), and Articles 85, 86, and 87 are more specific in the basic aspects of the economic order.

C. In short, the Constitution stipulates that in order to achieve the equal improvement of the economic life of the people, the government is obliged to make economic adjustments, ensure that the basic livelihood of the people is satisfied, and promote the development of a balanced national life.

Therefore, in order to achieve this, the government should place its economic policy on the principle of planning freedom and planned control, but strangely enough, it was true that each ministry had a different interpretation of the Constitution and lacked unity and uniformity both horizontally and longitudinally, and that the supreme policy was sometimes slightly distorted and incomprehensible in its implementation. Not only that, but I could even get a glimpse of their unaware of the actual situation in the country, or their admiration for a conceptually loose free economy, or their efforts to put it into practice in their policies. Even if we ignore what the Constitution teaches, the economic order of our country, which succeeded the planned strong control of the Japanese imperialist era and the unplanned weak control of the U.S. military regime, is to return to unbridled freedom, and various prerequisites are required, namely, the freedom to acquire raw materials for production, the freedom to acquire power, the freedom to trade abroad, and the freedom to acquire funds, which must be guaranteed even if there is a small amount. It cannot be said that the return to a free economy is still premature.

In any case, it can be said that the government's 15 principles of economic stability, which were announced at hand, are a natural emergency measure, which means that the government's comprehensive unified, uniform and planned control policy suitable for the economic reality of our country will finally be put

in place. Accordingly, it can be said that each ministry has finally reached a critical time when the old ideologies, policies and policies of the past have been unified, and their self-views and attitudes have been abandoned, and they have no choice but to strongly cooperate and promote the same goal both vertically and horizontally. For example, in order to maintain the maximum issuance of money, it is necessary to establish a maximum issuance of money, even if it is small, as long as the budget is balanced once and for all, no additional budget should be granted unless financial resources are secured in principle, and the maximum issuance should be set in consideration of industrial funds under the most precise plan for the promotion of people's livelihood, but if it goes according to schedule, the fluctuations in prices should be taken into account and the method of adjustment[691] should be taken.)

In the early years of the First Republic, most of the lower-level bureaucrats were appointed by employees of the U.S. military government, but in the case of bureau and section chiefs, they were formed according to the will of the minister, because the National Civil Service Act enacted in August 1949 gave almost unlimited discretion to the ministers and other personnel authority regarding the appointment of second- to fifth-level civil servants[692.]

The contributions of the Planning Office and Lee Soon-tak can be summarized as follows. First, the farmland reform bill, which advocated a 10-year repayment of 20% per annum, was the center of the committee of the Industrial Subcommittee, which was drafted by lawmakers Seo Sang-il and Cho Heon-young, who advocated strong agricultural land reform.[693] Second, the Ministry of Planning prepared a budget so that the First Republic could overcome the system of weak countries and record

691)『경향신문』,1950 년 3 월 17 일「경제안정 15 원칙에 요망재정: 이순탁」.
692)『중앙일보』,1982 년 3 월 31 일「중앙청(7): 초대내각(2)〉」.
693)『서울신문』,1949 년 3 월 9 일.

a surplus in just one year,[694] and the United States appreciated this and continued to provide large-scale aid to Korea without interruption. Third, at the time of the Yeosu and Suncheon incidents in October 48, the Planning Department identified the exact scale of the damage and prepared a budget so that it could be restored within a short period of time.[695] Fourth, Korea's first economic development plan to promote long-term economic revival was drafted by the Economic Planning Committee, which was chaired by Lee Soon-tak, director of the Planning Department. [696] As mentioned above, Yi Soon-tak pointed out that the promotion of the liberal economy during the period of the US military administration did not suit the actual situation of the DPRK, and that the purpose of the planned economy in terms of the economy was fully reflected in the constitutional law of the Republic of Korea.[697]

On the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Korea's economic outlook was at a positive turning point, with the budget balanced, tax revenues rising, and foreign exchange stabilizing.[698] From April 1 to June 25, 1950, the budget was executed with an unprecedented surplus of 16 million won, and the money supply was gradually shrinking

---

694)이순탁에 따르면 1949 년의 예산편성 방침은 국방과 치안, 동력확충, 식량증산, 조림사업, 의무교육 및 전재민 구호사업에 치중되어 있었다. 따라서 최대한의 경비절약을 통해 국민의 부담을 경감시키기 위해 노력했음에도 불구하고 신흥국가로서의 복구 건축 사업이 너무 많아 적자재정이 불가피 했었다. 하지만 1950 년도 예산은 국가 관업 사업의 중요부문인 교통, 전매, 체신사업 등을 일반 회계로부터 분리 독립시 켜서 특별회계로 편성함으로써 각 사업의 특수성을 살리면서 사업자체의 수지 균형이 맞도록 꾀하였다는 것이다. 『서울신문』,1949 년 7 월 12 일「이순탁 기획처장, 4283 년도 예산편성 방침을 발표」.

695)「제 2 회 국회속기록 제 13 호」, 1949 년 1 월 25 일「이윤영 사회부장관, 여순사건·제주사건 피해·구호상황 에 대해 제 2 회 13 차 국회본회의에서 보고」, pp. 243-245.

696)『조선중앙일보,』,1949 년 2 월 6 일「이순탁 기획처장, 경제위원회 발족에 관한 담화를 발표」.

697)『경향신문』,1950 년 3 월 17 일 「경제안정 15 원칙에 요망재정: 이순탁」.

698)맥도널드. 2001. pp. 376.

and prices remained steady.[699][700] The First Republic, which seemed to collapse easily after the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops, was gradually gaining nationalhood despite the partial recovery of the economy and the realization of a balanced budget by recording an unprecedented surplus of 16 million won from April 1, 1950 until the outbreak of the Korean War, despite the fact that the U.S. support fell far short of expectations.865)

A U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report dated June 19, 1950, also stated that by April 1950, Korea had quickly improved its economic situation and had a stable government and a loyal army, proving that the Truman Doctrine's resistance to Soviet expansionism was not hopeless.[701]

VI. Conclusion

Taken together, it can be seen that during the period of the US military occupation and the First Republic, which had just experienced 36 years of Japanese imperialism, Korea lacked all the resources necessary for nation-building, including human, material, and economic resources. In addition, the United States focused on the withdrawal of US troops through negotiations with the Soviet Union until July 1947 and did not actively engage in nation-building compared to the Soviet Union, resulting in the formation of a vulnerable state with a lack of resources and primitive vulnerability from the period of the US military administration. In contrast, in the case of North Korea, the Soviet Union

[699])김명윤, 1971, pp. 54-55.

[700])서주석, 2008. pp. 99-100.

[701])Central Intelligence Agency Report, June, 19, 1950, “Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime,”; DNSA(Declassified National Security Archive).

was rapidly supporting the nation-building process immediately after liberation, and the Cold War situation was already developing in international politics. Accordingly, the U.S. military government tried to improve the situation by deploying police and bureaucrats from before 1947 and increasing economic aid from 1947 onwards, but the Communist Party criticized the efforts of the U.S. military government as having an anti-nationalist character and waged a violent struggle.

In addition, the reality of being a vulnerable country that began during the US military occupation had to continue anew even after the establishment of the Republic of Korea.

In other words, the establishment of the Republic of Korea was suddenly decided in a short period of less than a year while the material and economic resources were still weak, and the centrist forces, fearing that the country would become a divided country, opposed the construction of the nation, thus failing to fully absorb nationalism from the stage of the nation's birth. On the other hand, this fact has become a pretext for leftist forces to accuse the Republic of Korea of building an anti-nationalist state, leading to the repetition and intertwining of the reality of a vulnerable country.

Accordingly, from the early stages of nation-building, the Republic of Korea made the following efforts to overcome the limitations of a vulnerable state, including nationalistic vulnerability, and to defeat the challenge of the left. First, the government elected a leader named Rhee Seung-man, who received the highest recognition from the people, as president, and obtained the support of the advanced country of the United States, which institutionally equipped the core requirements of a democratic state, such as the judicial system, the constitution, the National Assembly, elections, and democracy. At the same time, in order to protect the people internally and externally, they created a

bureaucracy that could run the country and the security and defense that monopolized violence. In addition, by inheriting the symbols and institutions of the Provisional Government, such as the name of the Republic of Korea and the Constitutional Law, it made efforts to gain symbolic legitimacy of the Provisional Government, and attempted to liquidate the pro-Japanese faction through the Anti-National Special Committee, while fulfilling the conditions of a national society that pursued equality through land reform.

In addition, the Republic of Korea was gradually acquiring the character of a modern nation by gradually improving the conditions of its fragile resources, avoiding the collapse of the state and attracting the participation of the moderates. However, in the intervening years, the constant threat from the Soviet Union, North Korea, and internal communists led to repeated crises of national security, resulting in the inability to fully absorb nationalism in the process of nation-building and the undermining of new resources in each period. In other words, if the vulnerability of the most urgent resources was improved in the previous stage, the next stage would be damaged in the next stage, and the vicious cycle would be repeated, and the state of the vulnerable country continued. This situation can be summarized in seven periods as shown in Table VI-1 below.

	jealousy	Resource Status
Phase 1	September 1945-August 1946	(Human, Physical, Economic, International Political Resources↓) (Ideological Resources↑)

Phase 2	September 1946-July 1947	(Human, Material, and Economic Resources↑) (Ideological and International Political Resources↓)
Phase 3	July 1947-August 1948	(Physical and Economic Resources↑) (Human, Ideological, and International Political Resources↓)
Phase 4	August 1948-October 1948	(Human, Material, Economic, Ideological, International Political Resources↑)
Stage 5	October 1948-February 1949	(Human, Physical, and Economic Resources↓) (Ideology, International Political Resources↓)
Stage 6	February 1949-October 1949	(Human, Physical, Economic, Ideological, (International Political Resources↓)
Step 7	October 1949-June 1950	(Human, Physical, Economic, Ideological Resources↑) (International Political Resources↓)

Table VI-1) Seven Stages of Formation of a Vulnerable State

The following Table VI-2) summarizes the main events and key changes in resources that occurred during the seven stages of the formation of a vulnerable state.

	jealousy	content

Phase 1	September 1945-August 1946	1. Immediately after liberation, the Japanese withdrawal from the country in charge of all resources in all areas of confusion intensified. 2. In addition, compared to the Soviet Union's efforts to build a nation in North Korea,

		Through negotiations with the USSR The U.S., which was obsessed with a quick withdrawal, did not commit sufficient resources, and the desire to create a unified nation-state of all resources except the elevated ideological resources Conditions are at their worst. (Human, Physical, Economic, International Political Resources↓

		3. On the other hand, due to the overall lack of resource input, corruption occurs, and ideological resources do not rise significantly. (Ideological Resources↑)
Phase 2	September 1946-July 1947	1. With increased U.S. aid From the beginning of 1947 the conditions of material and economic resources began to improve. (Physical and Economic Resources↑) 2. The

		left-wing forces supported by the Soviet Union began a violent struggle against the left and the right. As the conflict escalates, ideological resources and international politics

		Conditions of the resource begin to deteriorate. (Ideological Resources, International Political Resources↓) 3. The U.S. mobilized all its bureaucrats to establish a formal framework for the state apparatus. Lee Beom-seok, Ji Cheng-chun, etc. who were staying in China Officials from the Provisional Government returned home and led the Youth Brigade By organizing, the conditions of human resources are improved (Human Resources↑) 4. Along with the sixth stage, it was the most unstable of the seven stages, and it was the stage of the most vulnerable countries.

		The period when the country could have collapsed or collapsed
Phase 3	July 1947-August 1948	1. Despite the increase in U.S. aid and the deployment of strikes and violence by leftist forces. Improved conditions of material and economic resources

		(Physical and Economic Resources↑) 2. The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is in full swing, and the North and the South The establishment of two unilateral governments

		By becoming a fait accompli The conditions of international political resources have deteriorated. 3. Regarding the establishment of a unilateral government and the establishment of a unified nation-state, there is disagreement within the right Divided, the Soviet Union and North Korea, with the support of the United States, appointed officials from Japan that they are building an anti-nationalist state By launching a nationalist ideological offensive, the conditions of ideological resources are undermined. 4. Around the 38th parallel, the North and

		the South began to clash, and North Korea's In the nationalist ideological offensive, the Northwestern Youth Corps and the police, Officials recognize the fragility of the state and use tyrannical power By exercising on the people, the Jeju 4.3 situation worsened. (Human Resources, International Political Resources, Ideological Resources↓)
Phase 4	August 1948-October 1948	1. U.S. support continued to rise, improving the conditions of material and economic resources.

		Period (material and economic resources↑) 2. Some members of the Provisional Government and the centrists participated in the government, and the Constitution was drafted, and the anti-people special Nation-building through the promotion of the Commission Act, etc. By satisfying nationalist demands Compared to the third stage, human beings, Period when the conditions of ideological resources have improved (human and ideological resources↑) 3. By obtaining the approval of the United Nations The conditions of international political resources are also

		Improved (International Political Resources↑) 4. Along with the seventh phase, it was the most stable of the seven phases.
Stage 5	October 1948-February 1949	1. Guerrilla units led by South Korean partisans and partisans sent by North Korea With the development of troops and full-fledged irregular warfare, the consumption of human,

		material and economic resources Deepening Period (Human, Physical, Economic Resources↓) 2. North Korea, South Korea, Japan

		As with the time of year Ban, which is in a de facto colonial state subordinate to the United States and employs subordinate officials. that we are building a nationalist state Intensification of nationalist propaganda. 3. With the intensification of this anti-nationalist propaganda Deepening the vulnerability of the country Aware soldiers and police officers overreacted to nationalist propaganda through Yeosu, Suncheon, and other incidents, and became nervous about the state By using violence to try to sustain the state,

		The deterioration of the state of ideological resources (Ideological Resources↓)
Stage 6	February 1949-October 1949	1. The withdrawal of the USFK is completed and mainland China Communism, and the Soviet Union's success in developing nuclear weapons

		Conditions for international political resources have deteriorated further Period (International Political Resources↓)

		2. Material and economic conditions have also risen slightly due to increased U.S. aid. Due to the destruction caused by the intensification of guerrilla warfare, productive forces Delays in recovery and the lack of material and economic Resources from the private sector By procuring virtually Stuck in a state of stagnation, or It was in a downward state (physical and economic resources↓) 3. Casualties caused by guerrilla warfare and within the military The general left within society, including the purge work Due to the removal of personnel, human

		The condition of the resource deteriorates somewhat (Human Resources↓) 4. Due to the rumors of internal riots and external aggression, Due to the unfolding security crisis, the Anti-National Special Committee Law was abolished, and the Japanese bureaucrats continued to participate, and former Japanese military figures such as Kim Seok-won were forced to join the Ongjin and partisans.

		By being at the center of subjugation, ideological resources are undermined. 5. On the other hand, to resolve the crisis of national security and to make the country In the process of transcending laws and ethics in order to save the country, the use of violence against the people of the state began to become customary. (Ideological Resources↓)

Step 7	October 1949-June 1950	1. U.S. aid and intrinsic efforts have led to productive forces Succeeded in improving and achieving fiscal balance, and the material and economic conditions were the best. Period (material and economic resources↑) 2. Through land reform and the implementation of compulsory national education in elementary schools, etc. In the process of nation-building Nationalist elements Through the 2nd National Assembly elections, the centrist faction began to participate in the nation-building in earnest, and human and ideological resources Improved Period (Human and Ideological Resources↑)

		3. U.S. support was increasing, but China and the Soviet Union were able to resist North Korean aggression. By supporting international politics It was said that the environment was deteriorating Be seen Yes (International Political Resources↓)

Table VI-2) The State of Human, Physical, Economic, Ideological, and International Political Resources from August 1945 to July 1950

On the other hand, the following Table VI-3) shows the actual state-building process described above.

is a comparison between the RAND Institute's Standard State Model, which calculates costs and manpower numerically, and the case of Korea during the period of the U.S. military administration and the early days of the First Republic. In this study, the cost and manpower of peacekeeping operations were selected from the Rand Institute's standard model of peacekeeping and peacekeeping operations, as the Korean state in the 1945-50 period could be considered a de facto state of civil war, and the two countries were compared. Next, two points were considered. First of all, since the total population of the U.S. military administration and the early days of the First Republic and the Rand Research Institute standard model countries differed by about four times,

the manpower required by the standard model was added four times to the manpower required by the standard national model. At the same time, the per capita national income of the two countries differs by about 13 times, but the economic and material conditions of Korea in the 1945-50 period are almost equal to those of the Rand Standard State Model corresponding to Haiti and Sierra Leone, and the cost is multiplied by 13 times.

	U.S. Army Period - First Republic Korea/North Korea	RAND Institute Standard Model Bureau (Peace Enforcement Activities)
population	21 million (1949)867)	5,000,000
Per capita National Income	$40 ($868)	$500

Total national construction cost	Approx. $2.4 billion (during the U.S. military administration)		Approx. $62.4 billion
Police and staff salaries	$3 ($869)/$40 ($870),$260 ($871)		$1,500
Police Force	1945	15,000 people	60,000 (1,5000*4)
	1946	22,620 people	
	1947	28,552 people	
	1948	35,000 people872)	
	1949		

	1950	48,010 people873)	
Military Personnel	1945	77,643 people	20-400,000 (5-100,000*4)
	1946	44,382 people	
	1947	58,985 people	
	1948	75,492 people874)/77,000 pass.	
	1949	85,000 / 97,000	
	1950	105,752 people/198,360 persons875)	
Police Budget	1945	202.5 million won	$72 million ($18 million*4)
	1946	KRW 147.0 million	
	1947	KRW 2,016.5 million	
	1948	2.4 Billion Won 876)	
	1949	10.6 Billion KRW	
	1950	13.4 Billion Won 877)	
Defense Budget	1945	KRW 0.1 million	$200 million ($50 million*4)
	1946	KRW 826.5 million	
	1947	KRW 1,991.0 million	
	1948	8.1 Billion Won 878)	

	1949	24.0 Billion KRW	
	1950	25.1 Billion Won 879)	
Overall Budget	1945		$62.4 billion ($15.6 billion*4)
	1946	202,300 thousand dollars	
	1947	277,628 thousand dollars	
	1948	244,500,000	
		$880)	
	1949	KRW 77.6 billion	
	1950	105.6 Billion Won 881)	

[867] "Results of the First Census (as of May 1, 1949: Released on June 16, 1949)," National History Compilation Committee, Memoirs of Korean People's National History: Korean Economic Policy Document 1 (1948.8-1949.12)』, 2010, pp. 333.

868) National History Compilation Committee, Memoirs of Korean History 2 Korean Economic Policy Document 2 (1950.1-1950.6)』, 2010. pp. 3.

869) Henderson, 2000. pp. 229.

[870] Park Jong-hyo, 2010, "Letter from Genenaloff, January 26, 1946, Far East 2 Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Personnel Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," pp. 191. Pak Jong-hyo, 2010, "Interview with a Korean Government Delegation Headed by Stalin and Kim Il-sung on March 5, 1949," pp. 311.

[871] Park Jong-hyo, 2010, "Letter from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the North Korean Embassy in the Soviet Union, February 2, 1950," pp. 466. Pak Jong-hyo, 2010, "Meeting with Stalin and a Korean Government Delegation Headed by Kim Il-sung on March 5, 1949," pp. 311.

872) HUSAFIK, U.S. MILITARY IN KOREA, VOL. 3, 1988. pp. 439. and each of the summations is for Lee Gil-sang, "Report on U.S. Military Administration," vols. 1-6, 1990, and G-2 Report, HQ, HUSAFIK G-2 P/R vols. 1-7 (U.S. Forces Korea Information Journal), 1988-1989. References.;Commentary on Summation and G-2 Report, 2008, pp. 215 < Chart V-3>.

[873] Public Security Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, ed., 1958, pp. 397.

(874) For the G-2 Summary to determine the number of South Korean National Defense Guards, see HQ, USAFIK G-2 weekly summary vols. 1-5, 1990. and G-2 Summary, 2008, pp. 167 <Diagram IV-4>. The number of USFK is Park Chan-pyo, 2007, pp. Table <4 of 214> Trends in the size of U.S. tactical forces and military personnel, pp. Table 6 of < 216> Citation of the Korean National Guard and the Trend of the Enhancement of the Eyeglass Trophy of the Sea respectively.

(875) First, the South Korean military data referred to the following sources: FRUS 1949, June 27, 1949, "Memorandum from the U.S. Department of the Army to the State Department on the Possibility of an All-Out Attack on North Korea Following the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea from South Korea," pp. 1046-1057. ; Korean Ministry of National Defense Transcription Committee, ed. 1967, pp. 109. ; Next, we referred to the following data on the build-up of the North Korean military.

C. Pak Jong-hyo (ed.), 2010, "Code Message from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tum Kin, September 14, 1949," pp.

331-333. ; Jang, Jun-Ik, 1991, pp. 134.

876) Choi, 1989. and the Research Department of the Bank of Industry, 1955. See the

[877] Public Security Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1973, pp. 295. National History Compilation Committee, 『Annals of Korean History: Korean Economic Policy Data 1(1948.8-1949.12)』,2010, pp. 691. References.

878) Choi, Kwang, 1989, and Korea Development Bank Research Department, 1955. See.

[879] Public Security Directorate, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1973, pp. 295. National History Compilation Committee, 『Annals of Korean History: Korean Economic Policy Data 1(1948.8-1949.12)』,2010, pp. 691. References.

880) Park Chan-pyo, 2007. pp. 314. This study is reprinted here in 1947 by the U.S. Committee on Foreign Liquidation.

A total of $24,928,000 provided by the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC) in the form of loans

Paid aid of the scale was summed up. On the issue of paid aid provided by the United States, see Thirty Years of Finance and Finance Committee, ed., 1978.

[881] Public Security Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1973, pp. 295. National History Compilation Committee, 『Annals of Korean History: Korean Economic Policy Data

Table VI-3 U.S. Military Administration-Early [702]Republic and Rand Research Institute Standard Model Comparison of National Construction Funds and Manpower Input Across Countries)

First of all, if we compare the military and police forces of the two countries, the U.S.

Compared to the Rand Institute's Standard Model State, the military government had 30 to 60 percent of the police force and 25 to 40 percent of the army, and the First Republic had 80 percent of the police force and only 26 percent of the military force. In the case of the police, it was relatively close to the Rand Institute's standard model of the state, but the Rand Institute's study recommends that the army be reduced and the police strengthened when building a nation[703), so the] number of police is not large at all, and in the case of the army, it is not enough.

Next, in terms of the overall budget, the RAND Institute's standard country requires a total budget of $62.4 billion per year, but the U.S. military budget consumes about $2.4 billion, which is only one-twentieth of the budget. In the case of the First Republic, it is not possible to make a direct comparison due to the lack of data, but after the breakup of the Second US-Soviet Joint Committee in July 1947, the United States supported the nation-building in earnest, and the amount of money soared, and the situation was much better than that of the US military. In the case of police expenditures, the average of 1.8 billion in the US military period is 24 percent compared to the average of 8.8 billion in the First Republic, and in the case of defense expenditures, the average of 9 billion in the US military period is 46 percent of the average of 19 billion

[702] (1948.8-1949.12)』,2010, pp. 691. 참조.

[703])Dobbins, 2007, pp. 66, pp. 72.

in the First Republic, an increase of about 5 times and 2.1 times, respectively. However, even in the First Republic, police and defense expenditures were still far below the national budget stipulated by the RAND Institute's standard state-building budget.

Lastly, in the case of the salary paid to the police, immediately after liberation, the police in South Korea

The average salary of $42 paid by the U.S. military is less than one-third of the average salary of $1,500 paid to police officers in standard country model countries. In particular, this was far less than the $56 and $3,640 that the Soviet Union paid to North Korean interpreters and soldiers in South Korea during the same period, suggesting that the United States spent much less on human resources than the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, it can be seen that relatively little money and manpower were invested in the state-building process during the US military occupation and the early days of the First Republic, creating an environment in which a vulnerable state was inevitably formed in terms of resource input. However, in the early years of the First Republic, the situation began to improve little by little, as the United States provided economic and material resources that were far more abundant than in the previous period, through economic aid. Of course, the First Republic was still lacking in human, material and economic resources, but it had no choice but to pursue state-building centered on ideological power resources. In other words, the government attempted to make up for the lack of human, economic, and material resources necessary for the construction of the state by maximizing the resources of ideological power based on the nationalist cause, and this is clearly seen in the process of drafting the Constitution and the first Cabinet, where emphasis was placed on the history of the anti-Japanese struggle and the legitimacy of the Provisional Government.

However, as the issue of national security emerged as a top priority for the survival of the new nation, it was inevitable that national security would be increasingly emphasized. Thus, despite concerns about undermining political legitimacy, actions were taken to save the country beyond laws and ethics, such as: In other words, he enacted the National Security Law and disbanded the Anti-People Special Committee, allowing Japanese bureaucrats with experience and skills in professional administration and policing to remain in the government, while creating the Korean Youth League, which integrated right-wing youth organizations, and entrusted them with the work of paramilitary organizations and involved them in the work of public security and national defense.

On the other hand, national security is a top priority over this nationalist cause. In the midst of the transition, the ideological resources of the Provisional Government, Sammyunism, and the Japanese People's Movement, which combined national security, emerged as a transitional ideological power resource, and mobilized in the realm of national security and the people's movement for nation-building to mobilize the economic, material, and human resources that the state lacked in the private sector, led by the Korean Youth League and the Student Patriotic League.

In fact, research by the Rand Institute found that policing is the most important part of nation-building.

Present it as a priority.[704][705] In other words, policing and security are essential prerequisites for development that provide the basis for economic growth for civil society to [706]emerge after minimum policing and security are achieved, and finally a civil society that can survive without external support begins to emerge on the basis of the legal system[707]. However, in order to achieve the objectives of national security, informal state organizations have been mobilized, exceeding the authority of formal state organizations, which has the side effect of creating a dual system of state power.

Nonetheless, nationalist demands for national security The First Republic, which had made sacrifices in the process, was able to compensate for the lack of material and economic resources and increase the people's consent to the mobilization of resources and a sense of belonging to them by accepting the voices of the masses demanding nationalist causes led by Rhee Seung-man in exchange for mobilization in the process of nation-building. In addition, the centrist figures who observed this recognized the Republic of Korea through the election of the 2nd National Assembly and participated in the nation-building, increasing their political legitimacy and ideological power resources. On the other hand, just before the outbreak of the Korean War, the centrist figures who participated in the nation-building as bureaucrats were achieving fiscal equality, thus escaping the stage of state collapse and acquiring a sense of statehood. This process of state

---

[704])이에 따르면 국가건설은 1.치안(평화 유지, 법 집행, 법치 안전부문 개혁)→2.인도적 구호(난민 귀환 및 잠재적인 전염병, 기아, 피난처 부족에 대한 대응)→3.경제 안정화(화폐가치 안정화, 지역 및 국제무역이 재개될 수 있는 법 제도적 틀 제공)→4.민주화(정당, 자유언론, 시민사회, 선거에 필요한 법적, 헌법적 틀 구축)→5.개발(경제성장, 빈곤 감소, 인프라 향상 추진) 등의 순서로 진행된다. Dobbins, 2007, pp.

[705] -32.

[706])Dobbins, 2007, pp. 265.

[707])Dobbins, 2007, pp. 46, pp. 62.

formation during the US military occupation and the early years of the First Republic can be reintroduced into Michael Mann's model of the nation-building process and schematized as follows.

		Infra structural power	
		Low	High
Despotic power (Despotic Power)	High	weak country (Weak State)	Authoritarian states (Authoritarian State)
	Low	↑ Prescription country (Vulnerable State), ↓Bankruptcy country, national collapse = weakest country (Failed State&Collapsed) State)	Bureaucratic state (Bureaucratic State)

Table VI-4) State-Building in Non-Western Countries in the Post-Modern Period

Table VI-4 above is a typology of Michael Mann's classification of countries[708] by applying it to the state-building process of non-Western countries. According to this, a country with high autocratic power but low underlying power is a weak state, and a country with low power of both can be classified as a weak state. And the most vulnerable of these vulnerable countries is the one that eventually breaks down
(Failed State) or collapsed state. The state in the early years of the U.S. military regime and the First Republic was a weak state that lacked almost all the resources for state-building and lacked both political and social mechanisms of political legitimacy and bourgeoisie, so both autocratic power and substructural power were low, but in the process of building a state that maximized ideological power resources, the consul Rhee Seung-man was able to escape from the collapse of the state or the collapse of the state by increasing the sense of belonging by increasing the sense of belonging and expanding the autonomy of the state by implementing land reform and compulsory education of the state by putting ideological power resources such as the Constitution in front of the nationalist cause from the position of mediator. However, the most striking features in the process of forming a vulnerable state are as follows. First of all, since the birth of the state, the state has not been able to properly represent nationalism due to the failure of the state to properly absorb nationalism, and since the Korean War, the confrontation between nationalism and extreme nationalism has continued in earnest since the Korean War, resulting in the repetition of the vicious cycle of weak countries without the improvement of the conditions of ideological resources.

---

[708])Michael Mann. “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results”,Archives européenes de sociologie Vol. 25, 1984, pp. 185-213.

First, the state, which judged itself to have failed to absorb nationalism, became constantly conscious of its own vulnerability and had a sense of crisis. In addition, the state tended to exert excessive state power in order to deliberately conceal its capabilities that were lacking in reality.

Second, by the people becoming victims of this excessive state power, the people

For them, the state came to be seen as tyrannical and oppressive. On the other hand, the people who had become fearful and victimized by state violence began to advocate nationalism outside the country after the Korean War. In addition, the state has been forced to be wary of the demands of nationalism outside the state.

Third, since the 1950s, the state has been extremely extreme within the country.

The confrontation between the institutional sphere that cries out for liberalism and the movement that calls for nationalism and democratization outside the country has intensified.

Fourth, the mixture of nationalist and anti-national characteristics within a country.

The attitude of the people and the people of the country, as well as the attitude of the people toward the government, was also divided and disjointed, and confusion persisted. Thus, the people, who had a strong desire for nationalism, became distrustful of the government, which led to their attitude towards the state.

Thus, a situation develops in which the state does not fully absorb nationalism.

However, due to the lack of human, economic, and material resources, the ironic situation of putting ideological power resources at the forefront of the nation-building process has also arose, and the process

of nation-building has become economically and militarily dependent on the United States.

Human. Due to the fragility of economic and material resources, ideological power resources that relied on nationalist causes and political legitimacy have come to play a key role in the nation-building process, and the resulting characteristics are as follows. First, even in a situation where the state did not fully absorb nationalism, it lacked almost all the resources necessary for the construction of the state, thus delaying the formation of the bourgeoisie, which is the social mechanism necessary for the formation of a modern state, thus increasing the dependence on ideological power resources and forcing the state to try to establish at least a political mechanism of political legitimacy. Therefore, the First Republic, led by a mediator-like consul named Rhee Seung-man, sought to mobilize resources by promoting a kind of negotiation process that would promote social reform that accommodated the nationalist demands of the people.

In this way, by putting the resources of ideological power at the forefront of state building, it became possible to expedite land reform and compulsory education in elementary schools, so that the state absorbed national sentiment in the process of state building and began to supplement its scarce economic and material resources, thus beginning to form a social mechanism, the bourgeoisie. In doing so, it was possible to reinforce the nationalist cause and the people's support, which had been undermined by the appointment of bureaucrats due to the lack of human resources, and to strengthen the sense of belonging to the state.

In particular, the First Republic focused on increasing the number of schools and pupils that could accommodate teachers, inheriting the policies of the U.S. military administration in the implementation of compulsory primary and secondary school education, by thoroughly

calculating teachers' salaries and providing them with a high level of salary. The aforementioned Rand Research Institute's research also found that the most effective way to create a functional education system is to provide competitive salaries to recruit competitive people as teachers, so that in the case of new Third World countries, it is necessary to create a stronger tax and funding base through minimal economic growth. It is recommended to concentrate resources in secondary schools.[709] Second, the reality that sufficient funds were not invested in nation-building and could not improve material and economic intoxication continued until the beginning of the First Republic, when public officials were forced to pay only a small salary, which in many cases led to corruption, but the state rationalized to provide small rewards due to economic and material limitations by advocating ideological power resources such as patriotism and nationalism.

In fact, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Cho Bong-am, North Chungcheong Province Governor Yoon Ha-young, and Temporary Trustee Bureau When corruption by high-ranking officials such as[710] Jang Lim Byung-hyuk often occurred[711], President Rhee Seung-man deliberately appointed a large number of people who had no administrative experience but could be trusted because they were close to him in the United States, and instructed the civil servants to serve the country with a low salary by appealing to them for patriotism. In addition, Rhee was recommending that the officials atone for their crimes under the logic of the so-called "atonement for the long service," which meant that vulnerable countries that could not properly compensate were facing the problem of national security. As a result, they justified the atonement of

[709])Dobbins,2007, pp. 206, pp. 208.

[710])『경향신문』,1949 년 7 월 5 일「관재처 오리송청」.

[711])『동아일보』,1950 년 3 월 10 일「관재처 오리파면」.

the nation for their participation in the nation-building while offering small compensation.

Third, talents such as Yi Soon-tak, the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Planning, and some officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Talents such as Yi Soon-tak, the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Planning, and those who possess superior capabilities in terms of ideological power resources, but also have excellent human resources, have emerged and contributed to the achievement of fiscal balance and aid from the United States, so that the country can overcome its vulnerabilities and acquire the character of a modern nation in a short period of time. In fact, the Rand Institute's research lists controlling inflation through balanced budgets as the top priority of the main challenges for the long-term development of emerging countries. This shows how great the achievement of the First Republic was to achieve a balanced budget and control inflation in just over three years.(890) Fourth, the traces of the promotion of nation-building by maximizing the resources of ideological power, which were relatively abundant in place of the weak human, economic, and material resources, remained for a considerable period of time before and after the Korean War. Typical examples are the influence of the Constitutional Constitution, which has been one of the justifications for state-led economic development since the 1960s, reflecting the ideology of the Provisional Government, and the influence of Ilminism, a transitional ideology that has served as an ideological resource for resource mobilization to achieve the objectives of nation-building and national security. Nonetheless, as ideological resources come to the fore in the process of nation-building,
It had the following negative effects at the same time:

In other words, people with high nationalist causes and political legitimacy but low state bureaucracy were appointed at the beginning of

the state-building process, resulting in setbacks and inefficiencies in the management of state affairs and a long time to replace them. In addition, due to their lack of competence, the appointment of non-Japanese bureaucrats with low nationalist causes and political legitimacy was justified, which led to a decline in the people's trust in the state, which led to a sense of belonging to the state to the people and a decrease in ideological power resources. Therefore, The lack of control over the people by the national administration continues, and the immigration rate is higher than that of other countries. At the same time, it has become a practice in the state apparatus to prioritize the relationships between the highest levels of political legitimacy rather than the personal abilities and suitability of bureaucrats.[891]

Above all, the most important thing is that, as mentioned above, the situation of shortage of all resources such as material and economic resources was re-enacted after the Korean War, and other ideological resources such as anti-communism and anti-Japanese were used as a sidewalk to mobilize various resources.

---

890)Dobbins, 2007, pp. 280.

[891] Sasaki points out that the tendency for promotion and appointment to post to be determined not by talent or ability, but by the liking of superiors, was seen from the very beginning of the army, when members of the Provisional Government formed the upper echelons of the military, and associates this with Chinese customs. Sasaki. 1977. M. pp. 127.

As the people began to grow tired, the value of ideological resources declined.

In particular, in the case of Il-democracy, it gradually disappeared as an object of contempt by the cynical people, and Rhee Seung-man, who had absolute authority, fell along with it and was forced to step down. As a result, in a situation where the vicious circle of lack of all resources was reversed, the subject of nation-building became ambiguous, and Rhee

Seung-man and the right-wing youth group could be regarded as the protagonists of nation-building. However, even they unreasonably mobilized resources through ideological resources and were so deeply aware of the weakness of the state that they hastily exercised tyrannical power over the people to maintain and run the state, which led to the people's anger and resentment and loss of respect.

Next, the nation-building that was economically and militarily dependent on the United States gave rise to the same characteristics.

First, a country that had insufficient economic and material infrastructure and capabilities,

With the support of the United States, the country was able to form a state in a relatively short period of time, and it was able to establish itself as a success story of nation-building led by the United States, which was an external power along with the United States. In particular, in the case of South Korea, when almost all resources were scarce, the standard of nation-building by freed people and shareholders was disseminated to the entire society through the Korean National Youth League, which was supported by the United States, which made it possible to quickly build a nation. In other words, the members of the Korean National Youth League carried out the tasks of national security, economic development and democracy in line with the progress of Korea's nation-building.

On the other hand, in order to quickly acquire the standards necessary for the construction of a liberal democratic state, young human resources were relatively advantageous, so as mentioned above, young bureaucrats in their 20s and 30s emerged as the mainstay of human resources. In contrast, human resources who had more experience as bureaucrats and were older than them were urgently sent to state institutions such as the military in spite of the problem of ideological diminishing resources when the crisis of national security occurred, but

they gradually disappeared because those who were accustomed to Japanese-style state standards could not meet the standards necessary for building a liberal democratic state.

Among the members of the Korean National Youth League, which was divided into conservative and centrist forces in terms of political orientation, it was the conservative forces led by Yi Beom-seok who played an active role in the early days of nation-building, when national security emerged as a top priority. They supported the establishment of the Republic of Korea in August 1948 from the front, advancing into the military and police circles, and were responsible for national security until it was officially disbanded in 1953 by Rhee Seung-man.

After the official dissolution decree in 1953, the Korean National Youth League, which had learned the standards of building a liberal democratic country and entered the relationship, rehabilitated the country devastated by the Korean War, promoted economic development, and improved the construction of material and economic resources. In other words, around 1956, when the Ministry of Reconstruction began to be established, 20 percent of the civil servants at that time, including Paek Doo-jin, were following the guidelines of the Korean National Youth League.

In addition, they studied in the United States from the 1960s to learn the standards of a modern American state, and in 1955 they promoted the construction of a modern nation and economic development in earnest together with the military forces, of which 70 percent of them were affiliated with the Korean National Youth League.

In this way, the conservative forces of the Korean National Youth League are the ruling Liberal Party and the Democratic Republican Party.

In contrast to the advance to the party, the progressive forces that promoted the establishment of progressive political parties such as the Shinjin Association from the mid-1950s became the main players in the promotion of democratization, led by ideological circles and opposition parties.[712] Representative figures include Bu Wan-hyuk and Lee Hee-ho, and as a result, after the problems of national security and economic development were resolved to a certain extent, the democratization that met the standards of the U.S. was successfully carried out, and Korea was able to establish itself as a representative success story of the modern nation-building supported by the United States. Second, the First Republic, which lacked almost all resources such as human, material, economic, and international political resources except for ideological resources, was economically and militarily unable to survive due to serious national security problems from the moment of its establishment. The scope of the state's independent decision-making has been greatly narrowed, and its dependence on the superpower has become constitutional. Therefore, immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, it failed to acquire the status and character of an independent war entity by handing over to the United States many powers necessary for independent war wages, such as the right to wartime control operations, and thus could not overcome the weakness of nationalist ideological power resources. Third, the lack of material and economic resources due to the lack of U.S. aid

Since it was made possible by supplementing the ham, diplomacy was also led by people who had studied in the United States for this purpose. In addition, since the government's recruitment of other human resources

[712])Record Group 319 Office of the Chief of Military History Investigative Record Repository(IRR) Box#327/ Case# XA531861 Pom Suk Yi, 중앙일보 현대사연구소 편, 1996. pp. 652-654.

was centered on people who had studied in the United States, as was the case during the period of the U.S. military administration and the early days of the First Republic, studying in the United States became an essential process for career advancement and success, and the Americanization of social leaders was promoted.[713][714] Thus, the tendency of society as a whole to be dictated by U.S.-centric standards and values has intensified. In addition, the academic world has also been in a hurry to explain social phenomena by continuously introducing Western-centered theories, which has prevented the development of social scientific theories that fit the reality of Korea.(894) Finally, the fragile states formed during the period of the US military and at the beginning of the First Republic were subsequently

It also influenced the process of Korean nation-formation and led to the emergence of the following characteristics.

First, the authoritarian governments that emerged after the First Republic pursued a policy of economic growth based on national security and economic development as ideological power resources in order to strengthen the insufficient material and economic foundations and secure political legitimacy[715]. Of course, this was possible because during the First Republic, the crumbs of the Japanese bureaucracy had already been picked up, the framework of the state apparatus was formed, human resources were supplemented, and a long-term economic development plan was formulated. And, through this, the material possessions of the First Republic, Economic and ideological vulnerabilities could be

[713])해방 이후 한국사회의 전반적인 미국화에 대한 학문적 논의는 김덕호, 원용진, 『아메리카나이제이션: 해 방 이후 한국에서의 미국화』, (서울: 푸른역사, 2008). 를 참조할 것.

[714])한국적 현실에 맞는 사회과학 이론이 개발되지 못한 이유에 대해서는 박상섭, 『국가, 주권』, (서울: 소 화, 2008). 를 참조할 것.

[715])노재봉, 1985.

overcome, and the material and economic foundations on which civil society could take shape could be secured.

Nevertheless, in the case of South Korea, the fragility of its material and economic base

Because the bourgeoisie could not form itself and was nurtured by the state, it could not have hegemony and the emergence of civil society was delayed. The bourgeoisie in a country did not have hegemony because it did not secure its own material base, as in the case of the West, but because it was nurtured by state power, it could not have moral legitimacy. In other words, the Korean bourgeoisie began to accumulate capital through the U.S. military occupation and the Red Bush left behind by Japan during the First Republic, and suffered criticism that they were the biggest beneficiaries of the pro-capitalist policies of the authoritarian governments that emerged afterwards, such as the repressive policies of labor, preferential financing, and the tax system. In this way, the Korean bourgeoisie, although they have secured material and economic resources, has not been able to possess the resources of ideological power, and therefore has not been able to demonstrate their social leadership.

Therefore, as an alternative, the middle class that began to form through economic growth

It was expected to lead a civil society, and in fact, the end of authoritarian rule through a democratic revolution centered on these strata would enhance political legitimacy and enhance this ideological power resource. However, these middle classes were also unable to have their own distinct culture, ethics, and identity that even the bourgeoisie did not have, due to the rapid timeline of state establishment and the short history of the introduction of capitalism. To make matters worse, the rules of distribution that the state provides to the people in exchange for

resource mobilization have collapsed in the wake of the 1998 IMF economic crisis, reducing the aspect of securing political legitimacy for civil society through negotiations. The ideological resources of the state have diminished. At the same time, as the economic and material foundations of the middle class have eroded, Korean civil society has not yet had a firm orientation compared to the West.[716] Of course, the country will be able to move quickly and in a short time, as in the previous period. Although it has made up for the problems of expulsion and lack of material resources, it can be said that it has failed to overcome the weakness of ideological resources by decreasing its political legitimacy due to the collapse of the rules of fair distribution and failing to present a direction for national security and economic development. Therefore, in the case of Korea, even though the vulnerability of various resources that the country possessed at the beginning of the establishment of the Republic of Korea has been overcome to a large extent, the reality that the problem of vulnerability of economic, material, and ideological resources continues to dominate, and the country remains an incomplete nation-state in which nation-building is still in progress.
All of them.

In other words, South Korea, which was in a state of division between the North and the South, and the crisis of national security continued to occur, was able to avoid the stage of national collapse by making efforts to overcome the problem of lack of resources. However, due to the outbreak of the Korean War, the problem of lack of human, material, and economic resources became more severe than before the war, and efforts to overcome it were only possible from around 1956. Accordingly, while the problem of resource shortage persisted, the

716) 박광주.1992.

problem of lack of resources in international politics also changed its appearance whenever relations with the United States deteriorated or the issue of the withdrawal of US troops was raised, thus constraining the reality of the weak countries.

In the end, the vicious cycle of resolving the urgent problem of resource shortage at the stage of barely escaping the stage of national collapse led to the emergence of another problem of resource shortage. In order to solve this, the state has taken the approach of diverting resources from the relatively abundant resources to solve the most urgent problems. For example, Sasaki points out that the South Korean government, which had to resolve the dispute in the Ongjin area and the subjugation of the Jirisan and Taebaeksan districts at the same time, took the approach of rotating units with other regiments as soon as one dispute was over, resulting in units being deployed in rotation every two months.[717] In addition, whenever a new problem arises, the method of imperial oratory to solve the most pressing problem by pouring resources from elsewhere became in full swing during the period of military rule, when these military commanders were in direct control of the country. However, this was only a stopgap measure, and the vicious cycle was repeated, so the state was forced to devote itself to the task of economic development to cultivate the bourgeoisie and develop the economy in order to fundamentally solve these problems. The fragility of material resources could be improved to a great extent.

Nonetheless, as authoritarian military rule drags on, political As the question of enemy legitimacy began to be raised, ideological resources were degraded. In addition, as the reality of confrontation between the North and the South continues, the state has become

[717])사사끼. 1977. pp. 460.

constantly dependent on international political resources to solve the problem of national security for survival.

However, the reality of the Cold War, which was fundamentally dominated by the bipolar system of the United States and the Soviet Union, In the midst of this, the problem of international political resources was not a problem that a weak country like South Korea could solve by its efforts alone. As Park pointed out, South Korea had no choice but to make its relationship with the United States a central axis from the beginning. In addition, considering that in the reality of world politics such as the Cold War, which was operated by the United States and the Soviet Union at the time, Britain, West Germany, Japan, and even de Gaulle's France, excluding neutral countries, were able to make their voices heard by relying on their relations with the United States, whether large or small[718], this was a reality that almost all countries at that time could not escape. Moreover, The Republic of Korea, which accepted the formation of a vulnerable country as an inherent limitation, could not escape the reality of a weak country that was sacrificed for the benefit of a powerful country. Thus, the vicious cycle of reducing international political resources along with ideological resources while improving human, material, and economic resources has been repeated until military rule continues.

On the other hand, after democratization, the vulnerability of ideological resources improved considerably compared to the period of military rule, but the problem of the division between the North and the South, which was emphasized by nationalism, which was still not absorbed by the state, could not be fundamentally resolved because it

[718])박준규, "조약협정으로 본 한미관계,", 『청맥』 제 2 집, 1 호(1965), (서울: 청맥사, 1965). pp. 82-83.

could not be resolved. On the contrary, due to the democratization that proceeded along with economic development, nationalist voices, which had been staying outside the state, mainly in the sphere of movement, entered the institutional sphere within the state and came into conflict with state-centrism. Thus, ideological resources have been depleted in post-democratization Korea due to the deepening conflict between those who advocate the nationalist cause of building a unified mono-nation-state and those who still believe that national security issues centered on state-centered values are important.

In this way, the problem of ideological and international political resource degradation comes together at different times.

In the late 1990s, the IMF economic crisis broke out, and the problem of lack of economic and material resources once again came to the fore. In other words, even though the Republic of Korea overcame the stage of national collapse and overcame the vulnerability of human, material, and economic resources through economic development, it was not able to fully escape from the reality of ideological and international political resources because it could not fully absorb nationalism due to the reality of the division of the North and South, unlike other countries with similar national power.

Finally, to summarize, Korea was liberated from Japan on August 15, 1945.

From that day on, it began as a vulnerable state because it lacked almost all the resources needed to run the state and build a modern nation-state. From August 15, 1945 until the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the vulnerable state continued to be formed and maintained. As a whole, the state did not absorb nationalism sufficiently and proceeded with nation-building, and after supplementing the most urgent resources in each period, another resource became scarce, and the state either

diverted other resources or borrowed resources from the private sector to compensate for the vicious cycle, which was the dynamic nature of the weak state. This was also repeated in the later period, when everything was destroyed after the Korean War and both economic development and national security had to be accomplished in a situation where there was a shortage of resources even worse than immediately after liberation.

In the midst of this, vulnerable countries are making their own intrinsic efforts. Overcoming the vulnerabilities of women's resources. Of course, due to the nature of a weak country, it was greatly restricted by the influence of international politics and had the limitation of building a modern nation-state with the support of the United States, but it was able to successfully build a modern nation compared to other countries that were in a much better condition than other countries through the dedicated efforts and sacrifices of its members that transcended the laws and ethics of its members.

Nonetheless, even in the midst of a division that is different from other countries,

The weakness of international political resources and nationalistic ideological resources to achieve the construction of a unified modern nation-state of a single nation remains an insurmountable limit, preventing it from escaping its attributes as a vulnerable state. In the end, it remains for us to decide whether these conditions and conditions can be overcome by improving them with intrinsic efforts and the human, material, and economic resources that have been achieved so far, or whether we will break the fundamental limitation of the vicious cycle of repetition of the vulnerability of ideological resources by abandoning the nationalist cause of achieving a unified modern nation-state.

References

■ Primary Data

1. Korean

(1) newspaper

『National Highway Newspaper』『Kookmin Newspaper』『National Defense Daily』『Kukje Newspaper』『Kyunghyang Newspaper』『Daedong Newspaper』『Independent Newspaper』『Independence Sinbo』『Donggwang Sinmun』『Donga Ilbo』『DPKUK Ilbo』『Minju Ilbo』『Maeil Sinbo』『Busan Sinmun』『Busan Ilbo』『Commerce and Industry Daily』『Seoul Newspaper』『Susan Economic Daily』『World Daily』『Shinhan Minbo』『Yonhap Newspaper』『Free Newspaper』『Leaflet』『Chosun Ilbo』『Chosun JoongAng Ilbo』『JoongAng Sinmun』『Peace Ilbo』『Hansung Ilbo』

(2) magazine

Official Gazette No. 3, Official Gazette No. 26, Gazette No. 6. 1949. Seoul: Editorial Division, Publication Bureau, Public Information Office.

Bulletin No. 39. 1949. Seoul: Editorial Division, Publication Bureau, Public Information Office.

Bulletin No. 52. 1950. Seoul: Editorial Division, Publishing Bureau, Public Information Office.
『Weekly Seoul』
『First issue of the Municipal Administration Monthly Bulletin』
『Municipal Monthly Bulletin No. 2』
『The Second Year of the Korean War』

(3) Yearbook

Investigation Department of the Korea Federation of Financial Unions. 1955. 『Korean Agricultural Yearbook』, Survey Department, Korea Finance Association.
Publication Committee of the Republic of Korea. 1987.『The Beginning of the Three Factors of Korea』Gwacheon: Session of the National History Compilation Committee. Economic History of Korea. 1947. 『Cradle of the Korean Economy』Seoul: Economic History of Korea. Bank of Korea Research Department. 1948. Annals of the Korean Economy, Seoul: Bank of Korea, Bank of Korea Research Department. 1948. Economic Yearbook, Seoul: Bank of Korea.
Bank of Korea Research Department. 1949. 『Handbook of Korean Economic Statistics』, Seoul: Bank of Korea. Ministry of Education. 1946. 『Overview of Education and Educational Administration』 Cho Missionary Books Co., Ltd.
1955.Economic Yearbook, Seoul: Bank of Korea Research Department. Bank of Korea Research Department. 1962, Annals of Economic Statistics, Seoul: Bank of Korea.

(4) Collection of materials

National History Compilation Committee. 2010.『Memoirs History of the Republic of Korea Kit Korea Economy Policy Document 1: Aug. 1948-Dec. 1949, Seoul: Sunin.
『Memoirs History of the Republic of Korea Kit Korea Economy Policy Document 2: 1950.1-1950.6』Seoul: Sunin. 1999.『Records of the South Korean Transitional Legislative Assembly』, Seoul: Sunin Cultural History. 2005.『Korean Society in the Period of Japanese Fascism』Seoul: Sunin. Jung Tae-so. 1992.『Collection of Korean Educational History of the U.S. Army, 1945~1948』Seoul: Hong Jiwon.
2009.『Alumni Letters of Seungman Lee』Seoul: Yonsei University Press.
. 2009.『Alumni Letters of Seungman Lee』, Seoul: Yonsei University Press.

(5) Materials in the possession of major institutions

『1st National Assembly Record No. 59』,
『1st National Assembly Record No. 82』
『1st National Assembly Record No. 83』
『The 1st National Assembly Record No. 93』
『1st National Assembly Record No. 105』
『2nd National Assembly Transcript No. 13』『National Assembly Record of the 2nd 55th Plenary Session of the National Assembly』
National Archives of Korea. 1947. "Decree No. 118 on the appointment of assistant military attaché to the U.S. Armed Forces (March 29, 1947)" Presidential Archives of the National Archives - 1950 Constitutional Amendment (AA0003855)

Proposed Constitutional Amendment (AA0003857) by the Government of January 23, 1954 Matters concerning the New Year's Eve of the implementation of the Agrarian Land Reform Act (AA0000103) Matters concerning the implementation of food rations (AA0000040) Request for report on punishment of blundering public officials (AA0000059)

2. Foreign Documents

(1) The United States

A. Unpublished materials

(1) Digital Data

DNSA(Declassified National Security Archive)

-NSC Report (National Security Council Report):
National Security Council Report 8, April, 2, 1949.
National Security Council Report 8/2, March, 22. 1949.
National Security Council Report 61, January, 27, 1950.
National Security Council Report 73, July, 1, 1950
-CIA Reprt(Central Intelligence Agency Report)
Central Intelligence Agency Report, June, 19, 1950.

FRUS(Foreign Relations of the United States)1948-1950.

B. Publications.

Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Summation of U. S. Military Government Activities in Korea. No.7-15.; Beat it. 1990. 『Report on the Activities of the U.S. Military Administration, Vol. 1-6』 Seoul: Wonju Cultural History.

Commander in Chief, Far East, Summation of U. S. Military Government Activities in Korea. No.16-22.: Winning the prize. 1990. 『Report on the Activities of the U.S. Military Administration, Vol. 1-6』 Seoul: Wonju Cultural History.

Headquarter USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary. ; Center for Asian Cultural Studies, Hallym University, 1989. 『USFK Weekly Information Summary』 Chuncheon: Center for Asian Cultures, Hallym University.

----------, G-2 Periodic Report. ; Center for Asian Cultural Studies, Hallym University, 1989. 『Daily Information Summary of USFK』 Chuncheon: Center for Asian Cultures, Hallym University.

----------, Intelligence Summary Northern Korea. : Center for Asian Culture, Hallym University, 1989. 『Summary of North Korean Information by USFK』 Chuncheon: Center for Asian Culture, Hallym University.

Headquarters KMAG, G-2 Periodic Report, G-2 Weekly Summary.Center for Asian Culture, Hallym University, 1989. 『U.S. Military Advisers' Jung Boy Magazine』 Chuncheon: Center for Asian Cultures, Hallym University.

Hoag, Leonard. 1970. American Military Government in Korea: War Policy and the First Year of Occupation, 1941-1946. Draft manuscript produced under the auspices of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1970, Pentagon Library; Shin Bok-ryong, Kim Won-duk, 1992. 『Report on the Division of Korea』 Seoul: Pulvit.

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, 895 Internal Affairs of Korea; National History Compilation Committee. 2006. 『U.S. Aid to Korea Documents 1-2』 Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee.

Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State; National History Compilation Committee. 2006. 『U.S. Aid to Korea Documents 1-2』 Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee.

Record Group 165: ABC 014 Japan. 1947. Report of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea, (Feb, 1947). ; Shin Bok-ryong, translated by Kim Won-duk. 1992. 『Report on the Division of Korea』, Seoul: Pulvit.

Record Group 332, Box 45, 1953. Office of the Chief of Military History: OCMH, Department of Defense. ; Shin Bok-ryong, translated by Kim Won-deok. 1992. 『Report on the Division of Korea』, Seoul: Pulvit.

Record Group 332, Boxes 29&65, Trusteeship: Third Draft (Manuscript). ; Shin Bok-ryong, translated by Kim Won-duk. 1992. 『Report on the Division of Korea』, Seoul: Pulvit.

Record Group 332, Box 66, 1947. Report of US Delegation on US-USSR Joint Commission (20, August, 1947).: Shin Bok-ryong, translated by Kim Won-duk Nori seaweed. 1992. Report on the Division of Korea Ha』, Seoul: Pulvit.

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, South Korean Interim Government Activities of Non-Military Activities. No.1-6.; Beat it. 1990. 『Report on the Activities of the U.S. Military Administration, Vol. 1-6』 Seoul: Wonju Cultural History.

United States Armed Forces in Korea, History of the United States

Armed Forces in Korea, Manuscript in the Office of the Chief of the Chief of the Military History, Washington, D . C . ; U.S. Military History in Korea 1-4, 1988. Seoul: Stone Pillow.
----------, Summation of South Korean Interim Government Activities No.23-34.; Beat it. 1990. "U.S. Army activity Report Vol. 1-6, Seoul: Wonju Cultural History.
Wedemeyer, Albert, C. 1947. Report to the President Submitted by Lt. Gen, A. C. Wedemeyer: Korea, September 1947, USGPO, Washington D.C, 1951.
JoongAng Ilbo Institute of Contemporary History, ed. 1996.『U.S. Military CIC Intelligence Report』, Vol. 1-4, Seoul: JoongAng Ilbo Institute of Contemporary History.

(2) The Soviet Union

National History Compilation Committee. 2004. "Soviet Military Administration Documents of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Report on the Situation in South Korea 1946-1947", Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee.
----------,2004.『Shtykov Diary』Gwacheon: National History Compilation Committee. Translated by Park Jong-hyo. 2010. "Policy Document I of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation" Seoul: Sunin.

3. Memoirs, biographies, and biography

(1) Paperback

Principality. 2001. 『An Old Soldier's Lamentation』 Seoul: Wonmin.
Doohan Kim. 1963『The Blood-stained Eve of the National Founding: Memoirs of Kim Doohan』 Seoul: Yeonwoo Publishing House. Doohan Kim. 2002. 『Autobiography of Kim Doohan (2)』 Seoul: Metro Seoul Holdings.
Written by Kim Koo and compiled by Do Jin-soon, 2007.『Baek Beom Eorok: The First Step to Peaceful Reunification, Baek Beom's Last Words and Writings』 Seoul: Stone Pillow.
Written by Kim Koo, translated by Do Jin-soon. 2011. 『Baek Beom Diary for Easy Reading』 Seoul: Stone Pillow. Kim Alignment. 2010. 『Alarm of Aviation: Memoirs of Kim Jung Jung』 Seoul: Dae-hee.
Ringworm lobe. 2010. 『Without Motherland, There Is No Me』 Seoul: Monthly ARMY.
Sunwoo Kisung. 1987. 『The Life of an Activist』 Seoul: Bae Youngsa.
Sunwoo Jongwon. 1992. 『Sasang Examination』 Seoul: Keimyungsa.
Lee Eung-jun. 1982. 『Ninety Years of Retrospective: The Autobiography of Lee Eung-jun』 Seoul: Sanwoon Commemorative Project. Cheolseung Lee. 1976. 『National Academic Union』, Seoul: JoongAng Ilbo.
Ichi up. Co-authored with Stephen M. Talph. 2001. 『Lightning General』 Seoul: Wonmin. Hanlim Lee. 1994. 『Memoirs of Hanlim Lee: The Turbulence of the Century』 Seoul: Pal Restoration
Yoo Se-yeol and Kim Tae-ho; 1984.『(Okgye) Yujinsan : Life, Thought, and Politics, Seoul: President.
Yoo Jae-heung. 1994. 『Turbulent Years: Memoirs of Yoo Jae-heung』 Seoul: Eulyu Cultural History.

Jang Taek-sang. 1992. 『The Founding of the Republic of Korea and Me: The Autobiography of Changrang Jang Taek-sang』 Seoul: Changrang Jang Taek-sang Commemorative Project.

Cho Byung-ok. 1959. 『My Memoirs』 Seoul: Minsa Kyo.

luggage Hausmann, Ilhwa Jung Station. 1995. 『Korea President Moving U.s. military Seoul: Korean Literature Center.

(2) Newspapers, magazines, serials

Kyungnam Lee. 1987. "Half a Century of the Youth Movement," Kyunghyang Newspaper (January-April 1987).

Younggeun Lee. 1990. "The Frustration of Yeo Woon-hyung 'Gun-Jun'; Unification Ilbo Chairman's Memoirs of the late Lee Young-geun (Sang)," Monthly Chosun (September 1990).

Hayoung Choi. 1968. "Commissioner for Political Affairs Summons Korean Chief," Monthly JoongAng (August 1968).

4. Testimonies, interviews

Korea Institute of Spiritual Culture, ed., Institute of Korean Ethnic Culture, 2001. 『Oral Materials Collection 1: Liberation and Division』 Seoul: Sun Phosphorus.

『Oral Materials Collection 3: My Founding and Conflict』 Seoul: Sunin.

"Oral Archives 4: I Suffered Korean War peel Division

Jeonghee Government』 Zen Seoul:
Phosphorus.

■ Secondary Materials [Paperback]

(1) English

Anderson, Perry. 1974. Lineages of the Absolutist State London: Verso.

Althusser, Louis. 1969. For Marx New York : Penguin Press.

Amsden, Alice. 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization New York : Oxford University Press.

Armstrong, Charles. 2003. The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Badie, Bertrand and Birnbaum, Pierre. 1983. The Sociology of the State Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Brazinsky, Gregg. 2007. Nation Building in South Korea : Koreans, Americans, and The Making of a Democracy Chapel Hill, NC : University of North Carolina Press.

Cho Soon Sung. 1967. Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 : an Evaluation of American Responsibility Berkeley: University. of California Press.

Cumings, Bruce. 1981. The Origins of the Korean War volume I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2001. The Origins of the Korean War, Seoul: Ilwol Seogak.

----------. 1990. The Origins of Korean War volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1946-1950 Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

----------. 1997. Korea's Place in the Sun : a Modern History New York: Norton.

Dobbins, James, Jones, Seth G, Crane, Keith, DeGrasse. Beth Cole. 2007. The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION: RAND Corporation.: Written by James Dobbins et al.; Translated by Lim Eul-chul and Son Hee-kyung.

2010.『How to Build a Nation by the Rand Institute of the United States』Paju

: Hanul.

Eudin, Xenia Joukof and Slusser, Robert M. 1967. Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934: Documents & Materials University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Evans, Peter and Skocpol, Theda (eds.). 1985. Bringing the State Back In Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fleming, Denna Frank. The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960. 1961. New York: Doubleday. ; D·コンデ著; 岡倉古志郎 監譯 現代朝鮮史 (An Untold History of Modern Korea), 1972. 東京: 太平出版社, 1972.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks New York: International Publishers.

Halliday, Jon and Cumings, Bruce. 1988. Korea : the Unknown War (New York: Pantheon Books.

Halliday, Jon and Chang , Jung. 2005. Mao : the Unknown Story New York: Knopf.

Henderson, Gregory. 1978. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Harvard University Press; 1978). ; by Gregory Henderson ; Park Haeng-woong ; Translated by Lee Jong-sam. 2000. 『Whirlpool of Korean Politics』 Seoul: Hanul.

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies New Heaven, Yale University Press,

Johnson,, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and The Japanese Miracle : The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kolko, Joyce and Kolko, Gabriel. 1972. The Limits of Power New York: Harper& Row.

Lankov, Andrei. 2002. From Stalin to Kim II Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960 New Bruswick NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. Political Man : The Social Bases of Politics New York : Doubleday.

Marx, Karl. 1981. Capital Volume III : A Critique of Political Economy London: Penguin Books.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. 1955. The Communist Manifesto New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

----------.1942. Selected Correspondence, New York: International Publishers,

Matray, James Irving. 1985. The Reluctant Crusade : American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press.; Written by James I. Mattrey; translated by Koo Dae-yeol. 1989. The Division of the Korean Peninsula and the United States: U.S. Policy toward Korea, 1941-1950, Seoul: Eulyu Cultural History.

Mazower, Mark. 1999. Dark continent : Europe's Twentieth Century London: Penguin.; written by Mark Mazower; translated by Junhyung Kim. 2009.

The Dark Continent: A Contemporary History of Twentieth-Century Europe, Seoul: Humanitas.

McCune, George M. 1950. Korea Today Cambrige: Harvard University. Press.

Macdonald, Donald Stone. 1992. U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record: An Interpretative Summary of the Archives of the U.S. Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965 Boulder: Westview Press. ; Korean Historical Research Association, 1950 Van Translation. 2001. 『20 Years of U.S.-ROK Relations (1945-1965): From Liberation to Self-Reliance』, Seoul: Hanul Academy.

Meade, Grant E. 1951. American Military Government of Korea New-York : King's Crown.

1993. 『A Study on the USFK』, Seoul: Community.

Meril. John. R. 1989. Korea-Peninsular Origins of the War New York: University of Delaware Press.

Millett, Allan R. 2005. The War for Korea, 1950-1951 : They Came From the North Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Miliband, Ralph. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society New York : Basic Books.

Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Boston: Beacon Press.

Nordinger. Eric. 1977. Soldiers in Politics : Military Coups and Governments, Englewood Cliffs N. J. : Prentice-Hall.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 1973. Modernization and

Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Oliver, Robert Tarbell. 1954. Syngman Rhee : The Man Behind the Myth, New York : Mead ; London : R. Hale.; Written by Robert Oliver; Translated by Hwang Jung-il. 2002. 『Seungman Lee: A Mythical Figure』 Seoul: Konkuk University Press.

Palais, James B. 1975. Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.

Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System London : Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.

Passmore, Kevin. 2002. Fascism : a Very Short Introduction Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Paxton, Robert O. 2004. The Anatomy of Fascism New York: Knopf.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 1979. Fascism and Dictatorship : the Third International and the Problem of Fascism London: Verso.

Rotberg, Robert I. 2003. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press.

----------. 2004.When States Fail: Causes and Consequences Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Saul, John S. 1979. The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa New York: Monthly Review Press.

Schnabel. James F. 1996. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff : The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945~1947 Washington, D.C.: USGPO.

Sen, Anupam. 1982. The State, Industralization and Class Formations in India: A Neo-Marxist Perspective on Colonialism, Underdevelopment and Development London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Shin Gi Wook. 1996. Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea Seattle : University of Washington Press.

----------. 2006. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics and Legacy Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Simmons, Robert. 1975. The Strained Alliance: Peiking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War, New York: The Free Press.

Slusser, Robert M. and Trisk, Jan F. 1959. A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957 Stanford: Stanford University. Press.

Stewart, Frances and Brown, Graham. 2009. Fragile States, Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security, University of Oxford, Crise Working Paper, N0.51, (January), London: Oxford.

Stone, Isidor. F. 1952. The Hidden History of the Korean War New York: Monthly Review Press.; Written by I.F. Stone; Moved by Paektu Apocrypha. 1988. 『Bisa Korean War』 Seoul: Shinhaksa.

Stueck, William Whitney. 2002. Rethinking the Korean war : a New Diplomatic and Strategic History Princeton, NJ ; Princeton University Press.

Suh, Dae-Sook. 1967. The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press.

Tilly. Charles(eds). 1978. The Formation of National States in Western Europe Princeton, NJ : Princeton University. Press.

----------. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 Cambridge, Mass., USA : B. Blackwell,

Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing the Market : Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

. 1984. The Politics of the World Economy: The State, the Movements, the Civilizations Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walt, Rostow. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, Max, Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus (eds), 1978. Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology Berkely: University of California Press.

Williams, William Appleman. 1959. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy Cleveland: World Pub. Co. Neocleus, written by Mark, translated by Joon-Young Chung. 2002. Fascism, Seoul: After.

Written by Richard D. Robinson; Translated by Jung Mi-ok. 1988. The U.S. Betrayal: The U.S. Military Administration and South Korea, Seoul: Science and Thought. by Bruce Cummings. 1983. 『Contemporary History Before and After the Division』, Seoul: Ilwol Seogak.

J.R.메릴 지음; 신성환 옮김. 1988.『침략인가 해방전쟁인가』서울: 과학과 사상.

안드레이 란코프 저, 김광린 역. 1995.『소련의 자료로 본 북한 현대정치사』서 울: 오름.

알버트 웨드마이어(Albert Wedemeyer), 민정합동위원회(Joint Civil Affairs Committee: JCAC); 신복룡, 김원덕 옮김. 1992.『한국분단보고서 하』 서울: 풀빛. 잔 프랑코 폿지 지음 ; 박상섭 옮김. 1995.『근대국가의 발전』서울: 민음사. 조이스 콜코, 가브리엘 콜코. 1982.『한국 현대사의 재조명』서울: 돌베개. 프랭크 볼드윈 편. 1984.『한국 현대사: 1945～1975』서울: 사계절.

(2)국문

강만길 외. 1985.『해방 전후사의 인식 2』서울: 한길사.
강만길. 2011.『20 세기 우리역사: 강만길의 현대사 강의』서울: 창비. 강성재. 1987.『참군인 이종찬 장군』서울: 동아일보사.
건국청년운동협의회. 2007.『대한민국건국청년운동사』서울: 건국청년운동협의회총본부.
고영자. 2008.『일본의 파시즘과 대한민국임시정부기』서울: 탱자. 고명섭. 2005.『지식의 발견: 한국 지식인들의 문제적 담론읽기』서울: 그린비.
국군보안사령부. 1987. 『대공 30 년사』서울:국방부.
국방부 전사편찬위원회. 1981.『국방사 1: (1945.8.15-1950.6.25)』서울: 국방부.
국회도서관 입법조사국. 1964.『선진제국의 대 아시아 경제협력』,서울: 국회도서관.
권명아. 2005.『역사적 파시즘 : 제국의 판타지와 젠더 정치』서울: 책세상.
김기원. 1990. 『미군정기의 경제구조: 귀속업체의 처리와 노동자 지주 관리 운동을 중심으로』서울: 푸른산.
김국후. 2008.『소련의 평양군정』서울: 한울.
김규항. 2005.『나는 왜 불온한가: B 급 좌파 김규항, 진보의 거처를 묻다』서울: 돌베개. 김남식. 1984.『남로당연구』서울: 돌베개.

김남식 외. 1989.『해방 전후사의 인식 5: 북한의 혁명전통. 인민정권의 수립과 반제 반봉건 민주주의 혁명과정』서울: 한길사.
김덕호, 원용진. 2008.『아메리카나이제이션: 해방 이후 한국에서의 미국화』서울: 푸른 역사. 김동춘. 2000.『전쟁과 사회』서울: 돌베개.
김득중. 2009.『빨갱이의 탄생: 여순사건과 반공국가의 형성』서울: 선인.
김명인. 2004.『조연현, 비극적 세계관과 파시즘 사이』서울: 소명. 김명윤.
1971.『한국재정의 구조』서울: 고려대학교 출판부.
김사량 외저; 이상경 편. 2009.『일제 말기 파시즘에 맞선 혼의 기록』서울: 역락.
김상봉. 2005.『도덕교육의 파시즘 : 노예도덕을 넘어서』서울: 길. 김석준.
1996.『미군정 시대의 국가와 행정』서울: 이화여대 출판부.
김성국(외). 1988.『한국자본주의의 정치 경제학적 연구』분당: 정신문화연구원. 김성호 (외). 1989.『농지 개혁 사 연구』서울:
한국농촌경제연구원.
김성희. 1976.『정치사』서울: 박영사.
김영명. 1983.『제 3 세계의 군부통치와 정치경제』서울: 한울.
김용일. 1999.『미군정하의 교육정책연구: 교육정치학적 접근』서울: 고려대 민족 문화연구원.
김일영. 2004.『건국과 부국: 한국현대정치사 강의』서울: 생각의 나무.
김운태. 1992.『미군정의 한국통치』서울: 박영사. 김운태.
2005.『고려정치 제도와 관료제』서울: 박영사. 김점곤.
1973.『한국전쟁과 노동당전략』서울: 박영사.
김재명. 2003.『한국 현대사의 비극: 중간파의 이상과 좌절』서울: 선인. 김주환 편.
1989.『미국의 세계전략과 한국전쟁』서울: 청사.
김행선. 2004.『해방정국 청년운동사』서울: 선인. 내무부
치안국 편. 1958.『경찰 십 년사』서울: 내무부 치안국. 내무부
치안국. 1972.『한국 경찰사』서울: 광명인쇄공사. 내무부
치안국. 1973.『한국 경찰사 2』서울: 내무부 치안국.

노재봉. 1985.『사상과 실천』서울: 녹두. 농수산부
편. 1978.『한국 농정사』서울: 농수산부.
대한민국 국방부 전사편찬위원회 편. 1967.『한국전쟁사 1 권: 해방과 건군, 1945～1950』서울: 국방부 작전편찬 위원회.
대한민족청년단. 1948.『민족과 청년 : 이범석 논설 집』서울: 백영회.
대한서울상공회의소. 1976.『상공회의소 구십 년 사 상』서울: 대한서울상공회의소. 박길용. 김국후 공저. 2008.『김일성 외교비사』서울: 중앙일보사. 박기덕 편. 1998.『한국 민주주의 10 년 : 변화와 지속』분당: 세종연구소.
박광주. 1992.『한국권위주의 국가론-지도자본주의체제하의 집정관적 신중상주의 국가』서울: 인간사랑.
박동서. 1961.『한국 관료제도의 역사적 전개』서울 :한국연구도서관. 박명림 외. 1989.『해방 전후사의 인식 6: 쟁점과 과제 』서울: 한길사,
박명림.1996.『한국전쟁의 발발과 기원 1-2: The Korean war : the Outbreak and Its Origins』서울: 나남출판.
.2002.『한국 1950: 전쟁과 평화』서울: 나남출판.
박상섭.1985.『자본주의 국가론: 현대 마르크스주의 정치이론의 전개』서울: 한울. 박상섭. 2008.『국가, 주권』서울: 소화.
박지향 등저. 2006.『해방 전후사의 재인식 1-2』서울: 책세상. 박찬표. 2007.『한국의 국가형성과 민주주의』서울: 후마니타스.
박현채. 1986.『한국경제구조론』서울: 일월서각.
박현채 외. 1987.『해방 전후사의 인식 3: 정치·사회운동의 혁명적 전개와 사상적 노선』서울: 한길사. 박현채, 조희연. 1989.『한국사회구성체 논쟁 I: 80 년대 사회변동과 사회구성체 논쟁의 전개』서울: 죽산.
방기중. 2005.『일제하 지식인의 파시즘체제 인식과 대응』서울: 혜안.
방기중 편. 2005.『일제 파시즘 지배정책과 민중생활』서울: 혜안. 변형윤 외. 1985. 『분단시대와 한국사회, 』서울: 까치.

백영철. 1995.『제 1 공화국과 한국 민주주의 : 의회정치를 중심으로』서울: 나남
출판. 산업은행 조사부. 1955. 『한국산업 경제 10 년사』서울: 산업은행.
서주석. 2008.『한국의 국가체제형성』서울: 학술정보.
서중석. 1991.『한국 현대 민족운동 연구 : 해방 후 민족국가 건설운동과 통일전
선』서울: 역사비평사.
서중석. 2007.『한국현대사 60 년』서울: 역사비평사.
서중석. 2011.『지배자의 국가, 민중의 나라: 한국 근현대사 100 년의 재조명』
서울: 돌베개.
선우기성. 1973.『한국청년운동사』서울: 금문사,
손호철. 1991.『한국정치의 새 구상』서울: 풀빛.
송건호 외. 1979.『해방 전후사의 인식 1: 미군정과 민족분단, 친일. 반민족 세
력의 실상과 해방직후의 경제구조』서울: 한길사.
송남헌. 1985.『해방 삼년 사 2: 1945-48』서울: 까치. 안호상.
1950.『일민주의의 본바탕』서울: 일민주의 연구원. 양호민.
2004.『38 선에서 휴전선으로』서울: 생각의 나무.
유영익 편. 1998.『수정주의와 한국 현대사』서울: 연세대학교 출판부.
유진오. 1956.『헌법의 기초이론』서울: 일조각, 유팔무, 김호기.
1995.『시민사회와 시민운동』서울: 한울. 육군본부 군사연구실.
1994.『한국전쟁 시 학도의용군』육군본부.
이기열. 2006.『정보통신 역사기행』서울: 북스토리. 이경남.
1989.『분단시대의 청년운동 상』서울: 삼성개발.
.『분단시대의 청년운동 하』서울: 삼성개발. 이대근.
1987.『한국전쟁과 1950 년대 자본축적』서울: 까치. 이인호, 김영호, 강규형
등저. 2009.『대한민국 건국의 재인식』서울: 기파랑. 이철순 편.
2010.『남북한 정부수립 과정 비교 1945-1948』서울: 인간사랑.
이현식. 2006.『일제 파시즘체제하의 한국 근대문학비평 : 1930 년대 후반 한국
근대 문학 비평 이론 연구』서울: 소명출판. 이현희. 1982.『대한민국 임시정부
사』서울: 집문당.

이혜숙. 2008.『미군정기 지배구조와 한국사회: 해방 이후 국가-시민사회관계의 역사적 구조화』서울: 선인.
임지현 외. 2000.『우리 안의 파시즘』서울: 삼인. 장준익.
1991.『북한인민군대사』서울: 서문당. 재무부. 1958.『재정금융의
회고-건국 십 주년 업적』서울: 재무부.
재정금융 삼십 년 사 편찬위원회 편. 1978.『재정금융 삼 십 년사』서울: 재정금융 삼 십 년사 편찬위원회 편,
진덕규. 2000.『한국현대정치사 서설』서울: 지식 산업사. 진덕규.
2000.『한국정치의 역사적 기원』서울: 지식 산업사. 중앙선거
관리위원회. 1973.『대한민국 선거사 제 1 집』서울: 중앙선거
관리위원
회.
조기안. 2003.『미군정기의 정치행정체제 : 구조분석 : 조직·법령·자원을 중심으로』서울: 아람.
조선민주주의 인민공화국 사회과학원. 역사연구소. 1981.『조선전사 제 24 권』평양: 과학백과사전출판사.
전국 경제인 연합회 편. 1975.『한국경제정책 30 년사』서울: 사회사상사.
전상인. 2001.『고개 숙인 수정주의: 한국현대사의 역사사회학』서울: 전통과 현대.
정병준. 1985.『몽양 여운형 평전: 머리가 희일수록 혁명 더욱 붉어졌다』서울: 한울.
------. 2005.『우남 이승만 연구』서울: 역사비평사.
------. 2006.『한국전쟁 : 38 선 충돌과 전쟁의 형성』파주 : 돌베개.
정석균. 1988.『대비정규전사』국방부전사편찬위원회. 정해구.
1988.『10 월 인민항쟁연구』서울: 열음사. 주섭일. 1999.『프랑스
대숙청』서울: 중심.
제주 4.3 사건진상 규명 및 희생자 명예회복위원회. 2003.『제주 4.3 사건진상 보고서』서울: 선인. 최장집 외. 1989.『해방 전후사의 인식 4: 민중항쟁.

무장투쟁. 문화예술운동. 한 국 전쟁의 해명』서울: 한길사. 최장집. 1990.『한국현대정치의 구조와 변화』서울: 까치.
-----. 1993.『한국 민주주의론』서울: 한길사.
하영선 편. 1999.『한국전쟁의 새로운 접근: 전통주의와 수정주의를 넘어서』서울: 나남. 한국 미래학회 편. 2010.『제헌과 건국』서울: 나남. 한국사학회 편. 1983.『한국사회 어디로 가고 있나』서울: 현대사회연구소. 한국산업 사회 연구회 편. 1991.『한국사회의 지배이데올로기』서울: 녹두.
한국산업은행조사부 편. 1955.『한국산업 경제 십년 사 1945-1955』한국산업은행조사부. 한국은행조사부. 1953.『한은조사월보』한국은행(1953 년 2 월).
한국정치연구회 지음. 1989.『한국정치론』서울: 백산서당. 한국정치학회(편). 1987.『현대 한국정치와 국가』서울: 법문사. 한국정치학회 엮음. 2011.『한국정치연구의 쟁점과 과제』서울: 한울.
한배호 편. 2000.『한국현대정치론 I: 제 1 공화국의 국가형성, 정치과정, 정책』서울: 오름. 한승조 외 공저. 1990.『해방 전후사의 쟁점과 평가 1』서울: 형성출판사.
한용원. 1984. 『창군』서울: 박영사.
한홍구. 2003.「대한민국사 1」서울 : 한겨레 신문사. 홍성유. 1962.『한국경제와 미국원조』서울: 박영사.

(3)일문, 노문(번역본)

木村光彦, 安部桂司 著. 2008. 戦後日朝関係の研究 : 対日工作と物資調達 東京 : 知泉書館. ; 기무라 미쓰히코, 아베 게이지 지음; 차문 석, 박정진 옮김. 2009. 『전쟁이 만든 나라, 북한의 군사 공업화』서울: 미지북스.
佐佐木春隆. 1976. 1, 建軍と戦争の勃發前まで 東京 : 原書房.; 사사끼 하루다까, 강창구 편역.『한국전비사』서울: 병학사, 1977.

예프게니 바자노프. 나딸리아 바자노바. 김광린 역. 1998.『소련의 자료로 본 한국전쟁의 전말』서울: 열림.

■ 2 차 자료 〔논문〕

(1)영문

Alavi, Hamza. 1972. “The State on Post-Colonial Societies: Parkistan and Bangladesh”, New Left Review, Vol. 74, (Jul.-Aug 1972).

Althusser, Louis. 1969. “Contradiction and Overdetermination,” Althusser, Louis. For Marx New York : Penguin Press.

Bamtat, Thomas. 1977. “Relative State Autonomy and Capitalism: Brazil and Peru,”, Insurgent Sociologist, Vol.7.

Lankov, Andrei. 2005 “Soviet Politburo Decisions and the Emergence of the North Korean State, 1946-1948,”, Korea Observer Vol.36. No.3. Institute of Korean Studies.

Lasswel, Harold D. 1941. “The Garrison State,”, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4.

Marx. Karl. 1955. “The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and Capital,”, Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. The Communist Manifesto New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Mann, Michael. 1984. “The Autonomous Power of the State: It's Origins, Mechanisms, and Results”, Archives européenes de sociologie Vol. 25,

Saul, John S. 1979. “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania,,” Saul, John S. The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa New York: Monthly Review Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1985. “Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” , Evans, Peter and Skocpol, Theda (eds.), Bringing the State Back In Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1978 “Reflections on the history of European State-Making,”, Tilly, Charles(eds), The Formation of National States in Western Europe N.J: Princeton : Princeton University Press.

(2)국문 A.

학술지

강민. 1983. “관료적 권위주의의 한국적 생성,”,「한국정치학회보」,제 17 집, 한국 정치학회.

권혁주. 2010. “취약국가의 이해 :INCAF 와 국제협력 기구의 논의를 중심으로,” ,『국제 개발협력』(2010 년 제 3 호) 한국 국제 협력단.

권혁주, 배재현, 노우영, 동그라미, 이유주. 2010. “분쟁과 갈등으로 인한 취약 국가의 개발협력 :취약국가 모형과 정책대안 모색을 중심으로,”,『행정논총』제 48 권 제 4 호 (2010 년 12 월), 서울대학교 한국행정연구소.

김수자. 2008. “미군정의 군정기구 운영과 관료임용 정책”,『향토 서울』제 71 호(2008 년 2 월호) 서울 특별시사편찬위원회. 김일영. 1993. “부산정치파동의 정치사적 의미,”『한국과 국제정치』17(93 년 6

월) 서울: 경남대학교 극동문제연구소. 김태명, 조성제. 2008. “우리나라 관세정책, 제도의 변천 및 향후 과제,”,『경영 사학』,Vol.47, 한국경영사학회,
박성진.2010.“1950 년대 한국 발전국가의 태동”. 건국대학교 정치외 교학과 박사학위 논문.
박준규.1965. “조약협정으로 본 한미관계”, 『청맥』제 2 집 1 호, 서울 청맥사.
원구환. 2003. “미군정기 한국 관료제의 소극적 대표성”,『행정논총』제 41 권, 제 4 호(2003 년 12 월호), 서울대학교 한국행정연구소. 이병천. 2005. “전환시대의 한국 자본주의론-'61 년 체제'와 '87 년 체제'의 시험 대,”『역사비평』 통권 71 호 (여름), 서울: 한국역사연구회.
이조원. 2008. “취약국가 모델과 북한에 대한 개발협력 연구,”,『북한연구 학회 보』12 권, 2 호, 북한연구학회.
이현진. 2004.『제 1 공화국기 미국의 대한경제 원조정책 연구』, 서울: 이화여자 대학교 박사학위논문.
정성기. 2005. “80 년대 한국사회구성체논쟁, 또 하나의 성찰적 재론,”,『역사비 평』통권 71 호 (여름), 한국역사연구회.
정용욱. 2007. “해방직후 주한미군 방첩대의 조직 체계와 활동”, 서울 대학교『서울말 연구』제 53 집.
정일형. 1946. “해방 이후의 인사행정 실체”,『法政』제 1 권 제 1 호(1946 년 9 월).
정태수. 1991. “현대 한국 군정교육의 역사적 평가에 대한 토론,”,『한국교육사 학』13, 한국교육학회 교육사연구회.
최광. 1989. “미군정하의 재정제도와 재정정책,”,『재정학연구 3』, 한국재정학회.
최진근, 이은진. 2010. “취약국가와 새마을운동 개발협력 증진방안,”,『새마을 운동과 지역사회개발 연구』제 6 권, 평택: 경문 대학교 새 마을 연구소.
안병직. 1985. “식민지 반 봉건 사회론의 쟁점,”,『산업사회연구』제 1 집.
이병천. 2005. “전환시대의 한국 자본주의론-'61 년 체제'와 '87 년 체제'의 시험 대,”,『역사비평』 통권 71 호 (여름), 한국역사연구회.

이선아. 2003.「한국전쟁 전후 빨찌산의 형성과 활동」,『역사연구』제 13 호, 서울: 역사학연구소.
이성형. 1989. “신 식민지파시즘론의 이론구조,”,『현실과 과학』2 집 임종명. 1996. “조선민족청년단(1946.10~1949.1)과 미군정의 ‘장래 한국의 지 도세력’양성정책,”,『한국사연구』제 95 호, 한국사 연구회.
정성기. 2005. “80 년대 한국사회구성체논쟁, 또 하나의 성찰적 재론,”,『역사비평』통권 71 호 (여름), 서울: 한국역사연구회.
정용욱. 2007.「해방직후 주한미군 방첩대의 조직 체계와 활동」,『서울말 연구』 제 53 집, 서울대학교.
정일형. 1946. “해방 이후의 인사행정 실체”『法政』제 1 권 제 1 호(1946 년 9 월),
조형제. 1989. “한국 국가에 대한 신식민지파시즘론의 적용,” 한국산업연구회 편,『경제와 사회』4(겨울호) 서울: 한울.
캐스린 웨더스비(Kathryn Weathersby), 강규형. 2010. “북-중-소 삼각관계가 6 · 25 전쟁과정과 전후 북한외 교 행태에 미친 영향,”『정신문 화 연구』Vol.33 No.3. 분당: 한국학중앙연구원.

B. 출판물

김성호, 최선. 2010. “제 1 장 1948 년 건국헌법에 나타난 혼합적 권력구조의 기원: 미군정기와 제헌국회의 헌법안 및 헌법논의를 중심으 로,”, 한국미래학회 편. 2010.『제헌과 건국』서울: 나남.
김영호. 1998. “한국전쟁 원인의 국제정치적 해석-스탈린의 롤벡 이론,” 유영익 편.『수정주의와 한국 현대사』서울: 연세대학교 출판부.
김일영. 2011. “농지개혁을 둘러싼 신화의 해체,”,한국정치학회 엮음,『한국정치연구의 쟁점과 과제』서울: 한울.
노재봉. 1985. “제 3 부 제 3 장 한국 경제개발에 따르는 정치적 cost,” 노재봉.

『사상과 실천』 서울: 녹두.
류상영. 1989. “8.15 이후 좌, 우익 청년단체의 조직과 활동”,『해방 전후사의 인식 4』 서울: 한길사.
박기덕. 1998. “한국 국가의 성격과 능력 : 통계지표에 의거한 민주화 전후의 비교 연구,” 박기덕 편.『한국 민주주의 10 년 : 변화와 지 속』분당: 세종연구소.
박상섭. 1985. “제 9 장 결론: 네오마르크수주의 국가이론에 대한 평가,”, 박상섭,『자본주의 국가론: 현대 마르크스주의 정치이론의 전개』서울: 한울.
--------. 1987. “한국정치와 자유민주주의”, 한국정치학회(편),『현대 한국정치와 국가』, 서울: 법문사.
박현채. 1986. “제 3 부 경제구조와 사회발전론, 제 4 장 현대 한국사회의 성격과 발전단계에 관한 연구(1),” 박현채,『한국경제구조론』서울: 일 월 서각.
이완범. 1990. “해방 전후사 연구 10 년의 현황과 자료,” 한승조 외『해방 전후사의 쟁점과 평가 1』서울: 형성출판사.
유팔무, 1995. “시민사회의 성장과 시민운동,”, 유팔무, 김호기,『시민사회와 시민운동』서울: 한울.
장달중. 1988. “국가와 자본주의 발달,” 김성국(외), 『한국자본주의의 정치 경제학 적 연구』 분당: 정신문화연구원.
전상인. 1998. “고개 숙인’수정주의,”, 유영익 편,『수정주의와 한국현대사』,서울: 연세대학교 출판부.
전상인. 2001. “고개 숙인수정주의: 한국현대사 연구의 새로운 출발,”,전상인,『고개숙인 수정주의: 한국현대사의 역사사회학』서울: 전통 과 현대.
조효제. 2005. “머리글,”, Robert O Paxton, 2004. ; 손명희, 최희영 옮김. 2005.『파시즘: 열정과 광기의 정치혁명』서울: 교양인.

최장집. 1985. “노동조합에 대한 조합주의적 통제,”, 변형윤 외, 『분단시대와 한국사회』서울: 까치. 최장집. 1990. “과대성장국가의 형성과 정치균열의 전개,”, 최장집.『한국현대정 치의 구조와 변화』서울: 까치.

최장집, 이성형. 1991. “한국사회의 정치 이데올로기,”, 한국산업 사회 연구회 편,『한국사회의 지배이데올로기』서울: 녹두.

-----.1993. “한국 국가론의 비평적 개관,”, 최장집,『한국 민주주의이론』서울: 한길사.

------.1993. “한국정치균열의 구조와 전개,”, 최장집,『한국 민주주의이론』, 서울: 한길사.

하영선. 1999. “냉전과 한국,”,하영선 편, 『한국전쟁의 새로운 접근: 전통주의와 수정주의를 넘어서』서울: 나남.

한국정치연구회. 1989. “제 1 장 한국국가성격에 관한 이론적 고찰,”, 한국정치연구회.『한국정치론』서울: 백산서당.

한배호. 2000. “서론: 제 1 공화국의 정치체제,”, 한배호 (편)『한국현대정치론 I: 제 1 공화국의 국가형성, 정치과정, 정책』서울: 오름.

한상진.1983. “관료적 권위주의 하에서의 민주주의의 전망,”, 한국사회학회 편, 『한국사회 어디로 가고 있나』서울: 현대사회연구소.

한용원.2010. “남북한 군대창설과정 비교”, 이철순 편,『남북한 정부수립과정 비교:1945-1948』서울: 인간사랑.

가브리엘 콜코. 1983. “국제정치적 역학관계와 전후처리문제,”,브루스 커밍스 등 저.『분단전후의 현대사』서울: 일월서각.

조이스 콜코, 가브리엘 콜코. 1982. “미국과 한국의 해방,”, 조이스 콜코, 가브리엘 콜코『한국 현대사의 재조명』서울: 돌베개.

----------. 1989. “미국의 세계전략과 한국전쟁,”, 김주환 편. 『미국의 세계전략과 한국전쟁』서울: 청사.

■ 2 차 자료 〔문헌해제〕

박태균, 2010 “이승만 대통령 시기 공개문서를 통해 본 1950 년대 대한민국 정부의 정책과 그 특징: 자료 해제” (2010 년 12 월 2 일).
정병준. 2002. “미 국립문서 기록 관리청 소장 RG 59(국무부 일반문서) 내 한 국 관련문서,” 국사편찬위원회 편, 『해외 사료총서 2: 미국 소재 한 국사 자료 조사 보고 제 1 권』 과천: 국사편찬위원회.
. “미 국립문서 기록 관리청 소장 RG 84(국무부 재외 공관문서) 내 한국 관련문서,” 국사편찬위원회 편, 『해외 사료총서 2: 미국 소 재 한국사 자료 조사 보고 제 1 권』 과천: 국사편찬위원회.

Abstract

Nation-State Building of the Republic of Korea(1945-50): Formation of the Vulnerable State

Taek Sun, Lee
Department of International Relations
The Graduate School
Seoul National University

This dissertation raises new alternatives of the vulnerable state theory in regards to Korea's state formation as to the character of the state in South Korea instead of the orthodox school and the revisionist group. State formation of third world countries is understood in terms of the combinations of resources. State formation of third world countries is equal to the following combination: human resources+ material and economic resources +ideological resource+international political resources+ moderator praetorian, who arbitrates interactions between resources.

Korea's vulnerable state has been formed since 1945. With the scarce resources, even the U.S military government and Syngman Ree's administration have attempted their best to manage and build the state. However, they were not able to replenish the new emerging problem of scarce resources at each stage. Although South Korea has attempted to make an effort to recruit resources, it was not possible to compensate for all of the resources simultaneously. For instance, when they compensated material resources through economic aid from the United States of America, the problems of ideological resources like nationalism emerged. In this way, a vicious cycle occurred at all stages even before Korean war began.

Although ideological resources are the most important factors for state making in third world countries, the scarcity of other resources eroded such factors. Since the Communists of North Korea and Soviet Union threatened the existence of the new weak state continuously, the Syngman Rhee administration had to take all possible measures, such as recruiting human resources from people who worked for the Japanese colonial period and anti-communist youth organizations. However, the weak state often was not able to control the unofficial violence which came from doubt of vulnerable state's existence due to the scarcity of resources as well as the state's inability. The communists blamed such violence in terms of nationalism, and instigated it to the common people for the collapse of the new regime. Consequently, it brought about the Syngman Rhee adminstration at the level of collapsed state or failed state.

Fortunately, Syngman Rhee's government performed reformative measures, such as land reforms, and realized financial independence. Rhee's administration lifted the support of the common people toward state and ideological resources. Nevertheless, a crisis, similar to after the Korean war, continued in Korea. After the Korean war, Korea solved its problems of material and economic resources through the achievement of economic development. However, even though the Koreans were able to handle the problems of scarce resources, they never solved the problems of ideological resources. Actually, the vulnerable state was not able to admit nationalism fully for the process of state formations. Therefore, the remains of the vulnerable state still affect the republic of Korea till today.

keywords: Vulnerable State, Resource, Nation-State, Nationalism, State Apparatus
Student Number: 2005-30940